DR. LUDWIG OTT

FUNDAMENTALS OF CATHOLIC DOGMA

EDITED IN ENGLISH
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Translated from the German
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PREFACE

THIS Basic Course of Dogmatic Theology appears in place of B. Bartmann's († 1938) Basic Course which has been out of print for years. Derived from practical experience of theological instruction, it is primarily intended to meet the needs of students. My aim was to present the essentials of Church teaching and the foundation of such teaching in clear and concise form. On didactic grounds the matter was very extensively correlated. As the framework of a basic course could not be exceeded, only the most important pronouncements of Official Church Teaching, only individual significant scriptural texts, and only one or two patristic texts could be quoted verbatim. The history of the development of dogma has been kept within the minimum limits indispensable for the understanding of Church doctrine. The scriptural and patristic texts were, on principle, quoted in their translation. Anyone desirous of seeing the original texts can easily find them in the Bible ; most of the patristic texts quoted or indicated may be found in the Enchiridion Patristicum of M. J. Rouet de Journel (Freiburg i Br. 1947). On account of the brevity aimed at, the speculative establishment of doctrine had to give place to the positive. The many indications to the works of St. Thomas are intended to be a pointer to deeper study. The reader is directed to the appropriate Articles in the Dictionnaire de Théologie catholique and to the Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament of G. Kittel.

The present Basic Course is constructed on the framework of the lectures of my teacher Michael Rackl († 1948 as Bishop of Eichstätt) and of Martin Grabmann († 1949), and I venture to hope that it breathes their spirit. It was Grabmann who urged me to publish this work. I acknowledge with thanks that I found many hints and ideas in various religious textbooks particularly in those of Bartmann, Diekamp, Pohle and Van Noort. I am indebted to the Most Reverend Dr. Alfred Kempf in Oberzell bei Würzburg for assistance in reading proofs and for the preparation of the Index of Persons.

May this book contribute to the extension of the knowledge of the Church's teaching, to the deepening of the understanding of this teaching, and to the awakening of the religious life !

Eichstätt LUDWIG OTT.
15th August, 1952.

FOREWORD

To the First English Edition

THIS book by Dr. Ludwig Ott is a conspectus of all Dogmatic Theology and quite the most remarkable work of compression of its kind that I have encountered.

The book will appeal particularly to busy priests who are anxious to review quickly the teaching from Tradition, from the Bible, and from reason on any particular point of doctrine. It will be specially useful to students who desire to revise rapidly, in the vernacular, the tracts which they are presenting for examination. It makes available for educated laymen a scientific exposition of the whole field of Catholic teaching. Finally, Dr. Ott's work will be invaluable for use as a text-book by those priests whose duty it is to present to students, in a systematic way, the teaching of the Catholic Church.

The Mercier Press has performed a service of major importance in making this work available in English. A special word of praise is due to the translator, Dr Patrick Lynch, whose careful and accurate work made my task relatively simple.

Personally I am happy to be associated with the first appearance in English of this work. I believe it will prove to be of such importance and lasting value as to justify fully the labour which has gone into its production.

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JAMES BASTIBLE

FOREWORD

To the Second English Edition

THE exhaustion of the first edition, in such short time, is most gratifying. It may, perhaps, be interpreted not only as an indication of the need which the book fills but also as a tribute to the book itself. In this connection it is of considerable interest to note that Dr. Ott's work has appealed not only to priests and religious but to a very wide circle of layfolk.

As the author mentions in his preface, the object is to provide a basic course. In the light of this the book is amazingly comprehensive. The references to disputed questions are, of course, very much in outline but students of theology find them valuable in that they recall to their minds problems which they have studied in detail elsewhere. The very many references to sources and the bibliography will appeal to those desiring to study particular points more fully than they are dealt with here.

This second English edition embodies the many changes made in the second and third German editions. Further, in this edition, all Latin quotations have been translated wherever this seemed necessary to enable a reader, whose Latin is rusty, to follow the text with ease.

Every effort has been made to eliminate inaccuracies, but, doubtless, some slips have been overlooked in this book with its quarter-million words. I shall be very grateful for any help by readers in correcting these in future editions.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AAS =Acta Apostolicae Sedis
AS =Anathema Sit. This signifies that the preceding proposition is officially condemned by the Church and is heretical.
CIC =Codex Iuris Canonici
D =H. Denzinger—C. Rahner, Enchiridion symbolorum, definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum
DThC=Dictionnaire de Théologie catholique
PG =J. P. Migne, Patrologia Graeca
PL =J. P. Migne, Patrologia Latina
S. th. =S. Thomas, Summa theologiae
S.c.G. =S. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles

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INTRODUCTION

§ 1. Concept and Object of Theology

1. Concept

The word theology, according to its etymology, means "teaching concerning God" (λόγος περὶ θεοῦ, de divinitate ratio sive sermo: St. Augustine, De civ. Dei VIII I). Thus theology is the science of God.

2. Object

The material object of theology is firstly God, and secondly, created things under the aspect of their relation to God: Omnia pertractantur in sacra doctrina sub ratione Dei, vel quia sunt ipse Deus, vel quia habent ordinem ad Deum ut ad principium et finem. In sacred science all things are considered under the aspect of God, either because they are God Himself or because they refer to God as their beginning and end. S. th. I 1, 7.

As regards the Formal Object a distinction must be made between natural and supernatural theology. Natural theology was first expounded by Plato. It is called by St. Augustine, in agreement with Varro, *Theologia Naturalis*, and since the 19th century it is also called theodicy. It is the scientific exposition of the truths concerning God, in so far as these can be known by natural reason and thus may be regarded as the culmination of philosophy. Supernatural theology is the scientific exposition of the truths about God under the light of Divine Revelation. The formal object of natural theology is God, as He is known by natural reason from creation; the formal object of supernatural theology is God, as He is known by faith from revelation (cf. St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei VI 5: S. th. I 1, 1 ad 2).

Natural and supernatural theology differ: (a) in their principles of cognition, unaided human reason (ratio naturalis), reason illuminated by faith (ratio fide illustrata); (b) in their means of cognition, the study of created things (ea quae facta sunt), divine revelation (revelatio divina); (c) in their formal objects, God as Creator and Lord (Deus unus, Creator et Dominus), God one and three (Deus Unus et Trinus).

§ 2. Theology as a Science

1. The Scientific Character of Theology

a) According to the teaching of St. Thomas, theology is a true science, because it uses as principles the securely founded basic truths of Divine Revelation and draws from these new knowledge (theological conclusions) by a strict scientific method and unites the whole in a closed system.

But theology is a subordinate science (scientia subalternata) because its principles are not immediately evident to us in themselves, but are taken

over from a higher science, from the truths communicated to us by God in revelation (cf. S. th. I 1, 2 : Sacred doctrine is a science because it proceeds from principles established by the light of a higher science namely the knowledge possessed by God and by the Blessed ; Sacra doctrina est scientia, quia procedit ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae, quae scilicet est scientia Dei et beatorum).

The questions posed by the Schoolmen were exclusively those pertaining to speculative theology. The development of historical research at the beginning of the modern era led to an extension of the concept of "science" which permits its application to positive theology also. By "science" in the objective sense is understood today a system of methodically worked-out knowledge about a unitary object. Theology possesses a unitary object, uses a methodical process adapted to the object, and unites its results in a closed system. The dependence of theology upon Divine authority and that of the Church does not derogate from its scientific character, because theology belongs to the revealed truth given by God into the hands of the Church, and therefore these cannot be dissociated from the object of theology.

b) Theology transcends all other sciences by : the sublimity of its object ; by the supreme certainty of its knowledge which is based on the infallible knowledge of God ; and by its practical purpose which is eternal bliss, i.e., the ultimate destination of mankind (cf. S. th. I 1, 5).

c) According to St. Thomas theology is both a speculative and a practical science, since, in the light of Divine Truth, it contemplates on the one hand, God, the First Truth, and things in their relation to God and on the other hand it contemplates the moral actions of man in relation to his supernatural ultimate goal. Speculative theology is the more noble since theology is concerned above all with Divine Truth. Thus the final aim even of Moral Theology is to bring men to the perfection of the knowledge of God (S. th. I 1, 4).

The medieval Franciscan School appraises Theology primarily as a practical or affective science, because theological knowledge by its very nature is aimed at moving the affections or the will. The main object of moral theology is the moral perfection of man : ut boni fiamus (St. Bonaventura, Proemium in IV libros Sent. q. 3).

The ultimate reason for the various answers to the problem lies in the various estimations of the hierarchy of the powers of the human soul. St. Thomas and his School, with Aristotle, recognise the primacy of the intellect, the Franciscan School with St. Augustine, that of the will.

d) Theology is "Wisdom," since its object is God the ultimate origin of all things. It is the supreme wisdom since it contemplates God, the ultimate origin, in the light of the truths of revelation communicated to man from the wisdom of God Himself (cf. S. th. I 1, 6).

2. A Science of Faith

Theology is a science of faith. It is concerned with faith in the *objective sense* (fides quae creditur) that which is believed, and in the *subjective sense* (fides qua creditur) that by which we believe. Theology like faith accepts, as the sources of its knowledge, Holy Writ and Tradition (remote rule of faith)

and also the doctrinal assertions of the Church (proximate rule of faith) But as a science of faith it seeks by human reason to penetrate the content and the context of the supernatural system of truth and to understand this as far as possible. St. Augustine expresses this thought in the words: "Crede, ut intelligas" Believe that you may understand (Sermo 43, 7, 9); St. Anselm of Canterbury, with the words: "Fides quaerens intellectum" Faith seeking to reach the intellect (Proslogion, Proemium) and: "Credo, ut intelligam" I believe that I may understand (Proslogion I); Richard of St. Victor with the words: "Properemus de fide ad cognitionem. Satagamus, in quantum possumus, ut intelligamus, quod credimus" (De Trinitate, Prologus). Let us hasten from faith to knowledge. Let us endeavour so far as we can, to understand that which we believe.

3. Classification

Theology is a unitary science, as it has a single formal object: God and the created world, in so far as they are the objects of Divine Revelation. As Revelation is a communication of the Divine knowledge, so theology is, in the words of St. Thomas, a stamp or impression imposed by the Divine knowledge, which is unitary and absolutely simple, on the created human spirit (S. th. I 1, 3).

Theology is, however, divided into various branches and departments according to its various functions, which are all sub-divisions of the one theological science:

a) *Dogmatic Theology*, which includes *Fundamental Theology*, i.e., the basis of Dogmatic Theology.

b) *Biblical-historical Theology:* Biblical introduction, Hermeneutics, Exegesis; Church History, History of Dogmas, History of Liturgy, Church Legal History, Patrology.

c) *Practical Theology:* Moral Theology, Church law, Pastoral Theology, including Catechetics and Homiletics.

§ 3. Concept and Method of Dogmatic Theology

1. Concept

On the ground of its proposition to the faithful by the Church the whole field of supernatural theology could be called dogmatic theology. In point of fact, however, only the theoretical truths of Revelation concerning God and His activity are dealt with in dogmatic theology (doctrina credendorum: the science of things to be believed), while the practical teachings of Revelation regulating the activity of men are the object of moral theology (doctrina faciendorum: the science of things to be done). Thus dogmatic theology can with Scheeben (Dogmatik, Einleitung n. 2) be defined as "the scientific exposition of the whole theoretical doctrine revealed by God about God Himself and His activity and which we accept on the authority of the Church."

2. Method

The method of dogmatic theology is both positive and speculative.

Positive dogmatic theology is concerned with doctrines that have been proposed to our belief by the Teaching Authority of the Church (dogmatic factor) and that are contained in the sources of Revelation, Scripture and

Tradition (Biblical-Patristic factor). In so far as it defends the doctrine of the Church against false conceptions, it becomes controversial theology (apologetic or polemic factor).

Speculative dogmatic theology, which is identical with the so-called scholastic theology, strives as far as possible for an insight into the truths of faith by the application of human reason to the content of revelation.

The positive and speculative methods must not be separated from each other. The ideal lies in the harmonious coalescence of authority and reason. This is, indeed, expressly prescribed by Ecclesiastical Authority: Pope Pius XI, in the Apostolic Institution "Deus scientiarum Dominus" 1931, directs that Sacred Theology "is to be presented according to the positive as well as to the scholastic method." The speculative exposition is to proceed "according to the principles and teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas" (Article 29) (cf. St. Thomas, Quodl. IV 9, 18).

§ 4. Concept and Classification of Dogma

1. Concept

By dogma in the strict sense is understood a truth immediately (formally) revealed by God which has been proposed by the Teaching Authority of the Church to be believed as such. The Vatican Council explains: Fide divina et catholica ea omnia credenta sunt, quae in verbo Dei scripto vel tradito continentur et ab Ecclesia sive solemni iudicio sive ordinario et universali magisterio tanquam divinitus revelata credenda proponuntur. D 1792. All those things are to be believed by divine and Catholic faith which are contained in the Word of God written or handed down and which are proposed for our belief by the Church either in a solemn definition or in its ordinary and universal authoritative teaching.

Two factors or elements may be distinguished in the concept of dogma:—
a) An immediate Divine Revelation of the particular Dogma (revelatio immediate divina or revelatio formalis), i.e., the Dogma must be immediately revealed by God either explicitly (explicite) or inclusively (implicite), and therefore be contained in the sources of Revelation (Holy Writ or Tradition).

b) The Promulgation of the Dogma by the Teaching Authority of the Church (propositio Ecclesiae). This implies, not merely the promulgation of the Truth, but also the obligation on the part of the Faithful of believing the Truth. This Promulgation by the Church may be made either in an extraordinary manner through a solemn decision of faith made by the Pope or a General Council (Iudicium solemne) or through the ordinary and general teaching power of the Church (Magisterium ordinarium et universale). The latter may be found easily in the catechisms issued by the Bishops.

In this view, which is the usual one, and which is principally expounded by the Thomists, the Truth proposed in the dogma must be immediately and formally contained in the sources of Revelation either explicitly or implicitly. According to another opinion, however, which is held by the Scotists, and also by several Dominican theologians (M. M. Tuyaerts, A. Gardeil, F. Marín-Sola), a Truth can be proposed as a dogma, if it be only mediately or virtually contained in the sources of Revelation, that is, in such a manner that it may be derived from a Truth or Revelation by the aid of a truth known by Natural Reason. The Scotist view permits greater room for play in the formal action of the Teaching

Authority and makes it easier to prove that the Dogma is contained in the sources of Revelation but its validity is challenged on the ground that the Truth of the Dogma is supported not solely by the authority of the Revealing God, but also by the natural knowledge of reason, while the Church demands for the dogma a Divine Faith (fides divina).

Dogma in its strict signification is the object of both Divine Faith (Fides Divina) and Catholic Faith (Fides Catholica); it is the object of the Divine Faith (Fides Divina) by reason of its Divine Revelation; it is the object of Catholic Faith (Fides Catholica) on account of its infallible doctrinal definition by the Church. If a baptised person deliberately denies or doubts a dogma properly so-called, he is guilty of the sin of heresy (CIC 1325, Par. 2), and automatically becomes subject to the punishment of excommunication (CIC 2314, Par. 1).

If, despite the fact that a Truth is not proposed for belief by the Church, one becomes convinced that it is immediately revealed by God, then, according to the opinion of many theologians (Suarez, De Lugo), one is bound to believe it with Divine Faith (fide divina). However, most theologians teach that such a Truth prior to its official proposition of the Church is to be accepted with theological assent (assensus theologicus) only, as the individual may be mistaken.

2. Protestant and Modernistic Conception

a) Protestantism rejects the Teaching Authority of the Church, and consequently also the authoritative proposition of the content of Revelation by the Church. It claims that the Biblical Revelation attests itself. In spite of this, and for the sake of unity of doctrine, a certain connection is recognised between dogma and the authority of the Church. "Dogma is the valid teaching of the Church" (W. Elert). The liberal movement of the newer Protestantism rejects not only the authoritative doctrinal proclamation of the Church, but also the objective Divine Revelation, by conceiving Revelation as a subjective religious experience, in which the soul enters into contact with God.

b) According to Alfred Loisy († 1940) the conceptions which the Church represents as revealed dogmas are not truths which have come from Heaven, and which have been preserved by religious tradition in the exact form in which they first appeared. The historian sees in them "the interpretation of religious facts acquired by the toil of theological mental labour" (L'Évangile et l'Église, Paris, 1902, 158). The foundation of the dogma is, according to the modernistic viewpoint, subjective religious experience, in which God reveals Himself to man (religious factor). The totality of religious experience is penetrated by theological science and expressed by it in definite formularies (intellectual factor). A formulary of this kind is then finally approved by the Church Authority, and thus declared a dogma (authoritative factor). Pope Pius X has condemned this doctrine in the Decretum "Lamentabili" (1907), and in the Encyclical "Pascendi" (1907). (D 2022, 2078 et seq.)

As against Modernism, the Catholic Church stresses that dogma according to its content is of truly Divine origin, that is, it is the expression of an *objective truth*, and its content is *immutable*.

3. Classification

Dogmas are classified:

a) *According to their content* as: General Dogmas (dogmata generalia) and Special Dogmas (dogmata specialia). To the former belong the fundamental truths of Christianity, to the latter the individual truths contained therein.

b) *According to their relation with Reason* as: Pure Dogmas (dogmata pura) and Mixed Dogmas (dogmata mixta). The former we know solely through Divine Revelation, e.g., The Trinity (mysteries), the latter by Natural Reason also, e.g., The Existence of God.

c) *According to the mode by which the Church proposes them,* as: Formal Dogmas (dogmata formalia) and Material Dogmas (dogmata materialia). The former are proposed for belief by the Teaching Authority of the Church as truths of Revelation; the latter are not so proposed, for which reason they are not Dogmas in the strict sense.

d) *According to their relation with salvation* as: Necessary Dogmas (dogmata necessaria) and Non-necessary Dogmas (dogmata non-necessaria). The former must be explicitly believed by all in order to achieve eternal salvation; for the latter implicit faith (fides implicita) suffices (cf. Hebr. II, 6).

§ 5. The Development of Dogma

1. Heretical Notion of Dogmatic Development

The Liberal Protestant concept of dogma (cf. A. von Harnack) as well as Modernism (cf. A. Loisy) assumes a substantial development of dogmas, so that the content of dogma changes radically in the course of time. Modernism poses the challenge: "Progress in the sciences demands that the conceptions of the Christian teaching of God, Creation, Revelation, Person of the Incarnate Word, Redemption, be remoulded" (cf. D 2064). Loisy declares: "As progress in science (philosophy) demands a new concept of the problem of God, so progress in historical research gives rise to a new concept of the problem of Christ and the Church." (Autour d'un petit livre, Paris 1903, XXIV.) In this view there are no fixed and constant dogmas; their concept is always developing.

The Vatican Council condemned Anton Günther's († 1863) application of the idea of development in this sense to dogmas as heretical: Si quis dixerit, fieri posse, ut dogmatibus ab Ecclesia propositis aliquando secundum progressum scientiae sensus tribuendus sit alius ab eo, quem intellexit et intelligit Ecclesia. If anybody says that by reason of the progress of science, a meaning must be given to dogmas of the Church other than that which the Church understood and understands them to have let him be anathema. A.S. D 1818. In the Encyclical "Humani Generis" (1950), Pope Pius XII rejected that dogmatic relativism, which would demand that dogmas should be expressed in the concepts of the philosophy ruling at any particular time, and enveloped in the stream of philosophical development: "This conception," he says, "makes dogma a reed, which is driven hither and thither by the wind" (D 3012).

The ground for the immutability of dogmas lies in the Divine origin of the Truths which they express. Divine Truth is as immutable as God Himself: "The truth of the Lord remaineth for ever" (Ps. 116, 2). "Heaven and earth shall pass away: but my word shall not pass" (Mk. 13, 31).

2. Development of Dogmas in the Catholic Sense

a) From the material side of dogma, that is, in the communication of the Truths of Revelation to humanity, a substantial growth took place in human

history until Revelation reached its apogee and conclusion in Christ (cf. Hebr. I, 1).

St. Gregory the Great says: "With the progress of the times the knowledge of the spiritual Fathers increased; for, in the Science of God, Moses was more instructed than Abraham, the Prophets more than Moses, the Apostles more than the Prophets" (in Ezechielem lib. 2, hom. 4, 12).

With Christ and the Apostles General Revelation concluded. (*sent. certa.*)

Pope Pius X rejected the liberal Protestant and Modernistic doctrine of the evolution of religion through "New Revelations." Thus he condemned the proposition that: "The Revelation, which is the object of Catholic Faith, was not terminated with the Apostles." D 2021.

The clear teaching of Holy Writ and Tradition is that after Christ, and the Apostles who proclaimed the message of Christ, no further Revelation will be made. Christ was the fulfilment of the Law of the Old Testament (Mt. 5, 17; 5, 21 et seq), and the absolute teacher of humanity (Mt. 23, 10: "One is your master, Christ"; cf. Mt. 28, 20). The Apostles saw in Christ: "the coming of the fullness of time" (Gal. 4, 4) and regarded as their task the preservation, integral and unfalsified, of the heritage of Faith entrusted to them by Christ (1 Tim. 6, 14; 6, 20; 2 Tim. 1, 14; 2, 2; 3, 14). The Fathers indignantly repudiated the claim of the heretics to possess secret doctrines or new Revelations of the Holy Ghost. St. Irenaeus (Adv. haer III 1; IV 35, 8), and Tertullian (De praesc. 21) stress, against the Gnostics, that the full truth of Revelation is contained in the doctrine of the Apostles which is preserved unfalsified through the uninterrupted succession of the bishops.

b) As to the *Formal* side of dogma, that is, in the knowledge and in the ecclesiastical proposal of Revealed Truth, and consequently also in the public faith of the Church, there is a progress (accidental development of dogmas) which occurs in the following fashion:

1) Truths which formerly were only implicitly believed are expressly proposed for belief. (Cf. S. th. I; II, 1, 7: quantum ad explicationem crevit numerus articulorum (fidei), quia quaedam explicite cognita sunt a posterioribus, quae a prioribus non cognoscebantur explicite. There was an increase in the number of articles believed explicitly since to those who lived in later times some were known explicitly, which were not known explicitly by those who lived before them.)

2) Material Dogmas are raised to the status of Formal Dogmas.

3) To facilitate general understanding, and to avoid misunderstandings and distortions, the ancient truths which were always believed, e.g., the Hypostatic Union (unio hypostatica), Transubstantiation, etc., are formulated in new, sharply defined concepts.

4) Questions formerly disputed are explained and decided, and heretical propositions are condemned. Cf. St. Augustine, De civ. Dei 2, 1; ab adversario mota quaestio discendi existit occasio (a question moved by an adversary gives an occasion for learning).

The exposition of the dogmas in the given sense is prepared by theological science and promulgated by the Teaching Authority of the Church under the

direction of the Holy Ghost (John 14, 26). These new expositions of dogmatic truth are motivated, on the one hand, by the natural striving of man for deeper understanding of Revealed Truth, and on the other hand by external influences, such as the attacks arising from heresy and unbelief, theological controversies, advances in philosophical knowledge and historical research, development of the liturgy, and the general assertion of Faith expressed therein.

Even the Fathers stress the necessity of deeper research into the truths of Revelation, of clearing up obscurities, and of developing the teachings of Revelation. Cf. the classical testimony of St. Vincent Lerin († before 450). "But perhaps someone says: Will there then be no progress in the religion of Christ? Certainly there should be, even a great and rich progress . . . only, it must in truth be a progress in Faith and not an alteration of Faith. For progress it is necessary that something should increase of itself, for alteration, however, that something should change from one thing to the other." (Commonitorium 23.) Cf. D 1800.

5) There may be also a progress in the confession of faith of the individual believer through the extension and deepening of his theological knowledge. The basis for the possibility of this progress lies in the depth of the truths of Faith on the one hand, and on the other in the varying capacity for perfection of the human reason.

Conditions making for a true progress in the knowledge of Faith by individual persons are, according to the declaration of the Vatican Council, zeal, reverence and moderation: cum sedule, pie et sobrie quaerit. D 1796.

§ 6. Catholic Truths

Corresponding to the purpose of the Teaching Authority of the Church of preserving unfalsified and of infallibly interpreting the Truths of Revelation (D 1800) the primary object (obiectum primarium) of the Teaching Office of the Church is the body of immediately revealed truths and facts. The infallible doctrinal power of the Church extends, however, secondarily to all those truths and facts which are a consequence of the teaching of Revelation or a presupposition of it (obiectum secondarium). Those doctrines and truths defined by the Church not as immediately revealed but as intrinsically connected with the truths of Revelation so that their denial would undermine the revealed truths are called *Catholic Truths* (veritates catholicae) or Ecclesiastical Teachings (doctrinae ecclesiasticae) to distinguish them from the *Divine Truths* or Divine Doctrines of Revelation (veritates vel doctrinae divinae). These are proposed for belief in virtue of the infallibility of the Church in teaching doctrines of faith or morals (fides ecclesiastica).

To these Catholic truths belong:

1. *Theological Conclusions* (conclusiones theologicae) properly so-called. By these are understood religious truths, which are derived from two premisses, of which one is an immediately revealed truth, and the other a truth of natural reason. Since one premiss is a truth of Revelation, theological conclusions are spoken of as being mediately or virtually (virtualiter) revealed. If however both premisses are immediately revealed truths, then the conclusion also must be regarded as being immediately revealed and as the object of Immediate Divine Faith (Fides Immediate Divina).

2. *Dogmatic Facts* (facta dogmatica). By these are understood historical

facts, which are not revealed, but which are intrinsically connected with revealed truth, for example, the legality of a Pope or of a General Council, or the fact of the Roman episcopate of St. Peter. The fact that a defined text does or does not agree with the doctrine of the Catholic Faith is also, in a narrower sense, a "dogmatic fact." In deciding the meaning of a text the Church does not pronounce judgment on the subjective intention of the author, but on the objective sense of the text (D 1350: sensum quem verba prae se ferunt).

3. *Truths of Reason*, which have not been revealed, but which are intrinsically associated with a revealed truth, e.g., those philosophic truths which are presuppositions of the acts of Faith (knowledge of the supersensual, possibility of proofs of God, the spirituality of the soul, the freedom of will), or philosophic concepts, in terms of which dogma is promulgated (person, substance, transubstantiation, etc.). The Church has the right and the duty, for the protection of the heritage of Faith, of proscribing philosophic teachings which directly or indirectly endanger dogma. The Vatican Council declares: Ius etiam et officium divinitus habet falsi nominis scientiam proscribendi (D 1798).

§ 7. Theological Opinions

Theological opinions are free views on aspects of doctrines concerning Faith and morals, which are neither clearly attested in Revelation nor decided by the Teaching Authority of the Church. Their value depends upon the reasons adduced in their favour (association with the doctrine of Revelation, the attitude of the Church, etc.).

A point of doctrine ceases to be an object of free judgment when the Teaching Authority of the Church takes an attitude which is clearly in favour of one opinion. Pope Pius XII explains in the Encyclical "Humani generis" (1950): "When the Popes in their Acts intentionally pronounce a judgment on a long disputed point then it is clear to all that this, according to the intention and will of these Popes, can no longer be open to the free discussion of theologians" (D 3013).

§ 8. The Theological Grades of Certainty

1. The highest degree of certainty appertains to the immediately revealed truths. The belief due to them is based on the authority of God Revealing (fides divina), and if the Church, through its teaching, vouches for the fact that a truth is contained in Revelation, one's certainty is then also based on the authority of the Infallible Teaching Authority of the Church (fides catholica). If Truths are defined by a solemn judgment of faith (definition) of the Pope or of a General Council, they are "de fide definita."

2. Catholic truths or Church doctrines, on which the infallible Teaching Authority of the Church has finally decided, are to be accepted with a faith which is based on the sole authority of the Church (fides ecclesiastica). These truths are as infallibly certain as dogmas proper.

3. A Teaching proximate to Faith (sententia fidei proxima) is a doctrine, which is regarded by theologians generally as a truth of Revelation, but which has not yet been finally promulgated as such by the Church.

4. A Teaching pertaining to the Faith, i.e., theologically certain (sententia ad fidem pertinens, i.e., theologice certa) is a doctrine, on which the Teaching

Authority of the Church has not yet finally pronounced, but whose truth is guaranteed by its intrinsic connection with the doctrine of revelation (theological conclusions).

5. Common Teaching (sententia communis) is doctrine, which in itself belongs to the field of the free opinions, but which is accepted by theologians generally.

6. Theological opinions of lesser grades of certainty are called probable, more probable, well-founded (sententia probabilis, probabilior, bene fundata). Those which are regarded as being in agreement with the consciousness of Faith of the Church are called pious opinions (sententia pia). The least degree of certainty is possessed by the tolerated opinion (opinio tolerata), which is only weakly founded, but which is tolerated by the Church.

With regard to the doctrinal teaching of the Church it must be well noted that not all the assertions of the Teaching Authority of the Church on questions of Faith and morals are infallible and consequently irrevocable. Only those are infallible which emanate from General Councils representing the whole episcopate, and the Papal Decisions Ex Cathedra (cf. D 1839). The ordinary and usual form of the Papal teaching activity is not infallible. Further, the decisions of the Roman Congregations (Holy Office, Bible Commission) are not infallible. Nevertheless normally they are to be accepted with an inner assent which is based on the high supernatural authority of the Holy See (assensus internus supernaturalis, assensus religiosus). The so-called "silentium obsequiosum," that is "reverent silence," does not generally suffice. By way of exception, the obligation of inner agreement may cease if a competent expert, after a renewed scientific investigation of all grounds, arrives at the positive conviction that the decision rests on an error.

§ 9. Theological Censures

By a theological censure is meant the judgment which characterises a proposition touching Catholic Faith or Moral Teaching as contrary to Faith or at least as doubtful. If it be pronounced by the Teaching Authority of the Church it is an authoritative or judicial judgment (censura authentica or iudicialis). If it be pronounced by Theological Science it is a private doctrinal judgment (censura doctrinalis).

The usual censures are the following: A Heretical Proposition (propositio haeretica). This signifies that the proposition is opposed to a formal dogma; a Proposition Proximate to Heresy (propositio heresi proxima) which signifies that the proposition is opposed to a truth which is proximate to the Faith (Sent. fidei proxima); a Proposition Savouring of or Suspect of heresy (propositio haeresim sapiens or de haeresi suspecta); an Erroneous Proposition (prop erronea), i.e., opposed to a truth which is proposed by the Church as a truth intrinsically connected with a revealed truth (error in fide ecclesiastica) or opposed to the common teaching of theologians (error theologicus); a False Proposition (prop. falsa), i.e., contradicting a dogmatic fact; a Temerarious Proposition (prop. temeraria), i.e., deviating without reason from the general teaching; a Proposition Offensive to pious ears (prop. piarum aurium offensiva), i.e., offensive to religious feeling; a Proposition badly expressed (prop. male sonans), i.e., subject to misunderstanding by reason of its method of expression; a Captious Proposition (prop. captiosa), i.e., reprehensible because of its intentional ambiguity; a Proposition exciting scandal (prop. scandalosa).

As to the form of the censures a distinction is made between Damnatio Specialis, by which a censure is attached to an individual proposition, and the Damnatio in Globo, in which censures are imposed on a series of propositions.

BOOK ONE

The Unity and Trinity of God

PART I

The Unity of God : His Existence and Nature

SECTION I

The Existence of God

CHAPTER I

The Natural Knowability of the Existence of God

§ 1. The Possibility of the Natural Knowledge of God in the Light of Supernatural Revelation

1. Dogma

God, our Creator and Lord, can be known with certainty, by the natural light of reason from created things. (*De fide.*)

The Vatican Council defined: Si quis dixerit, Deum unum et verum, creatorem et Dominum nostrum per ea, quae facta sunt, naturali rationis humanae lumine certo cognosci non posse, A.S. "If anybody says that the one true God, Our Creator and Lord cannot be known with certainty in the light of human reason by those things which have been made, anathema sit" D 1806; cf. 1785, 1391.

The Vatican definition stresses the following points: a) The object of our knowing is the one true God, our Creator and Lord, therefore an *extra-mundane*, personal God. b) The subjective principle of knowledge is natural reason in the condition of fallen nature. c) The means of knowledge are created things. d) The knowledge is from its nature and manner a knowledge of certitude. e) Such knowledge of God is possible, but it is not the only way of knowing Him.

2. Scriptural Proof

According to the testimony of Holy Writ, the existence of God can be known: a) from nature: Wis. 13, 1-9. V. 5: "For by the greatness of the beauty, and of the creature, the creator of them may be seen." Rom. 1, 20: "For the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made. His eternal power and His divinity also: so that they are inexcusable." The knowledge of God witnessed to in these two passages is a natural, certain, immediate and easily achieved knowledge.

b) From conscience: Rom. 2, 14 et seq: "For when the Gentiles, who know not the (Mosaic) law do by nature these things that are of the law; these, having not the law, are a law to themselves. Who shew the work of the law written in their hearts." The heathens (that is) know naturally, without supernatural revelation, the essential content of the Old Testament

law. In their hearts a law has been written whose binding power indicates a Supreme Lawgiver.

c) From history: Acts 14, 14-16; 17, 26-29. St. Paul, in his discourses at Lystra and at the Areopagus in Athens, shows that God reveals Himself in beneficent works also to the heathens, and that it is easy to find Him, as He is near to each of us: "For in Him we live, and move and are" (17, 28).

3. Proof from Tradition

The Fathers, in referring to the assertions of Holy Scripture, stress the possibility and the facility of the natural knowledge of God. Cf. Tertullian, Apol. 17: "O testimony of the soul, which is by its nature Christian" (O testimonium animae naturaliter christianae). The Greek Fathers preferred the cosmological proofs of God which proceed from external experience; the Latin Fathers preferred the psychological proofs which flow from inner experience. Cf. Theophilus of Antioch, ad Autolycum I 4-5: "God has called everything into existence from nothing, so that His greatness might be known and understood through His works. Just as the soul in man is not seen, as it is invisible, but is known through the movement of the body, so God cannot be seen with human eyes; but He is observed and known through providence and His works. Just as one, at the sight of a well-equipped ship which sweeps over the sea and steers towards a harbour, becomes aware that there is a helmsman on her, who directs her, so also one must be aware that God is the director of everything, even though He is not seen with bodily eyes, as He cannot be apprehended by them." Cf. St. Irenaeus, Adv. haer, II, 9, I; St. John Chrysostom, in ep. ad Rom. hom. 3, 2 (to I, 19).

4. Innate Idea of God

Taking their stand on the authority of the Fathers, many Catholic theologians, for example, Ludwig Thomassinus, Heinrich Klee, Anton Staudenmaier, Johannes von Kuhn, taught that the idea of God is not acquired by deductive thinking from the world of experience, but is innate in man (idea innata). Certainly many of the Fathers, for example, St. Justin (Apol. II, 6) and St. Clement of Alexandria (Strom. V. 14, 133, 7) characterised the knowledge of God as automatic "not learned" "automatically learned" "implanted" self-taught: or as "a gift of the soul" (animae dos: Tertullian, Adv. Marc I, 10). St. John of Damascus says: "The knowledge of the existence of God is implanted (by Him) in all in their nature" (De fide orth. I I). But as the same Fathers teach that we must win the knowledge of God from the contemplation of Nature, therefore, according to their conception, what is innate is not the idea of God as such, but the ability easily and to a certain extent spontaneously to know the existence of God from His works. Cf. St. Thomas, In Boethium De Trinitate, q. I. a 3 ad 6: eius cognitio nobis innata dicitur esse, in quantum per principia nobis innata de facili percipere possumus Deum esse. The knowledge of Him is said to be innate in us in so far as we can easily know the existence of God by means of principles which are innate in us.

§ 2. The Possibility of a Proof of God's Existence

The Existence of God can be proved by means of causality. (*Sent. fidei proxima.*)

The traditionalists, L. E. Bautain († 1867) and A. Bonnetty († 1879), having been reproved by the Teaching Authority of the Church, signed the assertion that reason can with certainty, prove the existence of God: Ratiocinatio potest

cum certitudine probare existentiam Dei. D 1622, 1650. Pope Pius X extended the Vatican Definition of the natural knowability of God in the anti-Modernist oath (1910) by the more exact statement, that the existence of God can formally be proved through reason by means of the principle of causality: Deum, rerum omnium principium et finem, naturali rationis lumine per ea quae facta sunt, hoc est, per visibilia creationis opera, tamquam causam per effectus certo cognosci, adeoque demonstrari etiam posse. God, the beginning and end of all things can be known with certainty, by the natural light of reason, as a cause is known by its effects, from those things that are made, that is by the visible works of creation and can equally be demonstrated (to be). D 2145.

The possibility of the proof of God flows:

a) From the dogma of the natural knowability of God; for the proof of God's existence is distinguished from the elementary knowledge of God only in that the basis for the knowledge is proposed in a more scientific form.

b) From the fact that since the time of the Fathers, theologians have adduced proofs of the existence of God. Cf. Aristides, Apol. 1, 1-3: Theophilus of Antioch, Ad Autolycum 1 5: Minucius Felix, Octavius 17, 4 et seq: 18, 4; St. Augustine, De vera religione 30-32: Conf. X 6; XI 4; St. John of Damascus, De fide orth. 1 3.

Scholasticism, in its greatest exponents, has unshakably adhered to the demonstrability of the existence of God. The scholastic proofs of God found their classical formulation in St. Thomas Aquinas (S. th. 1 2, 3: S.c.G. 1 13). It was only in the era of late scholasticism that influential representatives of nominalism (Wilhelm of Ockham, Nicholas of Autrecourt, Peter of Ailly), in consequence of their scepticism, began to doubt the certainty of the proofs of God's existence.

These proofs are based on the absolute validity of the principle of causality, which St. Thomas formulates thus: Omne quod movetur, ab alio movetur (moveri=transition from potence to act). While Kant, under the influence of David Hume, limited the validity of this to the world of experience, St. Thomas establishes its transcendental validity, which far surpasses the world of experience, by reference to the self-evident principle of contradiction. S. th. I 1, 2, 3.

§ 3. Errors Regarding the Natural Knowability of God

1. Traditionalism

Traditionalism, which developed as a reaction against the rationalism of the Enlightenment, proceeds from the view that God, in a comprehensive primitive Revelation, bestowed on man simultaneously with speech a sum of religious and moral basic truths, which have been reproduced in mankind through tradition. General reason (raison générale) or common sense (sens commun) guarantees the unfalsified transference of the original heritage of the Revelation. The individual receives it through oral teaching. Reason cannot achieve of itself the knowledge of the existence of God (scepticism). The knowledge of God is, like every religious and moral knowledge, a knowledge of faith: Deum esse traditur sive creditur. The chief exponents of traditionalism in its strict form are L. G. A. de Bonald, F. de Lamennais and L. E. Bautain. It was represented in a moderated form by A. Bonnetty and G. Ventura. This theory was condemned by Pope Gregory XVI (D 1622/27), Pope Pius IX (D 1649/52) and by the Vatican Council (D 1785 et seq. 1806).

The semi-traditionalists of the School of Löwe (G. C. Ubaghs, † 1875) admit, indeed, that natural reason from the contemplation of natural things

can with certainty recognise the existence of God, but only on the supposition that it has already, through instruction, imbibed the idea of God originating from the primitive Revelation.

Traditionalism is to be rejected on philosophical and theological grounds: a) Language does not generate concepts, it presupposes them. b) Acceptance of the Revelation presupposes, according to reason, knowledge of the Revealing God, and the certain conviction of the truth of His testimony.

2. Atheism

The systems of agnosticism, scepticism, and Kantian criticism deny the certain knowability and the demonstrability of the existence of God, but can be associated with the belief in a Divine Being. They are based on the principle: We do not know and we shall not know (Ignoramus et ignorabimus).

Negative atheism is inculpable ignorance regarding the existence of God. Positive atheism (materialism, pantheism) directly denies the existence of a supramundane, personal Divine Being. It was condemned by the Vatican Council. D 1801-1803.

As far as the possibility of atheism is concerned, it cannot be denied that there are atheistic doctrinal systems (materialism, pantheism) and practical atheists, that is, people who live as if there were no God. The possibility, that there are also subjectively convinced theoretical atheists, is founded in the spiritual and moral weakness of man, and on the fact that the proofs of God are not immediately, but only mediately evident. But as the knowledge of God can easily be gained from the contemplation of nature and the life of the soul, it will not be possible permanently to adhere to an honest and positive conviction of the non-existence of God. An inculpable and invincible ignorance regarding the existence of God is not possible for a long time in a normal, grown-up person, in view of the facility of the natural knowledge of God attested in Holy Writ and in Tradition. Cf. Rom. 1, 20; ita ut sint inexcusabiles.

Kant's Critique

While Kant in his pre-critical period recognised the possibility of the proofs of God, and even developed the ideological proof of God (cf. the article published in 1763: "The only possible ground of proof for a demonstration of the existence of God"), in his critical period he denied the validity of all proofs of God (cf. the "Critique of Pure Reason" which appeared in 1781). According to Kant, the only object of theoretical reason is the world of phenomena; the supersensual is withdrawn from it. The validity of the principle of causality is limited to things perceptible to the senses. In order to refute the individual proofs of God's existence, Kant sought to show that they all go back to the ontological argument, by deriving from the concept of the Supreme Reality its factual existence. Nevertheless, Kant believed in the existence of God and designated this belief the postulate of practical reason.

Kant's philosophy exercised a decisive influence on the Protestant theology of the 19th century. From the standpoint of the Kantian doctrine of cognition it rejected the rational foundation of religion, and with it the intellectual proofs of the existence of God, and taught that religious truths must be perceived, not by reason, but through religious feeling, which affirms the existence of God and by which we live in God. They claimed that it is on this subjective religious experience that Faith is founded. The consequence is a sharp separation of the spheres of knowledge and of Faith (Jacobi Schleiermacher, Ritschl, A. Harnack).

4. Modernism

The cognitional theoretical basis of Modernism is agnosticism, according to which human rational cognition is limited to the world of experience. Religion,

according to this theory, develops from the principle of vital immanence (immanentism) that is, from the need for God which dwells in the human soul. The truths of religion are, according to the general progress of culture, caught up in a constant substantial development (evolutionism).

CHAPTER 2

The Supernatural Knowability of the Existence of God

§ 4. God's Existence as an Object of Faith

1. Dogma

God's existence is not merely an object of natural rational knowledge, but also an object of supernatural faith. (*De fide.*)

In the beginning of all the formulas of the Faith stands the fundamental article: Credo in unum Deum. I believe in one God. The Vatican Council teaches: Sancta catholica apostolica Romana Ecclesia credit et confitetur unum esse Deum; The Holy Catholic Apostolic Roman Church believes and confesses that there is a God. D 1782. The denial of God's existence is condemned as heresy by the same Council. D 1801.

According to Hebr. 11, 6 faith in the existence of God is an indispensable condition of salvation: "Without faith it is impossible to please God; for he who wishes to approach God must believe that He is: and that He is a rewarder to them that seek Him." But only supernatural Faith in Revelation is effective unto salvation (cf. D 798, 1173).

The supernatural Revelation of the existence of God confirms the natural knowledge of God, and enables the existence of God to be known easily by all with certainty and without any admixture of error (D 1786; ab omnibus expedite, firma certitudine et nullo admixte errore)—relative or moral necessity of the Revelation (cf. S. th. I 1, 1; S.c.G. I 4.)

2. Knowledge and Faith as Regards the Same Object

It is a disputed point whether one and the same person can at the same time have knowledge and faith in the existence of God. Many outstanding scholastic theologians (Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, Albertus Magnus) and many later theologians (Suarez) assert that such is possible, because the formal object is different (natural insight—Divine Revelation), and because both acts or habits belong to different orders of being (nature-grace). St. Thomas, on the contrary, teaches: "It is impossible for the same truth to be known and believed by the same person": impossible est, quod ab eodem idem sit scitum et creditum (S. th. 2 II, 1, 5). As ground for this he submits that the clear insight into the truth associated with knowledge cannot co-exist with the obscurity of faith. It is, however, possible, that the same truth could be known by one person and believed by another. According to the teaching of St. Thomas, it is also possible for the same person at the one time to have a natural knowledge of the existence of God as the originator of the natural order, and a supernatural faith in the existence of God as the originator of the supernatural order, because the supernatural faith comprehends truths which are not contained in natural knowledge (difference of the material object). (Cf. S. th. 2 II 1, 5.)

SECTION 2

The Nature of God

CHAPTER I

The Knowledge of the Nature of God

§ 5. The Natural Knowledge of the Nature of God in This World

As the knowledge of the existence of a thing is not possible without some cognition of its constitution, so in the natural knowledge of the existence of God there is always a certain knowledge of His Nature. Every single proof of God reveals a definite perfection of the Divine Nature. The naturally achievable knowledge of God is deepened and extended by supernatural revelation.

1. Constitution of our Natural Knowledge of God in This World

a) Mediate knowledge

> **Our natural knowledge of God in this world is not an immediate, intuitive cognition, but a mediate, abstractive knowledge, because it is attained through the knowledge of creatures. (*Sent. certa.*)**

In opposition to the teaching of the Church, Ontologism (Malebranche, † 1715, Gioberti, † 1852) teaches that, even in this life, we possess from nature an immediate, intuitive knowledge of God, and that in the light of the immediate knowledge of God we become cognisant of created things. The order of knowledge must correspond to the order of being. God, as the First Being, must therefore also be the primary object of knowledge: Primum esse ontologicum debet esse etiam primum logicum (Gioberti).

Ontologism is incompatible with the doctrine of the General Council of Vienna (1311/12), according to which the soul requires the supernatural light of glory for the immediate knowledge of God (D 475). In 1861 and 1887 the Holy Office rejected several ontologistical assertions. (D 1659 et seq., 1891 et seq).

Holy Writ proves, on the one hand, that the natural knowledge of God is attained through created things (cf. Wis. 13, 1: operibus attendentes: Rom. 1, 20: per ea quae fact sunt), and on the other hand, that no human being is capable of seeing God immediately, but that the vision of God is reserved for the other life. Cf. 1 Tim. 6, 16: "He inhabiteth light inaccessible; whom no one hath seen, nor can see." 1 Cor. 13, 12: "Now we see Him through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face."

Ontologism also contradicts the testimony of consciousness, and in its consequences leads to pantheism and rationalism. The ontologists, quite wrongly,

appeal to the teaching of St. Augustine of the knowledge *in rationibus aeternis*; for St. Augustine without doubt teaches a mediate cognition of God, which proceeds from the contemplation of the human soul or of the external world, and which ascends to God.

b) Analogical cognition

Our knowledge of God here below is not proper (cognitio propria) but analogical (cognitio analoga or analogica). (*Sent. certa.*)

While cognition properly so-called comprehends an object through its own mental form (per speciem propriam) or by immediate vision, analogical cognition comprehends an object through an alien form (per speciem alienam). In the cognition of God in this world we apply concepts gained from created things to God on the ground of a certain similarity and ordination of the created things to Him as their efficient and exemplary cause. There is a relation of analogy between the creature and the Creator which is founded on the fact that the creature is necessarily made to the likeness of the Creator. This analogy is the basis of all natural knowledge of God (cf. Wis. 13, 5). This so-called analogy of being (analogia entis) is sharply rejected by K. Barth as the "invention of anti-Christ." Despite this analogy or similarity, there is a much greater dissimilarity between the creature and the Creator, namely the dissimilarity between the finite and the infinite.

2. Method of the Natural Knowledge of God Here Below

Our cognition of God in this world, comes as Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite taught, by the three-fold way of affirmation, negation and eminence.

a) The way of Affirmation or Causality (θέσις) proceeds from the consideration that God is the efficient cause of all things, and that the efficient cause contains in itself every perfection which is in the effect. From this it follows that God, the Originator of all creatures, possesses every true perfection of the creatures. The pure perfections are formally ascribed to God. The mixed perfections, which contain something finite in their concept, are ascribed to God in a transferred sense (metaphorically or anthropomorphically) only.

b) The way of Negation (ἀφαίρεσις) denies to God every imperfection which is found in created things, also the circumscription attached to imperfections of created things, deriving from their finiteness. Such negation of an imperfection implies affirmation and eminence (for example, infinite = absence of limit, i.e., fullness of being).

Under the influence of the theology of the Neo-platonists, certain individual Fathers make use of such formulations as: "God is not substance, not light, not life, not sense, not spirit, not wisdom, not goodness" (Pseudo-Dionysius, Myst. theol. c. 3). They do not wish to deny to God these perfections, but to assert that these perfections do not belong to God in the same manner as they do to creatures, but in an infinitely higher manner.

c) The Way of Eminence enables us to deduce, from the finite perfections of creatures, the possession by God of infinite analagous perfections.

The three modes of cognition complement one another. For the attributing of a perfection to God demands the attribution of it to Him eminently, and the negation of every imperfection. Cf. Ecclus. 43, 29 (G 27) et seq. St. John of Damascus, De fide orth. I 12.

3. Imperfection of the Knowledge of God Here Below

God's Nature is incomprehensible to men. (*De fide.*)

Our knowledge of God in this world is a composition of many inadequate concepts, and on account of this composition, it is necessarily limited and imperfect. The 4th Lateran Council (1215) and the Vatican Council, call God "incomprehensible" (incomprehensibilis), the Lateran Council also calls Him "ineffable" (ineffabilis). D 428, 1782. Cf. Jer. 32, 19 (according to the Vulgate: Magnus consilio et incomprehensibilis cogitatu: "great in council and incomprehensible in thought"). Rom. 11, 33: "How incomprehensible are His judgments, and how unsearchable His ways!"

The Fathers, notably St. Basil, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. John Chrysostom, defend the incomprehensibility of the Divine Essence by indicating the infinity and the sublimity of God in comparison with all creatures, against the Eunomians, who assumed an exhaustive (adequate or comprehensive) cognition of God, and indeed even in this world. St. Augustine says: "More true than our speech about God is our thinking of Him, and more true than our thinking is His Being" (Verius enim cogitatur Deus quam dicitur et verius est quam cogitatur; De Trin. VII 4, 7). Only God possesses a comprehensive knowledge of God; for the Infinite Being can be completely comprehended by an Infinite Intellect only. Cf. S. th. I 12, 7: "God whose Being is infinite, is infinitely knowable. No created understanding can, however, know God in an infinite manner."

4. Truth of the Knowledge of God in This World

Although our knowledge of God in this world is imperfect, still it is true, because God really possesses the perfections attributed to Him, and because we are conscious of the analogous character of our knowledge of God and of our assertions concerning Him.

§ 6. The Supernatural Knowledge of the Divine Essence in the Other World

1. Reality of the Immediate Vision of God

The blessed in Heaven possess an immediate intuitive knowledge of the Divine Essence. (*De fide.*)

Pope Benedict XII defined in the dogmatic constitution "Benedictus Deus" (1336): vident (sc. animae sanctorum) divinam essentiam visione intuitiva et etiam faciali, nulla mediante creatura in ratione obiecti visi se habente, sed divine essentia immediate se nude, clare et aperte eis ostendente. They (the souls of the just) see the divine essence by an intuitive vision and face to face, so that the divine essence is known immediately, showing itself nakedly clearly and openly, and not mediately through any creature. D 530. The Council of Florence (1438/45) determined the object of the knowledge of God in the other world as follows: intuiri (sc. animas sanctorum) clare ipsum Deum trinum et unum, sicuti est. (to know God one and three as He is) D 693.

The most apposite passage in Holy Writ is 1 Cor. 13, 12, in which the Apostle contrasts the mirror-like, enigmatical and piecemeal knowledge of

God in this world with the immediate and clear knowledge of God in the other world: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner: but then face to face. Now I know in part: but then I shall know even as I am known." St. John describes the future state which is prepared for the children of God on earth, with the words: "We shall be like to Him: because we shall see Him as He is" (videbimus eum, sicuti est: 1 John 3, 2). Cf. Mt. 5, 8: 18, 10; 2 Cor. 5, 7.

The older Fathers, using the simple words of Holy Scripture, teach that the angels and saints are vouchsafed a real vision of God, and behold Him face to face. Cf. St. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. IV 20; V 7, 2. Since the middle of the 4th century, some Fathers, like St. Basil the Great, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. John Chrysostom, appear to dispute the possibility of an immediate vision of God. Their assertions in point of fact can, however, be explained as being directed against Eunomius, who claimed an immediate cognition of God, even in this world. In contrast to this, the Fathers stress that the knowledge of God in this world is mediate, in the next world immediate, but not comprehensive. St. John Chrysostom compares the vision of God in the other world with the sight of the transfigured Christ on Tabor and says: "What shall be said when Royalty Itself appears, when the palace is opened, and it is permitted to view the King Himself, no longer enigmatically nor in a glass, but face to face, no longer in faith but in vision" (Ad Theodorum lapsum I 11).

To the corporeal eye, even in the transfigured state, God is invisible, since God is a pure spirit, and the corporeal eye is able to see corporeal objects only. St. Augustine, Ep. 92 and 147; S. th. I 12, 3.

2. Object of the Immediate Vision of God

a) The primary object of the immediate vision of God is the Infinite Divine Essence in its Triune fullness of personal life (ipse Deus trinus et unus, sicuti est). D 693.

b) The secondary object consists in the extra-Divine things, which are seen in God as the origin of all things. The scope of this knowledge is different in the individual blessed according to the grade of their immediate cognition of God; the latter, however, is determined by the measure of their supernatural merits (D 693). One may assume with St. Thomas that the glorified spirit in God in any case sees all that pertains to it. Cf. S. th. III 10, 2: nulli intellectu beato deest, quin cognoscat in Verbo omnia, quae ad ipsum spectant (nothing is lacking to the knowledge of a beatus of things which pertain to him; he knows all (these) in the Word).

3. Supernatural Character of the Immediate Vision of God

The Immediate Vision of God transcends the natural power of cognition of the human soul, and is therefore supernatural. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Vienne (1311/12) rejected the false teaching of the Beghards and Beguines: quod anima non indiget lumine gloriae ipsam elevante ad Deum videndum et eo beate fruendum. That the soul does not need the light of glory elevating it to see and enjoy God. D 475. According to the general

teaching of theologians, the immediate vision of God is a gift absolutely exceeding the natural potentiality of every created and creatable intellect and hence it is absolutely supernatural.

Holy Scripture asserts that the immediate knowledge of the Divine Essence is inaccessible to natural reason. 1 Tim. 6, 16. "God habiteth light inaccessible: whom no one hath seen, nor can see." The vision of the Divine Essence belongs by its very nature, only to God. John 1, 18: "No man hath seen God; the Only Begotten God (Vulg: Son), who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him." Cf. Mt. 11, 27; John 6, 46; 1 Cor. 2, 11.

Speculatively the absolute supernatural character of the immediate vision of God may be demonstrated from the principle: Cognitum est in cognoscente, secundum modum cognoscentis. As the nature is so is the cognition. When the mode of being of the object of cognition is higher than the mode of being of the subject of cognition, then the latter is from its nature incapable of immediately knowing the object of cognition in its essence. God is Subsistent Being (ipsum esse subsistens) while every created intellect has a communicated being (esse participatum) only. Therefore it lies beyond the cognitive power of every created intellect immediately to know the Essence of God. Cf. S. th. I 12, 4. On account of its absolute supernatural character the immediate vision of God is a mystery stricte dictum (strictly so called).

One may, with St. Augustine and St. Thomas, assume that the human intellect can, even on earth, be elevated supernaturally and exceptionally (et supernaturaliter et praeter communem ordinem) to the immediate vision of God. As examples are quoted Moses (Ex. 33, 11; Num 12, 8) and St. Paul (2 Cor. 12, 2 et seq.). Cf. St. Augustine, Ep. 147, 13, 31-32; S. th. I 12, 11 ad 2.

4. Necessity of the Light of Glory for the Immediate Vision of God

The possibility of the elevation of the soul to the immediate vision of God is founded on the one hand, on the soul's likeness to God, i.e., on its immateriality (Gn. 1, 26 et seq.), and on the other hand, on the omnipotence of God. Cf. S. th. I 12, 4 ad 3.

The soul, for the Immediate Vision of God, requires the light of glory. (*De fide. D 475.*)

Lumen gloriae is as necessary for the mode of cognition of the state of glory as is lumen rationis for the mode of cognition of the state of nature, and lumen fidei for the mode of cognition of the state of faith. It consists in a lasting supernatural perfecting of the human power of cognition, through which it is inwardly strengthened for the vital act of the immediate vision of the Divine Essence. (Cf. S. th. I 12, 5 ad 2: perfectio quaedem intellectus confortans ipsum ad videndum Deum.) In its ontological nature it must be considered as a supernatural operative habit bestowed upon reason. The habit of the light of glory dissolves the habit of faith. The, expression which is first found in St. Bonaventura and St. Thomas, goes back to Ps. 35, 10: in lumine tuo videbimus lumen.

5. Limits to the Immediate Vision of God

God's Essence is also incomprehensible to the blessed in Heaven. (*De fide.*)

The blessed in Heaven also possess no adequate or comprehensive cognition of the Divine Being. God is for every created spirit even in the state of supernatural elevation, incomprehensible (incomprehensibilis). Cf. D 418, 1782: Jer. 32, 19 (according to the Vulgate: incomprehensibilis cogitatu). In the times of the Fathers, St. John Chrysostom especially, in his 12 Homilies Dei incomprehensibili, has defended the incomprehensibility of God against the Eunomians.

The intrinsic basis of the incomprehensibility of God lies in the boundless abyss between the Infinite Divine Spirit and the finite created spirit. The finite spirit can understand the infinite Essence of God in a finite manner only: Videt infinitum, sed non infinite. Cf. S. th. I 12, 7 ad 3.

§ 7. The Supernatural Knowledge of the Divine Being in This World through Faith

The order of grace in this world is a preliminary stage and a preparation for the glory in the world to come: gratia et gloria ad idem genus referuntur, quia gratia nihil est aliud quam quaedem inchoatio gloriae in nobis. S. th. 2 II, 24, 3 ad 2. Supernatural faith here below corresponds to the immediate vision of God in the other world; lumen fidei corresponds to lumen gloriae. Faith is a kind of anticipation of the vision of God in the world to come.

1. Relation to the Natural Knowledge of God

Knowledge of faith is distinguished from natural knowledge of God by the principle of cognition (ratio fide illustrata), the means of cognition (revelatio divina), and the formal object (God, as He is known through Revelation: Deus unus et trinus). The principal object of supernatural faith lies in the mysteries of faith which are known by Divine Revelation (mysteria in Deo abscondita, quae, nisi revelata divinitus, innotescere non possunt: D 1795). The Divine Revelation guarantees the infallible certainty of the truths of Faith (certitudo evidentiae). The truths of Faith have therefore a higher degree of certitude than the natural truths of reason. But from the viewpoint of clarity or intelligibility (certitudo evidentiae) the natural truths of reason are higher than the truths of Faith, because in the former we possess an inner insight, in the latter, however, we do not. In this sense the frequently cited saying of Hugo of St. Victor († 1141) is valid, namely, that the certitude of Faith is of a lower grade than natural knowledge (De sacramentis christ. fidei I 10, 2: Fidem esse certitudinem quandam animi de rebus absentibus, supra opinionem et infra scientiam constitutam). Cf. S. th. 2 II 4, 8.

2. Relation to the Immediate Vision of God

In relation to the vision of God in the other world the supernatural cognition of Faith, although it also is a participation in the Divine self-cognition, is still imperfect. The basic truths of Faith are beyond the power of comprehension of the human reason, and even after the Revelation, still remain obscure and mysterious. 2 Cor. 5, 7: "We walk by faith and not by sight." Cf. D 1796. As supernatural Revelation takes its concepts from the created world, so also the cognition of Faith is analogical. 1 Cor. 13, 12: "Now we see through a glass in a dark manner."

CHAPTER 2

The Nature of God in Itself

§ 8. The Biblical Names of God

As the Nature of God cannot be adequately conceived by the mind, it cannot be expressed in a perfectly corresponding name. Hence the Fathers designate God as "unnameable, inexpressible" (ἄρρητος, ineffabilis) and "nameless" (ἀνώνυμος). The manifold names which Holy Writ applies to God express more the Operations than the Nature of God. According to the various operations, God can be called by various names, for which reason Pseudo-Dionysius calls Him the "Many-named" (πολυώνυμος) or the "All-named" (πανώνυμος). Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, De div. nominibus 1, 6; 12, 1; St. John of Damascus, De fide. orth. I 12.

Following Scheeben (Dogmatik I. n. 84 et seq.), the seven "Holy Names" of the Old Testament may be divided into three groups, the first of which determines the relation of God to the world and to mankind (El=The Strong, the Powerful: Elohim=He Who possesses the Fullness of Power: Adonai=Lord, Commander, Judge). The second group designates more the intrinsic perfections of God (Schaddai=The Mighty One, Eljon=The Highest; Kadosch=The Holy. The third group comprehends the proper name and the essential name (Jahweh).

The real name of the true God is Jahweh. It is linguistically derived from hawa, a related form of haje=to be; it means; he is. The Septuagint renders the form 'ehje=I am (or 'ascher 'ehje=the I am) by which God designates Himself in Ex. 3, 14 by ὁ ὤν=The Being One, while it regularly paraphrases the form Jahweh by the expression κύριος=Lord, which was a current Greek designation for God. God Himself revealed His name to Moses, when He, in answer to the question as to His name, replied "I AM WHO AM" ('ehje 'ascher 'ehje). "You shall say to the children of Israel: HE WHO IS, hath sent me to you. . . . The Lord God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, hath sent me to you. This is my name for ever, and this is my memorial unto all generations." (Ex. 3, 14 et seq.) According to Ex. 6, 3 God Himself revealed Himself, in the first instance to Moses, by His proper name of Jahweh, while He appeared to the Patriarchs as El schaddai. The Biblical narrator used the name Jahweh, foreseeing the later Revelation, even in the story of Paradise, and puts it into the history of the Patriarchs, even into the mouth of the Fathers and of God Himself. (Gn. 15, 2, 7.) In agreement with this, Gn. 4, 26, "This man began to call upon the name of the Lord," is not to be understood as an invocation of the name of God in virtue of the use of the word Jahweh, but as a general adoration of God. In the pre-Mosaic era the name Jahweh cannot with certainty be established either within or without Israel. The New Testament takes over the Old Testament designations of God as found in the Septuagint, and makes the appellation Father, which occurs only in a few places in the Old Testament, the centre of the Christian Revelation.

§ 9. The Physical and Metaphysical Nature of God

1. The Physical Essence of God

The physical essence of God is the totality of the Divine perfections which are

factually identical among themselves. Cf. the enumeration of the Divine attributes by the 4th Lateran Council and the Vatican Council. D 428, 1782.

2. The Metaphysical Nature of God

The metaphysical nature of God is the basic determining factor of the Divine Essence. According to our analogical conception, it is the fundamental note of the Deity which distinguishes It from all created things, and which is the source and origin of all the other Divine perfections. Various opinions have been advanced on this point :

a) The Nominalists wrongly place the metaphysical essence of God in the sum of all His perfections (cumulus omnium perfectionum) and thus equate the physical and the metaphysical essence.

b) The Scotists see the metaphysical essence of God in His radical infinity (infinitas radicalis), that is, in that quality by which God possesses all perfections in infinite measure. This view, however, leaves unsolved the question of the final basis of the infinity. Infinity is a mode of being only, not the metaphysical essence itself.

c) Many Thomists would find the metaphysical essence of God in His absolute intellectuality, which they define either as absolute spirituality (intelligere radicale), or as formal intellectuality (intellegere actuale, intellectio subsistens). Against both opinions the objection is made that they do not give the ultimate root of all perfections, but a characteristic derived therefrom. Absolute Spirit-Being implies absolute being, intelligere subsistens presupposes esse subsistens.

d) The opinion best founded in Scripture and Tradition is that the metaphysical essence of God consists in this that It is Subsistent Being (ipsum esse subsistens). As distinct from created things, which have received being (. . existentia) from another being (esse participatum), God has His Being of Himself and through Himself by virtue of His own perfection of Essence. God is Being Itself, the Absolute Being, the Subsisting Being. In God essence and existence coincide. The concept of Absolute Being excludes all non-being, and all merely potential being. Consequently, God is pure act (actus purus) without any admixture of potentiality (actus purus sine omni permixtione potentiae).

This opinion, which follows the Thomistic definition, is held by many theologians, who conceive the metaphysical essence of God to be *Aseity*, which, however, is not to be understood in the negative sense of not having been made (ἀγενησία) or in being independent of a cause since this is only a mode of being, but in the positive sense of self-actualisation.

Foundation

a) In Ex. 3, 14 et seq., God revealed His proper name and His essential name : "I AM WHO I AM," that is, I AM HE Whose Essence is expressed in the words : "I am." God is therefore purely and simply Being (He who is ; ὁ ὤν). His Essence is Being. Israel, however, did not yet grasp the full sense of the Revelation vouchsafed to it ; it understood the name Jahweh as He who is always, the Constant, the True, the Helper, as He had shown Himself to be in the history of Israel (cf. Is. 43, 11). Later Scriptural texts express the absolute being of God by designating Jahweh as the First and Last, as the Alpha and Omega, the Beginning and End, as He Who Is, Who Was, and Who Shall

Come. Cf. Is. 41, 4 ; 44, 6 ; 48, 12 ; Acts, I, 4, 8, 17 ; 21, 6 ; 22, 13. Wis. 13, 1 calls God, as does Ex. 3, 14 He Who Is (τὸν ὄντα) and contrasts Him with the visible things which have received being from Him. The characteristic of absolute Being, expressed in the name Jahweh, distinguishes God from all non-living beings. Cf. Is. 42, 8 : "I am the Lord ; this is my name. I will not give my glory to another, nor my praise to graven things."

b) The Patristic writers and the Schoolmen accept the name of the Divine Essence given in Ex. 3, 14, and regard Absolute Being as that concept by which we state the Essence of God most fundamentally. St. Hilarius, full of wonderment at the Divine self-designation, says : "Nothing can be conceived which is more appropriate to God than Being" (De Trin. I, 5). St. Gregory Naziantus remarks on Ex. 3, 14 : "God was always, is, and will always be : or rather, He is always ; for 'was' and 'will be' are divisions of our time and of nature which is in constant flow. But He is the Constant Being ; and thus He called Himself, when He answered Moses on the mountain. He holds sealed off in Himself the whole fullness of being, which has neither a beginning nor an end, like an endless and boundless ocean of being, transcending every notion of time and (created) nature" (Orat. 45, 3). St. Augustine, referring to Ex. 3, 14, says that God has called Himself the Very Being (ipsum esse). He alone is the immutable Being, which is the True Being (Enarr. in Ps. 134, 4). St. John Damascene remarks that the name "He Who Is" (ὁ ὤν) is the most appropriateof all the Divine names. (De fide orth. I 9).

St. Bernard says : "One may call God good or great or blessed or wise or whatever one will, all is contained in the phrase 'Est' (=He is)" (De consid. V 6). St. Thomas teaches : "Cuius (sc. Dei) essentia est ipsum suum esse" (De ente et essentia c. 6). As only in God is essence one with existence, he sees in the name "He Who Is" (qui est) the appropriate proper name of God. S. th. I 13, 11.

c) The concept of ipsum esse subsistens (in the positive sense) fulfils all conditions necessary for the determination of the metaphysical essence of God.

d) Ipsum Esse Subsistens does not designate a mere mode of being, but that perfection which, according to our analogical thinking, is fundamental to God and which is the summing-up of His Essence. Cf. The proofs of God which proceed from esse participatum (participated Being) to Subsistent Being.

β) Ipsum Esse Subsistens distinguishes God fundamentally from all created things, which only possess being, but which are not being itself. The being of created things is a limited being, and in comparison with the Being of God it is more non-being than being. "They cannot be compared with Him, because they are from Him : but compared with Him they are not, because the True Being is an immutable being, and that is He alone" (Enarr. in Ps. 134, 4). Ipsum Esse Subsistens also distinguishes God from abstract or general being ; for the latter is of such a nature that it has not any objective reality without the addition of further characteristics, while the Absolute Divine Being is such that nothing can be added to it. Abstract being is the poorest concept in point of content, while absolute being is the richest. Cf. St. Thomas, De ente et essentia c. 6.

Ipsum Esse Subsistens is the root from which all the other Divine perfections may logically be derived. As God is the Absolute Being he must contain in Himself all the perfections of being. Cf. S. th. I 4, 2 ad 3. Nulla de perfectionibus essendi potest deese ei, quod est ipsum esse subsistens.

Appendix

Hermann Schell († 1906) sought to give the concept of the Divine Aseity a richer content by extending the idea of causation to God, and formulated the dictum: Deus est causa Sui (God is His Own Cause). He claimed that Aseity is to be conceived as self-causation, self-realisation, self-inauguration of the Divine Essence. God, according to him, is not the fullness of being, as the Schoolmen asserted, but the fullness of activity and of life.

Schell's concept of God, which goes back to Platonic and neo-Platonic ideas, contradicts the principle of causality, according to which all that is moved must be moved by another thing, as well as the principle of contradiction on which the principle of causality is based; for an essence which causes itself must have been effective before it exists, that is, be and not be. God is not *causa sui*, but *ratio sui*, that is, He has the reason of His existence in Himself. In a wider, improper sense, following the precedent of St. Jerome (In ep. ad Ephes. II 3, 14: ipse sui origo est suaeque causa substantiae), individual Schoolmen apply the concept "causa sui" to God. St. Augustine rejected the idea of the Divine self-origination and with it self-causation. Cf. De. Trin. I 1, 1. Sc. G. I 18: nihil est causa sui ipsius; esset enim prius seipso, quod est impossibile. (nothing is the cause of itself since that implies that it had existed prior to itself, which is impossible).

SECTION 3

The Attributes or the Qualities of God

§ 10. The Attributes of God in General

1. Concept

The attributes or properties of God are perfections which, according to our analogical mode of thinking, proceed from the metaphysical substance of God and belong to it. Hence, we only know being of the absolutely simple Divine Substance " in part " (1 Cor. 13, 9), i.e., in a multiplicity of inadequate concepts, by which we know individual perfections of God truly but inadequately.

2. Difference between the Attributes and the Essence of God

a) The Divine Attributes are really identical among themselves and with the Divine Essence. (*De fide.*)

The reason lies in the absolute simplicity of God. The acceptance of a real distinction (distinctio realis) would lead to acceptance of a composition in God, and with that to a dissolution of the Godhead. In the year 1148, a Synod at Rheims, in the presence of Pope Eugene III, condemned, on the instance of St. Bernard of Clairvaux, the doctrine of Gilbert of Poitiers, who, according to the accusation of his opponents, posited a real distinction between God and Godhead (Deus-Divinitas), between the Divine Persons and Their properties (Pater-paternitas), and, according to the accounts of his opponents, also, between the Divine Essence and the Divine Attributes. This accusation can hardly be demonstrated from Gilbert's writings. Against this doctrine, the Synod asserted the factual identity of God with the Godhead, that is with the Divine Nature and the Persons, as well as of God and His Attributes: Credimus et confitemur simplicem naturam divinitatis esse Deum nec aliquo sensu catholico posse negari, quin divinitas sit Deus et Deus divinitas . . . credimus, nonnisi ea sapientia, quae est ipse Deus, sapientem esse, nonnisi ea magnitudine, quae est ipse Deus, magnum esse est. (We believe and confess that the divine nature in itself is (identical with) God nor, in any way consonant with Catholic doctrine, can we deny that the divinity is God and God is the divinity. . . . We believe that God is wise by that wisdom which is God Himself, that God is great by that greatness which is God Himself). D 389. The Union Council of Florence explained in the Decretum pro Jacobitis (1441): " (in God) all is one, where an opposition of relation does not exist." D 703.

In the Greek Church, the 14th century mystic-quietistic Sect of the Hesychasts or Palamites (so-called after the monk Gregory Palamas († 1359) taught a real distinction between the Divine Essence (*οὐσία*) and the Divine Efficacy or the Divine attributes (*ἐνέργεια*). While the former was claimed to be

unknowable, the latter was claimed to be vouchsafed to humanity in a condition of contemplative prayer (ἡσυχία) through an uncreated Divine light (" Taborlight "). With this they distinguished a higher and a lower, an invisible and a visible side of the Godhead.

Holy Scripture indicates the identity of the Essence and the attributes of God, when it says : " God is charity " (John 4, 8). St. Augustine teaches : " What God has, that He is " (Quod habet, hoc est : De civ. Dei XI 10, 1). Gilbert's opponents summed up the ecclesiastical doctrine advanced against his error in the words attributed to St. Augustine : Quidquid in Deo est Deus est.

Again, the distinction is not a mere mental distinction, as the Eunomians in the 4th and 5th centuries, and the Nominalists in later medieval times taught. According to the Eunomians, all names and attributes of God are synonyms, which express nothing other than agennesie (ingeneratedness) in which we apparently adequately comprehend the Essence of God. According to the Nominalists the distinguishing of several qualities has no basis in the Divine Essence itself, but only in the various operations of God (distinctio cum connotatione effectuum—a distinction connoting effects).

Against the acceptance of a mere logical distinction there is the fact that Holy Scripture refers to many attributes of God. To explain these away as mere synonyms is incompatible with the dignity of Holy Writ. Again the perfections appearing in the works of God presuppose that God as their Originator Himself possesses them. God is not good because He does good, but He does good because He Himself is good.

c) According to the Scotists, the difference between God and His attributes is formal (distinctio formalis). A formal difference lies between a real and a purely mental difference. But the acceptance of the notion of various formalities of being which are (actualiter) present in God, previous to and independent of our thinking, is contrary to the absolute simplicity of the Divine Substance.

d) According to the general teaching, the difference is to be conceived as a virtual difference (distinctio virtualis or rationis ratiocinatae sive cum fundamento in re—a virtual distinction, a distinction of ratiotinative reason with a foundation in reality). The distinguishing of many attributes in God has a factual basis in the infinite fullness of the Divine Being. Even if God's Nature is in itself absolutely simple, yet we can only know it in a multiplicity of concepts. Cf. S. th. I 13, 4 : nomina Deo attributa licet significent unam rem, tamen quia significant eam sub rationibus multis et diversis, non sunt synonyma (although the names attributed to God signify the same reality, yet because they signify it under many and diverse aspects, they are not synonomous). The assumed virtual difference is to be more exactly determined as distinctio virtualis minor, since one Divine perfection im licity includes the other.

3. Classification

The Divine attributes are classified into :

a) Negative and positive (infinite—power) ; b) incommunicable and communicable (ingeneratedness—goodness) ; c) absolute and relative (holiness—mercifulness) ; d) attributes of being, and of being-active, also quiescent and active attributes (simplicity—omniscience).

CHAPTER I

The Attributes of the Divine Being

§ 11. The Absolute Perfection of God

That is perfect, in which nothing is lacking which according to its nature it should possess. Cf. S. th. I 4, 1 : Perfectum dicitur, cui nihil deest secundum modum suae perfectionis. That is absolutely perfect, which unites in itself all possible excellences and excludes all deficiencies. That is relatively perfect which has a finite nature and possesses all the advantages corresponding to this nature.

God is absolutely perfect. (*De fide.*)

The Vatican Council teaches that God is infinite in every perfection (omni perfectione infinitus). D 1782. Cf. Mt. 5, 48 : " Be ye therefore perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect ! " Holy Writ indirectly expresses the absolute perfection of God by stressing His self-sufficiency and His independence of all other substance (cf. Rom. II, 34 et seq. : Is. 40, 13 et seq. ; Acts 17. 24 et seq.) and teaches that God contains in Himself all perfections. Ecclus, 43, 29 : " He is all " (τὸ πᾶν ἐστιν αὐτός). Cf. Rom. II, 36. Ps. 93, 9. The Fathers base the absolute perfection of God on the infinite fullness of being of God. They represent God's perfection as an essential, universal perfection which transcends all perfection. St. Irenaeus says : " God is perfect in everything, like unto Himself, all light, all reason, all essence, and the source of all goodness " (Adv. Haer. IV 11, 2). St. John of Damascus teaches : " The Divine Essence is perfect, is in no way deficient in goodness, in wisdom and in power. It is without beginning, without end, eternal, boundless—in short, absolutely perfect " (De fide orth. I 5). Cf. Ps.-Dionysius, De div. nominibus 13, 1.

St. Thomas bases the absolute perfection of God speculatively on the fact that God, as the First Cause of all created things, virtually contains in Himself all the perfections of the created, and that He, as the ipsum esse subsistens includes in Himself Eminently every being and thus, every perfection. Cf. S. th. I 4, 2. In regard to the attribution to God of perfections which are in creatures, the saying is valid : the pure perfections are in God formaliter and eminenter (formally and eminently), the mixed, virtualiter et eminenter (virtually and eminently).

§ 12. God's Infinity

That is infinite which has no end, no bound. Cf. S. th. I 7, 1 : Infinitum dicitur aliquid ex eo, quod non est finitum. The infinite is distinguished according to potentiality (infinitum potentiale) and according to actuality (infinitum actuale). The potentially infinite can be multiplied infinitely, but in reality it is finite and limited. On account of the indefiniteness of the limits, it is also called indefinitum. Further, one distinguishes between the relative and the absolute infinite. The former is infinite in a definite connection (for example duration), the latter is infinite in every respect.

God is actually infinite in every perfection. (*De fide.*)

The Vatican Council says of God that in reason and will and in every perfection He is infinite (intellectu ac voluntate omnique perfectione infinitus). D 1782. Cf. Ps. 146, 5: "Of His wisdom there is no measure." Ps. 144, 3: "Of His greatness there is no end" (Sept. and Vulg: infinite).

The Fathers call God infinite, boundless, uncircumscribed (ἄπειρος ἀόριστος ἀπερίγραπτος, infinitus, incircumscriptus). According to St. Gregory of Nyssa, God is "in every way without limit" (Quod non sint tres dii: PG 45, 129). As He is "according to His nature boundless," He cannot be comprehended in a human concept (C. Eunomium 3; PG 45, 601). Speculatively, the absolute infinity of God may be based on the concept of the "ipsum esse subsistens." As God does not originate from another Being, and as He is in no wise composed of parts, there exists in Him no basis for a limitation of His Being. Cf. S. th. I 7, 1.

§ 13. God's Simplicity

That is simple which is not composed, and on that account also not divisible. The composition is a physical one when a thing is composed of parts which are really distinct from one another, whether substantially (material and form, body and soul) or accidentally (substance and accidents). The composition is a metaphysical one, when a thing is composed of logical or metaphysical parts (e.g., determinations of being such as "*potency* and *act*," "*genus and specific difference*").

God is absolutely simple. (*De fide.*)

The 4th Lateran Council and the Vatican Council teach that God is an absolutely simple substance or nature (substantia seu natura simplex omnino). D 428, 1782. The expression simplex omnino asserts that with regard to God any kind of composition, whether physical or metaphysical, is out of the question. From this it follows that:

1. God is a pure spirit, that is, God is neither a body nor a composition of body and spirit. The Old Testament, it is true, represents God in a visible human form by the employment of many anthropomorphisms and anthropopathisms. Indirectly, however, it expresses God's spirituality by representing Him as supreme over matter and as the ruler of matter. Men, in distinction to God, are often called "flesh" (cf. Is. 31, 3). The New Testament designates God explicitly a Spirit. John 4, 24: "God is a spirit." 2 Cor. 3, 17: "The Lord is a spirit."

The viewpoint of the Audians or Anthropomorphists, who, in a false interpretation of Gn. 1, 26 held God to be a psycho-physical Being, as men are, was rejected by the Fathers as a foolish heresy (*stultissima haeresis;* St. Jerome). Tertullian, under Stoic influence, and starting from the assumption that everything actual is corporeal, ascribes to the spiritual essences, to God and to the soul a certain corporeality. Adv. Praxeam 7: Quis enim negabit Deum corpus esse, etsi Deus spiritus est? Spiritus enim corpus sui generis in sua effigie.

Speculatively, the immateriality of God is implied by His pure actuality. Since there exists in God no potency, and since for matter potentiality is essential, there can therefore be no matter in God. Cf. S. th. I 3, 1 and 2.

2. God is an absolutely simple spirit, that is, in God there is no composition of any kind, of substance or accidents, of essence and existence, of nature and person, of power and activity, of passivity and activity, of genus and specific difference. Holy Writ indicates the absolute simplicity of God when it equates the Essence of God with His Attributes. Cf. 1 John 4, 8 : " God is charity." John 14, 6 : " I am the way, the truth and the life." St. Augustine says of the Divine Nature : " It is called simple because it is that which it has, except that which is said of one Person in relation to the Other " (De civ. Dei XI 10, 1).

Speculatively the absolute simplicity of God may be derived from His pure actuality. Pure Act is incompatible with any kind of composition, for the composed thing comes later than the composing parts and is dependent on these. Further, a composed thing presupposes an origin, which brings the parts together and thus the parts are in potency to the whole. Cf. S. th. I 3, 7. The existence of virtual differences between the essence and the attributes of God and between the attributes themselves does not controvert the absolute simplicity of God, because the individual attributes do not designate parts of the Divine Essence, but the whole Divine Essence, although from different points of view.

§ 14. God's Unicity

There is only One God. (*De fide.*)

Most of the Symbols of Faith expressly teach the Unicity of God. The Nicene-Constantinople Symbol declares : Credo in unum Deum. (I believe in one God) D 54, 86. The 4th Lateran Council (1215) declares : Unus solus est verus Deus. (The true God is one alone) D 428 : cf. 1782. Opposed to this basic Christian dogma are heathen polytheism, and gnostic-manichaean dualism which posit several eternal principles.

It is a basic doctrine of the Old Testament and of the New Testament Revelation that there is only one God. Dt. 6, 4 (Mk. 12, 29) : " Hear O Israel : The Lord our God is one Lord." St. Paul, the Apostle of the Heathens, insistently stresses against heathen polytheism, the necessity of belief in the one God. 1 Cor. 8, 4 : " We know that an idol is nothing in the world and that there is no God but one." Cf. Acts, 14, 14 ; 17, 23 : Rom. 3, 29 : Eph. 4, 6 ; 1 Tim. 1, 17 : 2, 5. The heathen Gods are not true Gods, but lies and vanity (Jer. 16, 19) and nothingnesses (Ps. 95, 5). Cf. Wis. 13-15. Against the gnostic-manichaean dualism, which traces all evils in the world to an evil principle, Holy Script teaches that natural evil or metaphysical imperfections originate from God's Decree (Dt. 32, 29 : Is. 45, 6 et seq.), but that moral evil has its basis in the misuse of freedom (Rom. 5, 12).

The Fathers base God's unicity on His absolute perfection and on the unity of the world-order, and defend it against the heathens, the gnostics and the Manichaeans. Tertullian writes against Marcion : " That which shall be valid as the highest greatness, that must stand unique and must have no equal, in order not to cease to be the highest essence. . . . But as God is the supreme essence our ecclesiastical truth has with justice declared : If God is not One then there is no God " (Adv. Marc. I 3). Cf. Pastor Hermae. Mand. I, 1 : St.

Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. I 10, 1 ; II 1, 1-5 : Tertullian, Apol. 17. De praescr. 13, Origen, C. Celsum I 23 : St. John of Damascus, De fide orth. I 5.

St. Thomas speculatively derives the Unicity of God from His simplicity, from the infinity of His perfections, and from the unity of the world. S. th. I 11, 3. The history of comparative religion shows that religious development did not proceed from polytheism to monotheism but on the contrary from monotheism to polytheism. Cf. Rom. I, 18 et seq. Again it is not demonstrable that Jahweh up to the time of the Prophets, was merely the national God of the People of Israel, so that in spite of the veneration of a single God, the belief in the existence of several Gods was firmly adhered to (henotheism). "It is not the national God which has become a world God, but the world-God entered on Sinai into a covenant of association with Israel" (E. Kalt, Bibl. Reallexikon 1[2] 721).

§ 15. God's Truth

One distinguishes an ontological, a logical and a moral truth (veritas in essendo, in cognoscendo, in dicendo et agendo—truth in being, in knowing, in saying, in acting).

1. God's Ontological Truth

Ontological truth, or "truth of things" consists in the agreement of a thing with its idea (adaequatio rei cum idea eius sive cum intellectu). It is the being of the things themselves in so far as it is knowable. Being and truth are convertible terms (Ens et verum convertuntur.)

The One God is, in the ontological sense, The True God. (*De fide.*)

The 4th Lateran and the Vatican Council designated God a True God (Deus verus), because He alone fully corresponds to the idea of God. Cf. Jer. 10, 10 ; Jo. 17, 3 ; 1 Thess. 1, 9.

God, as Ipsum Esse Subsistens (subsistent being) is both Being and Truth Itself (αὐταλήθεια). God, as exemplary and efficient cause, gives all extra-divine things their knowability together with their being. Every created thing is the realisation of a Divine Idea, which is imitated in the created spirit. In so far as all actual and possible things reflect the Being of God, He is All Truth (παναλήθεια). As God's Being is elevated over all created being, so also His truth or knowability transcends the truth or knowability of created things ; to this extent He is the Supreme Truth (ὑπεραλήθεια).

2. God's Logical Truth

Logical truth or "truth of thought" consists in the agreement of thought with things : adaequatio intellectus cum re. The perfection of the truth of cognition is dependent on the perfection of the intellect.

God possesses an infinite power of cognition. (*De fide.*)

According to the teaching of the Vatican Council, God is "infinite in understanding" (intellectu infinitus). D 1782. Ps. 146, 5 : "Of His wisdom there is no end." Cf. Ps. 43, 22: 93, II ; 138, 1-6. The object of the Divine knowing is the Divine Essence. In this way God knows all created things in their origin. As in God the subject (of cognition), the object (of cognition), and the act of cognition, are identical, it follows that God is The Absolute Logical Truth. Thus every error is excluded from God (qui nec falli . . . potest : who cannot be deceived. D 1789).

3. God's Moral Truth

Moral truth comprehends veracity (veritas in dicendo or veracitas—truth in speech) and faithfulness (veritas in agendo or fidelitas—truth in action). Veracity is the agreement of speech with knowledge ; adaequatio sermonis cum intellectu. Fidelity is agreement of action with speech ; adaequatio actionis cum sermone.

a) God is absolute Veracity. (*De fide.*)

The Vatican Council says of God that He cannot deceive (qui . . . nec fallere potest). D 1789. Cf. D 1782 : omni perfectione infinitus (infinite in every perfection). Holy Scripture bears witness to the veracity of God and to the incompatibility of a lie with His Essence. John 8, 26 : " He who has sent me, is true." Tit. 1, 2 : " God who lieth not." Hebr. 6, 18 : " It is impossible for God to lie." Cf. Rom. 3, 4.

b) God is absolutely faithful. (*De fide.*)

Cf. D 1789, 1782, Ps. 144, 13 : " The Lord is faithful in all His works." 2 Tim. 2, 13 : " If we believe not He continueth faithful. He cannot deny Himself." Mt. 24, 35 : " Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass." Cf. St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps. 123, 2 : Veritas enim (divina) nec falli potest nec fallere. (Divine truth can neither deceive nor be deceived.)

§ 16. God's Goodness

1. God's Ontological Goodness

As ontological truth is being in relation to intellect, so ontological goodness is being in relation to will : Bonum est ens, in quantum est appetibile. A thing is good (bonum quod) in itself if it possesses the perfections corresponding to its nature ; relatively good (bonum cui) if it is suitable to perfect others (bonum est diffusivum sui—good tends to communicate itself to others).

God is absolute ontological Goodness in Himself and in relation to others. (*De fide.*)

The Vatican Council teaches that God is infinite in every perfection (omni perfectione infinitus : D 1782) and that in the creation He communicates His goodness to creatures (per bona, quae creaturis impertitur : D 1783).

As " Ipsum Esse Subsistens " God is substantial goodness or Goodness Itself (*αὐταγαθότης*, ipsa bonitas). As the origin of all created things and of all created goodness God is The All Good (*παναγαθότης*, bonum universale). In virtue of the infinite chasm between the Divine Goodness and created goodness, God is the Highest Good (*ὑπεραγαθότης*, summum bonum). God alone is The Substantial Good (Luke 18, 19 : " None is good but God alone "). Creatures possess a derived communicated goodness only (1 Tim. 4, 4 : " For every creature of God is good "). The absolute ontological goodness of God is the basis of His Infinite Bliss. In knowing and loving Himself as the Supreme Good He is infinitely blissful in the possession and enjoyment of Himself.

God is absolute ontological goodness in relation to others, in so far as He is the causa exemplaris, efficiens and finalis (exemplary, efficient and final cause) of all created things. Rom. 11, 36 : " For of Him, and by Him, and in Him are all things."

2. The Moral Goodness (Holiness) of God

Moral goodness or holiness consists in freedom from sin and the purity of moral behaviour. The ultimate basis of freedom from sin and of purity of morals lies in the agreement of the will with the moral norm.

God is absolute Moral Goodness or Holiness. (*De fide.*) *D 1782.*

In Holy Mass the Liturgy praises God as the Holy One Holy Writ bears witness to the holiness of God both negative and positive. Dt. 32, 4 : " God is faithful and without any iniquity." Ps. 5, 5 : " Thou art not a God that willest iniquity." Ps. 76, 14 : " Thy way, O God, is in the holy *place*." Is. 6, 3 : " Holy, holy, holy, the Lord God of hosts, all the earth is full of his glory." The word " holy " (kadosh = exempted from profanity) expresses not only God's sublimity over all worldliness (objective holiness) but also His sublimity over all sinfulness (subjective holiness), as the comparison between God's holiness and the uncleanliness of the Prophets shows (6, 5–7). The twofold repetition of the word means that God is in the highest grade or absolutely holy. The tremendous distance between the holiness of God and the sinfulness of man is demonstrated in the term used by Isaias and also in the Psalms (70, 22 ; 77, 41), " the Holy one of Israel."

God is Substantial Holiness, because His Will is identical with the supreme moral norm. The sinlessness of God is, therefore, not merely a factual state of being free from sin (impeccantia), but an intrinsic (metaphysical) impossibility of sinning (impeccabilitas).

3. God's Benignity (benignitas)

God is absolute Benignity. (*De fide.*) *D 1782.*

God's benignity reveals itself in that He bestows on created things countless gifts in the natural and supernatural order, and thus permits them to participate in His goodness (creation, preservation, providence, redemption, sanctification). Cf. Mt. 6, 26 et seq.: Ps. 144, 15 et seq : John 3, 16 : Rom. 8, 32.

(Appendix : God's Beauty)

God is absolute Beauty. Cf. D 1782. God unites in Himself, in the most perfect manner, the three requisites, which, according to St. Thomas (S. th. I 39, 8) belong to the concept of the beautiful : a) integritas sive perfectio : God is absolutely perfect ; b) debita proportio sive consonantia : God in spite of His infinite fullness of being, is absolutely simple ; c) claritas : God as a pure and absolutely simple spirit is the clearest and brightest Being. His beauty is a substantial beauty which encompasses and infinitely transcends all the beauty of the created world. According to Wisdom 13, 3–5, from the beauty of the creation one can conclude to the much greater beauty of the Creator. Ps. 95, 6 : " Praise and beauty are before him : holiness and majesty in his sanctuary " Cf. Ps. 103, 1 : Wis. 7, 29 : St. Augustine. Conf. X 27, 38 ; XI 4, 6.

§ 17. God's Immutability

That is mutable which goes from one condition to another. In consequence of the finite nature of its being every creature is mutable.

God is absolutely immutable. (*De fide.*)

The 4th Lateran Council and the Vatican Council teach that God is immutable (incommutabilis) D 428, 1782. Holy Scripture excludes all change from God

and positively ascribes to Him absolute immutability. James 1, 17: "With whom there is no change nor shadow of alteration." Ps. 101, 27 et seq.: "They (the heavens) shall perish but thou remainest and all of them shall grow old. And as a vestment thou shalt change them, and they shall be changed. But thou art always the selfsame. And thy years shall not fail." Cf. Ps. 32, 11; Is. 46, 10; Hebr. 6, 17. Mal. 3, 6 indicates in the Divine Name of God the basis of the absolute immutability of God: "For I am the Lord, and I change not.": Life and activity are associated with God's immutability. Cf. Wisdom 7, 24. 27. St. Augustine says: "God knows to act in restfulness and to rest in activity." Novit quiescens agere et agens quiescere (De civ. Dei XII 17, 2).

The Fathers exclude all change from God. Tertullian stresses that the Incarnation of the Logos involved no change or mutation in God: "Furthermore God must be held to be unchangeable and immutable, because He is eternal" (Adv. Prax. 27). Origen opposes to the stoical teaching of God's corporeality and His consequent mutability the Christian teaching of God's absolute immutability, for this he adduces proof from the Holy Writ (Ps. 101, 28; Mal. 3, 6); he also rejects the reproach by Celsus that God's Incarnation implied a change for the worse (C. Cels. I 21; IV 14). St. Augustine derives God's immutability from His absolute plenitude of being which is expressed in the name Jahweh: "Being is a name which connotes immutability. For all that changes ceases to be what it was and commences to be what it was not. True Being, Genuine Being is possessed only by Him who does not change" (Sermo 7, 7).

St. Thomas bases the absolute immutability of God on His pure actuality, on His absolute simplicity and on His infinite perfection. Mutability includes potentiality, composition, and imperfection, and is thus irreconcilable with God as the actus purus, the absolutely simple and absolutely perfect Essence. S. th. I 9, 1. When God operates ad extra (outside Himself), for example, in the creation of the world, He does not effect a new act, but He enters on a new realisation of the eternal resolve of His divine will. The decree of creation is as eternal and immutable as the Divine Essence with which it is factually identical: only its effect, the created world is temporal and mutable. Cf. St. Augustine, De civ. Dei. XII 17, 2.

§ 18. God's Eternity

Eternity is a duration without beginning and without end, without sooner and later, a "permanent now" (nunc stans). The essence of eternity is the absolute lack of succession. Boethius gave the classical definition: Aeternitas est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio (Eternity is the perfect and simultaneous total possession of interminable life) (De consol. phil. V. 6). From eternity in the strict sense must be distinguished the "aevum" or the "aeviternitas," that is, the duration of the created spirits, which have indeed a beginning, but no end, and which, in their substance, are subject to no mutation.

God is eternal. (*De fide.*)

The dogma asserts that God possesses the Divine Being without beginning and without end, and without succession in a constant undivided now. The Symbolum Quicumque declares: Aeternus Pater, Aeternus Filius, Aeternus Spiritus Sanctus et tamen non tres aeterni, sed unus aeternus. (Eternal Father,

Eternal Son, Eternal Holy Ghost and yet not three eternal beings but one.) D 39. The 4th Lateran Council and the Vatican Council attribute to God the predicate "eternal" (aeternus). D 428, 1782.

Holy Writ bears witness to the individual grounds of the Divine eternity. The negation of beginning and end is expressed in Ps. 89, 2: "Before the mountains were made, or the earth and the world were formed: from eternity and to eternity Thou art God." The absolute lack of succession is seen in Ps. 2, 7: "The Lord hath said to me: Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee." Jo. 8, 58: "Before Abraham was made, I am." Cf. Ps. 101, 27 et seq.; 89, 4; 2 Peter 3, 8.

The Fathers, in their conflict with the heathen world, familiar with the genealogies of gods, expressly attest God's eternity. Cf. Aristides, Apol. 1, 4; Tatian, Or. 4, 3; Athenagoras Suppl. 10; St. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. II 34, 2. St. Augustine says that God's eternity is a constant present: "The eternity of God is His Essence itself, which has nothing mutable in it. In It there is nothing past, as if it were no longer, nothing future, as if it had not yet been. In It there is only 'is,' that is, the present" (Enarr. in Ps. 101, 2, 10).

§19. The Immensity or Immeasurability of God and His Omnipresence

Immensity or spacelessness connotes the negation of spatial limitation; omnipresence expresses the relation of God to real space. Immeasurability is a negative and absolute attribute; omnipresence is a positive and relative one.

1. God's Immensity

God is immense or absolutely immeasurable. (*De fide.*)

The Symbol Quicumque teaches: Immensus Pater, immensus Filius, immensus Spiritus Sanctus, sed tamen non tres immensi, sed unus immensus. (Father Immense, Son Immense, Holy Spirit Immense and yet not three immense beings but one.) D 39. The 4th Lateran Council and the Vatican Council apply to God the attribute "immeasurable" (immensus) D 428, 1782.

Holy Writ bears witness to the sublimity of God over all spatial measure. The universe does not suffice to encompass Him: 3 Kings 8, 27: "For if heaven and the heavens of heavens cannot contain thee how much less this house, which I have built." Is. 66, 1: "Heaven is my throne, and the earth my footstool." Cf. Job 11, 7.9.

The Fathers call God incomprehensible, uncircumscribed, immeasurable (ἀχώρητος, ἀπερίγραπτος, immensus, incircumscriptus). Cf. Pastor Hermae Mand. 1, 1: "For the very first thing, believe, that there is only one God . . . who encompasses everything, while He alone cannot be encompassed." Cf. Athenagoras, Suppl. 10; St. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. II 30, 9. Speculatively, the immeasurability of God is to be based on His infinite fullness of being. This permits no limitation, including limitation of space.

2. God's Omnipresence

a) Reality of God's omnipresence

God is everywhere present in created space. (*De fide.*)

God's omnipresence is an object of regular and general teaching and is contained in the dogma of the Infinity of God as the part is contained in the whole

Holy Writ describes the omnipresence of God in picturesque language in Ps. 138, 7 et seq.: "Whither shall I go before thy spirit? or whither shall I flee before thy face? If I ascend to the heavens, thou art there; If I descend into hell, thou art present. If I take my wings early in the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea; even there also shall thy hand lead me and thy right hand shall hold me." Jer. 23, 24: "Do I not fill heaven and earth, saith the Lord." Acts 17, 27 et seq.: "God is not far from every one of us; 28. for in Him we live, and move and are." Cf. Dt. 4, 39; Wis. 7, 24; 8, 1.

From God's omnipresence St. Clement of Rome concludes to the fear of Him: "Where shall one flee and how shall one escape Him who spans the All" (Cor. 28, 4). Cf. Theophilus of Antioch Ad Autolycum II 3; Minucius Felix, Octavius 32, 7; St. Cyprian, De Dom. Or. 4. The first monograph on the substantial presence of God in the whole world and in all the parts thereof and on the indwelling of God in the just, was written by St. Augustine in his, "Liber de praesentia Dei ad Dardanum" (Ep. 187).

St. Thomas speculatively bases the omnipresence of God on His all-causality. As the origin of being, He is intrinsically present in everything as long as it exists. S. th. I 8, 1.

b) More exact determination of the omnipresence.

Since the time of Petrus Lombardus (Sent. I 37, 1) theologians more closely determine the omnipresence of God as a presence according to power (per potentiam—dynamic presence), according to knowledge (per praesentiam sive scientiam—ideal presence), and according to essence (per essentiam—essential or substantial presence). Through this essence He is present substantially in all things, including the created spiritual essences (angels, demons, human souls), as the immediate origin of their existence. Cf. S. th. I 8, 3. The substantial omnipresence of God is to be more closely defined as a repletive presence, that is, the whole Divine Essence fills the whole created space and every one of its parts. On account of the absolute simplicity of God, however, the repletive omnipresence must not be conceived as an infinite extension (expansion or diffusion) of the Divine Substance.

In addition to this general, natural, presence of God, there is also a special supernatural presence or indwelling of God, by the supernatural efficacy of His grace, in the soul of the just man (John 14, 23; 1 Cor. 3, 16; 6, 19), in the house of God (Ps. 131, 13 et seq.) and in Heaven (Mt. 6, 9). The indwelling of God in the humanity of Christ on the basis of the Hypostatic Union is unique (Col. 2, 9: "In Him dwelleth all the fullness of the Godhead corporeally").

CHAPTER 2

The Attributes of the Divine Life

Life is a) the being of the living (i.e., a substance with the ability to self-movements); b) life-actuation, i.e., self-movement, self-actuation (S. th. I 54, 2 ad 1). The spiritual functions of knowing and willing are the most perfect form of self-actuation. These are found in all fullness in God. Consequently, God possesses life in all fullness. S. th. I 18, 3 ad 2. Sicut Deus est ipsum suum esse et suum intelligere, ita est suum vivere.

The Vatican Council calls God the Living God (Deus vivus). D 1782. Holy Writ frequently speaks of the Living God and of the life of God. God confirms its assertions: "As true as I live." The people of Israel swear: "As true as God lives." Jesus calls Himself "the Life." John 14, 6: "I am the way, the truth and the Life." Cf. John 5, 26; 1 John 5, 20.

St. Augustine bases the perfection of the Divine Life on the identity of this with the Absolute Divine Being. De Trin. VI 10, 11: "In Him (in the Son of God) is the first and highest life. For Him life and being are not two different things, but being and life is one and the same." As God is the origin of creation for creatures, so He is also the origin of life for them. Ps. 35, 10: "With thee is the fountain of Life." Acts 17, 25: "He giveth to all life and breath and all things."

I. The Divine Knowledge or Knowing

§ 20. The Perfection of Divine Knowledge

1. God's Knowledge Is Infinite. (*De fide.*)

The Vatican Council says of God that in His power of cognition He is infinite (intellectu infinitus). D 1782. Holy Writ designates God as the God of knowledge (Deus scientiarum: 1 Sm. 2, 3) and declares that His wisdom is without measure: Sapientiae eius non est numerus (Ps. 146, 5). Cf. Ps. 138, 6; Rom. 11, 33.

Speculatively, the infinity of the Divine knowledge may be based:

a) On the reality of created intelligence, for according to the relationship of cause and effect, this supreme created perfection must be contained in God as its origin, and indeed in an infinite manner.

b) On the order and finality of the world, which postulates a Creator and Director of the highest intelligence.

c) On the absolute immateriality of God; for the immateriality is the foundation of knowing, and the degree of the power of cognition is determined by the degree of immateriality. Cf. S. th. I 14, 1: Cum Deus sit in summo immaterialitatis, sequitur, quod ipse sit in summo cognitionis. (Since God is at the summit of immateriality it follows that He is at the summit of knowledge.)

2. God's Knowledge Is Purely and Simply Actual

As God is pure act (actus purus), there is in His knowing no transitions from potency to act, no habitus, no succession, and no progress from the known to the unknown. God's knowing is neither potential nor habitual, neither successive nor discursive. God knows all in one single indivisible act (simplici intuitu). Cf. S. th. I 14, 7.

3. God's Knowledge Is Subsistent

God does not only possess an activity of knowledge, but is Himself knowledge. His knowing is, in consequence of His absolute simplicity, really identical with His Essence. Cf. S. th. I 18, 3 ad 2: Deus est suum intelligere. (God is His own understanding.) S. th. I 14, 4: intelligere Dei est eius substantia. (The understanding of God is His own substance.)

4. God's Knowledge Is Comprehensive

From the infinity of His power of knowing it follows that God completely encompasses His infinite knowledge, and thereby comprehends Himself. Cf. S. th. I 14, 3 : Tanta est virtus Dei in cognoscendo, quanta est actualitas eius in existendo . . . . Unde manifestum est, quod tantum seipsum cognoscit, quantum cognoscibilis est. Et propter hoc seipsum perfecte comprehendit. "God's power of self-comprehension is as great as His reality in Being. . . . Therefore it is obvious that He comprehends Himself as far as He is comprehensible. Therefore He comprehends Himself perfectly." Holy Writ bears witness to the comprehensive character of the Divine knowledge in 1 Cor. 2, 10 : "The Spirit searcheth all things yea, the deep things of God." Cf. Mt. 11, 27.

5. God's Knowledge Is Independent of Extra-Divine Things

The Divine intellect is not determined to knowledge from without but from within through the Divine Essence. Extra-Divine objects are not the cause (causa determinans), but only the aim (terminus) of the Divine knowledge. Further, God does not know the extra-Divine objects through intelligible "species" imprinted from without ; for an intellect which knows by means of a species distinct from itself stands in the same relation to this as does potency to act. God, however, is actus purus (pure act). Cf. S. th. I 14, 4 : In Deo intellectus intelligens et id, quod intelligatur, et species intelligibilis et ipsum intelligere sunt omnino unum et idem. (In God the intellect understanding and the thing understood are the same reality and the intelligible species and the act of understanding itself are entirely one and the same.)
God knows extra-Divine things in His Own Essence, as He is the causa exemplaris and the causa efficiens of real things and for possible things—the Exemplar.

While exhaustively knowing His creative causality He also knows therein all the operations which flow or which can flow from this, and indeed, just as comprehensively as He knows Himself. 1 John 1, 5 : "God is light and in Him there is no darkness."

§ 21. Object and Division of the Divine Knowing

1. The Divine Self-cognition (*Scientia contemplationis*)

The primary and formal object of the Divine Cognition is God Himself.

God knows Himself immediately, that is, without a medium in quo, (i.e., an object through the cognition of which one attains to the cognition of another). The medium sub quo (= lumen intellectus, i.e., the light of intelligence) and the medium quo (= species intelligibilis) are in the act of the Divine Self-cognition identical with the Divine Essence. Cf. S. th. I 14, 2 : Deus se per seipsum intelligit (God knows Himself through Himself).

2. The Divine Knowledge of Extra-Divine Things

The secondary and material object of the Divine knowledge consists of the extra-Divine things. These are divided into the purely possible, the real, and the conditionally future.

a) God knows all that is merely possible by the knowledge of simple intelligence (*scientia simplicis intelligentiae*). (*De fide.*)

On the teaching of the Church cf. D 1782. Holy Writ teaches that God knows all things and hence also the merely possible. Est. 14, 14 : "O Lord

who hast the knowledge of all things." 1 Cor 2, 10: "The spirit (of God) searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God." In comprehending His infinite imitability and His omnipotence, God knows therein the whole sphere of the possible. S. th. I 14, 9.

b) God knows all real things in the past, the present and the future (*Scientia visionis*). (*De fide.*)

On the teaching of the Church cf. D 1782. Holy Writ asserts the universality of the Divine Knowledge in numerous passages. Ecclus. 23, 29: "All things were known to the Lord before they were created so also after they were perfected." God's providence which extends even to the smallest detail presupposes an equally extensive knowledge. Cf. Ps. 146, 4: "Who telleth the number of the stars: and calleth them by name." Ps. 49, 11: "I know all the fowls of the air." Job 28, 24; Ecclus. 1, 2 et seq.; Mt. 6, 26 et seq.; 10, 29 et seq. Holy Writ also ascribes knowledge of the heart to God. Acts 15, 8: "God who knoweth the hearts." Ps. 7, 10: "The searcher of hearts and reins is God." I Pa. 28, 9: "The Lord searcheth all hearts and understandeth all thoughts." Cf. Ps. 68, 6; 138, 1-6. The knowledge of hearts is an exclusive privilege of God. 3 Kings 8, 39: "Thou only knowest the heart of all the children of men." For humanity, on the other hand, the human heart is unsearchable (Jer. 17, 9). Cf. St. Clement of Rome, Cor. 21, 3. 9; 27, 6; 28, 1.

When God, in His self-comprehension beholds His infinite operative power, He knows therein all which He, as the main effective cause, actually comprehends, i.e., all reality. The difference between past, present and future does not exist for the Divine knowledge, since for God all is present.

By the knowledge of vision (scientia visionis) God also foresees the future free acts of the rational creatures with infallible certainty. (*De fide.*)

The Vatican Council teaches: "Omnia enim nuda et aperta sunt oculis eius (Hebr. 4, 13), ea etiam, quae libera creaturarum actione futura sunt." "All things are naked and open to his eyes, even those things that will happen through the free actions of creatures." D 1784, cf. D 3017. Holy Scripture attests this truth in the clearest fashion in Ps. 138, 3 et seq.: "Thou hast understood my thoughts from afar off: my path and my line thou hast searched out."

John 6, 65: "Jesus knew from the beginning who they were that did not believe and who he was that would betray him." The Fathers preferred to appeal to the prophecies. Tertullian, Adv. Marc. II 5: "What shall I say about His foreknowing? This has as many witnesses as it has made Prophets."

Prescience and freedom

The dogma of human freedom (D 815) is not abrogated by the dogma of the infallible certainty of the Divine prevision of future free actions. The Fathers point to the eternal character of the Divine knowing and conclude that the Divine foreknowledge imposes as little compulsion on future actions as human remembering does on the past. Cf. St. Aug. De libero arbitrio III 4, 11: "As thou through thy remembrance dost not oblige that which is past to have occurred, so God through His prescience does not compel that which shall be in the future to happen."

Speculative Theology makes a distinction between antecedent necessity (necessitas antecedens) and consequent necessity (necessitas consequens). This latter follows the action, and therefore does not involve freedom ; according to the principle of contradiction it flows from the reality of an action sinc: what really is cannot be non-effective. The future free actions foreseen by God follow infallibly or necessarily, not by antecedent but by consequent necessity. St. Thomas uses the distinction between necessitas consequentis and necessitas consequentiae in the same sense. The former asserts that an effect necessarily follows from its cause ; the latter expresses a logical necessity, such as exists, for example, between the premisses and the conclusion of a syllogism. In our case, if God, in His timeless knowing, sees something present, then according to the principle of contradiction it is inevitable that it really happens. Cf. S. c. G. 167 : De verit 24, 1 ad 13.

c) God also knows the conditioned future free actions with infallible certainty (Scientia futuribilium). (*Sent. communis.*)

By these are understood free actions of the future which indeed will never occur, but which would occur, if certain conditions were fulfilled. The Molinists call this Divine knowledge scientia media, because it stands between the scientia necessaria (or naturalis), by which God knows everything which is independent of His free will, i.e., Himself and His ideas, and the scientia libera, by which God knows everything which depends on His free will, i.e., every reality beside Himself. The Thomists deny that this knowledge of the conditioned future is a special kind of Divine knowledge which precedes the decrees of the Divine Will.

That God possesses the certain knowledge of conditioned future free actions (futuribilia) may be positively proved from Scripture. Mt. 11, 2: 1: "Woe to thee, Corozain! Woe to thee, Bethsaida ! For if in Tyre and Sidon had been wrought the miracles that have been wrought in you, they had long ago done penance in sackcloth and ashes." Cf. 1 Sm 23, 1–13 ; Wis. 4, 11.

The Fathers assert Divine foresight of conditioned future things when they teach that God does not always hear our prayer for temporal goods, in order to prevent their misuse ; or that God allows a man to die at an early age in order to save him from eternal damnation. Cf. the work of St. Gregory of Nyssa : " De infantibus, qui praemature abripiuntur."

Speculatively, the Divine foreknowing of conditioned future things is based on the infinite perfection of the Divine knowing, on the infallibility of the Divine providence, and on the practice of prayer in the Church.

§ 22. The Medium of the Divine Prescience of the Free Actions of Rational Creatures

The medium of cognition in which God from eternity foresees all extra-Divine objects and therefore also all real future and conditioned future actions of rational creatures with infallible certainty, is His own wisdom. On the question as to how God in His own Essence foresees future free actions, opinions diverge.

a) According to St. R. Bellarmine († 1621) the Divine prevision of the future free actions of rational creatures is founded on the fact that God possesses a cognitio supercomprehensiva of the created will. The creature's will is the origin of the

free actions. Now when God perfectly knows the cause, He also knows the effects proceeding from it. Against this explanation it is to be objected that the supercomprehensive cognition of the free will establishes only a morally certain prevision of future free actions. But the Divine prevision is absolutely certain.

b) Thomism, scientifically established by the Dominican theologian Dominicus Bañez († 1604), teaches that God knows the future free actions of creatures in His eternal volitional decrees : the absolute future in absolute, the conditioned future in conditioned or hypothetical decrees. God has from all eternity in these decrees laid down the totality of the world-order also in regard to free creatures. The realisation of the eternal decrees of God in time occurs through the fact that God, through a physical intervention, the " praemotio physica " infallibly moves creatures to the actions intended by Him, in a manner, however, suitable to the nature of creatures, so that unfree creatures act from necessity, free creatures with freedom. In His eternal decrees, God foresees with infallible certainty the free actions of creatures predetermined by Him.

c) Molinism, deriving from the Jesuit theologian Louis Molina († 1600) explains the infallible Divine prescience of future free actions by recourse to " scientia media," which precedes the Divine decrees of will conceptually, not in time, and which is independent of them. Through scientia simplicis intelligentiae God knows from all eternity how every creature endowed with reason will act in all possible circumstances (stage 1). Through scientia media He knows how it would act in all possible conditions, in the case of new conditions being realised (stage 2). In the light of scientia media He then resolves with the fullest freedom to realise certain determined conditions. Now He knows through scientia visionis with infallible certainty, how the person will, in fact, act in these conditions (stage 3).

Critique

Thomism very effectively stresses the all-causality and over-lordship of God over everything created, but does less justice to the fact of human freedom. It is difficult in fact to reconcile " praemotio physica " with human freedom. Molinism, on the other hand, defends human freedom, but weakens the all-causality and the absolute independence of God. The mode of the scientia media, which is the basis of the whole system, remains unexplained.

§ 23. The Divine Knowing as Origin of Things

1. Creative Wisdom

As the idea of the artist illuminates and directs his willing and activity in the execution of a work of art, so also the ideas of God which are factually identical with His knowledge, direct His Divine Willing and the Divine Activity in extra-Divine operations. Divine knowledge in association with Divine Will is the exemplary and efficient cause (causa exemplaris and causa efficiens) of all finite things. According to the terminology of Holy Writ, this practical Divine Knowledge is called wisdom. As the cause of the existence of things, it is called creative wisdom (sapientia creatrix). Cf. Ps. 103, 24 : " Thou hast made all things in wisdom." Pro. 3, 19 : " The Lord by wisdom hath founded the earth." Wis. 7, 21 : " Wisdom the worker of all things taught me."

Among the Fathers, St. Augustine particularly developed the doctrine of the Divine Ideas, in association indeed with the Platonic doctrine of ideas, which he christianised. He posited as existing in the Divine Mind the ideas conceived by Plato as hypostases eternally existing parallel with God, and by explaining

these as Divine Thoughts eternally identical with the Divine Essence, in which God is cognisant of His infinite imitability through finite created things. He regards the Divine Ideas as the origin of things. De Trin. XV 13, 22: "All His creatures, the spirits and the corporeal He does not know because they are, but they are because He knows them. That is, nothing which He would create was unknown to Him. Because He knew, He created; He did not know because He created." Cf. S. th. I 14, 8.

2. Regulating Wisdom
The Divine Wisdom is also regulating wisdom (sapientia disponens), because it communicates finality and order to things; gives them laws (legislative wisdom) and guides them to their ultimate destination (educative wisdom). Wis. 11, 21: "Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight."

3. Governing Wisdom
The Divine Wisdom is also a controlling and governing wisdom (sapientia gubernans). As such it coincides with Divine providence, Wis. 8, 1: "She reacheth therefore from end to end mightily and ordereth all things sweetly."

II. The Divine Willing

§ 24. The Perfection of the Divine Willing

1. God's Divine Will is Infinite. (*De fide.*)
The Vatican Council teaches that God, in His will, is infinite (voluntate infinitus). D 1782. Holy Scripture sees in God's free will the ultimate basis of the world-order (Ps. 134, 6: "Whatsoever the Lord pleased He hath done in heaven, in earth, in the sea, and in all the deeps)," and considers the will of God as the supreme norm of morality (Mt. 6, 10: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven"). The Fathers defend the freedom of God's will against the fatalism of the heathens.

Reason arrives at the notion of the Infinite perfection of the Divine volition from the fact of the created will. Since the will is a pure perfection it is predicated of God formally, but also infinitely and eminently. The categorical imperative also of the moral law points to a will which controls humanity.

2. God's volition like God's knowing is purely and simply actual, subsistent and independent of all extra-Divine things.

As God is Pure Act (Actus Purus) there is, in His willing, no transition from potency to act, no habitus, no sequence of individual acts of will, but one single successionless act of willing. His will, by virtue of the absolute simplicity of God, is factually identical with the Divine Essence. S. th. I 19, 1: sicut suum intelligere est suum esse, ita suum velle (just as His intelligence is His essence so is His will). The things external to God are not determining reasons, but merely the goal of the Divine volition. God's absolute fullness of being excludes concupiscible love (amor concupiscentiae). God's ardent longing for the salvation of mankind (cf. Is. 65, 2) is an expression of His Beneficent Love (amor benevolentiae), which shows itself in the communication of benefits to creatures.

3. The affections in God, corresponding to His nature, are purely spiritual manifestations of His volition. The basic affection is love, which in God is factually identical with His Essence: "God is charity" (1 John 4, 8). Among the other

affections, there is in God, in infinite intensification, that of joy or bliss (in se et ex se beatissimus: D 1782). As far as hate is concerned there is in Him, on account of His absolute holiness, the hate of abomination (odium abominationis) towards sin, but not the hate of enmity (odium inimicitiae) towards the person of the sinner. Cf. Ps. 5, 7: "Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity." Wis. 11, 25: "Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which thou hast made; for thou didst not appoint or make anything, hating it." Other affections such as longing, sadness, hope, anger, can be attributed to God only in an anthropomorphic sense. Anger in Holy Writ means the punitive justice of God.

§ 25. The Object of the Divine Volition

1. The Divine Self-love

The primary and formal object of the Divine will and of the Divine love is God Himself. The Vatican Council teaches: Necessario amat seipsum (He loves Himself necessarily). D 1805. Holy Writ bears witness to the fact that God has co-ordinated the whole creation to Himself as its final end. Prov. 16, 4: "The Lord hath made all things for Himself." Cf. S. th. I 19, 1 ad 3: Objectum divinae voluntatis est bonitas sua, quae est eius essentia (The object of the Divine Will is His own Goodness which is His essence).

Speculatively the love of God for Himself and its necessity arises from the fact that God is the Supreme Good and that He in His comprehensive self-knowledge completely knows His infinite amiability. From this knowledge there necessarily flows the infinite love of God for Himself.

2. God's Love for His Creatures

Things external to God are the secondary and material object of the Divine will and of the Divine love. The Vatican Council teaches that God called into existence all creatures most freely (liberrimo consilio voluntate ab omni necessitate libera, D 1783, 1805). Holy Writ stresses God's love for His creatures. Wis. 11, 25: "Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of those things which thou hast made."

God's love for His creatures is a love of complacency (amor complacentiae), that is, God loves creatures in so far as they participate in a finite manner in His perfections and have their final end in Him. Further, God's love for creatures is a benevolent love (amor benevolentiae), that is, God loves creatures not with a receiving, but with a bestowing, and therefore a most unselfish love. God's love is not motivated by the creature's goodness, but is itself the cause of that goodness. Amor Dei est infundus et creans bonitatem in rebus (The love of God infuses and creates goodness in things). (S. th. I 20, 2). Cf. 1 John 4, 10: "In this is charity; not as though we had loved God, but because He hath first loved us." The degree of God's love for creatures is one and the same in the inner-Divine act; in the extra-Divine created effect, however, it is different according to the grade of its amiability.

3. The Relationship of the Divine Will to Evil

a) Physical Evil

God does not (per se) desire physical evil, for example, suffering, illness, death, that is not for the sake of the evil or as an aim. Wis. 1, 13 et seq.: "For God has not made death: neither hath He pleasure in the destruction of the living

For He created all things that they might be." However, God wills physical evil, natural evil as well as punitive evil, per accidens, that is, as a means to a higher end of the physical order (for example, for the acquisition of a higher life), or of the moral order (for example, for punishment or for moral enlightenment). Ecclus. 11, 14 : "Good things and evil, life and death, poverty and riches are from God." Cf. Ecclus. 39, 35 et seq. ; Am. 3, 6.

b) Moral Evil

Moral evil, that is, sin, which according to its nature is a revolt against God, is willed by God neither per se nor per accidens, that is, neither as an end nor as a means to an end. The Council of Trent has condemned as heretical, the contrary doctrine of Calvin D 816, cf. Ps. 5, 5: "Thou art not a God that willest iniquity." God simply permits sin (permissive solum ; D 816), because He has consideration for man's freedom (Ecclus. 15, 15 et seq.), and because He possesses the wisdom and the power to cause good to arise from evil. Gn. 50, 20 : "Ye thought evil against me, but God turned it into good." Cf. St. Augustine, Enchiridion II. In the final end, moral evil will serve the supreme aim of the world, the glorification of God, in as much as it reveals His mercy in forgiving and His justice in punishing.

When Holy Writ says that God hardens man in evil (Ex. 4, 21 ; Rom. 9, 18) the intention is not to represent God as the proper originator of sin. The hardening is a punishment which consists in the withdrawal of grace. Cf. St. Augustine, In Ioan. tr. 53, 6 : "God blinds and hardens in such a fashion, that He deserts and does not help" (deserendo et non adiuvando).

§ 26. The Physical Properties of the Divine Will

1. Necessity and Freedom

God loves Himself of necessity, but loves and wills the creation of extra-Divine things, on the other hand, with freedom. (*De fide.*)

The Vatican Council declared against gnosticism, Manichaeism, fatalism, pantheism, cosmological optimism : Si quis dixerit, Deum non voluntate ab omni necessitate libera, sed tam necessario creasse, quam necessario amat seipsum (If anybody says that God created things not in virtue of a will free from all necessity, but in virtue of the necessity by which He necessarily loves Himself, let him be an anathema), A.S.D. 1805. Holy Writ attests God's freedom in the creation, in the Redemption, in the administration of the grace of Redemption. Ps. 134, 6 : "Whatsoever the Lord pleased He hath done, in heaven, in earth, in the sea, and in all the deeps." Eph. 1, 5 : "Who hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ unto Himself according to the purpose of His will." 1 Cor. 12, 11 : "Dividing to every one according to His will." St. Clement of Rome wrote : "He will do all things when He wills and how He wills" (Cor. 27, 5).

The imperfection which belongs to created volition must not be ascribed to the notion of the Divine freedom. Therefore the Divine freedom is not libertas contrarietatis, that is, a freedom to choose between good and evil ; for the possibility of willing evil is indeed a sign of freedom, but it is not of the essence

of freedom, and signifies rather imperfection : velle malum nec est libertas nec pars libertatis, quamvis sit quoddam libertatis signum (De verit. 22, 6). The Divine freedom is positively to be defined as libertas contradictionis, that is, the freedom to act or not to act (for example, to create the world), and as libertas specificationis, that is, freedom to choose between various good or indifferent actions (for example, to create this or that world).

2. Omnipotence

Power is the principle which executes that which reason knows and the will commands : (principium exsequens id, quod voluntas imperat et ad quod scientia dirigit) (S. th. I 25, 1 ad 4). God's omnipotence connotes that He has the power to execute all that He may wish, that is, all that is real and possible.

God is almighty. (*De fide.*)

The Apostles' Creed confesses : Credo in Deum Patrem omnipotentem ; as do similarly all the other symbols of faith. Cf. D 428, 1782. Holy Writ stresses the omnipotence of God in His name El, especially in the composition El schaddai (παντοκράτωρ omnipotens). It attests that nothing is impossible for God. Luke 1, 37 : "No word shall be impossible with God." Mt. 19, 26 : "With God all things are possible." Mt. 3, 9 : "For I tell you : God is able of these stones to raise children to Abraham." The Fathers very often ascribe to God the attribute "Almighty."

Speculatively, God's omnipotence flows from His being pure act. The efficacy of a thing is determined by the grade of its real being : (Unumquodque agit secundum quod est in actu) (S. th. I 25, 1 ad 1). To God's Infinite Reality of Being there corresponds an (intensively) Infinite Power. This extends over the whole sphere of real and possible being (extensively infinite). As God's power is identical with God's Essence, it cannot imply anything which contradicts the Essence and the Attributes of God. Thus God cannot change, cannot lie, can make nothing that has happened not to have happened (contrary to the teaching of St. Peter Damian), cannot realise anything which is contradictory in itself. 2 Tim. 2, 13 : (He cannot deny himself) negare seipsum non potest. Cf. St. Augustine, De civ. Dei V 10, 1 ; S. th. I 25, 4.

God has determined in a certain mode His omnipotence, by freely choosing to realise one definite world-order from many possible such orders. God's might, which activates itself in the framework of the real world-order, is called "potentia ordinata" to distinguish it from His "potentia absoluta."

3. Supreme Dominion

God is the Lord of the heavens and of the earth. (*De fide.*) *D 1782.*

In virtue of His Divine omnipotence God has supreme dominion. This implies an unlimited right of government (dominium iurisdictionis), and an unlimited dominion over all created things (dominium proprietatis), and demands from rational creatures unreserved obedience. This is realised in practice in the acceptance of His Revelation, in the fulfilling of His Commandments, and in adoration. God's right of lordship and of property belong to Him in virtue of His creation of the world and His redemption of mankind. Cf. Ps. 144, 11 et seq.; Est. 13, 9 et seq.; 1 Tim. 6, 15; Ps. 23, 1 et seq.; 88, 12 ; 1 Cor. 6, 20.

§ 27. The Moral Attributes of the Divine Will

1. Justice

While justice in the wider sense is synonymous with integrity or subjective holiness, it is, in the narrower and proper sense, the constant will to give to each what is due to him : constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum uniquique tribuendi (Ulpian).

God is infinitely just. (*De fide.*)

According to the teaching of the Vatican Council God is " infinite in all perfection," therefore also in justice. D 1782. Holy Writ attests God's justice in numerous passages. Ps. 10, 8 : " For the Lord is just, and hath loved justice." Ps. 118, 137 : " Thou art just, O Lord : and thy judgment is just." The Fathers defend God's punitive justice against Marcion, who saw an irreconcilable contrast between the just and punitive God of the Old Testament and the benevolent and merciful God of the New Testament, and therefore, concluded that there must be two Gods. St. Irenaeus shows that God's justice cannot exist without benevolence, nor God's benevolence without justice. Cf. St. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. III 25, 2-3 ; IV 40, 1-2 ; Tertullian, Adv. Marcionem I-III.

As God is the Creator and the Lord of the universe, there is no norm of justice which transcends Him, but God is Himself the Supreme Norm. Deus sibi ipsi est lex (S. th. I 21, 1 ad 2). Justice according to the law (iustitia legalis), which orders the legal relationship of the individual to the community, is predicated of God to the extent that He, through the natural law and the moral law, co-ordinates creatures to the common good. Commutative justice (iustitia commutativa), which regulates the legal relationship of the individual to the individual, cannot in the proper sense, be attributed to God, as the association of equality between the Creator and the created. The creature, on account of his complete dependence on the Creator, cannot by a service impose upon the Creator the obligation of a counter-service. Distributive justice (iustitia distributiva), which regulates the legal relationship of the community to the individual, belongs to God in the proper sense. God, having by His free resolve created the world, by His wisdom and goodness gives to His creatures everything that they need for the fulfilment of their tasks and for the achieving of their aims. God manifests His distributive justice further in that He, as a judge with no respect of persons, Rom. 2, 11, rewards the good (iustitia remunerativa) and punishes the wicked (iustitia vindicativa).

The punishment ordained by God for the sinner is not merely a means of improvement and warning, as Benedict Stattler († 1797) and Georg Hermes († 1831) taught, but is above all retribution for the insult offered to God, and reparation for the moral order disturbed by sin. Dt. 32, 41 : " I will render vengeance to my enemies, and repay them that hate me." Rom. 12, 19 : " for it is written ' revenge is mine, I will repay ', saith the Lord." The punishment of Hell is, on account of its eternal duration for the damned, vindictive only (Mt. 25, 41. 46). On the other hand, the vindictive character of God's penal justice must not be taken to the point that God owes it to His justice, not to remit sin without full atonement, as, following the precedent of St. Anselm of Canterbury († 1109), was taught by Honoré Tournely († 1729), and Fr. X. Dieringer († 1876). He, being the Supreme Lord and Ruler, owes nothing to any higher authority, so there also belongs to Him the right of pardoning, that is, the freedom to forgive sins to the repentant sinner, without a corresponding atonement, and even without any atonement. Cf. S. th. III 46, 2 ad 3 ; I 25,3 ad 3.

2. Mercy

God's mercy is His benevolent goodness in so far as it removes the tribulation of creatures, especially the tribulation of sin.

God is infinitely merciful. (*De fide.*)

On the teaching of the Church, cf. D 1782: omni perfectione infinitus. The Church prays: Deus, cuius misericordiae non est numerus et bonitatis infinitus est thesaurus (God of whose mercies there is no end and who is an infinite treasure-house of goodness.)

God, as the Most Perfect Essence, is not subject to the passion of sympathy—God cannot suffer—but He exercises mercy by the removal of defects: misercordia est Deo maxime attribuenda, tamen secundum effectum, non secundum passionis affectum (S. th. I 21, 3). Holy Writ testifies to no attribute of God more insistently than to that of mercy. Ps. 102, 8: "The Lord is compassionate and merciful: long-suffering and plenteous in mercy." Ps. 144, 9: "The Lord is sweet to all: and His tender mercies are over all His works." Cf. Ps. 117, 1, 4; Ps. 135; Wis. 11, 24 et seq.; Luke 6, 36; 2 Cor. 1, 3; Eph. 2, 4. God's mercy is most magnificently shown in the Incarnation of the Son of God for the purpose of the Redemption (Luke 1, 78; John 3 16; Tit. 3, 4 et seq.). In the Incarnation, the Son of God assumed a human nature in which He could also experience the movement of sympathy. Hebr. 2, 17: "Wherefore it behoved Him in all things to be made like unto His brethren, that He might become a merciful and faithful high priest before God, that He might be a propitiation for the sins of the people." Cf. Hebr. 4, 15 et seq. The Evangelists, especially St. Luke, describe the mercy of the God-man towards all those in tribulation, especially towards sinners.

In God mercy and justice are wonderfully inter-connected. Ps. 24, 10: "All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth (misericordia et veritas), to them that seek after His covenant and His testimonies." (Cf. Ps. 84, 11.) God's distributive justice is rooted in mercy; the ultimate reason why God gives to His creatures natural and supernatural grace, and rewards their good works, is His love and mercy. The rewarding of the good and the punishing of the wicked is not merely a work of the Divine Justice, but also an operation of the Divine Mercy, as He rewards beyond merits. (Mt. 19, 29: centuplum accipiet) and punishes less than is merited. (S. th. I 21, 4 ad 1.) On the other hand, the remission of sin is not merely a work of mercy, but at the same time, a work of justice, as God demands from the sinner repentance and atonement. The harmonious association of God's mercy and justice is magnificently shown in the death of Jesus Christ on the Cross. Cf. John 3, 16; Rom. 3, 25 et seq.; S. th. I 21, 4.

God's mercy is not merely an expression of His love and of His goodness, but at the same time a promulgation of His Majesty and of His Power. Wis. 11, 24: "But thou hast mercy upon all, because thou canst do all things." Cf. The prayer of the Church: "God, thou revealest thine almighty power mostly out of consideration and pity" (10th Sunday after Whit).

God's veracity and fidelity were treated in connection with God's ontological truth (§ 15), His moral goodness and His charitable goodness in connection with His ontological goodness (§ 16).

PART 2

The Doctrine of the Triune God

SECTION 1

The Dogmatic Formulation and Positive Foundation of the Dogma of the Trinity

CHAPTER 1

The Antitrinitarian Heresies and the Doctrinal Decisions of the Church

§ 1. The Heresies

1. Monarchianism

At the end of the 1st century, Judaic heretics, Cerinthus and the Ebionites, holding rigidly to the doctrine of one person in God, denied the divinity of Christ (St. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. I 26). Towards the end of the 2nd century, the so-called monarchianists taught that there was only One Person in God (monarchiam tenemus : Tertullian, Adv. Prax. 3). According to its attitude towards the Person of Jesus Christ, monarchianism falls into two main divisions :

a) Dynamic or adoptionist monarchianism teaches that Christ is a mere man, even although born in a supernatural manner from the Holy Ghost and of the Blessed Virgin (ψιλὸς ἄνθρωπος). At His baptism, He was equipped by God with Divine Power in extraordinary measure, and was adopted by Him in place of a son.

The principal exponents of this erroneous doctrine were Theodotius of Byzantium, who brought this doctrine to Rome in 190, and who was excommunicated from the Church by Pope Victor (189—198) ; Paul of Samosata, Bishop of Antioch, who was deposed as a heretic at a Synod at Antioch in the year 268 and Bishop Photinus of Sirmium, who was deposed by a Synod of Sirmium in 351.

b) Patripassianic or modalist monarchianism accepts the True Divinity of Christ, but admits only one Person in God, by teaching that the Father had become man in Jesus Christ, and had suffered.

The principal representatives of this pernicious teaching were Noëtus of Smyrna, against whom St. Hippolytus wrote (Philosophumena IX 7—10 ; X 27 ; Contra haeresim Noëti), and the Asia Minor Confessor, Praxeas, who was refuted by Tertullian (Adv. Praxeam). Sabellius extended this false doctrine to the Holy Ghost, and taught that in God there was one Hypostasis and Three Prosopa (πρόσωπον = actors' masks, roles) corresponding to His three different modes of Revelation (modi). The Uni-Personal God revealed Himself as a Father in the Creation, as a Son in the Redemption, as the Holy Ghost in the works of sanctification. Pope Callistus (217—222) excluded Sabellius from the

ecclesiastical community. Sabellianism was combated in a rather unhappy fashion by the Alexandrinian Bishop Dionysius the Great (c. 247—264), and was authoritatively condemned by Pope Dionysius (259—268). D 48—51.

2. Subordinationism

In contrast to Sabellian modalism, subordinationism admits three different Persons in God, but denies the consubstantiality of the Second and Third Persons with the Father, and therefore their True Divinity.

a) Arianism. The Alexandrine Presbyter Arius († 336) taught that the Logos does not exist from all eternity. He is not generated from the Father, but is a creature of the Father, produced by Him from nothing before all other creatures. According to His Essence He is unlike the Father (*ἀνόμοιος*, hence the designation Anhomoians) is mutable and capable of development. He is not, in the proper and true sense, God, but only in the improper sense, in so far as He, in anticipation of His merits, was adopted by the Father as a Son. This erroneous doctrine was condemned at the First General Council at Nicaea (325). The Council drafted a creed, which confesses Jesus Christ to be the Son of God, His generation from the substance of the Father, His true Divinity and His consubstantiality with the Father. D 54.

The Semi-Arians took up a middle position between the strict Arians (anhomoians) and the defenders of the Nicene Creed (Homousians). They rejected the expression *ὁμοούσιος*, because they believed that it favoured Sabellianism, but admitted that the Logos was similar to the Father (*ὅμοιος*, thus called Homoians) either similar in all things (*ὅμοιοςκατὰ πάντα*) or similar in Nature (*ὁμοιούσιος*, and therefore called Homousians).

b) Macedonianism. The Pneumatomachi (=Combators against the Spirit), a sect of the Semi-Arians, which is said (probably incorrectly) to have been founded (Didymus, De Trin. II 10) by the Semi-Arian Bishop Macedonius (360 deposed, † before 364), extended the notion of Subordinationism to the doctrine of the Holy Ghost by declaring the Holy Ghost to be a mere creature, a mere ministering Spirit like the angels (on the strength of Hebr. 1, 14). Against this error, St. Athanasius, the great Cappadocian Fathers (Basil, Gregory, Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa), and Didymus of Alexandria defended the divinity of the Holy Ghost and His consubstantiality with the Father and with the Son. Macedonianism was condemned at the Synod at Alexandria (362) under the presidency of St. Athanasius, at the Second General Council of Constantinople (381) and again at a Roman Synod (382) under the presidency of Pope Damasus (D 74-82). The Council of Constantinople made an important addendum to the Nicene Symbol and by ascribing divine attributes to the Holy Spirit asserted His Divinity, indirectly at least: Et in Spiritum Sanctum Dominum et vivificantem ex Patre procedentem cum Patre et Filio adorandum et conglorificandum, qui locutus est per sanctos Prophetos (and in the Holy Spirit the Lord and giver of life who proceedeth from the Father who together with the Father and the Son is to be adored and glorified ; who spoke by the prophets).

3. Trinitarianism

a) The Christian commentator on Aristotle, Johannes Philoponus († about 565), identified nature and person (*οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις*) and thus came to Monophysitism and in the doctrine of the Trinity, to Trinitarianism. The Three Divine Persons are, according to him, three individuals of the God-head, as three men are three individuals of the species man. Thus he would replace the numerical unity of the Divine nature by a mere specific unity.

b) Roscelin, a Canon of Compiègne († about 1120), was a nominalist. According to him the individual alone possesses reality. He therefore taught that the Three

Divine Persons were three separate realities (tres res ab invicem separatae), which are connected with one another morally only through the agreement of will and power, just as three angels or three human souls might be. His teaching was combated by St. Anselm of Canterbury, and condemned at a Synod at Soissons (1092).

c) Gilbert of Poitiers (†1154) according to his opponents (e.g., Bernhard of Clairvaux), posited a real difference between Deus and Divinitas, and a real difference between the Divine Persons and the Divine Essence, so that there would result a quaternity in God (Three Persons plus Godhead). This teaching, which is not obvious in Gilbert's writings, was rejected at the Council of Rheims (1148) in the presence of Pope Eugene III. (D. 389 et seq.)

d) The Abbot Joachim of Fiore († 1202) conceived the unity of the Three Divine Persons as a collective unit (unitas quasi collectiva et similitudinaria). His teaching was rejected at the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) and the teaching of Peter Lombardus, which he had attacked, was solemnly approved (Caput Damnamus: D 431 et seq.).

e) Anton Günther († 1873) taught that the Absolute determined Itself three times successively in a process of self-development, as thesis, antithesis and synthesis. The Divine Substance, he asserted, is thus trebled. The Three Substances are then attracted through consciousness, to one another, and thus make up a formal unity.

4. Protestantism

Although Luther contested the traditional trinitarian terminology, he held fast to belief in the Trinity. Cf. the Schmalkaldic Articles, P. I Art. 1—4. The subjectivism preached by him, however, led finally to his denial of the dogma of the Trinity. Socianism, established by Faustus Sozzini († 1604), from its basic rationalistic attitude expounded a strict unitary concept of God, which did not admit of a plurality of Divine Persons. It declared Christ to be a mere man, the Holy Ghost an impersonal Divine Force.

The newer rationalistic Theology holds generally to the traditional terminology, but sees in the Three Persons only the personification of the Divine Attributes, such as might, wisdom and goodness. According to Harnack, the Christian concept of the Trinity developed from the polemic between Christianity and Judaism. At first only the duplex formula " God and Christ" existed as antithesis to God and Moses; later, the Holy Ghost was added.

§ 2. The Doctrinal Decisions of the Church

In God there are Three Persons, the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost. Each of the Three Persons possesses the one (numerical) Divine Essence. (*De fide.*)

The terms " essence, nature, substance," refer to the Divine " Being," which is the same for the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost, while the terms " hypostasis and person " refer to the three owners or bearers of the Divine Being. See § 17, 1.

1. The oldest authoritative doctrinal formulation of the Church's belief in the Trinity is the Apostle's Creed, which, in the form of the ancient Roman baptismal symbol, served as the basis of catechumenical instruction and as a baptismal confession of faith since the 2nd century. It is based on the trinitarian formula of Baptism. Mt. 28, 19. Cf. D 1-12.

2. A letter of Pope Dionysius (259-268) " of epoch-making significance " (Scheeben, Gotteslehre n. 687), to Bishop Dionysius of Alexandria, rejected Sabellianism, Tritheism and Subordinationism. D 48-51.

3. The Nicene Creed, which arose out of the defensive struggle against Arianism, specially stresses the true Divinity of the Son and His consubstantiality (homousy) with the Father. D 54.

4. The Symbolum Nicaeno-Constantinopolitanum (Nicaeo-Constantinople Creed), the authoritative doctrinal confession of faith of the Second General Council of Constantinople (381), which arose out of the defensive struggle against Arianism and Macedonianism, stresses, side by side with the Godhead of the Son, also the Godhead of the Holy Ghost. D 86.

5. A Roman Synod under Pope Damasus (382) offers a summarised condemnation of the ancient antitrinitarian errors, above all of Macedonianism. D 58-82.

6. The Symbolum Quicumque (Athanasian Creed), which stems, not from St. Athanasius, but from an unknown Latin author of the 5th or 6th century, contains in very clear and readable form a synopsis of the teaching of the Church on the Incarnation and the Trinity. Against Sabellianism it lays particular stress on the Trinity; against Tritarism, on the numerical Unity of God. D 39 et seq.

7. The most complete formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity in a Creed since the times of the Fathers is found in the Symbol of the 11th Synod of Toledo (675), which is composed mosaic-like out of texts from the Fathers (above all from St. Augustine, St. Fulgentius, St. Isidore of Seville), and of former Synods (especially that of the 6th Synod of Toledo, 638). D 275-281.

8. Of significance in the Church formulation of the Trinity dogma in the middle ages, are the 4th Lateran Council (1215) which rejected the tritheistical error of Joachim of Fiore (D 428 et seq.), and the Council of Florence, which, in the Decretum pro Jacobitis (1441), gave a summarised, comprehensive exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity, which can be regarded as the keystone of the dogmatic development (D 703 et seq.).

9. In later times there is the doctrinal assertion of Pope Pius VI, from the Bull "Auctorem Fidei" (1794), in which he rejects the expression used by the Synod of Pistoia, "Deus unus in tribus personis distinctus," on account of its endangering the notion of the absolute simplicity of the Divine Essence, and declares that it is more correct to say: Deus unus in tribus personis distinctis. D 1596.

CHAPTER 2

Proof of the Existence of the Trinity from Scripture and Tradition

I. The Old Testament

§ 3. Indications of the Trinity of God in the Old Testament

As the Old Testament Revelation is but a shadowy picture of the New Testament (Hebr. 10, 1), so in the Old Testament there is no clear communication of the Mystery of the Trinity but merely indications.

1. God often speaks in the plural form of Himself. Gn. 1, 26: "Let us make man to our image and likeness!" Cf. Gn. 3, 22; 11, 7. The Fathers understood these passages in the light of the New Testament Revelation, to mean that the First Person was addressing the Second Person, or the Second the Third Person. Cf. St. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. IV 20, 1. The plural form may be explained with more probability as the plural of majesty which is really singular.

2. The Angel of the Lord in the Theophanies of the Old Covenant is called Jahweh, El and Elohim, and reveals Himself as Elohim and Jahweh. By this it is indicated that there are two Persons, who are God: One, who sends, and One who is sent. Cf. Gn. 16, 7-13; Ex. 3, 2-14. The Older Fathers understood Is. 9, 6 as referring to Jahweh (magni consilii in angelus, according to the Septuagint) and in Mal. 3, 1 (angelus testamenti) the Logos. The Later Fathers, especially St. Augustine, and the Schoolmen, held that the Logos here revealed Himself by the mediation of an angel.

3. The Messianic prophecies postulate a distinction of Persons in God in so far as they distinguish God and the Son of God. Ps. 2, 7: "The Lord hath said to me: thou art my Son, this day I have begotten thee." Is. 9, 6: "The government is upon his shoulder, and his name shall be called, Wonderful, Counsellor, God the Mighty, the Father of the world to come, the Prince of Peace." Is. 35, 4: "God himself will come and will save you." Cf. Ps. 109, 1-3; 44, 7; Is. 7, 14 (Emmanuel = God with us); Mich 5, 2.

4. The Sapiential Books represent the Divine Wisdom as an Hypostasis side by side with God. It has proceeded from God (according to Proverbs 8, 24 et seq., by birth) from all eternity, and co-operates in the creation of the world. Cf. Prov. 8, 22-31; Wis. 7, 22-8, 1; 8, 3-8. In the light of the New Testament Revelation (John 1, 1 et seq.: Hebr. 1, 3), one may well see in the wisdom of the Old Testament a pointer to the Divine Personality of the Word.

5. The Old Testament frequently speaks of the "Spirit of God," or of the "Holy Ghost." By this is to be understood not a Divine Person, but "a power proceeding from God, which gives life, bestows strength, illuminates and impels towards the good" (P. Heinisch). Cf. Gn. 1, 2; Ps. 32, 6; 50, 13; 103, 30; 138, 7; 142, 10; Is. 11, 2; 42, 1; 61, 1; 63, 10; Ez. 11, 5; Wis. 1, 5, 7. In the light of the New Testament Revelation many of these passages (especially Ps. 103, 30; Is. 11, 2; Ez. 36, 27; Joel 2, 28; Wis. 1, 7; cf. Acts 2, 16 et seq.) were referred by the Fathers and the Liturgy to the Person of the Holy Ghost.

6. It was believed that one might, perhaps, be entitled to see an indication of the Three Divine Persons in the light of the New Testament Revelation in the Trisagion, in Is. 6, 3, and in the threefold sacerdotal blessing in Num. 6, 23 et seq. It must be borne in mind however that in the Old Testament the treble number is an expression of intensification. In Ps. 32, 6, besides Jahweh His Word and His Spirit are mentioned and in Wisd. 9, 17, His wisdom and His Holy Spirit. The word, the wisdom and the spirit are here, however, not mentioned as single persons, but as powers of God.

The attempts to derive the Christian concept of the Trinity from the late Jewish Theology or from the Jewish-Hellenistic doctrine of the logos of Philos have failed. The "Memra Jahweh," that is, the word of God and the "Holy Ghost," are in Jewish Theology, not Divine Persons side by side with Jahweh

but circumlocutions of the name of Jahweh. The Logos of Philo is the instrument of God in the creation of the world. Although He is called the firstborn Son of God and a Second God, He is still to be conceived as a personification of the Divine Power only. He is essentially different from the Logos of St. John. "The Logos of Philo is basically the epitome of the power of God working in the world, even if He often appears as a Person, but the Logos of St. John is the eternal consubstantial Son of God and therefore a Person."

II. The New Testament

§ 4. The Trinitarian Formulae

1. The Evangelists

a) In the narrative of the Annunciation, the Angel, according to St. Luke 1, 35, says: "The Holy Ghost (πνεῦμα ἅγιον) shall come upon thee, and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee. And therefore also the Holy who shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God." Cf. St. Luke 1, 32: "He shall be great and shall be called the Son of the Most High."

Three Persons are named: The All Highest, the Son of the All Highest and the Holy Ghost. However, on account of the neutral form of the Greek word (πνεῦμα) and of the absence of the article, the fact that the Holy Ghost is a distinct person does not clearly emerge, but its implications are clear if we compare this passage with Acts 1, 8 in which the Holy Ghost and His action are differentiated. Acts 1, 8: "But ye shall receive the power of the Holy Ghost coming upon you."

b) The Theophany after the baptism of Jesus is regarded as a Revelation of the Trinity. Mt. 3, 16 et seq.: "He saw the Spirit of God, (πνεῦμα θεοῦ; Mk. 1, 10 τὸ πνεῦμα; Luke 3, 22 τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον; John 1, 32 τὸ πνεῦμα) descending as a dove and coming upon Him and behold a voice from Heaven saying: This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased." The speaker is God, the Father. Jesus is the Son of God, in fact the only one and therefore the true and proper Son of God; for the words "beloved Son" . . . in biblical language mean usually the "only Son" (cf. Gn. 22, 2. 12. 16; Mk. 12, 6). The Holy Ghost appears under a special symbol as an independent, personal Essence side by side with the Father and the Son.

c) In His solemn address at the Last Supper, Jesus promises another Helper (Paraclitus), the Holy Ghost or the Spirit of Truth, Whom He Himself and the Father would send. John 14, 16: "And I will ask the Father: and He shall send you another Paraclete that He may abide with you for ever." Cf. St. John 14, 26 and 15, 26. The Holy Spirit who is sent, is clearly distinguished as a Person from the Father and the Son who send Him. The appellation "Paraclitus" and the activities attributed to Him (teaching, giving witness) presuppose His personal subsistence.

d) The Mystery of the Trinity is most clearly manifested in the mandate of Jesus to go and baptise. Mt. 28, 19: "Going therefore, teach ye all nations, baptising them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost." That there are here three distinct persons, emerges as regards the Father and the Son from their relative opposition, as regards the Holy Ghost

from the fact that He is completely co-ordinated to the Two Persons, which would not be if spirit here meant merely an essential attribute. The unity of essence of the Three Persons is indicated in the singular form "in the name" (εἰς τὸ ὄνομα). The genuineness of the passage is guaranteed by the unanimous tradition of all manuscripts and translations. In the Didache it is cited twice (7, 1 and 7, 3).

2. The Apostolic Epistles

a) St. Peter uses a trinitarian formula of blessing in the introduction of his first letter. 1 Peter 1, 1 et seq.: "To the chosen strangers . . . according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, unto the sanctification of the Spirit unto obedience and to sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ."

b) St. Paul concludes the second Letter to the Corinthians with a trinitarian blessing. 2 Cor. 13, 13 : "The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ and the charity of God and the communication of the Holy Ghost be with you all."

c) St. Paul counts three different kinds of gifts of the Spirit and ascribes them to three donors—the Spirit, the Lord (Christ), and God. 1 Cor. 12, 4 et seq. : "There are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit. And there are diversities of ministries, but the same Lord. And there are diversities of operations, but the same God who worketh all things." The substantial unity of the Three Persons is indicated by the fact that the same works in V. 11 are appropriated to the Spirit alone. Cf. Eph. 1, 3-14 (chosen by God the Father redeemed through the blood of Christ, signed with the Holy Spirit) ; Eph. 4, 4-6 (One Spirit, One Lord, One God).

d) The Tri-personality and the unity of essence in God is most perfectly expressed in the so-called Comma Ioanneum 1 John 5, 7 et seq.: "And they are Three who give testimony [in Heaven: the Father, the Word and the Holy Ghost. And these Three are One. And there are Three that give testimony on earth.]" The genuineness of the words in brackets, however, is subject to the gravest doubts as they are missing in all the Greek biblical manuscripts up to the 15th century, in all the Oriental translations, also in the oldest and best Vulgate manuscripts, and are not used by the Greek and Latin Fathers in the great Trinitarian controversies of the 4th and 5th centuries. The passage is first found in the writings of the Spanish heretic Priscillian († 385) though in a heretical form (haec tria unum sunt in Christo Jesu). From the end of the 5th cenutry on they are more often cited (484 in a Libellus fidei of North African Bishops : St. Fulgentius of Ruspe, Cassiodor). As they have been adopted in the official Vulgate editions, and have been used by the Church for centuries, they may be regarded as an expression of the Church's teaching. Further, they enjoy a status as a testimony of Tradition. Even if the passage be not a genuine constituent part of the Vulgate, it is nevertheless authentic, that is, free from error dogmatically. In the year 1897 the Congregation of the Inquisition declared that the genuineness of the passage could not with certainty be denied or doubted. In recent times the doubts concerning its authenticity have grown and the Holy Office, in 1927, declared that, after careful examination of the whole circumstances, its genuineness could be denied. D 2198.

§ 5. The New Testament Doctrine of God the Father

1. The Fatherhood of God (derived sense)

Holy Writ often speaks of the Fatherhood of God in a derived or metaphorical sense. The Triune God is the Father of created things, above all, of creatures endowed with reason, by virtue of their creation, preservation and providence

(natural order), and especially their elevation to the state of grace, and kinship with God (supernatural order). Cf. Dt. 32, 6; Jer. 31, 9; 2 Sm. 7, 14; Mt. 5, 16, 48; 6, 1-32; 7, 11; John 1, 12; 1 John 3, 1 et seq.; Rom. 8, 14 et seq.; Gal. 4, 5 et seq.

2. The Fatherhood of God (In a true and proper sense)
Revelation teaches that there is also in God a fatherhood in the true and proper sense which belongs to the First Person only, and which is the model of God's fatherhood of man, and of all created paternity (Eph. 3, 14 et seq.). Jesus referred to God as His Father in a unique and exclusive sense. When He speaks of the Father in heaven He says either: "My Father" or "Thy Father," or when appropriate "Your Father," but never "Our Father." (The "Our Father" is not Jesus' prayer for Himself, but the prayer of His disciples: cf. Mt. 6, 9.) Assertions of Jesus, which testify to His identity of essence with the Father, prove also that His Sonship and the Fatherhood of God are to be understood in a proper physical sense. Cf. Mt. 11, 27: "And no one knoweth the Son but the Father: neither doth anyone know the Father, but the Son and he to whom it shall please the Son to reveal Him." John 10, 30: "I and the Father are One." John 5, 26: "For as the Father hath life in Himself, so He hath given to the Son also to have life in Himself." St. John calls Jesus the Only Begotten Son of God, St. Paul the only Son of God. John 1, 14: "And we saw His glory, the glory as it were of the only-begotten of the Father." John 1, 18: "The only-begotten God (Vulg.: Son), who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared Him." Cf. John 3, 16. 18; 1 John 4, 9; Rom. 8, 32: "That spared not even His own Son"; cf. Rom. 8, 3. John 5, 18: "Hereupon therefore the Jews sought the more to kill Him because He said God was His Father making Himself equal to God."

§ 6. The New Testament Doctrine of God the Son

1. The Johannine Doctrine of the Logos

a) The Logos, according to St. John, is neither an attribute nor an impersonal power of God, but a Person. This is indicated in the absolute designation ὁ λόγος, and is clearly expressed in the words: "The word was with God" (ὁλόγς ο ἦν πρός τὸν θεόν). The preposition "with" (πρός) expresses that the Logos was side by side with God (therefore not in God) and co-ordinated to God (cf. Mk. 9, 19). The assertion in V. 11: "He came unto His own" and in V. 14: "The Word became flesh" can only refer to a Person, not to a Divine attribute.

b) The Logos is a different Person from God the Father (ὁ θεός). This follows from the fact that the Logos was with God (V. 1 et seq.), and notably from the identification of the Logos with the Only-begotten Son of the Father. V. 14: "And we saw His glory, the glory as it were of the only-begotten of the Father" (cf. V. 18). Therefore, between Father and Son there is a relative opposition.

c) The Logos is a Divine Person. V. 1: "And the Word was God" (κας θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος). The true Deity of the Logos is implied also by the Divine attributes of the creation of the world ascribed to Him: ("All thing

were made by Him." V. 3), and of eternity ("in the beginning was the Logos": V. 1). The Logos also appears as God in that He is represented as the Originator of the supernatural order, in so far as He, as the Light, is the Dispenser of truth (V. 4 et seq.), and as the Life, the Dispenser of the supernatural life of grace (V. 12). V. 14, "full of grace and truth."

2. The Pauline Doctrine of the Identity of Christ's Image and Likeness with God

Hebr. 1, 3 calls the Son of God the "Brightness of the glory and figure of the substance of God." Cf. 2 Cor. 4, 4: Col. 1, 15 et seq. The designation of Christ as the reflection of the glory of God (ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης) indicates the similitude of essence or the identity of essence of Christ with God the Father ("Light of Light"). The expression "Figure of the substance of God," (χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ) indicates also the personal independence of Christ side by side with the Father. That here is meant not a created, but a truly Divine image of God the Father, is shown by the Divine attributes which are ascribed to the Son of God—the creation and preservation of the world, its purification by Him from sin, His sitting at the right hand of God (V. 3), His exaltation above the angels (V. 4).

§ 7. The New Testament Teaching concerning God the Holy Ghost

Even if the word πνεῦμα in individual passages of Holy Writ means the spiritual Nature of God or an impersonal Divine Power, still it may be shown from numerous passages that the Holy Ghost is a Divine Person distinct from the Father and from the Son.

a) The Holy Ghost is a real person. This is testified to by the trinitarian formula of baptism, Mt. 28, 19, the name Paraclitus=helper, representative, which belongs to a person only (John 14, 16, 26; 15, 26; 16, 7) cf. 1 John 2, 1, in which Jesus Christ is called our Paraclitus (=representative, advocate with the Father), and by the fact that personal attributes are ascribed to the Holy Ghost; for example, the teaching of truth (John 14, 16; 16, 13), the giving of testimony for Christ (John 15, 26), the knowledge of the mysteries of God (1 Cor. 2, 10), the forecasting of future events (John 16, 13; Acts 21, 11), the installation of bishops (Acts 20, 28).

b) The Holy Ghost is a Person distinct from the Father and from the Son. This is attested by the Trinitarian Formula of Baptism, the appearance of the Holy Spirit at the baptism of Jesus under a special symbol, and especially the parting discourses of Jesus, in which the Holy Ghost is distinguished, as one who is given or sent, from the Father and the Son who send Him (John 14, 16, 26; 15, 26).

c) The Holy Ghost is a Divine Person. The name "Holy Ghost" and the name "God" are used alternately. Acts 5, 3 et seq.: "Ananias, why has Satan tempted thy heart that thou shouldest lie to the Holy Ghost? Thou hast not lied to men, but to God." Cf. 1 Cor. 3, 16; 6, 19 et seq. In the Trinitarian Formula of Baptism, the Holy Ghost is made equal to the Father and to the Son who are truly God. Again, Divine attributes are ascribed to the Holy Ghost. The Holy Ghost possesses the fullness of knowledge: He

teaches all truth, presages future things (John 16, 13), searches the innermost secrets of God (1 Cor. 2, 10) and has inspired the Prophets in the Old Covenant (2 Peter 1, 21 ; cf. Acts 1, 16). The Divine power of the Holy Ghost is revealed in the miracle of the Incarnation of the Son of God (Luke 1, 35 ; Mt. 1, 20), and in the miracle of Pentecost (Luke 24, 49 ; Acts 2, 2-4). The Holy Ghost is the Divine Distributor of grace (1 Cor. 12, 11) and the Grace of justification in the baptism (John 3, 5), and in the Sacrament of Penance (John 20, 22). Cf. Rom. 5, 5 ; Gal. 4, 6 ; 5, 22.

§ 8. The New Testament Doctrine of the Numerical Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three Persons

The biblical teaching of the Trinity of the Persons in God can be reconciled with the basic biblical doctrine of the unicity of the Divine Nature (Mk. 12, 29 ; 1 Cor. 8, 4 ; Eph. 4, 6 ; 1 Tim. 2, 5), only if the Three Divine Persons subsist in One Single Nature. The numerical unity or identity of the Divine Nature in the Three Persons is indicated in the trinitarian formulas (cf. especially Mt. 28, 19 : in nomine) and in individual authors, who discourse on the mutual co-inherence (perichoresis) of the Divine Persons (John 10, 38 ; 14, 9 et seq. ; 17, 10 ; 16, 13 et seq. ; 5, 19). Christ has explicitly declared the numerical unity of His Divine Nature with that of the Father in John 10, 30 : "I and the Father are One" (ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἕν ἐσμεν). St. Augustine comments on this : "Quod dixit 'unum,' liberat te ab Ario ; quod dixit 'sumus,' liberat te a Sabellio". (That He said "one" preserves us from Arianism ; that He said "we are" preserves us from Sabellianism). (In Ioan, tr. 36. 9).

The Church's term for the numerical Unity of Essence of God is the expression ὁμοούσιος which was sanctioned by the Council of Nicaea (325).

The Cappadocians use the formula : One Essence—three hypostases (μία οὐσία —τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις) by which they understand the Unity of Essence in the sense of numerical, not of specific unity.

III. Tradition

§ 9. The Testimony of Tradition for the Trinity of God

1. Testimonies from the Liturgy of the Ancient Christian Church

a) The Ancient Christian Baptismal Liturgy contains a clear confession of the belief in the Trinity. According to the testimony of the Didache baptism was already administered in ancient Christian times "in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost" through the triple dipping or triple pouring of water. Cf. St. Justin, Apologia, I 61 ; St. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. III 17, 1 ; Tertullian, De baptismo, 13 ; Origen, In ep. ad Rom. 5, 8 ; St. Cyprian, 73, 18.

b) The Apostle's Creed, which, in its older form, is identical with the ancient Roman Symbol used in baptism, is built up on the trinitarian formula of baptism. The rules of faith handed down by the Church authors of the second and third centuries are an extension and paraphrase of the trinitarian symbol of baptism. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. I 10, 1; Tertullian, De praescr. 13 ; Adv. Prax. 2, De virg. vel. 1 ; Origen, De principiis I praef. 4—10 ; Novatian, De Trin. 1. The whole doctrine of the Trinity is extraordinarily clearly represented in the

private statement of faith directed against Paul of Samosata by St. Gregory Thaumaturgos († about 270).

c) The belief in the Trinity is also expressed by the ancient Christian doxologies. Christian antiquity knows two forms, the co-ordinating form : Glory be to the Father and to the Son and to the Holy Ghost ; and the subordinating form : Glory be to the Father through the Son in the Holy Ghost. As the latter was misinterpreted by the Arians in a heretical subordinatian sense, St. Basil altered it as follows : Glory be to the Father with the Son together with the Holy Ghost δόξα τῷ πατρὶ μετὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ σὺν τῷ πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ (De Spiritu Sancto 1, 3). Cf. Martyrium. S. Polycarpi 14, 3.

2. The Ante-Nicene Fathers

St. Clement of Rome writes (about 96) to the Community of Corinth : " Have we not one God and one Christ and one Spirit of Grace " (46, 6). He designates God and the Lord Jesus Christ and the Holy Ghost as the belief and the hope of the elect (58, 2). St. Ignatius of Antioch († about 107) not only teaches the Deity of Christ in the most definite fashion, but also employs trinitarian formulas. Magn. 13, 2 : " Be ye subject to the Bishop and to one another, as Jesus Christ to the Father according to the flesh, and the Apostles to Christ and to the Father and to the Spirit." Cf. Magn. 13, 1 ; Eph. 9, 1.

The Apologists sought with the aid of Philosophy (concept of the Logos) to win a scientific understanding of the mystery of the Trinity, but did not always keep themselves free from subordinatian expressions. St. Justin teaches that the Christians adore Jesus Christ the son of the True God in the second place, after the Creator of the universe and then the Prophetic Spirit (Apol. I 13). Athenagoras (about 177) replies to the reproach of atheism : " Who should not wonder when he hears those called atheists who acknowledge God the Father and God the Son and the Holy Ghost and teach their power in unity as well as their distinction in order ? " (Suppl. 10). More exact expositions of the Church belief in the Trinity are to be found in St. Irenaeus (Adv. haer. I 10, 1 ; IV 20, 1. Epideixis 6 et seq.; 47) and especially in Tertullian (Adv. Praxeam). The last-mentioned teaches against Sabellianism the Trinity of the Divine Persons (ecce enim dico alium esse Patrem et alium Filium et alium Spiritum ; The Father and the Son and the Spirit are distinct ; c. 9), but holds just as decisively to the unity of the Substance (unius autem substantiae et unius status et unius potestatis, qui unus Deus ; The one God is one in substance, one in status, one in power ; c. 2) Origen already uses the expression ὁμοούσιος (In ep. ad Hebr. 1, 3). The expression τριάς as the designation of the tri-personal nature of God is first used by Theophilus of Antioch (Ad Autol. II 15) ; the corresponding Latin expression, trinitas, is first used by Tertullian (Adv. Prax. 2 ; De pud. 21).

In pre-Nicene times, the Roman Church most clearly expressed belief in the tri-personality and consubstantiality of God in the famous dogmatic doctrinal composition of Pope Dionysius (259—268) addressed to Bishop Dionysius of Alexandria, in which the Pope rejects Tritheism, Sabellianism and Subordinatianism (D 48—51). The decision of the Nicene Council was no novelty, but an organic development of the primitive Trinitarian doctrine which was in the deposit of faith of the Church from the very beginning and the implications of which were gradually developed and made clear by scientific theology.

3. The Post-Nicene Fathers

The post-Nicene Fathers especially had the task of scientifically establishing and defending, against Arianism and Semi-Arianism, the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father and, against Macedonianism, the identity of essence of the

Holy Ghost with that of the Father and the Son. Those who were especially notable in this connection were St. Athanasius the Great († 373) and the three outstanding Cappadocians, St. Basil the Great († 379), St. Gregory Nazianzus († about 390) ("the theologian"), and St. Gregory of Nyssa († 394), St. Cyril of Alexandria († 444), and among the Latin Fathers, St. Hilary of Poitiers († 367), "the Athanasius of the West," and St. Ambrose of Milan († 397). Primitive Christian doctrine on the Trinity reaches its apex in the outstanding work of St. Augustine († 430), De Trinitate.

CHAPTER 3

The Triple Personality of God

§ 10. The Internal Divine Processions in General

1. Concept and Reality

In God there are two Internal Divine Processions. (*De fide.*)

By procession is understood the origin of one from another. One distinguishes external procession (processio ad extra or per transiens), and internal procession inwards (processio ad intra or per immanans). A procession is said to be external when the terminus of the procession goes outside the principle from which it proceeds. Thus creatures proceed by external procession from God, their Primary Origin, but the processions of the Son and the Holy Ghost are an immanent act of the Most Holy Trinity. An Internal-Divine Procession signifies the origin of a Divine person from another through the communication of the numerically one Divine Essence.

The Creeds teach us that there are two internal Divine Processions: the Begetting of the Son and the Procession of the Holy Ghost. Cf. D 86. By reason of these Processions there are in God three Hypostases or Persons really distinct from one another. The expression "Procession" or "Issue" (ἐκπόρευσις, processio) comes from Holy Writ. John 8, 42: "From God I proceeded (Ego ex Deo processi). John 15, 26: "the Spirit of Truth who proceedeth from the Father" (Spiritum veritatis, qui a Patre procedit). According to the context, however, both passages are to be referred, not to the Eternal Processions of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, but to their temporal missions into this world. These missions, however, are the reflected images of the eternal processions.

2. The Subject of the Internal Divine Processions

The Divine Persons, not the Divine Nature, are the subject of the Internal Divine processions (in the active and in the passive sense). (*De fide.*)

The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) espoused the teaching of Peter the Lombard against the attacks of the Abbot Joachim of Fiore, and declared: Illa res (sc. substantia divina) non est generans neque genita nec procedens, sed est Pater qui generat, et Filius, qui gignitur, et Spiritus Sanctus, qui procedit. (The Divine Substance) does not generate nor is it generated nor does it proceed; It is the Father who generates, the Son who is generated and the Holy Ghost who proceeds. D. 432. Holy Writ always refers the producing and the being produced to a person. Rationally the doctrine derives from the axiom: "actiones sunt suppositorum" (actions are to be predicated of supposita). Cf. S. th. I 39, 5 ad 1.

§ 11. The Procession of the Son from the Father by Way of Generation

The Second Divine Person proceeds from the First Divine Person by Generation, and therefore is related to Him as Son to a Father. (*De fide.*)

The Athanasian Creed confesses: Filius a Patre solo est, non factus, nec creatus, sed genitus. (The Son is from the Father alone not made not created but generated) D 39. Cf. the Nicene Confession of Faith (D 54).

According to the testimony of Holy Writ the first and second Persons stand to each other in the relationship of a true and proper fatherhood and sonship. The characteristic biblical name for the First Person is the name Father, that of the Second Person the name Son. The Father is more closely designated as "own Father" (*πατὴρ ἴδιος*; John 5, 18), the Son as "own Son" (*υἱὸς ἴδιος*; Rom. 8, 32), as the "only born Son" (*υἱὸς μονογενής*; John 1, 14, 18; 3, 16, 18; 1 John 4, 9); as "beloved Son" (*υἱὸς ἀγαπητός*; Mt. 3, 17; 17, 5); as "true Son" (verus Filius; 1 John 5, 20 Vulg.). Thus the Son is distinguished from the adopted children of God (Rom. 8, 29). A true and proper filiation is, however, based on a true generation only. The eternal generation of the Son from the Father is directly expressed in Ps. 2, 7 and Hebr. 1, 5: "Thou art my son; this day I have begotten thee." Cf. Ps. 109, 3, according to the Vulgate: Ex utero ante luciferum genui te (according to the new translation of the Biblical Institute: ante luciferum tamquam rorem, genui te (Before the daystar, like dew, I begot thee)). The Fathers and the Councils of the 4th century establish the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father from the eternal generation.

§ 12. The Procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son by way of Spiration

The Procession of the Third Person is, with reference to its Biblical proper name, called Spiration (*πνεῦσις* spiratio).

1. The Teaching of the Church

The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and from the Son as from a Single Principle through a Single Spiration. (*De fide.*)

Since the 9th century, the Greek Orthodox Church has taught that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father alone. A Synod at Constantinople in the year 879, under the Patriarch Photius, rejected the "filioque" of the Latins as heretical. In contrast to this, the Second General Council of Lyons (1274) declared: Fideli ac devota professione fatemur, quod Spiritus sanctus aeternaliter ex Patre et Filio non tanquam ex duobus principiis, sed tanquam ex uno principio, non duabus spirationibus, sed unica spiratione procedit. (The Holy Ghost eternally proceeds from Father and Son as from one principle and by one spiration.) D 460. Cf. the Creed of the Synod of Toledo in the year 447 (D 19), the Athanasian Creed (D 39), the Creed of the 11th Council of Toledo (675) (D 277,) the Caput Infirmiter of the Fourth Lateran Council (D 428), and the Decretum pro Graecis as well as the Decretum pro Jaocbitis of the Union

Council of Florence (D 691, 703 et seq.). In the Niceno-Constantinople Creed the addition " et filio " was first added by the Third Synod of Toledo, in the year 589.

2. Proofs from Holy Scripture

a) The Holy Ghost, according to the teaching of Holy Writ, is not merely the Spirit of the Father (Mt. 10, 20 : " It is the Spirit of the Father that speaketh in you "; cf. John 15, 26 : 1 Cor. 2, 11 et seq.), but also the Spirit of the Son (Gal. 4, 6 : " God sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts "), the Spirit of Jesus (Apostles 16, 7 : " And the Spirit of Jesus suffered them not "), the Spirit of Christ (Romans 8, 9 : " Now if any man have not the Spirit of Christ he is none of His "), the Spirit of Jesus Christ (Phil. 1, 19 ; " through the supply of the Spirit of Jesus Christ "). If the designation " spirit of the Father " expresses an original reference to the Father (=spiramen Patris or spiratus a Patre), as the Greeks admit, then the expression " Spirit of the Son " must analogously express an original connection with the Son (=spiramen Filii or spiratus a Filio).

b) The Holy Ghost is sent not only from the Father (John 14, 16, 26), but also from the Son, John 15, 26 : " The Paraclete Whom I will send you from the Father " ; cf. John 16, 7 ; Luke 24, 49 ; John 20, 22. This external mission (ad extra) is to a certain extent the continuation of the Eternal Procession in time. From the mission one can therefore infer the Eternal Procession. The eternal production corresponds to the mission, and the eternal being produced corresponds to the being sent. As, according to the testimony of Holy Scripture, the Holy Ghost is sent from the Father and from the Son, it must be inferred that He is produced by the Father and by the Son.

c) The Holy Ghost receives His knowledge from the Son. John 16, 13 et seq.: " What things soever He shall hear He shall speak. He shall glorify me ; because He shall receive of mine and shall show it to you." The hearing and receiving of knowledge can be understood of a Divine Person only in the sense that He receives the Divine Knowledge and, with it, the identical Divine Essence from all eternity from another Divine Person through communication of Essence. As the Holy Ghost receives His knowledge from the Son He must proceed from the Son as the Son, who receives His knowledge from the Father (John 8, 26 et seq.), proceeds from the Father. St. Augustine comments on this passage : " from each He will hear it, from whom He proceeds. Hearing is for Him knowing, but knowing is Being." (In Ioan. tr. 99, 4.)

That the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and from the Son as from One Single Principle and through One Single Spiration, is clear from John 16, 15 : " All that the Father has, is mine." If the Son, by virtue of His eternal generation from the Father, possesses everything that the Father possesses except the Fatherhood and the ungeneratedness which are not communicable, then He must also possess the power of spiration (vis spirativa) and with it the being a Principle in relation to the Holy Ghost.

3. Proof from Tradition

The Latin Fathers preferred the co-ordinating formula : ex Patre et Filio (Filioque), the Greek the subordinating formula : ex Patre per Filium. Ter-

tullian employs both forms, but explains the co-ordinating formula in the sense of the subordinating one. Adv. Prax. 4 : " I do not derive the Spirit otherwise than from the Father through the Son (a Patre per Filium). Op. cit. 8 : " the Third is the Spirit proceeding from God (the Father) and from the Son (a Deo et filii), as the third from the root through the bud is the fruit." St. Hilary, under Greek influence, uses the subordinating formula : " From thee (the Father) through him (the Son) is thy Holy Spirit " (De Trin. XII 56). St. Ambrose teaches that " the Holy Ghost, since he proceeds from the Father and the Son, cannot be separated from the Father nor from the Son " (De Spiritu Sancto I 120). St. Augustine establishes the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son (de utroque) by a detailed scriptural proof (In Ioan. tr. 99, 6 ; De Trin. XV 27, 48).

Origen uses the subordination phrase : " the Holy Ghost is the first of everything by the Father through the Son " ; " The Son gives to His hypostasis not only that he is, but also that he is wise, understanding and just " (Comm. in Ioan. II 10 (6), 75-76). St. Athanasius declares : " The same peculiar relationship in which we know the Son to be with the Father, governs, as we shall find, also that which is between the Spirit and the Son. And as the Son speaks : ' All things whatsoever the Father hath are mine (John 16, 15), ' so we shall find, that all this is also through the Son in the Spirit " (Ep. ad Serap. 3, 1). St. Basil teaches that " the goodness and the sanctity and the kingly dignity characteristic of God the Father is transmitted from the Father through the Only-begotten to the Spirit " (De Spiritu Sancto 18, 47). The three Cappadocians (Basil, Gregory Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa) compare the relationship of the three Persons to each other with the links of a chain. The example is based on the subordinating formula " from the Father through the Son."

St. Didymus of Alexandria, St. Ephiphanius of Salamis and St. Cyril of Alexandria employ, even if not exclusively, the co-ordinating formula (filioque). Cf. St. Epiphanius, Ancoratus 7 : " the Holy Ghost is from the same Essence of the Father and of the Son." 16. 8 : " From the Father and the Son, the third according to his name." Cf. Didymus, De Spiritu Sancto 34 ; Cyril of Al ; Thes. de sancta et consubst. Trin. 34.

St. John of Damascus rejects the notion that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, nevertheless he teaches that He is the Spirit of the Son and that He proceeds through the Son from the Father (De fide orth. 18, 12). In saying this he does not deny that the Son is a Principle of the Holy Spirit, but only that unlike the Father He is not the Primitive Principle.

The co-ordinating formula (filioque) and the subordinating formula (per filium) concur essentially, in so far as they both attest that both the Father and the Son are the Principle of the Holy Ghost and they also complement each other. While in the former the unicity and the indivisibility of the Principle are above all expressed, the latter effectively stresses that the Father is the Primitive Principle (cf. St. Augustine, De Trin. XV 17, 29 : de quo procedit principaliter), and that the Son as " God from God " is the Derived Principle, in so far as He, with His Essence, also receives the power of spiration from the Father. Cf. D 691.

4. Scholastic Proof from Reason

As the real difference of the Divine Persons derives exclusively from an opposition of the original relationships (D 703) there would exist no basis for the hypostatic distinction between the Son and the Holy Ghost, if the Holy Ghost did not also proceed from the Son. Cf. S. th. I 36, 2.

SECTION 2

Speculative Explanation of the Dogma of the Trinity

CHAPTER I

Speculative Explanation of the Internal Divine Processions

§ 13. The Son proceeds from the Intellect of the Father by way of Generation. (*Sent. certa.*)

1. Teaching of the Church

The Roman Catechism (III, 9) teaches : " Of all examples which are adduced with a view to an explanation of the nature and manner of this eternal generation, that appears most nearly to approach the matter, which is taken from the intellectual activity of our soul, for which reason St. John calls the Son of God the ' Word.' For just as our spirit, knowing itself, produces a picture of itself, which theologians have called a ' word ' so God also, in so far as human can be compared to Divine, knowing Himself, generates the Eternal Word (ita Deus seipsum intelligens Verbum aeternum generat)." Thus the generation of the Son from the Father is to be conceived purely as an intellectual generation or as an act of intellect (generatio per modum intellectus).

2. Positive Foundation

The Second Person is called the " Word of God " in Holy Writ. This name indicates that the Son is the Word (verbum mentis), generated by an act of cognition, or the product of the knowledge of the Father. The name " Wisdom," which is a personal name of the Second Person (cf. the Old Testament sapiential doctrine ; 1 Cor. 1, 24), and therefore indicates the mode of His origin, indicates that the Son is generated through an act of cognition (per modum intellectus) of the Father. The designation : " Image of the invisible God " (Col. 1, 15) or " Figure of the substance of God " (Hebr. 1, 3), indicates that the generation of the Son occurs through that activity of the Father, which tends to produce a likeness of Himself, that is, through the activity of cognition.

St. Ignatius of Antioch applies to Christ the designation " Word of God " (αὐτοῦ [τοῦ θεοῦ] λόγος ; Magn. 8, 2), " Disposition of the Father (τοῦ πατρὸς ἡ γνώμη ; Eph. 3, 2), " Knowledge of God " (θεοῦ γνῶσις ; Eph. 17, 2). Justin compares the generation of the Son with the coming of the word from the intellect (Dial. 61, 2). Athenagoras of Athens calls the Son of God " the Thought (νοῦς) and the Word (λόγος) of the Father " (Epid. 39). Augustine explains the divine generation as an act of the divine self-knowledge : " The Father generated by uttering His Word Who is equal to Him in all things " (De Trin. XV 14, 23).

3. Speculative Foundation

The Trinitarian "Processions" are the activities of a spirit, i.e., knowing or willing. In the divine act of cognition every reality is present which is essential to the concept of generation. Generation is defined according to Aristotle, as: origo viventis a principio vivente coniuncto in similitudinem naturae (the origin, from a conjoined living principle, of a living being with a like nature). The likeness which is essential to the concept of generation pertains to the act of knowledge only; for by knowledge there is produced an image (similitudo) of the object known. An act of will, on the contrary, presupposes a certain similarity between its object and the person willing (S. th. I 27, 4 ad 2). God the Father, by knowing Himself, produces the Perfect Image of Himself, i.e., the Son Who is identical in nature with Him.

What the object of the Divine act of cognition is, by which the Father generated the Son, is disputed. According to St. Thomas it is everything which is contained in the knowledge of the Father: primarily (principaliter et quasi per se) that which is the object of the necessary Divine knowledge, i.e., the Divine essence, the Divine Persons, possible things; and secondarily (ex consequenti et quasi per accidens) that which is the object of free Divine knowledge, i.e., the things of reality which God decided from eternity to fulfil. Cf. De verit. 4, 4-5; S. th. I 34, 1 ad 3.

§ 14. The Holy Ghost proceeds from the will or from the mutual love of the Father and of the Son. (*Sent. certa.*)

The Roman Catechism teaches that the "Holy Ghost proceeds from the Divine Will, inflamed, as it were, with love (a divine voluntate veluti amore inflammata)" (I 9, 7).

The biblical name of the Third Person, "Holy Ghost" "πνεῦμα ἅγιον," (Pneuma = wind, breath, respiration, life principle, soul) designates a principle of movement, of activity. As the personal name of a Divine Person, the name Pneuma indicates that the Holy Ghost, through an activity of the Divine Will, proceeds as the Spiritual Principle of Divine Activity (per modum voluntatis). Again, the verb πνεῖν, spirare, expresses a relationship to the will. Compare the expressions: amorem spirare, odium spirare, spirans minarum (Acts 9, 1). The personal name "Holy" similarly indicates a procession from the will, as holiness has its seat in the will. Scripture and Tradition ascribe the works of love to the Holy Ghost. Cf. Rom. 5, 5: "The charity of God is poured forth into our hearts by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us." The appropriation of the works of love to the Holy Ghost has its basis in the personal character and ultimately in the origin of the Holy Ghost. It is, therefore, to be inferred that the Holy Ghost "proceeds" by an act of love (per modum amoris). For this reason the Fathers call the Holy Ghost "Love" (amor, caritas, dilectio, vinculum amoris, osculum amoris). The 11th Council of Toledo (675) declared: "(Spiritus Sanctus) simul ab utrisque processisse monstratur, quia caritas sive sanctitas amborum esse cognoscitur." (that the Holy Ghost proceeds from both is seen by this that He is known as the love or sanctity of both.) D 277.

The designation "Love" is connected with the designation "gift" or "donation" (δωρεά δῶρον, donum, munus), which the Fathers ascribe to the

Holy Ghost following Holy Writ. Cf. Acts 2, 38: "And you shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost." Acts 8, 20: "Keep thy money to perish with thee: because thou hast thought that the gift of God may be purchased with money." St. Augustine, De Trin. XV 19, 33-36. As a gift is the expression of love, so also this personal name of the Holy Ghost indicates His origin per modum amoris, and points to the fact that the Holy Ghost is the mutual love-gift of the Father and of the Son.

The object of the Divine will, by which the Father and the Son produce the Holy Ghost, is primarily (principaliter et quasi per se) that which God necessarily wills and loves, i.e., the Divine essence and the Divine Persons, and secondarily (ex consequenti et quasi per accidens) that which He freely wills and loves, i.e., created things and, according to some theologians, also merely possible things.

§ 15. The Holy Ghost does not proceed through generation but through spiration. (*De fide.*)

The Symbol Quicumque says of the Holy Ghost: nec genitus sed procedens. D 39; Cf. D 277, 703. The Holy Ghost is, therefore, not the Son of God. Scripture and Tradition speak only of one or the Only-Begotten Son of God, the Logos. In Tradition, generation and filiation are not applied to the Holy Ghost. Cf. St. Athanasius, Ep. ad Serap. 1, 16; St. Augustine, C. Maxim. II 14, 1.

The distinction between generation and spiration may be founded in this that the intellect, out of which the Son is generated, and the will, out of which the Holy Ghost proceeds, are virtually different in God, and also in the fact that knowing but not willing produces that likeness (to the knower) which is essential to the concept of generation. In knowing just as in generating the aim is similarity (similitudo rei intellectae), but in willing this likeness is presupposed (similitudo est principium amandi). The Holy Ghost is indeed, just as the Son, of like substance with the Father, but He does not possess the identity of substance by reason of His proceeding. Cf. S. th. I 27, 4. The Spiration of the Holy Ghost does not therefore, conform to the notion of generation.

The distinction between the active generation and the active spiration is neither real (there is no contrast of relation; D 703) nor merely logical (the Holy Ghost is not generated; D 39) but a virtual distinction such as exists between the Divine Knowing and the Divine Willing.

CHAPTER 2

The Divine Relations and Persons

§ 16. The Divine Relations

1. Concept of Relation

By relation is understood the ordination of one thing to another (respectus unius ad alterum: S. th. I 28, 3). Three elements belong to the concept of relation, i.e.: 1. The subject (subiectum). 2. The aim (terminus). 3. The basis

(fundamentum) of the relation. The essence of the relation lies in being ordained to another (esse relativi est ad aliud se habere : S. th. I 28, 2). A distinction is made between real and mental (logical), mutual and unilateral relations. Between the subject and the terminus of a relation there exists a relative opposition.

2. Four Real Relations in God

The two internal Divine processions establish in God two pairs of real mutual relationships. Accordingly, there exist in God four real relations : a) the relationship of the Father to the Son : the active generation or paternity (generare) ; b) the relationship of the Son to the Father : the passive generation or filiation (generari) ; c) the relation of the Father and of the Son to the Holy Ghost : the active spiration (spirare) ; d) the relation of the Holy Ghost to the Father and to the Son ; the passive spiration (spirari).

The teaching of Holy Writ concerning the Divine relations is found in the personal names Father, Son and Holy Ghost (Spiritus = spiratus). It was scientifically elaborated by the Fathers of the 4th and 5th century, in the Eastern Church by the Cappadocians (Basil, Gregory Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa) and Cyril of Alexandria, in the Western Church by St. Augustine, followed by Fulgentius and Boethius. Gregory Nazianzus said : " Father is neither a name of the being nor of the activity but a name of the relation (σχέσις), which demonstrates the relationship of the Father to the Son and of the Son to the Father." (Or. 29, 16). Augustine teaches : " Although Father and Son are different this is not a difference in the substance but in the relationship " (non secundum substantiam dicuntur, sed secundum relationem, De Trin. V 5, 6). The official Church teaching embodies this doctrine of the relations which has been developed by the Fathers and theologians. Cf. the Creed of the 11th Synod of Toledo (D 278 ff) and the Decretum pro Jacobitis of the Council of Florence (D 703).

From the dogma of the Trinity of God it follows that the mutual relations in God are not merely logical or mental, but real relations. Otherwise the trinity of persons would be reduced to a mere logical trinity. The difference of the Three Divine Persons is not founded in the Divine Essence, but in the mutual relation of the Persons to one another.

3. Three Really Distinct Relations in God

Of the four real internal-Divine relations three stand in opposition to one another, and are therefore really distinct from one another, namely, the Fatherhood, the Sonship and the Passive Spiration. The Active Spiration stands in opposition to the Passive Spiration only, but not to the Fatherhood and to the Sonship ; consequently it is not really distinct from the Fatherhood and the Sonship, but only virtually distinct.

4. The Relations in God are really identical with the Divine Nature. (*De fide*).

The Synod of Rheims (1148) declared against Gilbert of Poitiers, who was accused of teaching that there is a real distinction between the Divine Persons and the Divine Relations (e.g., between the Father and the Fatherhood), " that there are no realities in God, whether they be called relations or proprieties or singularities or unities or other such, which exist from eternity, and which

are not identical with God (quae non sint Deus)." D 391 The Council declares: Quidquid in Deo est, Deus est (Whatever is in God is God). The Union Council of Florence declares: (In Deo) omnia sunt unam, ubi non obviat relationis oppositio (In God everything is one except there be an opposition of relation). D 703. Between the Divine Relations and the Divine Nature however, no relative opposition exists.

The intrinsic basis is the absolute simplicity of the Divine Essence, with which real composition of substance and relations is incompatible.

Between the relations and the Divine Essence there exists, however, not merely a purely mental, but a virtual distinction, in so far as in the relation the ordination to the terminus of the relation is included, while in the concept of the Essence this ordination is missing: manifestum est, quod relatio realiter existens in Deo est idem essentiae secundum rem et non differt nisi secundum intelligentiae rationem, prout in relatione importatur respectus ad suum oppositum, qui non importatur in nomine essentiae. S. th. I 28, 2.

§ 17. The Divine Persons

1. The Concepts Hypostasis and Person

The Church, in its teaching concerning the Dogma of the Trinity, uses the philosophical concepts essence, nature, substance, hypostasis and person (cf. Caput Firmiter of the 4th Lateran Council (1215): Tres quidem personae, sed una essentia, substantia seu natura simplex omnino). The concepts essence, nature and substance characterise the physical essence of God common to the Three Persons, that is, the totality of the Perfections of the Divine Essence. An hypostasis is an individual complete substance existing entirely in itself, an incommunicable substance (substantia singularis completa tota in se or substantia incommunicabilis). A Person is a hypostasis endowed with reason (hypostasis rationalis). The classical definition comes from that of Boethius (De duabus naturis 3): Persona est naturae rationalis individua (=incommunicabilis) substantia (a Person is the individual (incommunicable) substance of a rational nature). Hypostasis and nature are related to each other in such a manner that the hypostasis is the bearer of nature and the ultimate subject of all being and acting (principium quod), while the nature is that through which the hypostasis is and acts (principium quo).

2. The Relations and the Persons

The three mutually opposite relations of Fatherhood, of Sonship and of the Passive Spiration are the Three Divine Hypostases or Persons. The Fatherhood constitutes the Person of the Father, the Sonship constitutes the Person of the Son, the Passive Spiration constitutes the Person of the Holy Ghost.

A person is an incommunicable substance. The Divine Relations are substantial since they are really identical with the Divine Essence: quidquid est in Deo, est eius essentia (S. th. I 28, 2). But incommunicability belongs to the three relations of Fatherhood, Sonship and Passive Spiration only since the active spiration is common to the Father and to the Son; consequently only these three Relations are persons. Accordingly, each Divine Person is a subsistent incommunicable, internal Divine Relation. Cf. S. th. I 29, 4: Persona divina significat relationem ut subsistentem (a Divine Person signifies a subsistent relation).

3. In God all is one except for the opposition of relations. (*De fide*). From the doctrine of the Divine Relations there flows the so-called basic trinitarian law, which was first formulated by St. Anselm of Canterbury (De processione Spiritus S. 2), and which was solemnly asserted by the Council of Florence in the Decretum pro Jacobis (1441). (In Deo) omnia sunt unum, ubi non obviat relationis oppositio (In God all is one where there is not an opposition of relation) (D 703). According to this assertion, the real distinction of the Persons rests exclusively on the opposition of the relations.

§ 18. The Divine Personal Properties (Proprietates) and Notions

1. The Proprietates

By proprietas is understood a distinguishing property, which belongs to One Divine Person only, and distinguishes It from the Other Two. The proprietates are divided into personal or person-forming (proprietates personales or personificae (ἰδιώματα ὑποστατικά; (D 428), and proprietates of the Persons or distinguishing properties (proprietates personarum (ἰδιώματα τῶν ὑποστάσεων)). To the former class belong the three opposed or person-forming relations of Fatherhood, Sonship and the Passive Spiration. To the second class belongs originlessness (innascibilitas, ἀγεννησία) as a proprietas of the Father. The active spiration is a common property of two Persons, the Father and the Son, and is, therefore, not a proprietas in the strict sense. (S. th. I 32, 3: Communis spiratio non est proprietas, quia convenit duabus personis.)

The "unspiratedness" (ἀπνευστία) of the Father and of the Son, the "ungeneratedness" and the "unfruitfulness" of the Holy Ghost are not reckoned among the properties because the properties express an excellence or a dignity (whence also the designation ἀξιώματα, dignitates).

The Fathers generally recognise "ungeneratedness" as a proprietas of God the Father only, although the meaning of the word expresses the negation of generation and in this sense would apply also to the Holy Ghost. The Fathers regard it as signifying not only "not being generated" but also having no origin (ἀγννέητος=ἄμαρχος); ingenitus=sine principio), and "being the origin of the two other Persons." St. John of Damascus, De fide orth. I 8: "The Father alone is ungenerated (ἀγέννητος); for He has His Being not from another person." Cf. D 275, 277 (11th Synod of Toledo: Solus Pater est ingenitus).

2. The Notions

The notions are distinctive characteristics of the Divine Persons by which they are known. Factually they coincide with the properties. S. th. I 32, 3: Notio dicitur id, quod est propria ratio cognoscendi divinam personam. The notions of the individual Persons are: a) Innascibility and Active Generation as a cognitive mark of the Father: b) Passive Generation as a mark of cognition of the Son; c) Passive Spiration as a cognition-mark of the Holy Ghost. The Active Spiration is a common characteristic of the Father and of the Son, and is therefore not compatible with the strict concept of the notion (distinctive characteristic). The Notions are internal Divine activities which characterise the Persons and distinguish them, as contrasted with the essential acts, which are common to the Three Persons. In God there are two notional acts, notional knowing

through which the Father generates the Son, and notional willing (love) through which the Father and the Son breathe the Holy Ghost. The notional and the essential acts are factually identical; they are only virtually different. When speaking of national acts we think of the Divine Nature from the point of view of its relations, when speaking of essential acts we think of the Divine Nature in an absolute way.

§ 19. The Trinitarian Perichoresis (Circumincession)

By the Trinitarian Perichoresis (περιχώρησις, ἐνύπαρξις; circumincessio, later circuminsessio) is understood the penetration and indwelling of the Three Divine Persons reciprocally in one another.

The Three Divine Persons are in One Another. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Florence, in the Decretum pro Jacobis (1441), declared with St. Fulgentius (De fide ad Petrum 1, 4): Propter hanc unitatem Pater est totus in Filio, totus in Spiritu Sancto: Filius totus est in Patre, totus in Spiritu Sancto: Spiritus Sanctus totus est in Patre, totus in Filio (Because of this unity the Father is wholly in the Son and wholly in the Holy Ghost, the Son is wholly in the Father and wholly in the Holy Ghost, the Holy Ghost is wholly in the Father and wholly in the Son). D 704. Christ testifies that the Father is in Him, and that He is in the Father. John 10, 30: "I and the Father are one." 10, 38: "Believe the works that you may know and believe that the Father is in me and I in the Father." Cf. John 14, 9 et seq.: 17, 21. The indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the Father and in the Son is indicated in 1 Cor. 2, 10 et seq.

The expression περιχωρεῖν is used for the first time by St. Gregory of Nazianzus (Ep. 101, 6) to characterise the relation of the two natures in Christ (Christological Perichoresis). St. John Damascene (De fide orth. I 8; I 14; III 5) used it as a technical term for the coinherence of the two natures in Christ, as well as for the circumincession of the Three Divine Persons. Through the translation of the works of St. John Damascene by Burgundia of Pisa (about 1150) the expression, in the Latin rendering "circumincessio," became current in the Theology of the Occident. "Circumincessio" later became "circuminsessio." The word circumincessio expresses more the idea of the active penetration, the latter circuminsessio more the idea of the passive coinherence. The former corresponds more to the Greek, the latter more to the Latin way of looking at it.

In the Greek conception of the Trinity the Perichoresis plays a greater rôle than it does in the Latin. The Greeks commence with the idea of the Father and thence proceed to the Son by the outpouring of the Divine Life by the Father to the Son, and thence through the Son to the Holy Ghost. Through the emphasis on the mutual penetration of the Three Persons, it emphasises strongly the unity of the Divine Essence. The Latin way of thinking proceeds from the Unity of the Divine Essence and thence develops the concept of the internal Divine Processions into the Trinity of the Persons. Thus in the Latin notion the idea of the unity of the Essence stands in the foreground.

The fundamental basis of the Trinitarian Perichoresis is the one Essence of the Three Persons. Cf. S. th. I 42, 5.

§ 20. The Unity of the Divine Operation ad extra

All the ad extra Activities of God are common to the Three Persons. (*De fide.*)

The 4th Lateran Council (1215), teaches in the chapter *Firmiter*, that the Three Divine Persons are the sole principle of all things (unum universorum principium : D 428). The Council of Florence declares in the Decretum pro Jacobitis (1441) : Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus non tria principia creaturae, sed unum principium. D 704. Cf. D 254, 281, 284.

"Tritheism" is opposed to this teaching of the Church because it denies not only the unity of the Divine Being but also the unity of the Divine operations. According to A. Günther († 1863) the realisation of the Divine world-idea is exclusively the work of the second Person, and the conversion of the creation to God is exclusively the work of the third Person.

Christ testifies to the unity of His working with the Father, and bases it on the unity of Nature. John 5, 19 : "What things soever (the Father) doth these the Son also doth in like manner." John 14, 10 : "But the Father who abideth in Me, He doth the same works." Holy Writ asserts the unity of the operations of the Divine Persons also by ascribing the same works, for example, the realisation of the Incarnation, the bestowal of the supernatural gifts of grace, the forgiveness of sins, to different persons. Cf. Luke 1, 35 ; Mt. 1, 20 ; Phil. 2, 7 ; Hebr. 10, 5 (Incarnation) ; 1 Cor. 12, 4 et seq. (gifts of grace) ; Mt. 9, 2 ; Luke 7, 48 ; 23, 34 ; John 20, 22 (forgiveness of sins).

The Fathers base the unity of operation on the unity of the Divine Nature, which is the "principium quo" of the Divine Activity. St. Augustine, De Trin. I 4, 7 : "As the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost are inseparable, so they work inseparably." Sermo 213, 6, 6 : "The works of the Trinity are inseparable" (Inseparabilia sunt opera Trinitatis).

§ 21. The Appropriations

By appropriation is understood a mode of predication in which the properties and activities of God which are common to the Three Persons, are attributed to an Individual Person (appropriare nihil est aliud, quam commune trahere ad proprium : De verit. 7, 3).

The purpose of the appropriations is to make manifest the differences in the Divine proprietates and persons (manifestatio personarum per essentialia attributa S. th. I 39, 7). In order that this purpose be achieved, only those common attributes and activities are appropriated to an Individual Divine Person, which exhibit a certain relationship to the proprietates of the Person concerned.

Holy Writ ascribes the effecting of the Incarnation to the Father (Hebr. 10, 5) and to the Holy Ghost (Luke 1, 35 ; Mt. 1, 20) and allocates the bestowing of the gifts of grace to the Third Person (1 Cor. 12, 4 et seq.), although the operation of God ad extra is common to the Three Persons.

The appropriations in Holy Scripture, and in the Fathers, and those made by the theologians can, following Scheeben (Dogmatik, Gotteslehre n. 1046 et seq.), be divided into four classes :

a) The appropriation of the substantive names of God (θεός, κύριος). Cf. 1 Cor. 12, 5 et seq.; John 3, 16 et seq.; Gal. 4, 4. 6 (θεός=God the Father, κύριος=God the Son).

b) The appropriation of the absolute attributes of God (Power, Wisdom, Goodness). Cf. St. Augustine, De doctrina christ. I 5, 5: In Patre unitas, in Filio aequalitas, in Spiritu Sancto unitatis aequalitatisque concordia. St. Hilary, De Trinitate II 1: Eternity is in the Father; beauty is in the Image (Word); and use (happiness) is in the Gift (Paraclete) [infinitas in aeterno (=Patre), species in imagine (=Filio), usus in munere (=Spiritu Sancto).]

c) The appropriation of the works of God (causa efficiens, causa exemplaris causa finalis, following Rom. 11, 36: resolution, execution, completion).

d) The appropriation of the cult of adoration and sacrifice (the Father as recipient, the Son and the Holy Ghost as mediators). Cf. S. th. I 39, 8.

§ 22. The Divine Missions

The concept of "mission" (missio ad extra) according to the teaching of St Thomas (S. th. I 43, 1), comprises two elements: a) a relation between the one sent and the sender as terminus a quo (The one sent stands in a relation of dependence to the sender, in the Divine Persons, on account of their identity of essence, it can be a dependence according to origin only; b) A relation between the one sent and the object of the mission (terminus ad quem). The object of the mission is the presence of the One sent at a definite place. In the sending of a Divine Person, in view of the substantial omnipresence of God in the created world, there is question only of a new kind of presence. Thus the concept of sending implies not only the eternal procession, but also a new kind of presence in the created world: missio includit processionem aeternam et aliquid addit, sc. temporalem effectum (S. th. I 43, 2 ad 3). The temporal missions, therefore, reflect the "notions" of the Divine Persons: The Father sends only, but is not sent; the Son is sent and sends. The Holy Ghost is sent only, but does not send.

The Father sends the Son: the Father and the Son send the Holy Ghost. (*Sent. certa.*)

The 11th Council of Toledo (675) declares: Hic igitur Spiritus Sanctus missus ab utrisque sicut Filius a Patre creditur (we believe that the Holy Ghost is sent from both [the Father and the Son] as the Son is sent from the Father). D 277; cf. D 794.

Holy Writ testifies to:

a) The mission of the Son by the Father; cf. John 3, 17; 5, 23; 6, 58; 17, 18; Gal. 4, 4: "God sent His Son."

b) The mission of the Holy Ghost by the Father; cf. John 14, 16. 26; Gal. 4, 6: "God sent the spirit of His Son into your hearts, crying,: Abba, Father."

c) The mission of the Holy Ghost by the Son; cf. John 15, 26; 16, 7; Luke 24, 49: "And I send the promise of the Father upon you." Holy Writ does not

speak of the Father as being sent but only of His coming and indwelling. John 14, 23 : "If anyone loves me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him, and We will come to him and make our abode with him."

The missions are divided into visible and invisible, according to whether the new presence of the person sent is sensibly perceptible or not. The Incarnation of the Word is a visible mission (missio substantialis) as is also the mission of the Holy Ghost under the visible Symbol of the dove or tongues of fire (missio repraesentativa). The invisible sending follows on the bestowal of sanctifying grace, and has as its object the indwelling of God in the soul of the just. In Holy Writ the indwelling is generally ascribed to the Holy Ghost (1 Cor. 3, 16 ; 6, 19 ; Rom. 5, 5 ; 8, 11) ; but with the Holy Ghost the Father and the Son also come to dwell in the souls of the just (John 14, 23 ; 2 Cor. 6, 16).

CHAPTER 3

The Relation of the Trinity to Reason

§ 23. The Mysterious Character of the Dogma of the Trinity

1. The dogma of the Trinity is above human reason

The Trinity of God can only be known through Divine Revelation. (*Sent. fidei proxima.*)

The absolutely mysterious character of the dogma of the Trinity is, indeed, not defined, but it is contained in the doctrine of the Vatican Council, that among the truths of Faith " there are mysteries concealed in God, which can be known on the basis of Divine Revelation only " ; mysteria in Deo abscondita, quae nisi revelata divinitus innotescere non possunt (D 1795). Christianity has always regarded the dogma of the Trinity as the most fundamental and most profound mystery of Faith. The sublimity of the dogma of the Trinity over natural rational knowledge is indicated in Mt. 11, 27 : " None knoweth the Father but the Son, and he to whom it shall please the Son to reveal Him." Cf. John 1, 18 ; 1 Cor. 2, 11.

The Fathers often emphasise the mysterious character of the dogma of the Trinity and the necessity of Faith. St. John Damascene says : " It is known and adored in Faith (the Trinity), not by investigating, examining and proving. . . . You have to believe that God is in three Persons. How sublime is this above all questions. For God is inconceivable " (De haer., epil.). Cf. Ambrose, De fide I, 10, 64 ; 12, 78 ; 13, 84. Augustine, In Ioan. tr. 97, 1 ; 21, 3. Gregory of Nyssa, Or. cat. 3.

The necessary reasons (Rationes necessariae), adduced by St. Anselm of Canterbury and Richard of St. Victor, are in fact only grounds of congruity, which pre-suppose the Revelation of the Trinity and belief in it. The attempt of Anton Günther, under the influence of Hegel, to derive the Trinity of God on purely rational grounds from the Divine self-consciousness, was a failure.

Natural reason can know God from the created things only as their origin. But the perfections of God which reveal themselves in created things, for example, power, wisdom, goodness, are common to the Three Divine Persons. Consequently, natural reason can know God only in His Unity of Nature, but not in His Trinity of Persons.

2. Capacity of Reason

The Vatican Council says of the mysteries of Faith that even "after the promulgation of the Revelation and its acceptance of Faith, they remain covered by the veil of Faith and hidden in a certain obscurity" (1796). This applies, par excellence, to the dogma of the Trinity as the basic dogma of Christian belief.

Nevertheless, reason enlightened by Faith can correctly apprehend and represent the true sense of the dogma from the explanations of the Church and from the testimonies of Revelation. Further, it can, through analogues derived from created things, throw a light on the mystery and bring it nearer to the understanding, for example, in the comparison of the internal-Divine processions with human self-knowledge and self-love. Also the objections brought against the dogma can be refuted by reason. The dogma of the Trinity is, in fact, beyond reason (supra rationem) but not contrary to reason (contra rationem). Cf. D 1797.

Objections.

The rationalist argument that according to the dogma of the Trinity three is equal to one and one is equal to three, is refuted by pointing out that the Divine Persons are not in the same respect three and one, but in one respect three, namely, according to the Persons, and in another respect one, namely, according to Essence.

The principle adduced against the dogma of the Trinity: two things which are equal to a third are equal among themselves, is valid only when the two things are in every respect, re et ratione, equal to a third thing. The Divine Persons and the Divine Essence are indeed really identical, but virtually (ratione) different. Thus the Three Persons are indeed identical in Essence, but different from one another in their relation to one another. Cf. S. th. I 28, 3 ad 1.

Human reason cannot fathom the mystery of the Blessed Trinity even after the dogma has been revealed by God (sent. fidei proxima).

BOOK TWO

God the Creator

SECTION 1

The Divine Act of Creation

CHAPTER I

The Beginning or the Creation of the World

§ 1. The Reality of the Divine Creation of the World

1. The Dogma and the Heretical Counter-Propositions

All that exists outside God was, in its whole substance, produced out of nothing by God. (*De fide.*)

The Vatican Council declared against the ancient pagan and gnostic-manichaean dualism, as well as against modern monism (materialism, pantheism): Si quis non confiteatur mundum resque omnes, quae in eo continentur, et spirituales et materiales, secondum totam suam substantiam a Deo ex nihilo esse productas anathema sit. D 1805. Cf. The Symbols of Faith and "Caput Firmiter" (D 428).

In philosophical and theological parlance, by Creation is understood: *The production of a thing out of nothing* (productio rei ex nihilo, i.e. non ex aliquo), and indeed, ex nihilo sui et subiecti (not ex nihilo causae), that is, before the act of Creation, neither the thing as such, nor any material substratum, from which it was produced, existed. St. Thomas defines Creation as: Productio alicuius rei secundum suam totam substantiam nullo praesupposito, quod sit vel increatum vel ab aliquo creatum (S. th. I 65, 3). From Creation in the proper and strict sense (creatio prima) is to be distinguished the so-called creatio secunda, by which is understood the modelling of formless material and the bestowal of life upon it.

2. Proof from Scripture and Tradition

a) The creation of the world out of nothing may be proved indirectly by the fact that the name Jahweh, and with it, necessary self-existence (Aseity), is attributed to God alone, while all other things in comparison with God are called *nothing*. From this follows the conclusion that everything outside God must attribute its existence to God. Cf. Is. 42, 8; 40, 17. The Divine name Adonai (κύριος) represents God as the Lord and Proprietor of Heaven and Earth by virtue of the Creation. Unlimited rights attributed to a lord and proprietor signify that the property has its origin solely in the proprietor himself. Cf. Ps. 88, 12; Est. 13, 10 et seq.; Mt. 11, 25.

The creation of the world out of nothing, according to general Jewish and Christian conviction, is directly expressed in Gn. 1, 1: "In the beginning God created Heaven and earth." It must be noted that in this basic text no substratum of creation (materia ex qua) is named. "In the beginning," without a more detailed definition, means the absolute beginning, that is, that point in time, before which there was nothing side by side with God, and in which the things external to God began to exist. "Heaven and Earth"

is the whole universe, that is, all extra-Divine things, the world. The verb bara (=create) can, indeed, also mean produce in the wider sense, but it is used almost exclusively of the Divine Activity; apart from Gn. 1, 27, it is never associated with the presence of a material, out of which God produces something. According to the usage of the biblical narrative in Gn. 1, 1, it expresses creation out of nothing only. Cf. Ps. 123, 8; 145, 6; 32, 9.

The belief of the Jewish people concerning the Creation which is found in Gn. 1, 1, is attested to also in 2 Macc. 7, 28, in which the Maccabean mother, "full of Wisdom" (V. 21) adjures her youngest son to accept martyrdom: "I beseech thee, my son, look upon the heavens and the earth, and see all that is in them: and consider that God made them out of nothing (οὐκ ἐξ ὄντων, ex nihilo)." Cf. Wis. 1, 14: "For He created all things that they might be." Rom. 4, 17: "Who calleth those things that are not, as those that are."

Wis. 11, 18: "For thy almighty hand which made the world of matter without form (ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης)" is, according to the context, to be understood as referring to the creatio secunda, as is also Hebr. 11, 3: "By faith we understand that the world was framed by the word of God; that from invisible things, the visible things would be made." Cf. Gn. 1, 2, according to G: "And the earth was invisible (ἀόρατος) and unformed."

b) The Fathers regard the creation of the world out of nothing as a basic truth of Christian belief, and defend it against the false dualism of pagan philosophy and of gnostic-manichaean error. About the middle of the 2nd century, Pastor Hermae writes: "For the very first thing believe that God is the only God, who has created and who prepared everything, and who has made everything, out of nothing" (Mand. I 1). Cf. Theophilus of Antioch (Ad Autol. II 4 10), St. Irenaeus (Adv. haer. I 22, 1; II 10, 4; Epideixis I 1, 4), Tertullian (Adv. Hermogenem 1: De praescr. 13; Apolog. 17) and St. Augustine (De Genesi contra Manichaeos).

3. Creation and Reason

The creation of the world from nothing is not only a basic truth of Christian Revelation, but also a truth of reason, which is inherent in the cosmological proofs of God (except the teleological) and especially in the contingency proof. But since philosophy, including that of Aristotle, apart from Christianity, never achieved a pure concept of Creation, the revelation of this truth was morally necessary. (Cf. S. th. I 44, 1; I 61, 1; S.c.G. II 15–16.)

§ 2. The Divine World-Idea

The world is the work of the Divine Wisdom. (*Sent. certa.*)

In opposition to Christian doctrine, materialists propounded the "Accident Theory," according to which the present world has developed purely mechanically out of a material eternally existing.

Holy Writ teaches that God has made all in wisdom. Ps. 103, 24: "Thou hast made all things in wisdom." Wisdom stood at His side as a counsellor at the creation of the world. Pro. 8, 27 et seq. Cf. Pro. 3, 19 et seq.; Gn. 1, 26. Thus the created world is the realisation of Divine Ideas.

Since the Divine Ideas are thoughts of God they are Eternal and Unchangeable

because identical with the Divine Wisdom and with the Divine Essence. From the point of view of their realisation in Creation, they are temporal and mutable, because they have for their object merely finite replicas of Divine perfections. (N.B.: On account of the absolute simplicity of His Essence there is in God one single idea. In so far as this one Idea is reflected in many extra-Divine objects, one speaks of a multiplicity of Divine Ideas.)
St. Augustine adapted Plato's doctrine of "Ideas" to Christian doctrine by identifying the Eternal Idea with the Divinity Itself. (Cf. In Ioan. tr. 1, 16 et seq.) See also The Doctrine of God, § 23.

§ 3. Motive and Purpose of the Creation of the World

1. Motive

God was moved by His Goodness to create the world. (*De fide.*)

The motive which moved God to creation (finis operantis) is, as the Provincial Synod of Cologne declared in 1860, the love of His Absolute Goodness (amor bonitatis suae absolutae). This moved Him to reflect His Perfections in other beings by finite images. The Vatican Council declared: Deus bonitate sua et omnipotenti virtute non ad augendam suam beatitudinem nec ad acquirendam, sed ad manifestandam perfectionem suam per bona, quae creaturis impertitur, liberrimo consillio . . . utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam. D 1783.

According to the testimony of Holy Writ the motive of the Divine Act of Creation lies in God Himself: "The Lord hath made all things for himself" (Prov. 16, 4).

The Fathers testify that God did not create the world because He needed it, but in order to "pour out His benefits" (Irenaeus, Adv. haer. IV 14, 1). Origen teaches (De princ. II 9, 6): "In the beginning when God created what He wanted to create, i.e., rational creatures, He had no other cause for it but Himself, i.e., His goodness". Augustine says (De doctr. christ. I 32, 35): "We are because He is good". Cf. Hilary, In Ps. 2, 15; Augustine, De civ. Dei XI 24; St. John Damascene, De fide orth. II 2.

God's necessary Self-Existence (Aseity) and the Infinite Bliss which it connotes (in se et ex se beatissimus: D 1782) excludes any extra-Divine motive for the Divine act of Creation. St. Thomas teaches: "God does not act for His own profit, but only for His own Goodness." S. th. I 44, 4 ad 1.

2. Purpose

The world was created for the Glorification of God. (*De fide.*)

a) The objective purpose of creation (finis operis), i.e., the purpose intrinsic in the work of creation, is primarily the revelation of the Divine Perfections, and the glorification of God which flow from this. The Vatican Council thus defined: Si quis . . . mundum ad Dei gloriam conditum esse negaverit, A.S. D 1805.

The glorification of God which is made by creatures is called external glory (gloria externa). A distinction is made between objective glory (gloria objectiva) and formal glory (gloria formalis). The former is given to God by all creatures without exception, by their mere existence, in so far as they

mirror the Divine Perfections. Cf. Ps. 18, 2 : " The heavens show forth the glory of God." Dn. 3, 52 et seq. (Benedicite) ; Ps. 148. The latter is rendered to Him with knowledge and with will by rational creatures. Cf. Ps. 146150 (Laudat e Dominum).

According to the teaching of Holy Scripture, God is the Alpha and Omega, the Beginning and the Final Purpose of all things. Apoc. 1, 8 : "I am the Alpha and the Omega (that is, the Beginning and the End) saith the Lord God." Cf. Rom. 11, 36 : " For of Him, and by Him, and in Him, are all things, to Him be glory for ever." Hebr. 2, 10 : " For Whom are all things and by Whom are all things." Cf. Pro. 16, 4. According to Tertullian, God produced the world out of nothing "as an adornment of His glory" (Apol. 17).

The objection raised by Descartes, Hermes and Günther, that it would be a reprehensible egoism if God had intended His Own Glory to be the ultimate purpose of the Creation, is unjustified, because the Perfection and the Beatitude of God cannot be increased by creatures, and because the Activity of God, being of the highest Goodness, must necessarily be co-ordinated with the highest end.

b) The secondary purpose of the creation of the world is the bestowal of good on creatures, especially creatures endowed with reason. The Vatican Council teaches that God created the world " for the Revelation of His Perfection " (primary purpose) " through the good things which He communicates to creatures " (secondary purpose).

Holy Writ stresses that the created world should serve mankind, but does not regard the happiness of mankind as an end in itself, but as an end subordinated to the glorification of God. Cf. Gn. 1, 28 et seq.; Ps. 8, 6 et seq.; Apoc. 4, 11. The two aims of creation are inseparably connected with each other, for the glory given to God by creatures who know and love Him, constitutes at the same time the bliss of the rational creature.

As a refutation of the objection that the external glory of God as something finite could not be the ultimate purpose of the Creation it is necessary to distinguish between the finis qui and the finis quo of the Creation. Finis qui, (objective purpose) is that which is aimed at ; finis quo (formal purpose) is that through which the thing aimed at is achieved. The finis qui of the work of Creation is the intrinsic goodness of God and thus God Himself. The finis quo is the participation of creatures in the goodness of God, which contributes at the same time to the bliss of rational creatures. The definition of the Vatican (D 1805) according to which the world was created for the glory of God, has the finis quo in mind ; for the participation of creatures in the goodness of God coincides with the external glory of God : The perfections of the creatures are images of the perfection of the Creator (gloria obiectiva) ; the consideration of the perfections of creatures leads rational creatures to the perception and acknowledgement of the perfections of the Creator (gloria formulis). While the finis quo is finite, the finis qui is infinite. This is what Holy Writ means when it names God as the ultimate purpose of every Creation.

§ 4. The Trinity and Creation

The Three Divine Persons are one single, common Principle of the Creation. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Florence declared in the " Decretum pro Jacobitis " (1441) : Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus non tria principia creaturae, sed unum

principium. D 704 ; cf. D 428. As the work of Creation, however, exhibits a certain similarity with the proprietates of the First Person, it is usually referred to the Father by "appropriation." (Cf. The Apostles' Creed.)

In contrast to the teaching of the Church there is the viewpoint of A. Günther, who, indeed, ascribed the idea of the world and the resolution to create to the Three Persons, but attributed the *execution* of the work of Creation to the Second Person exclusively, and the re-unification of creatures with God to the Third Person exclusively.

Holy Writ stresses the communal character of the operation of the Father and of the Son and founds this on their community of Nature. Cf. John 5, 19 ; 14, 10 (see Doctrine of the Trinity, § 20). In Holy Writ the work of Redemption is sometimes attributed to the Father, sometimes to the Son. Cf. Mt. 11, 25 ; John 1, 3 ; Col. 1, 15 et seq. ; 1 Cor. 8, 6 ; Hebr. 1, 2. Cf. St. Augustine, De Trin. V 13, 14 : "In relation to the creation God is called a Single Principle, not two or three principles."

Since the time of St. Augustine the general teaching of theologians is that creatures unendowed with reason are a "Trace of the Trinity" (Vestigium Trinitatis), those gifted with reason are an "Image of the Trinity" (imago Trinitatis) and those endowed with saving grace a "Likeness (similitudo) of the Trinity." S. th. I 45, 7 ; I 93, 5-9.

§ 5. Freedom of the Divine Act of Creation

1. Libertas Contradictionis (Freedom of Contradiction)

God created the world free from exterior compulsion and inner necessity. (*De fide.*)

The Vatican Council declared that God "with a will free from all necessity" (voluntate ab omni necessitate libera) executed the act of Creation (D 1783, 1805 ; cf. D 706). The Vatican definition refers primarily to "libertas contradictionis," which asserts that God had the choice of creating or of not creating. It is directed chiefly against Hermes, Günther, and Rosmini, who maintained that the goodness of God imposed on Him a necessity to create.

Holy Script and tradition place the origin of the Creation in the free will of the Creator. Ps. 134, 6 : "Whatsoever the Lord pleased He hath done, in heaven, in earth, in the sea and in all the deeps." Apoc. 4, 11 : "Because thou hast created all things, and for thy will they were and have been created." Cf. Ps. 32, 6 ; Wis. 9, 1 ; 11, 26 ; Eph. 1, 11.

St. Augustine comments on Ps. 134, 6 : "The cause of all that He has created is His will" (Enarr. in Ps. 134, 10). Cf. St. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. II 1, 1 ; III 8, 3. A pressure from without or an urgency from within is incompatible with God's absolute Being and with the independence and self-sufficiency which this implies. Again, no necessity to create derives from God's Goodness, because the desire for self-communication inherent in the nature of goodness (bonum est diffusivum sui) is satisfied in a perfect manner through the internal Divine Processions. God's infinite Goodness is indeed the reason for His communication of Being to creatures (communicateo ad extra), but He is not compelled to make this communication. Cf. S. th. I 19, 3.

2. Libertas Specificationis

"God was free to create this world or any other." (*Sent. certa.*)

So declared the Provincial Synod of Cologne in 1860 against the absolute optimism expounded by Abelard, Malebranche and Leibniz, according to which God was obliged to create the best imaginable of all possible worlds. Cf. D 374. The world now existing does not possess the highest conceivable measure of perfections. Neither did God owe it to Himself to create the best world, because His perfections and happiness cannot be increased even by the best world. If one were to deny God's freedom in the choice between this or that world (libertas specificationis) one would limit His Omnipotence, which extends to all that is intrinsically possible.

3. Lack of Libertas Contrarietatis

God has created a good world. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Florence declared, in the Decretum pro Jacobitis (1441), against the Manichaean error: "there is no nature bad in itself, as all nature in so far as it is nature, is good: nullamque mali asserit esse naturam, quia omnis natura, in quantum natura est, bona est." D 706. Cf. D 428.

The biblical foundation is Gn. 1, 31: "And God saw all the things He had made and they were very good." Cf. Ecclus. 39, 21: 1 Tim. 4, 4. God could not create a world that was morally bad, as by virtue of His absolute holiness He could not be the Originator of moral evil. Cf. D 816 (against Calvin). Thus God does not possess the libertas contrarietatis, that is, the freedom of choice between good and evil.

Against Pessimism (A. Schopenhauer, Ed. v. Hartmann), according to which the existing world is the worst imaginable, the Christian view of the world represents a relative optimism, which holds the present world to be relatively the best, since, being a work of the Divine Wisdom, it corresponds to the aim pre-determined for it by God, and unites in wonderful harmony in itself the various stages of the perfections of the natural and supernatural orders.

§ 6. The Temporal Character of the World

1. The Dogma

The world had a beginning in time. (*De fide.*)

While pagan philosophy and modern materialism assume the eternity of the world and also of the world-material, the Church teaches that the world has not existed from all eternity, but began to be. The 4th Lateran (1215) and the Vatican Councils declared: simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam spiritualem et corporalem (together, in the beginning of time (God) founded out of nothing th double order of creatures, spiritual and corporal). In this the eternity of the world is clearly rejected. D 428, 1783. Cf. D 501-503 (Meister Eckhart).

Holy Writ clearly testifies that the world once was not and that it began to be. John 17, 5: "And now glorify thou me, O Father, with thyself, with the glory which I had before the world was with thee." Eph. 1, 4: "He chose us

in Him (Christ) even before the foundation of the world." Ps. 101, 26: "In the beginning, O Lord, thou foundest the earth." Cf. Gn. 1, 1; Pro. 8, 22 et seq.; Ps. 89, 2; John 17, 24.

The Fathers reject the notion of the eternity of the world in the struggle against the dualistic error. (Cf. Tatian, Or ad Graecos 5; Irenaeus, Adv. haer. II 34, 2; St. Basil, In Hexaem. hom. 1, 7.) Under the influence of Plato, Origen erroneously proposed the idea of series of worlds without a beginning, the first of which was created by God from all eternity.

The eternity of the world cannot be proved by philosophical arguments. As the existence of the world is due to a free act of God's will, God does not necessarily will that it should always exist. S. th. I 46, 1. The discoveries of modern atomic physics afford the possibility that in virtue of the disintegration process of the radio-active elements, the age of the earth, and thereby its temporal beginning, may positively be proved. Cf. the speech of Pius XII in 22.11.1951: "The proof of God's existence in the light of modern Natural Science."

2. Controversy over the Possibility of an Eternal Creation of the World

Whether or not a created world without a beginning is possible is disputed.

a) St. Thomas and his School assert that there is no compelling proof from reason of the impossibility of an eternal creation of the world. Thus, that the world was created in time is, according to St. Thomas, purely a truth of Faith, and not a truth of reason. S. th. I 46, 2: mundum non semper fuisse, sola fide tenetur et demonstrative probari non potest.

In support of this view, St. Thomas explains that the temporal nature of the world can be proved by reason neither from the nature of the world nor from its relation to God. The concept of the essence of a thing which is the starting-point of the proof prescinds from space and time. Consequently it cannot be proved from the concept of the world that it did not always exist. It is true that the effective cause of the world is the Free Will of God. This, however, cannot be established through human reason, but can be known on the basis of Divine Revelation only. The temporal beginning of the world is therefore, not an object of natural knowledge, but an object of faith only.

b) St. Bonaventure and many other theologians are, however, of the opinion that the acceptance of an eternal world-creation involves an intrinsic contradiction; for creation out of nothing means: to have being in succession to non-being (habere esse post non esse), i.e. first not to be and then to be. (Sent. II d. 1, p. 1 a. 1 q. 2.)

The Fathers also teach that a creature without beginning is not possible. They reject the teaching of Origen concerning the eternal creation of the first world (Methodius), and affirm against the Arians, the Eternal Godhead of the Logos. St. Athanasius says: "Even if God can always create, still the created things could not always be; for they are out of non-being, and were not, before they became" (Contra Arianos or. I 29).

c) The eternal creation of a changeable world is not possible, because the succession involved in a change constitutes the essence of time. Only an unchangeable world could be eternal. An unchangeable creature is, however, hardly conceivable, as changeability necessarily exists with finity. In any case, the material of which the present world is constituted is mutable even in its very atomic nucleus.

§ 7. The Incommunicability of the Creative Power

1. The Creative Power as Potentia Incommunicata

God alone created the World. (*De fide.*)

The 4th Lateran Council teaches that the Triune God is " A Single Principle of all things " (" unum universorum principium ; creator omnium visibilium et invisibilium ") (D 428).

Holy Scripture rules out any other origin of the work of creation. A Demiurg (Demi-God) cannot exist conjointly with Him. Is. 44, 24 : " I am the Lord that made all things, that alone stretch out heavens, that establish the earth " (according to another reading : " Who was with Me ? "). Hebr. 3, 4 : " He that created all things is God." Cf. Ps. 88, 12 ; 32, 6, 9 ; 94, 5 ; John 1, 3 ; Apoc. 4, 11.

The Fathers rejected both the Gnostic teaching, according to which the world was formed through an intermediary being (demiurg) from the eternal material, and the Arian doctrine which contended that the world was created out of nothing by a Logos who was a creature. (Cf. St. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. IV 20, 1 ; St. Augustine, De civ. Dei XII 24.)

2. The Creative Power as Potentia Incommunicabilis

a) No creature can, as Principal Cause (causa principalis) that is, from its own power, create something out of nothing. (*Sent. communis.*)

In contrast to this teaching, individual scholastic theologians, such as Durandus († 1334) and Gabriel Biel († 1495) expounded the viewpoint that God could equip a creature with the power to create so that it could, by its own power, produce things out of nothing. Jacob Frohschammer († 1893) held that parents, through a power of creation bestowed on them by God, produced the soul of the child out of nothing.

The Fathers, refuting the Arian thesis, took as their point of departure the fact that a creature can create nothing. From the fact then that everything was created through the Logos they established the Godhead of the Logos (John 1, 3). (Cf. St. Athanasius, Contra Arianos or. II 21 : " If, according to your opinion the Son has become to be out of nothing, how is He capable of transforming non-being into being ? . . . No emergent thing is a creative cause.")

The impossibility of a creature having the power of creation may be established speculatively by reason of the fact that the act of creation demands infinite power in order to overcome the infinite distance between non-being and being, while the power of every creature is finite (cf. S. th. I 45, 5).

b) Most theologians hold with St. Thomas, against Petrus Lombardus, that a creature cannot co-operate even as instrumental cause (causa instrumentalis) in the Creation : impossibile est, quod alicui creaturae conveniat creare, neque virtute propria neque instrumentaliter sive per ministerium (S. th. I 45, 5). The intrinsic basis of the argument is the fact that every creative cause presupposes a substratum for its activity. Therefore it is impossible for a creature to co-operate as an instrumental cause in the production of a thing out of nothing.

CHAPTER 2

The Continuous Preservation and Governing of the World

§ 8. The Preservation of the World

1. Dogma

God keeps all created things in existence. (*De fide.*)

Against Deism, according to which God, the Creator, having created it, leaves the world to run itself, the Church declares that God continuously preserves in existence created things. The Vatican Council teaches: "God, by His Providence, protects all that He has created," that is, He preserves it from relapsing into nothingness. D 1784. Cf. Cat. Rom. I 2, 21: "If His Providence did not preserve all things with the same power with which they were created in the beginning they would fall back into nothingness immediately."

God's conservating activity is a constant causal intervention through which He preserves things in existence. This intervention acts not merely mediately through secondary causes, but it immediately secures the continuance of things. St. Thomas points out that the preservation of Creation is really a continuation of the creative activity of God; conservatio rerum a Deo non est per aliquam novam actionem, sed per continuationem actionis qua dat esse. (S. th. I 104, 1 ad 4.)

2. Proof from the Sources of Faith

Holy Writ bears constant witness to God's Activity in conserving the world. Wis. 11, 26: "And how could anything endure if thou wouldst not, or be preserved, if not called by thee?" John 5, 17: "My Father worketh until now; and I work." The working of the Father refers to the preservation and governing of the world. St. Paul ascribes the preservation as well as the creation of the world, to Christ. Col. 1, 17: "And by Him all things consist." (Hebr. 1, 3): "He upholdeth all things by the word of His power." (Cf. Acts 17, 28.)

St. Augustine comments on John 5, 17: "Let us therefore believe that God works constantly, so that all created things would perish, if His working were withdrawn." (De Gen. ad Litt. V 20, 40.) (Cf. Theophilus, Ad Autol. 1 4: St. Irenaeus. Adv. haer. II 34, 2 et seq.)

St. Thomas speculatively establishes the Divine preservation of the world on the fact that God is not merely the cause of the becoming of things, but also the origin of their being. On this account, the creature depends on God, not merely in its becoming, that is at the point of time in which it is produced, but also in its existence and, indeed, in every moment of its existence. (S. th. I 104, 1.)

3. Freedom of Annihilation

As God has freely created creatures, He is free also to annihilate them through the withdrawing of His conservating influence, and so allow them to relapse into nothingness. (Cf. 2 Macc. 8, 18: "But we trust in the Almighty God, who, at a beck, can utterly destroy the whole world.") However, Revelation teaches that, in point of fact, God does not desire the complete annihilation of

His creatures. Cf. Wis. 1, 13 et seq.: "God hath not pleasure in the destruction of the living. For He created all things that they might be." Wis. 11, 27; Pro. 1, 4; 3, 14.

It is consonant with the Wisdom and the Goodness of God that He preserves in existence the creatures who are imitations of the Divine Perfections, and thus serve to give glory to God.

§ 9. The Divine Co-operation

1. The Fact of the Divine Co-operation

God co-operates immediately in every act of His creatures. (*Sent. communis.*)

There is no decision of the Church on this. However, theologians generally hold that God co-operates immediately in every act of His creatures. This is opposed by the theory of "Occasionalism" which denies that created things have a true cause, and to "Deism," which, admitting Creation, denies all subsequent intervention of God in created things. The Roman Catechism (I 2, 22) teaches that "God, by means of a most intrinsic power, impels everything that moves and acts to its movement and activity."

This co-operation of the Causa Prima (God) with the Causae Secundae (creatures) is known as "Concursus Divinus." The Divine co-operation in the Natural Order is called "Concursus Generalis or Naturalis," to distinguish it from the special supernatural intervention of God through grace in rational creatures; it is known as "Concursus Physicus," to distinguish it from a merely moral intervention which derives from some external cause, e.g., a command, advice, a threat, etc.; It is called "Concursus Immediatus" to distinguish it from a merely mediate intervention which is implied in the bestowal and conservation of self-sufficient natural powers (Durandus held this theory of mediate intervention); and finally it is called "Concursus Universalis," in so far as it affects all the activities of all creatures without exception.

The Holy Scriptures frequently ascribe to God the activity of created causes, for example, the formation of human life in the mother's womb, the dispensing of rain, nourishment and clothing (cf. Job. 10, 8 et seq.; Ps. 146, 8 et seq.; Mt. 5, 45; 6, 26. 30). However, these passages could be understood as referring to the mediate co-operation of God. Is. 26, 12, however, and especially Acts 17, 28, indicate an immediate co-operation. Is. 26, 12: "Thou hast wrought all our works for us." Acts 17, 28: "In Him we live, and move, and are."

St. Jerome, and St. Augustine defend the immediate Divine co-operation in all natural activities against the Pelagians, who limited the co-operation of God to the bestowal of the ability to be active. (St. Hieronymus. Dial. adv. Pelag. I 3; Ep. 133, 7; St. Augustine, Ep. 205, 3, 17.)

The intrinsic reason for the necessity of the Divine co-operation lies in the entire dependence of all created being on God. As the activity of the creature has a real being which is distinct from the power from which it flows, so this "being of activity" must be caused by God.

2. Divine Co-operation and Sin

God co-operates in the physical act of sin also (actio peccati, entitas peccati); since the activation of the sensual and spiritual powers of the creature, is a being, and therefore something good. The moral deficiency (i.e. the, sin as such),

which is associated with the physical act, derives from the free will of the creature who, therefore, alone is guilty. God, in consequence of His infinite perfection, cannot be the cause of a moral defect. (Cf. S. th. I 49, 2; de malo 3, 2.)

3. The Mode of the Co-operation between the Causa Prima (God) and of the Causae Secundae (Creatures)

The co-operation of the Causa Prima (God) and of the Causae Secundae (creatures) is not to be conceived as a mechanical working together, but as an organic activity in one another and with one another. Hence it is incorrect to ascribe part of the activity to the Divine Cause and part to the creature. The action as a whole belongs to the Divine as well as to the created cause. The created cause is subordinated to the Divine, in such a manner, however, that its own causality is not abrogated. (Cf. St. Thomas, De potentia, 1, 4 ad 3: licit causa prima maxime influat in effectum, tamen eius influentia per causam proximam determinatur et specificatur.)

In the more exact determination of the mode and manner of the co-operation of the Divine and the created cause in the free action of rational creatures, Thomists and Molinists diverge.

Thomists teach that God, through a "Concursus Praevius" or "Praemotio Physica" (physical pre-motion) brings the created power from potency to act, and through a "Concursus Simultaneus" accompanies the activity of the creature during its whole duration. The entire action therefore proceeds from God as the principal cause (causa principalis), and from the creature as the instrumental cause (causa instrumentalis). The physical preliminary movement (praemotio physica) is more closely defined as "prae-determinatio" (pre-determination), since it has as its aim not merely the activity of the creatures in general, but an exact definite activity (determinatio ad unam). By this means the operation desired by God is infallibly induced.

The *Molinists* teach that God's immediate physical co-operation depends on the free decision of the human will, but not as an effect depends on a cause, but as the conditioned depends on the condition. The Divine Co-operation begins in the instant in which the will goes over from potency to act. Prior to the free decision God works only morally and mediately on the will. Thus the Molinists refuse to accept a "Concursus Praevius" and accept a "Concursus Simultaneus" only. Many Molinists distinguish between "Concursus Oblatus" and "Concursus Collatus," that is, between the still undefined proffering of the Divine co-operation, which precedes the self-determination of the will, and the bestowal of the Divine co-operation for a quite definite action according to the free decision of the will.

The Thomist thesis emphasises God's omni-causality and the ubiquitous dependence of the creatures. Molinism emphasises the freedom of the will, but seems to weaken the essential dependence of the creatures upon God.

§ 10. Divine Providence and the Government of the World

1. Concept and Reality of the Divine Providence

By Divine Providence in the narrow sense (providentia) (πρόνοια) is understood the eternal Divine world-plan: ratio ordinis rerum in finem in mente divina praeexistens (S. th. I 22, 1). It involves an act of cognition and of willing. The Divine government of the world (gubernatio) (κυβέρνησις) is the execution of the eternal Divine world-plan in time. The eternal world-plan and its fulfilment in time are conjointly designated Divine Providence in the wider sense.

God, through His Providence, protects and guides all that He has created. (*De fide.*)

The Vatican Council teaches this doctrine against pagan fatalism, deism and materialism: Universa, quae condidit, Deus providentia sua tuetur atque gubernat, attingens a fine usque ad finem fortiter et disponens omnia suaviter (Wis. 8, 1). (God, by His Providence protects and governs all that He established, reaching mightily from end to end and ordering all things sweetly.) D 1784, cf. D 239 et seq.

Holy Writ attests the operation of Divine Providence in numerous passages. The Old Testament specially stresses the Providence of God for the people of Israel and for individual figures of Israelite history (for example, Joseph, Moses, Tobias). The Psalms are permeated by a belief in Providence. Wis. 6, 8 affirms the universality of Providence: "He hath made the little and the great, and He hath equally care for all." Cf. Wis. 8, 1; 11, 21; 12, 13; 14, 3. Jesus, in the Sermon on the Mount, teaches that the Providence of the Heavenly Father extends even to the most insignificant creatures, the birds of the air, the lilies and the grass of the field, and that it is vouchsafed in special measure to the creatures endowed with reason. In the same way, St. Paul also proclaims the universality of the Divine Providence: "It is He who giveth to all life and breath and all things." Acts 17, 25. The Apostle St. Peter warns people to have trust in the Divine Providence: "Casting all your care upon Him, for he hath care of yours" (Peter 5, 7).

The Fathers defend Divine Providence against pagan fatalism, pagan astrology, and the gnostic-manichaean dualism. Cf. St. Gregory of Nyssa, "Contra fatum." Monographs on the Divine providence were written in the times of the Fathers by St. John Chrysostom (Ad Stagyrium), Theodoret of Cyprus (10 Sermons De providentia), Salvianus of Massilia (De gubernatione Dei). St. Augustine glorified the wise and loving Providence of God in his "Confessions" and in his "De civitate Dei."

St. Thomas establishes the Divine Providence speculatively on the existing co-ordination between the world and its end. Since everything is created according to the idea of God, then also the idea of the regulation of all things to an end (ratio ordinis rerum in finem) exists from all eternity in the Spirit of God. S. th. I 22, 1. St. Thomas bases the universality of the Divine Providence on the omni-causality of God: God's causality, as Primum Agens, extends to every individual being. As every active principle is active for the sake of an end, so everything that God operates, that is, every created being, is adapted to an end, and is therefore the object of the Divine Providence. S. th. I 22, 2.

2. Classification of the Divine Providence

According to the object and grade of the Divine Providence one distinguishes "Providentia Generalis," which extends to all creatures, including those not endowed with reason; "Providentia Specialis," which refers to all rational creatures, including sinners, and "Providentia Specialissima," which is vouchsafed to the predestined.

According to the mode and manner of the fulfilment of the eternal plan of Providence, one distinguishes "Providentia Mediata" (Mediate Providence) and "Providentia Immediata" (Immediate Providence). In Mediate Providence God utilises created mediate causes (causae secundae). He Himself executes His Immediate Providence.

According to the nature and manner of the Divine operation one distinguishes Providentia Ordinaria and Providentia Extraordinaria. The former consists in the ordinary operation of God, the latter in an extraordinary intervention, for examples, in miracles, in inspiration, in infallible decisions of Faith.

3. Attributes of the Divine Providence

a) *Infallible certainty*. The Divine Plan of Providence is fulfilled with infallible certainty through the Divine government of the world, so that nothing happens without Providence or independent of it. As God is Causa Universalis (Universal Cause), to which all causae particulares (particular causes) are subordinate, it is impossible for any event to happen which is not foreseen and desired, or at least permitted in the Divine world-plan. For God, therefore, there can be neither an accident, nor any fate existing above Him or conjointly with Him. To Him all world events are necessarily and inevitably subject. Cf. S. th. I 22, 2 ad 1.

b) *Immutability*. By reason of God's absolute unchangeability, the Eternal Plan of Providence is immutable. But this does not make prayer of petition purposeless, nor does it interfere with the Eternal Plan of Divine Providence. On the contrary, prayer is from all eternity, foreseen and included as a "causa secunda" (secondary cause), in the Divine Providence.

4. The Divine Providence and Evil

See Doctrine of God § 25, 3.

SECTION 2

The Divine Work of Creation

CHAPTER 1

Revealed Doctrine concerning Material Things, i.e., Christian Cosmology

§ 11. The Biblical Hexahemeron (The Six Days of Creation)

1. General Principles

In order to solve the difficulties deriving from the apparent contradiction between the results of natural science and the Biblical narrative of the Creation the following general principles are to be observed:

a) Even though all Holy Writ is inspired and is the Word of God, still, following St. Thomas (Sent. II d. 12 q. 1 a. 2), a distinction must be made between that which is inspired per se, and that which is inspired per accidens. As the truths of Revelation laid down in Holy Writ are designed to serve the end of religious and moral teaching, inspiration per se extends only to the religious and moral truths. The profane facts of natural science and history contained in Holy Writ are not inspired per se, but only per accidens, that is, by virtue of their relation to the religious-moral truths. The data inspired per accidens is also the Word of God, and consequently without error. However, as the hagiographers in profane things make use of a popular, that is, a non-scientific form of exposition suitable to the mental perception of their times, a more liberal interpretation, is possible here. The Church gives no positive decisions in regard to purely scientific questions, but limits itself to rejecting errors which endanger faith. Further, in these scientific matters there is no value in a consensus of the Fathers since they are not here acting as witnesses of the Faith, but merely as private scientists.

b) Since the findings of reason and the supernatural knowledge of Faith go back to the same source, namely to God, there can never be a real contradiction between the certain discoveries of the profane sciences and the Word of God properly understood. The Vatican Council declared: Nulla unquam inter fidem et rationem vera dissensio esse potest. D 1797.

2. Decisions of the Bible Commission (30/6/1909)

a) The first three Chapters of Genesis contain narratives of real events (rerum vere gestarum narrationes quae scilicet obiectivae realitati et historicae veritati respondeant), no myths, no mere allegories or symbols of religious truths, no legends. D 2122.

b) In regard to those facts, which touch the foundations of the Christian religion (quae christianae religionis fundamenta attingunt), the literal historical sense is to be adhered to. Such facts are, inter alia, the creation of all things by God in the beginning of time, and the special creation of humanity. D 2123.

c) It is not necessary to understand all individual words and sentences in the literal sense (sensu proprio). Passages which are variously interpreted by the Fathers and by theologians, may be interpreted according to one's own

judgment with the reservation, however, that one submits one's judgment to the decision of the Church, and to the dictates of the Faith. D 2124 et seq.

d) As the Sacred Writer had not the intention of representing with scientific accuracy the intrinsic constitution of things, and the sequence of the works of creation but of communicating knowledge in a popular way suitable to the idiom and to the pre-scientific development of his time, the account is not to be regarded or measured as if it were couched in language which is strictly scientific (proprietas scientifici sermonis). D 2127.

e) The word "day" need not be taken in the literal sense of a natural day of 24 hours, but can also be understood in the improper sense of a longer space of time. D 2128. Cf. the whole letter of the Secretary of the Bible Commission to Cardinal Suhard, dated 16th January, 1948 (D 3002).

3. Explanation of the Work of the Six Days

The Biblical account of the duration and order of Creation is merely a literary clothing of the religious truth that the whole world was called into existence by the creative word of God. The Sacred Writer utilised for this purpose the pre-scientific picture of the world existing at the time. The numeral six of the days of the Creation is to be understood as an anthropomorphism. God's work of creation represented in schematic form (opus distinctionis—opus ornatus) by the picture of a human working week, the termination of the work by the picture of the Sabbath rest. The purpose of this literary device is to manifest Divine approval of the working week and the Sabbath rest. Cf. Ex. 20, 8 et seq.

The many theories which have been evolved to explain the Biblical Hexahemeron (the six days of Creation), fall into two groups. The former regard Gn. 1, as giving a historical account of the duration and sequence of the works of creation (realistic theories). The second group sacrifices the historicity of the narrative concerning the duration and sequence of the works of the Creation, and in order to avoid conflict with natural science, assumes that the division of the six working days derives from the imagination of the Sacred Writers (idealistic theories). To the former group belong those who hold the "Verbal Theory," which is expounded by most of the Fathers and Schoolmen, the "Restitution Theory," the "Sin Flood Theory," and the various "Concordance Theories," which explain the six days of Creation as six periods of creation. To the second group belong the "Allegorism of St. Augustine," "The Vision Theory," "Poetism," "The Anthropomorphistic Explanation," mentioned above, and "Mythism," which has been rejected by the Church (D 2122).

§ 12. The Doctrine of Evolution in the Light of the Revelation

1. The materialist doctrine of evolution (E. Haeckel) which assumes the eternal existence of uncreated material, and which explains the emergence of all living creatures, of plants and animals and also of men, both body and soul, through purely mechanical evolution out of this material, is contrary to Revelation, which teaches the creation of the material and its formation by God in time.

2. The doctrine of evolution based on the *theistic* conception of the world, which traces matter and life to God's causality and assumes that organic being, developed from originally created seed-powers (St. Augustine) or from stem-

forms (doctrine of descent), according to God's plan, is compatible with the doctrine of Revelation. However, as regards MAN, a special creation by God is demanded, which must extend at least to the spiritual soul (creatio hominis peculiaris D 2123). Individual Fathers, especially St. Augustine, accepted a certain development of living creatures. Proceeding from the assumption that God created everything at the one time (cf. Ecclus. 18, 1), they taught that God brought a certain part of His creatures into existence in a finished state, while He created others in the form of primitive seeds (rationes, seminales or causales) from which they were gradually to develop. Those Fathers and Schoolmen who accepted a development, conceived a development of the individual species of living things each from a particular primitive form created by God; but modern theories of evolution (descendence theory) conceives the development as from one species to another. According as these give priority to evolution from a plurality of original forms or from one single stem-form (primitive form) one speaks of a many-stemmed (polyphyletic) or single-stemmed (monophyletic) development. From the standpoint of the doctrine of evolution, either form is possible. From the standpoint of natural science, F. Birkner says: " A single-stemmed monophyletic development of living beings is to be rejected, as the transitions from one group to the other are missing. Everything seems to favour a many-stemmed, polyphyletic development. Unfortunately, up to the present it has not been possible to determine how many primitive forms or basic organisations of living beings existed."

CHAPTER 2

The Doctrine of the Revelation regarding Man or "Christian Anthropology"

I. The Nature of Man

§ 13. The Origin of the First Human Pair and the Unity of the Human Race

1. Origin of the First Man

The First Man was created by God. (*De fide.*)

The 4th Lateran and the Vatican Council declared: utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam, spiritualem et corporalem . . . ac deinde humanam quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam (D 428, 1783). The creative deed, by which God called the first man into existence, is to be conceived in regard to the soul as creatio prima, in regard to the body as creatio secunda.

The materialistic theory of evolution, according to which man as to his whole being, both body and soul, developed mechanically from the animal kingdom, is to be rejected. The soul of the first man was created immediately by God out of nothing. As regards the body, its immediate formation from inorganic stuff

by God cannot be maintained with certainty. Fundamentally, the possibility exists that God breathed the spiritual soul into an organic stuff, that is, into an originally animal body. In fact, noteworthy, even if not absolutely decisive palaeontological and biological grounds seem to point to a genetic connection between the human body and the highest forms of the animal kingdom.

The Encyclical "Humani generis" of Pius XII (1950) lays down that the question of the origin of the human body is open to free research by natural scientists and theologians. He insists on the careful weighing of the pros and cons of the grounds for its origination from an already living material, and warns the faithful against the assumption that discoveries up to the present determine and prove the origin of the human body from an organic stuff, and points out that in this question, the need for the greatest reserve and care emerges from the sources of Revelation. D 3027. Cf. D 2286.

Holy Writ contains a double account of the creation of the first man. Gn. 1, 27: "God created man to His own image. To the image of God He created him. Male and female He created them." Gn. 2, 7: "And the Lord God formed man out of the slime of the earth and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul."

According to the immediate, literal sense, God created the body of the first man immediately out of inorganic material ("from the slime of the earth") and vivified it by breathing into it a spiritual soul. The idea that the spiritual soul was created in an animal body is foreign to the letter of Holy Writ and to the Fathers. The question of the descent of the human body from the animal kingdom first appeared under the influence of the modern theory of evolution. The Biblical text does not exclude this theory. Just as in the account of the creation of the world, one can, in the account of the creation of man, distinguish between the per se inspired religious truth that man, both body and soul, was created by God, and the per accidens inspired, stark anthropomorphistic representation of the mode and manner of the Creation. While the fact of the creation of man by God in the literal sense must be closely adhered to, in the question as to the mode and manner of the formation of the human body, an interpretation which diverges from the strict literal sense, is, on weighty grounds, permissible.

According to Gn. 2, 21 et seq., the body of the first woman was formed from the body of the first man. Gn. 2, 22: "And the Lord God built the rib which He took from Adam into a woman." This account, which is starkly anthropomorphistic, was understood by the generality of the Fathers in the literal sense. By individual Fathers and theologians it was allegorically interpreted (The Alexandrians, Cajetan, Lagrange) or explained as a vision (Hummelauer, Hoberg). According to a decision of the Bible Commission the literal historical sense is to be adhered to in regard to the formation of the first woman out of the first man (D 2123). Cf. Ecclus. 17, 5 (Vulg.): "Out of him He created a helper similar to him." 1 Cor. 11, 8: "The woman is of the man." However, the saying is and remains mysterious.

The Fathers concur in teaching that God immediately created the first man, both as to body and to soul. They see symbolised in the manner of Eve's creation the essential assimilation of the woman to the man, the Divine inauguration of marriage, and the origin of the Church and of the Sacraments from the wound in the side of Christ, the second Adam. Cf. St. Augustine, In Ioan. tr. 9, 10.

2. Unity of the Human Race

The whole human race stems from one single human pair. (*Sent. certa.*)

Against the Pre-Adamite Theory (first expounded by the Calvinist Isaac de la Peyrère, 1655), and the view of certain modern scientists, according to which the various races are derived from several separated stems (polygenism), the Church teaches that the first human beings, Adam and Eve, are the progenitors of the whole human race (monogenism). The teaching of the unity of the human race is not, indeed, a dogma, but it is a necessary pre-supposition of the dogma of Original Sin and Redemption. According to a decision of the Bible Commission, the unity of the human race is to be reckoned among those facts which affect the foundations of the Christian religion, and which, on this account, are to be understood in their literal, historical sense (D 2123). The Encyclical "Humani Generis" of Pius XII (1950) rejects polygenism on account of its incompatibility with the revealed doctrine of original sin. (D 3028).

The biblical proof derives from the narration of the creation, which purports to relate the origin of all things, and therefore also the first emergence of man. Explicit testimonies are Gn. 2, 5 : "And there was not a man to till the earth." Gn. 3, 20 : "Adam called the name of his wife, Eve ; because she was the mother of all the living." Acts 17, 26 : "And hath made of one all mankind to dwell upon the whole face of the earth." Cf. Wis. 10, 1 ; Rom. 5, 12, et seq. ; 1 Cor. 15, 21 et seq. ; Hebr. 2, 11 ; St. Augustine, In Ioan. tr. 9, 10.

We may note that racial differences affect external characteristics only. The essential agreement of all races in physical structure and in mental endowment indicates a common origin.

§ 14. The Essential Constituent Parts of Human Nature

1. Two Essential Constituent Parts of Man

Man consists of two essential parts—a material body and a spiritual soul. (*De fide.*)

The 4th Lateran Council and the Vatican Council teach this doctrine : deinde (condidit creaturam) humanam quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam. D 428, 1783.

In opposition to the teaching of the Church is the exaggerated spiritualism of Plato and of the School of Origen, according to which the body is a burden and hindrance to the soul, its prison and grave. In Plato's view the soul alone makes the man, while the body is only a kind of shadow. The Church teaches on the contrary that the body essentially belongs to human nature.

When St. Paul speaks (Rom. 7, 14 et seq.) of a conflict between the body and the soul, and when he longs to be freed from the body of death (Rom. 7, 24) he is not thinking of the body in its physical construction, but in its condition of moral disorder occasioned by sin.

Again incompatible with Church dogma is the trichotomism taught by Plato, the gnostics, manichaeans, apollinarians, and in recent times also by Günther, according to which man is composed of three essential component parts, the body, an animal soul, and a spiritual soul (σάρξ, ψυχή, πνεῦμα).

The 8th General Council of Constantinople (869-870) rejected the doctrine of the two souls, and laid down the Catholic dogma that man possesses only one single spiritual soul: unam animam rationabilem et intellectualem habere hominem. D 338. The spiritual soul is the principle of the spiritual mental life, and at the same time, the principle of the corporeal (vegetative and sensitive) life. D 1655.

According to the teaching of Holy Scripture, man is composed of two essential component parts, and will again be resolved into two parts. Gn. 2, 7: "And the Lord God formed man out of the slime of the earth, and breathed in his face the breath of life (spiraculum vitae=life principle, soul), and man became a living soul." Pro. 12, 7: "Think of thy Creator . . ., before the dust returns to the earth as it was, and the Spirit of God who sent it." Cf. Mt. 10, 28; 1 Cor. 5, 3; 7, 34.

The Fathers defend dichotomism notably against the Christologically false teaching of Apollinaris of Laodicea founded on trichotomism. The locution "Spirit and Soul" serves on occasion as a designation of the higher and the lower soul-life, without involving the distinction between two principles. In Holy Writ the distinction between spirit and soul arises sometimes through the parallelism of Hebraic poetry, for example, Luke 1, 46, et seq.

Speculatively, the uniqueness of the soul-principle in man is shown especially by the testimony of the self-consciousness, according to which the same person is the principle of the rational as of the sensitive and vegetative activities.

2. Relation of Body and Soul

The rational soul is per se the essential form of the body. (*De fide.*)

Body and soul are connected with each other, not merely externally like a vessel and its contents, a ship and its pilot (Plato, Descartes, Leibniz), but as an intrinsic natural unit, so that the spiritual soul is of itself and essentially the form of the body. The Council of Vienne (1311-1312) condemned as heretical: quod anima rationalis seu intellectiva non sit forma corporis humani per se et essentialiter. D 481, cf. 738, 1655.

The decision was directed against the Franciscan theologian Johannis Olivi († 1298), who taught that the rational soul was not of itself (immediately) the essential form of the body, but only mediately through the forma sensitiva and vegetiva, which is really distinct from it. This would destroy the essential unity of human nature replacing it by a dynamic unity of operation. This decision of the Council of Vienne does not imply a dogmatic recognition of the Thomistic teaching of the uniqueness of the substantial form, or of the Aristotelian-Scholastic hylomorphism.

According to Gn. 2, 7, the slime, by virtue of the creation of the soul, becomes a living human body, and thus a component part of human nature. According to the vision of Azechiel 37, 1 et seq., the dead members of the body are awakened to life through the spiritual soul.

The Fathers conceive the attachment of body and soul as such an intrinsic one that they compare it to the Hypostatic Union. Cf. the Symbol Quicumque (D 40). St. Augustine teaches: "From the soul the body has feeling and life" (De civ. Dei XXI 3, 2. Cf. St John Damascene, De fide orth. 11, 12.)

3. Individuality and Immortality of the Soul

Every human being possesses an individual soul. (*De fide.*)

The Fifth General Lateran Council (1512–17) denounced the humanistic neo-Platonists (Pietro Pomponazzi) who espoused Averroistic monopsychism declaring that the rational soul in all men is numerically one unique principle, and that only this general soul is immortal: damnamus et reprobamus omnes asserentes animam intellectivam mortalem esse aut unicam in cunctis hominibus. D 738 (we condemn and reprove all who maintain that the rational soul is mortal or one unique reality (shared) in (by) every man). The individuality of each soul is an essential presupposition of personal immortality.

The idea of retribution in this world appears strongly in the Old Testament, yet even the oldest of its books profess, as against the assertion of rationalistic criticism, a belief in immortality. According to the view of Holy Writ, life on earth is an exile in a foreign land (Gn. 47, 9). The deceased go to their fathers (Gn. 15, 15), are gathered to their people (Gn. 25, 8. 17 passim), sleep in their fathers (Dt. 31, 16; 3 Kings 2, 10 passim). After death the soul enters the Scheol, that is a place of collective detention of the departed souls (Gn. 37, 35). The newer books, especially the Book of Wisdom, are rich in testimonies of the belief in immortality held by the People of Israel. Cf. especially Wis. 2, 23: "For God created man incorruptible, and to the image of His own eternity He made him." (According to another reading . . "to the image of His own Being".)

The firm belief in the other world expressed in the New Testament rests on the conviction of personal immortality. Jesus teaches: "Fear ye not them that kill the body, and are not able to kill the soul" (Mt. 10, 28). "These shall go into everlasting punishment; but the just into eternal life" (Mt. 25, 46). St. Paul believes that he will be united with Christ immediately after his death, and not only after the resurrection: "But I am straitened between two: having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ" (Phil. 1. 23). The doctrine of the death of the soul (thnetopsychism) is unknown in the New Testament.

The passage Eccles. 3, 21: "Who knoweth if the spirit of the children of Adam ascend upward, and if the spirit of the beasts descend downward?" appears to cast doubt on immortality. However, according to the context it refers only to the animal side of man, which is like the animal, mortal. The immortality of the soul is proved beyond all doubt by other passages of the Book. Cf. 12, 7; 9, 10.

The Fathers, not merely unanimously assert the doctrine of immortality, but also establish it philosophically. Origen defends it against Thnetopsychism which was widely current in Arabia. St. Gregory of Nyssa treats it from the philosophic standpoint in his "Dialogus de anima et resurrectione," as does St. Augustine in his monograph: De immortalitate animae.

Natural reason proves the immortality of the soul from its physical simplicity. As it is not composed of parts, it cannot be resolved into parts. God could, it is true, annihilate the soul, but His Wisdom and Goodness demand that He

should not frustrate the connatural desire of the soul for truth and bliss in the other world, just as His Justice demands that He reward the good and punish the wicked in the other world.

§ 15. The Origin of Individual Human Souls

In the posterity of Adam, the origin of the soul is associated with natural generation. As to the mode and manner of the origin of the soul different opinions have been advanced.

1. Pre-existentianism

Pre-existentianism, which was proposed by Plato, and which in the early Christian era was accepted by Origen and individual members of his disciples (Didymus of Alexandria, Evagrius Ponticus, Nemesius of Emesa), as well as by the Priscillianists, teaches that souls exist even before their connection with the bodies—according to Plato and Origen, from all eternity—and are exiled in bodies, as a punishment for moral defect. This doctrine was rejected by a Synod at Constantinople (543) against the Origenists, and by a Synod at Braga (561) against the Priscillianists. D 203, 236.

The idea of a pre-existence of the soul and of a pre-corporeal fall through sin is unknown to Holy Writ. Again, the passage, Wis. 8, 19 et seq.: "And I was a witty child and had received a good soul. And whereas I was more good I came into a body undefiled," is not to be understood in the sense of the Platonic doctrine of pre-existence, as the anthropological conceptions of the Book of Wisdom are entirely different from those of Plato. According to the testimony of Holy Writ, the first man created by God was good in soul and body (Gn. 1, 31). Sin entered the world through the fall by sin of our first parents (Gn. 3, 1 et seq.; Rom. 5, 12). St. Paul, in Rom. 9, 11, directly excluded a pre-corporeal fall through sin: "For when the children were not yet born, nor had done any good or evil." The Fathers, with very few exceptions, are opponents of the doctrine of pre-existence upheld by Origen. Cf. St. Gregory Nazianzus, Or. 37, 15; St. Gregory of Nyssa, De anima et resurr. Par. 15, 3; St. Augustine, Ep. 217, 5, 16; Leo I, Ep. 15, 10. The testimony of self-consciousness testifies against the pre-existence of the soul. Cf. S. th. I 118, 3.

2. Emanationism

Emanatism, which was represented in antiquity by gnostic-manichaean dualism and which in modern times is taught by pantheism, teaches that individual souls proceed by emanation (outflowing) from the Divine Substance. The teaching contradicts the absolute simplicity of God. It was rejected by the Vatican Council, together with pantheism, as heretical. D 1804. Cf. D 348. St. Augustine says: "The soul is not a part of God; for if it were then it would be in every respect unchangeable and indestructible" (Ep. 166, 2, 3).

3. Generationism

Generationism traces the origin of the human soul, as well as the origin of the body, back to the act of generation performed by the parents. According to it, parents are the originators of both body and soul. The cruder form of generationism, i.e., the traducianism expounded by Tertullian, teaches that with the corporeal semen, a part of the soul-substance of the parents (tradux) is transmitted to the child. A less crude form of generationism, which was held

by St. Augustine to be possible, and in the past century by Klee, Rosmini and others to be probable, holds fast to the spirituality of the soul, and makes the soul of the child emerge from a semen spirituale of the parents.

Generationism is incompatible with the simplicity and spirituality of the soul. Pope Benedict XII demanded the condemnation of the doctrine of generationism as a pre-condition of the Union, from the Armenians (1341). D 533. Leo XIII condemned the teaching of Rosmini. D 1910.

4. Creationism

Every individual soul was immediately created out of nothing by God. (*Sent. certa.*)

Creationism, taught by the vast majority of the Fathers by the Schoolmen, and by modern theology, holds that each individual soul is created by God out of nothing at the moment of its unification with the body. This doctrine is not defined; it is, however, indirectly expressed in the decision of faith of the 5th General Lateran Council (pro corporum, quibus infunditur, multitudine multiplicanda: D 738). Pope Alexander VII, in a doctrinal assertion on the Immaculate Conception of Mary, which formed the basis of the dogmatic definition of Pius IX, speaks of the "creation and infusion" of her soul into the body (in primo instanti creationis atque infusionis in corpus). D 1100, cf. D 1641. Pope Pius XII, in the Encyclical "Humani generis," teaches "The Catholic Faith obliges us to hold firmly that souls are immediately created by God" D 3027. Cf. D 348 (Leo IX).

A stringent scriptural proof of the doctrine of creationism is not possible. However, it is intimated in Ecc. 12, 7: "The Spirit returns to God Who gave it"; Wis. 15, 11 (inspiration of the soul through God), and Hebr. 12, 9 (distinction between the fathers of the flesh and the Father of the Spirits=God).

Most of the Fathers, especially the Greek, are adherents of creationism. While St. Jerome decisively advocates creationism, St. Augustine wavered all his life between generationism and creationism (Ep. 166). The difficulty of reconciling the immediate creation of the soul by God with the handing-on of original sin held him back from a decisive confession of creationism In the following centuries, under the influence of St. Augustine, a certain indecision continued up to the period of the peak of scholasticism when creationism found a general recognition. St. Thomas went so far as to condemn generationism as heretical. S. th. I 118, 2.

The Time of the Creation and Infusion of the Soul.

According to the Aristotelian-scholastic viewpoint, in the human embryo three different forms of life follow one another in point of time, in such a manner that the following form at any time takes over the functions of the preceding, namely, the vegetative, the sensitive and finally (after 40 or, mutatis mutandis, 80 days), the spiritual. From this derives the distinction between foetus informis and foetus formatus. Confirmation of this was sought in Ex. 21, 22 et seq. (according to the Septuagint and the old-Latin translation). The foetus informis was regarded as being purely animal, the foetus formatus a human being, the destruction of which was regarded as murder. Modern Christian philosophy generally holds that the creation and infusion of the spiritual soul coincides with the moment of conception. Cf. D 1185.

II. The Elevation of Man to the Supernatural Order

§ 16. The concept of the supernatural

1. Determination of the Concept

Natural, in opposition to supernatural, is that which is either a part of nature, or that which proceeds out of nature as its effect, or to which nature has a claim: Naturale est, quod vel constitutive vel consecutive vel exigitive ad naturam pertinet, or more concisely: Naturale est, quod naturae debetur. The natural order is the ordination of all creatures to their ultimate end in accordance with their nature.

St. Augustine employs the word "natural" in accord with its etymology (natura = nascitura) frequently in the sense of "original" (originalis), and on occasion, in the sense of "according to nature" (conveniens). The "natural" endowment of man in the sense of St. Augustine includes also the supernatural gifts of the primitive state. (Cf. D 130: "naturalis possibilitas.")

Supernatural is that which is neither a part of nature, nor proceeds as effect from nature, nor can be claimed by nature, but which transcends the being, the powers and the claims of nature. The supernatural is super-added by God over the claims and endowments of nature to the natural gifts of the creature: supernaturale est donum Dei naturae indebitum et superadditum. The supernatural order is the ordination of rational creatures to a supernatural final goal.

2. Division

The supernatural is divided into:

a) The supernatural in substance (supernaturale secundum substantiam) and the supernatural in mode (supernaturale secundum modum). The "supernatural in substance" is that which by its intrinsic character transcends the nature of the creature, for example, our knowledge of the triune personality of God, actual grace, sanctifying grace, the immediate vision of God. "Supernatural in mode" is an effect which as to its essence is indeed natural, but which in the mode and manner of its production transcends the natural powers of the creature, for example, a miraculous healing of a sick person.

b) "The absolutely supernatural" or the supernatural pure and simple (supernaturale simpliciter) and "the relatively supernatural," or the supernatural in a definite respect (supernaturale secundum quid). "The absolutely supernatural" connotes goods of the Divine order, which transcend the nature of creatures; for example, sanctifying grace, or the immediate vision of God. The relatively supernatural connotes goods of the created order, which though supernatural for one creature, are not supernatural for another creature, for example, infused knowledge, which is natural for the angels, and supernatural for human beings. To the relatively supernatural belong the so-called preternatural gifts of man's primitive state.

§ 17. Relation between nature and supernature

1. Nature's capacity to receive a supernature

A creature has the capacity to receive supernatural gifts. (*Sent. communis.*)

Though the supernatural is beyond nature, still nature has a certain receptivity for the supernatural, the so-called potentia oboedientialis. This is the passive

potentiality proper to creatures, of being elevated by the Creator to a supernatural state of being and activity. Cf. S. th. III 11, 1.

According to the Schoolmen, the supernatural gift is educed through the power of the Creator from the potentia oboedientialis, in other words the passive potentiality which is present in the nature of the creature is actualised by the omnipotence of God. This doctrine is essentially different from the modernistic teaching of the "vital immanence," according to which everything religious develops out of the necessities of human nature in a purely natural fashion. St. Augustine teaches: Posse habere fidem sicut posse habere caritatem naturae est hominum; habere autem fidem quemadmodum habere caritatem gratia est fidelium (De praedest. sanct. 5, 10).

2. Organic Connection of Nature and Supernature

a) The Supernatural presupposes Nature. (*Sent. communis.*)

The supernatural does not exist in itself, but in something else; it is therefore not a substance, but an accident. Thus the supernatural presupposes a created nature, which receives it and in which it operates.

b) The Supernatural perfects Nature. (*Sent. communis.*)

The supernatural is not superadded merely externally to nature, but affects nature intrinsically. It permeates the being and the powers of nature, and perfects it either within the created order (e.g., the preternatural gifts) or through elevation into the divine order of being and activity (absolutely supernatural gifts). The Fathers and theologians compare the supernatural to fire which makes iron glow, or to a plant which is grafted on a tree.

3. The Natural and the Supernatural Aim of Man

God has conferred on man a supernatural Destiny. (*De fide.*)

The Vatican Council establishes the absolute necessity of Revelation by reason of man's ordination to a supernatural final end: Deus ex infinita bonitate sua ordinavit hominem ad finem supernaturalem, ad participanda scilicet bona divina, quae humanae mentis intelligentiam omnino superant. D 1786. Cf. D 1808. Man's final end consists in a participation by him in God's Vision of Himself. The attainment of this end by men gives glory to God and fills men with supernatural happiness. Cf. 1 Cor. 13, 12; 1 John 3, 2 (see Doctrine of God, Par. 6).

The natural end of man, which consists in man's natural knowledge and love of God, and in the natural glorification of God, is subordinated and adapted to his supernatural end. The natural order is thus used as a means for the attaining of the ultimate supernatural goal. Man, by reason of his whole dependence on God, is bound to strive after the supernatural destination determined for him by God. If he neglects this, then he cannot reach the natural goal either. Cf. Mk. 16, 16.

§ 18. The Supernatural Endowment of the First Man

1. Sanctifying Grace

Our first parents, before the Fall, were endowed with sanctifying grace. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent, in opposition to Pelagianism and to modern Rationalism, teaches: primum hominem Adam . . . sanctitatem et iustitiam, in qua constitutus fuerat, amisisse. (If anyone will not confess that when the first man Adam had transgressed the mandate of God in paradise he did not immediately lose the sanctity and justice in which he had been constituted A.S.) D 788; cf. D 192.

Against Baius and the Jansenist Quesnel, the Church asserted the supernatural character of the gifts given to man in the primitive state. D 1021 to 1026, 1385. Cf. D 1516.

The elevation to the state of grace is indicated by the intimacy between God and the progenitors of the human race in Paradise. A scriptural proof is provided by St. Paul's teaching on the Redemption. The Apostle teaches that Christ, the Second Adam, restored what the first Adam had lost, the state of holiness and justice. But if he had lost it, he must previously have received it. Cf. Rom. 5, 12 et seq.; Eph. 1, 10; 4, 23 et seq.; 1 Cor. 6, 11; 2 Cor. 5, 17; Gal. 6, 15; Rom. 5, 10 et seq.; 8, 14 et seq.

The Fathers find the supernatural endowment with grace indicated in Gn. 1, 26 (similitudo = supernatural identity of image and likeness with God); in Gn. 2, 7 (spiraculum vitae = supernatural life-principle), and in Eccles. 7, 30: "Only this have I found that God made man right."

St. Augustine declares that our renewal (Eph. 4, 23) consists in this that: "We have received justice from which man had fallen off through sin" (De Gen. ad Litt. VI 24, 35). St. John Damascene says: "The Creator has communicated His Divine Grace to man and thereby made him a participant in His community" (De fide orth. II 30).

As regards the time of man's elevation to the state of grace, most theologians, including St. Thomas and his school, are of the opinion that the first men were created in the state of sanctifying grace, Petrus Lombardus and the Franciscan school, on the other hand, teach that the first human beings on their creation received only the preternatural gifts of integrity, and were required to prepare themselves with the help of actual grace for the reception of sanctifying grace. The Council of Trent has deliberately left the question undecided (whence constitutus, not creatus: D 788). St. Thomas' teaching is that of the Fathers. Cf. D 192: St. John Damascene, De fide orth. II 12. S. th. I 95, 1.

2. The Gifts of Integrity

The supernatural endowment of the first men (iustitia originalis) included, in addition to the absolute supernatural gift of Sanctifying Grace, certain preternatural gifts, the so-called "dona integritatis":

a) The donum rectitudinis or integritatis in the narrower sense, i.e., the freedom from irregular desire. (*Sent. fidei proxima.*)

The Council of Trent explains that concupiscence was called a sin by St. Paul because it flows from sin and makes one inclined to sin (quia ex peccato est et

ad peccatum inclinat : D 792). But if it does flow from sin, then it did not exist before sin. Cf. D 2123, 1026.

Holy Writ attests the perfect harmony between reason and sensuality. Gn. 2, 25 : " And they were both naked . . . and were not ashamed." It was only sin that gave rise to the feeling of shame (Gn. 3, 7. 10).

The Fathers defend the donum integritatis against the Pelagians, who regarded concupiscence, not as a defect of nature (defectus naturae), but as a power of nature (vigor naturae). St. Augustine teaches that the first man, by reason of the gift of integrity, had the possibility of easily avoiding sin (posse non pecare : De corrept. et gratia 12, 33).

b) The donum immortalitatis, i.e., bodily immortality. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent teaches that Adam fell under the sentence of death as a punishment for sin : Si quis non confitetur, primum hominem Adam . . . incurrisse per offensam praevaricationis huiusmodi iram et indignationem Dei atque mortem, quam antea illi comminatus fuerat Deus, . . . A.S. D 788 ; cf. D 101, 175, 1078, 2123.

Holy Writ records that God threatened and imposed death as punishment for the transgression of His probationary commandment. Gn. 2, 17 ; 3, 19. Cf. Wis. 1, 13 : " For God made not death." Wis. 2, 24 : " But by the envy of the devil death came into the world." Rom. 5, 12 : " By one man sin entered into the world and by sin death."

The gift of immortality is, as St. Augustine teaches (De Gen. ad Litt. VI 25, 36), to be conceived as posse non mori (= the possibility of not dying) not as non posse mori (= impossibility of dying). The Fathers regarded bodily immortality as being transmitted through the tree of life (Gn. 2, 9 ; 3, 22).

c) The donum impassibilitatis, i.e., the freedom from suffering. (*Sent. communis.*)

This gift is to be more closely defined as posse non pati (= the possibility of remaining free from suffering). It is associated with corporeal immortality.

Holy Writ represents suffering and sorrow as the consequences of sin. Gn. 3, 16 et seq. Before sin came into the world the progenitors of the human race lived in a condition of unalloyed happiness (cf. Gn. 2, 15 [Vulg.] : in paradiso voluptatis). But freedom from suffering in no wise means inactivity. Our first parents immediately after their creation by God received from Him the order to till the land (Gn. 2, 15), and thus, in a limited measure, to participate in the work of the Creator.

d) The donum scientiae, i.e., a knowledge of natural and supernatural truths infused by God. (*Sent. communis.*)

Since our first parents, according to Holy Writ, entered into existence in an adult state, and were the first teachers and educators of humanity, it was appropriate that they should be equipped by God with a natural knowledge suitable to their age and their tasks, and with that measure of supernatural knowledge which was necessary to enable them to achieve their supernatural

destiny. In Holy Writ the deep knowledge of Adam is indicated in his naming of the animals (Gn. 2, 20) and in his immediate knowledge of the status and tasks of the woman (Gn. 2, 23 et seq.). Cf. Ecclus. 17, 5 et seq.

In Gn. 2, 20 (naming of the animals), St. Augustine sees " a proof of the transcendental wisdom " (indicium excellentissimae sapientiae : Op. imperf. contra Jul. V 1). According to St. Cyril of Alexandria, "Adam, the head of the race, was perfect in knowledge immediately from the first moment of his emergence " (In Ioan. 1, 9). Cf. S. th. I 94, 3.

3. The Gifts of the Primitive State as Hereditary Gifts

Adam received sanctifying grace not merely for himself, but for all his posterity. (*Sent. certa.*)

The Council of Trent teaches that Adam lost sanctity and justice (= sanctifying grace) not merely for himself, but also for us (D 789). It follows from this, that he received these not only for himself but also for us his descendants. This, according to the unanimous teaching of the Fathers and of the theologians, applies to the preternatural gifts of integrity (with the exception of the donum scientiae); for these were bestowed for the sake of sanctifying grace. Adam received the gifts of the original state, not as an individual person, but as head of the human race, and thus for the whole human race. They were a present to human nature (donum naturae) and, according to the positive ordinance of God, were to be transmitted with nature to all the heirs of that nature. Original justice was intended to be hereditary justice.

The Fathers declare that we, the posterity of Adam, received the grace of God gratuitously and lost it through sin. This manner of speaking presupposes that the original endowment with grace ought to pass from Adam to his posterity. Cf. St. Basil, Sermo asc. 1 : " Let us return to the original grace, of which we were deprived by sin." St. Augustine, De spir. et litt. 27, 47. S. th. I 100, 1. Cf. Comp. theol. 187.

§ 19. The Various States of Human Nature

By the state of human nature (status naturae humanae) is understood the inner constitution of human nature in relation to the final goal set for it by God. One distinguishes between historical (or real), and merely possible states.

1. Real States

a) *The state of elevated nature* (status naturae elevatae or status iustitiae originalis), that is, the primitive state of the first human beings before the fall through sin in which they possessed both the absolute supernatural gift of sanctifying grace as well as the preternatural gifts of integrity.

b) *The state of fallen nature* (status naturae lapsae), that is, the state following immediately after the sin of Adam, in which man, as punishment for sin, possessed neither sanctifying grace nor the gifts of integrity.

c) *The state of restored nature* (status naturae glorificatae), that is, the condition of those who have achieved their supernatural destiny, i.e., the *Immediate Vision of God.* This state includes in its perfection sanctifying grace. After

their resurrection, the bodies of those in this state will also be endowed with the preternatural gifts of integrity (non posse peccare, mori, pati).

Common to all real states is the possession of the Beatific Vision of God.

2. Merely Possible States

a) *The state of pure nature* (status naturae purae), that is, a condition in which man would possess all that, and only that, which appertains to human nature, and in which he could attain to a *natural* final end only.

The possibility of a pure state of nature, which was denied by Luther, Baius and Jansenius, is certain Church doctrine. It springs as a necessary consequence from the doctrine of the supernatural character of the gifts of the primitive state. Pope Pius V rejected the assertion of Baius: Deus non potuisset ab initio talem creare hominem, qualis nunc nascitur (D 1055). The Church teaches therefore that God could have created man without supernatural or praeter-natural gifts, but not in a condition of sin.

St. Augustine and the Schoolmen expressly teach the possibility of the pure state of nature. Cf. St. Augustine, Retract. I 8(9), 6. St. Thomas, In Sent. II d. 31 q. a. 2 ad 3.

b) *The state of unimpaired nature* (status naturae integrae), i.e., that is a condition in which man, in addition to his nature, would possess the preternatural gifts of integrity, in order to reach his *natural* final goal with ease and with certainty.

III. Man's Lapse from the Supernatural Order

§ 20. The Personal Sin of Our First Parents or Original Sin

1. The Act of Sin

Our First Parents in Paradise sinned grievously through transgression of the Divine probationary commandment. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent teaches that Adam lost sanctity and justice by transgressing the Divine commandment (D 788). Since the punishment is proportionate to the guilt, the sin of Adam was clearly a serious sin.

The biblical account of the fall through the sin of the First Parents is contained in Gn. 2, 17 and 3, 1 et seq. Since Adam's sin is the basis of the dogma of Original Sin and Redemption the historical accuracy of the account as regards the essential facts may not be impugned. According to a decision of the Bible Commission in 1909, the literal historical sense is not to be doubted in regard to the following facts: a) That the first man received a command from God to test his obedience; b) That through the temptation of the devil who took the form of a serpent he transgressed the Divine commandment;

c) That our First Parents were deprived of their original condition of innocence. D 2123.

The later Books of Holy Writ confirm this literal, historical interpretation. Ecclus. 25, 33 : "From the woman came the beginning of sin, and by her we all die." Wis. 2, 24 : "But by the envy of the devil death came into the world." 2 Cor. 11, 3 : "But I fear lest, as the serpent seduced Eve by his subtlety, so your minds should be corrupted and fall away from the simplicity which is Christ." Cf. 1 Tim. 2, 14 ; Rom. 5, 12, et seq ; John 8, 44. The mythological explanation, and the purely allegorical explanation (of the Alexandrines) are therefore to be rejected.

The sin of our First Parents was a sin of disobedience. Cf. Rom. 5, 19 : "By the disobedience of one man many were made sinners." The root of the disobedience was pride. Tob. 4, 14 : "From it (pride) all perdition took its beginning." Ecclus. 10, 15 : "Pride is the beginning of all sin." The theory that Original Sin was a sexual sin (St. Clement of Alexandria, St. Ambrose) cannot be accepted. The gravity of the sin is clear when we regard its purpose and the circumstances of the Divine commandment. St. Augustine regards Adam's sin as an "inexpressibly great sin" (ineffabiliter grande peccatum : Op. Imperf. c. Jul. I 105).

2. The Consequences of Sin

a) Through sin our First Parents lost sanctifying grace and provoked the anger and the indignation of God. (*De fide.*)

In Holy Writ the loss of Sanctifying Grace is indicated in the exclusion of Our First Parents from intercourse with God. (Gn. 3, 10. 23). God appears as a judge and announces the sentence of punishment (Gn. 3, 16 et seq.).

God's displeasure finally takes effect in the eternal rejection. Tatian believed that Adam lost eternal salvation but St. Irenaeus (Adv. haer. III 23, 8), Tertullian (De poenit. 12) and St. Hippolytus (Philos. 8, 16) rejected this view. In later times, the Fathers generally, supported by Wis. 10, 2 : ("She [Wisdom] brought him out of his sin"), teach that Our First Parents did atonement and "through the Blood of the Lord" were saved from eternal destruction (cf. St. Augustine, De peccat. mer. et rem. II 34, 55).

b) Our First Parents became subject to death and to the dominion of the Devil. (*De fide.*) *D 788.*

Death and the evils associated with it follow from the loss of the gifts of integrity. According to Gn. 3, 16 et seq., God imposed suffering and death as a punishment for sin. The dominion of the devil is mentioned in Gn. 3, 15 and is explicitly taught in John 12, 31 ; 14, 30 ; 2 Cor. 4, 4 ; Hebr. 2, 14 ; 2 Peter 2, 19.

§ 21. The Existence of Original Sin

1. The Heretical Counter-propositions

The doctrine of Original Sin was rejected by the Gnostics and Manichaeans, who believed that the moral corruption of humanity comes from an eternal principle of evil and also by the Origenists and Priscillianists, who explained humanity's inclination to evil by a pre-corporeal fall through sin.

Original sin was directly denied by the Pelagians, who taught: a) The sin of Adam is transmitted to posterity not by inheritance but through imitation of a bad example (imitatione, non propagatione). b) Death, suffering and concupiscence are not punishment for sin, but a natural condition of man who was created in a pure state of nature. c) The baptism of children is administered, not for the remission of sins, but as a sign of acceptance by the Church, and to enable men to reach the Kingdom of Heaven, which is distinct from vita aeterna (a higher stage of blessedness).

The Pelagian error was combated chiefly by St. Augustine and was condemned by the Church at the Synods of Mileve 416, Carthage 418, Orange 529 and in later times by the Council of Trent (1546) D 102, 174 et seq., 787 et seq.

The Pelagian error lives on in modern rationalism (Socianism, Rationalism of the age of the Enlightenment, Liberal Protestant Theology, modern unbelief).

In medieval times the Synod of Sens (1141) rejected the following thesis of Peter Abelard: Quod non contraximus culpam ex Adam, sed poenam tantum D 376.

The Reformers, the Baians, and the Jansenists admitted the reality of original sin, but misunderstood its essence and its operation, since they regarded it as identical with concupiscence which corrupts completely human nature. Cf. St. Augustine Conf. Art. 2.

2. Teaching of the Church

Adam's sin is transmitted to his posterity, not by imitation, but by descent. (*De fide.*)

The dogmatic teaching on original sin is laid down in the Tridentine Decree "Super peccato originali" (Sess. V; 1546), which in part follows word for word the decisions of the Synods of Carthage and of Orange. The Council of Trent rejects the doctrine that Adam's loss of the sanctity and justice received from God was merely for himself alone, and not for us also, and that he transmitted to his posterity death and suffering only, but not the guilt of sin. It positively teaches that sin, which is the death of the soul, is inherited by all his posterity by descent, not by imitation, and that it dwells in every single human being. It is removed by the merits of the Redemption of Jesus Christ, which as a rule are bestowed through the Sacrament of Baptism on adults as well as on children. Therefore children also are baptised for the forgiveness of sins (in remissionem peccatorum). D 789-791.

3. Proof from the Sources of Faith

a) Scriptural proof

The Old Testament contains references to original sin. Cf. especially Ps. 50, 7: "For behold I was conceived in iniquities: and in sins did my mother conceive me." Job 14, 4 (according to Vulg.): "Who can make him clean that is conceived unclean?" Both passages speak of an inborn sinfulness whether this be understood in the sense of habitual sin or merely of the inclination to sin, but do not bring this into causal connection with the sin of Adam. The causal connection between the death of all mankind and the

sin of our First Parents (original death) is, however, clearly stated in the Old Testament. Cf. Ecclus. 25, 33 ; Wis. 2, 24.

The passage which contains the classical proof is Rom. 5, 12–21, in which the Apostle draws a parallel between the first Adam, from whom sin and death are transmitted to all humanity, and Christ, the second Adam, from whom justice and life are transmitted to all men. V. 12 : " Wherefore as by one man sin entered into this world and by sin death, and so sin passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned (in quo omnes paccaverunt—ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον) . . . 19. For as by the disobedience of one man many were made sinners : so also by the obedience of one, many shall be made just."

By sin (ἁμαρτία) is to be understood quite generally sin, which here appears personified. Original sin is therefore included. What is meant is the guilt of sin and not the consequences of sin. Death is expressly distinguished from sin and is represented as the consequence of sin. Concupiscence is not meant, because sin, according to V. 18 et seq., is removed by the grace of Christ's Redemption, while evil desire remains as experience shows.

β) The words in quo (ἐφ' ᾧ ; V. 12 d) were related relatively to unum hominem by St. Augustine and during the whole middle-ages : " By one man . . . in whom all have sinned." Since the time of Erasmus the better-founded conjunctional meaning already proposed by the Fathers, especially by the Greeks, came to the fore : ἐφ' ᾧ = ἐπί τούτῳ ὅτι = " on the ground that all have sinned " or " because all have sinned " ; cf. the linguistic parallels in 2 Cor. 5, 4 ; Phil. 3, 12 ; 4, 10 ; Rom. 8, 3. Since those also die who have committed no personal sin (young children), the origin of bodily death is not a personal guilt, but a guilt inherited from Adam. Cf. V. 13 et seq. and V. 19, in which the sin of Adam is given as the reason for the sinfulness of the many. The conjunctional interpretation, which is adopted generally to-day, conforms to the explanation of St. Augustine : all have sinned in Adam, therefore all die.

γ) The words : " Many (οἱ πολλοί) were made sinners " (V. 19a) do not limit the universality of original sin, since the expression " many " (in opposition to the one Adam, or Christ) is parallel to " all " (πάντες) in V. 12 d and 18 a.

b) Proof from Tradition

St. Augustine appeals to the Tradition of the Church against the Pelagian Bishop Julian of Eclanum : " It is not I who have invented original sin, which the Catholic Faith holds from of old, but thou, who deniest it, thou art without doubt a new heretic " (De nupt. et concup. II 12, 25). St. Augustine, in his Contra Julianum (L. I and II), adduces a formal proof from Tradition, in which he quotes St. Irenaeus, St. Cyprian, Reticius of Autun, Olympius, St. Hilary, St. Ambrose, Innocent I, St. Gregory of Nazianzus, St. John Chrysostom, St. Basil and St. Jerome as witnesses of the Catholic teaching. Many assertions of the Greek Fathers who insist on personal responsibility for sin and appear entirely to prescind from original sin, are to be understood as being in opposition to Gnostic-Manichaean dualism and to Origenistic pre-existentianism. St. Augustine defended the teaching of St. John Chrysostom against its misinterpretation by the Pelagians : vobis nondum litigantibus securius loquebatur (Contra Jul. I6, 22).

Irrefutable proof of the conviction of the primitive Church as to the reality of original sin is the old Christian practice of the baptism of children " for the remission of sin " (in remissionem peccatorum). Cf. St. Cyprian, Ep. 64, 5.

4. Dogma and Reason

The doctrine of Original Sin cannot be proved by natural reason, nevertheless the fact of Original Sin is evidenced by many signs: peccati originalis in humano genere probabiliter quaedam signa apparent (S.c.G. IV 52). Such signs are the frightful moral aberrations of humanity, and the many lapses from belief in the True God (polytheism, atheism).

§ 22. The Nature of Original Sin

1. False Views

a) The view of Peter Abelard that Original Sin consists in eternal punishment ("reatus poenae aeternae) is false. According to the teaching of the Council of Trent, Original Sin is a true and proper sin, that is, a guilt of sin. Cf. D 376, 789, 792. St. Paul speaks of a real sin. Rom. 5, 12: "All have sinned." Cf. Rom. 5, 19.

b) Original Sin does not consist, as the Reformers, the Baians, and the Jansenists taught, in: "The habitual concupiscence, which remains, even in the baptised, a true and proper sin, but is no longer reckoned for punishment." The Council of Trent teaches that through Baptism everything is taken away which is a true and proper sin, and that the concupiscence which remains behind after Baptism for the moral proving is called sin in an improper sense only. D 792. That sin remains in man, even if it is not reckoned for punishment, is irreconcilable with the Pauline teaching of Justification as an inner transformation and renewal. The justified man is saved from the danger of rejection because the ground for the rejection, the sin, is removed. Rom. 8, 1: "There is now, therefore, no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus." As concupiscence, in consequence of the composition of human nature out of body and spirit would be present, as natural evil, even in the pure state of nature, it cannot be sinful in itself, for God has created everything well. D 428.

c) Original Sin does not consist, as, among others, Albert Pighius († 1542) and Ambrosius Catharinus, O.P. († 1553), taught, in a mere external imputation of the sinful deed of Adam (imputation theory). According to the teaching of the Council of Trent, Adam's sin is transferred by inheritance to all the children of Adam, and exists as his own proper sin in every single one of them: propagatione, non imitatione transfusum omnibus, inest unicuique proprium. D 790. Cf. D 795. Propriam iniustitiam contrahunt. According to the teaching of the Council of Trent, the efficacy of baptism consists in a real eradication of sin, not in a mere non-imputation of an alien guilt. D 792. Cf. Rom. 5, 12, 19.

2. Positive Solution

Original sin consists in the deprivation of grace caused by the free act of sin committed by the head of the race. (*Sent. communis.*)

a) The Council of Trent defined Original Sin as the death of the soul (mors animae: D 789). The death of the soul is, however, the absence [not-being-present] of supernatural life, that is, of sanctifying grace. In Baptism Original Sin is eradicated through the infusion of sanctifying grace (D 792). It follows from this that Original Sin is a condition of being deprived of grace. This flows from the Pauline contrast between sin proceeding from Adam and justice proceeding from Christ (Rom. 5, 19). As the justice bestowed by

Christ consists formally in sanctifying grace (D 799) so the sin inherited from Adam consists formally in the lack of sanctifying grace. The lack of sanctifying grace, which, according to the will of God, should be present, establishes that the guilt of Original Sin signifies a turning away from God.

As the ratio voluntarii, that is the free incurring of guilt, belongs to the concept of formal sin, and as a young child cannot perform a personal voluntary act, in original sin, the factor of spontaneity must be explained from its connection with Adam's deed of sin. Adam was the representative of the whole human race. On his voluntary decision depended the preservation or the loss of the supernatural endowment, which was a gift, not to him personally but, to human nature as such. His transgression was, therefore, the transgression of the whole human race. Pope Pius V rejected the assertion of Baius, that Original Sin had the character of sin in itself without any reference to the will from which it sprung. D 1047. Cf. St. Augustine, Retract. I 12 (13), 5. S. th. I II 81, 1.

b) According to the teaching of St. Thomas, Original Sin consists formaliter in the lack of original justice, materialiter in the unregulated concupiscence. In every sin St. Thomas distinguishes between a formal and a material element, the turning away from God (aversio a Deo) and the turning towards the creature (conversio ad creaturam). As the turning towards the creature manifests itself above all in evil desire, St. Thomas with St. Augustine, sees in concupiscence, which itself is a consequence of original sin, the material element of original sin: peccatum originale materialiter quidem est concupiscentia, formaliter vero est defectus originalis iustitiae (S. th. 1 II 82, 3). The doctrine of St. Thomas was influenced partially by St. Anselm of Canterbury, who sees in the nature of original sin only the lack of original justice and partially by St. Augustine, who defines original sin as: an evil concupiscence with its state of guilt (concupiscentia cum suo reatu) and explains that the state of guilt (reatus) is removed by Baptism, while the concupiscence persists for a moral test (ad agonem), but not as a sin. (Op. imperf. c. Jul. I 71). Most of the post-Tridentine theologians do not regard concupiscence as an essential constituent part of original sin, but as its consequence.

§ 23. The Transmission of Original Sin

Original sin is transmitted by natural generation. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent says: propagatione, non imitatione transfusum omnibus. D 790. In the baptism of children that is expurgated which they have incurred through generation. D 791.

As original sin is a peccatum naturae, it is transmitted in the same way as human nature, through the natural act of generation. Although according to its origin, it is a single sin (D 790) that is the sin of the head of the race alone (the sin of Eve is not the cause of original sin) it is multiplied over and over again through natural generation whenever a child of Adam enters existence. In each act of generation human nature is communicated in a condition deprived of grace.

The chief cause (causa efficiens principalis) of original sin is the sin of Adam alone. The instrumental cause (causa efficiens instrumentalis) is the natural act of

generation, which gives rise to the connection of the individual human being with the head of the race. The actual concupiscence associated with the act of generation, the sexual pleasure (libido) is, contrary to the view of St. Augustine (De nuptiis et concup. I 23, 25 ; 24, 27), neither the cause nor the inescapable condition for the reproduction of original sin. It is only an accompanying phenomenon of the act of generation, which in itself alone is the instrumental cause of the transmission of original sin. Cf. S. th. 1 II 82, 4 ad 3.

Objections.

From the Christian doctrine of the reproduction of original sin, it does not follow, as the Pelagians maintained, that God is the Originator of sin. The soul created by God is, according to its natural constitution, good. The condition of original sin signifies the want of a supernatural advantage to which the creature has no claim. God is not obliged to create the soul with the adornment of sanctifying grace. God is not to be blamed for the fact that the newly-created soul is denied the supernatural endowment, but man is who misused his freedom. Again, it does not follow from this teaching that marriage is bad. The marital act of generation is good because, objectively, that is, according to its adaptation to its end, and subjectively, that is, according to the intention of the generators, it is aimed at good, namely, the reproduction of the human nature desired by God.

§ 24. The Consequences of Original Sin

The consequences of original sin are, following Luke 10, 30, summarised by the scholastic theologians, in the axiom : By Adam's sin man is deprived of the supernatural gifts and wounded in his nature (spoliatus gratuitis, vulneratus in naturalibus). The word gratuita usually means only the absolute supernatural gifts and naturalia the gifts of integrity, which were part of man's abilities and powers before the fall. Cf. S. th. 1 II 85, 1 ; Sent. II d. 29 q. 1a.2.

1. Loss of the Supernatural Endowment

In the state of original sin man is deprived of sanctifying grace and all that this implies, as well as of the preternatural gifts of integrity. ***(De fide in regard to Sanctifying Grace and the Donum Immortalitatis. D 788 et seq.)***

The lack of the sanctifying grace has, as a turning away of man from God, the character of guilt and, as the turning of God away from man, the character of punishment. The lack of the gifts of integrity results in man's being subject to concupiscence, suffering and death. These results remain even after the extirpation of Original Sin, not as punishment, but as the so-called poenalitates, that is, as the means given to man to achieve the practice of virtue and moral integrity. The person stained by Original Sin finds himself in the imprisonment and slavery of the devil whom Jesus calls " the prince," and St. Paul " the god of this world " (2 Cor. 4, 4). Cf. Hebr. 2, 14 ; Peter 2, 19.

2. Wounding of Nature

The wounding of nature must not be conceived, with the Reformers and the Jansenists, as the complete corruption of human nature. In the condition of Original Sin, man possesses the ability of knowing natural religious truths and of performing natural morally good actions. The Vatican Council

teaches that man, with his natural power of cognition, can with certainty know the existence of God. D 1785, 1806. The Council of Trent teaches that free will was not lost or extinguished by the fall of Adam. D 815.

The wounding of nature extends to the body as well as to the soul. The 2nd Council of Orange (529) explained: totum, i.e., secundum corpus et animam, in deterius hominem commutatum (esse) (the whole man both in body and in soul was changed for the worse). D 174. Cf. D 181, 199, 793. Side by side with the two wounds of the body, sensibility to suffering (passibilitas) and mortality (mortalitas), theologians, with St. Thomas (S. th. 1 II 85, 3) enumerate four wounds of the soul, which are opposed to the four cardinal virtues: a) ignorance (ignorantia), that is, difficulty of knowing the truth (opposite to prudence), b) malice (malitia), that is the weakening of the power of the will (opposite to justice), c) weakness (infirmitas), that is, the recoiling before difficulties in the struggle for the good (opposite to fortitude), d) desire (concupiscentia) in the narrower sense, that is, the desire for satisfaction of the senses against the judgment of reason (opposite to temperance). The wounds of the body are caused by the loss of the preternatural gifts of impossibility and immortality, the wounds of the soul by the loss of the preternatural gift of freedom from concupiscence.

There is a controversy as to whether the wounding of nature consists exclusively in the loss of the preternatural gifts, or whether human nature in addition is intrinsically weakened in an accidental manner. The former view, which is that adopted by St. Thomas and by most theologians, conceives the wounding of nature as relative only, i.e., by comparison with its primitive condition, while the latter view conceives it as absolute and visualises it as a worsening in comparison with the pure state of nature. According to the former view, the person who is born in original sin is to the human being in the pure state of nature as one stripped of his clothes is to the unclothed (nudatus ad undum); according to the latter view, as the sick person is to the healthy (aegrotus ad sanum). The former view is to be preferred, as the sinful act of Adam, which occurred once only, could, neither in his own nature nor in the nature of his posterity, effect an evil habit and with it, a weakening of the natural powers. Cf. S. th. 1 II 85, 1. However, it must be admitted that fallen human nature, in consequence of individual and social aberrations, has declined below the state of pure nature.

§ 25. Souls who depart this life in the state of original sin are excluded from the Beatific Vision of God. (*De fide.*)

The 2nd General Council of Lyons (1274) and the Council of Florence (1438—45) declared: illorum animas, qui in actuali mortali peccato vel solo originali decedunt, mox in infernum descendere, poenis tamen disparibus puniendas (the souls of those who die in original sin as well as those who die in actual mortal sin go immediately into hell, but their punishment is very different). D 464, 693.

The dogma is supported by the words of Our Lord: " Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost he cannot enter into the Kingdom of God " (John 3, 5).

The spiritual re-birth of young infants can be achieved in an extra-sacramental manner through baptism by blood (cf. the baptism by blood of the children of Bethlehem). Other emergency means of baptism for children dying without sacramental baptism, such as prayer and desire of the parents or the Church (vicarious baptism of desire—Cajetan), or the attainment of the use of reason in the moment of death, so that the dying child can decide for or against God (baptism of desire—H. Klee), or suffering and death of the child as quasi-Sacrament (baptism of suffering—H. Schell), are indeed, possible, but their actuality cannot be proved from Revelation. Cf. D 712.

In the punishment of Hell theologians distinguish between the "poena damni," which consists in the exclusion from the Beatific Vision of God, and the "poena sensus" which is caused by external means, and which will be felt by the senses even after the resurrection of the body. While St. Augustine and many Latin Fathers are of the opinion that children dying in original sin must suffer "poena sensus" also, even if only a very mild one (mitissima omnium poena: Enchir. 93), the Greek Fathers (for example, St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Or. 40, 23), and the majority of the Schoolmen and more recent theologians, teach that they suffer "poena damni" only. The declaration of Pope Innocent III, is in favour of this teaching: Poena originalis peccati est carentia visionis Dei (= poena damni) actualis vero poena peccati est gehennae perpetuae cruciatus (= poena sensus). D 410. A condition of natural bliss is compatible with "poena damni." Cf. St. Thomas, De malo, 5, 3; Sent. II d. 33 q. 2 a. 2.

Theologians usually assume that there is a special place or state for children dying without baptism which they call limbus puerorum (children's Limbo). Pope Pius VI adopted this view against the Synod of Pistoia. D 1526.

CHAPTER 3

Revelation Concerning the Angels or Christian Angelology

§ 26. Existence, Origin and Number of the Angels

1. Existence and Origin of the Angels

In the beginning of time God created spiritual essences (angels) out of nothing. (*De fide.*)

The existence of the angels was denied by the Sadducees (Acts 23, 8: "The Sadducees say that there is no resurrection neither angel nor spirit; but the Pharisees confess both."), and by materialists and rationalists in all times. Modern rationalists explain the angels as personifications of Divine attributes and activities, or see in the Jewish-Christian doctrine of the angels traces of an original polytheism or a borrowing from Babylonian and Persian legends.

The 4th Lateran and the Vatican Councils declare: simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihils condidit creaturam, spiritualem et corporalem angelicam videlicet et mundanam (simultaneously at the beginning of time He created from nothing both spiritual and corporal creation, i.e., angelic and mundane). D 428, 1783. It is not defined that the creation of the angel-world was contemporaneous with that of the material world (simul can also mean: in

total, together; cf. Ecclus. 18, 1), but the sententia communis is that both were created at the same time.

Holy Writ, even in its oldest books, affirms the existence of the angels who glorify God, and as His messengers and servants, transmit His commands to mankind. Cf. Gn. 3, 24; 16, 7 et seq.; 19, 1 et seq.; 18, 2 et seq.; 22, II et seq.; 24, 7; 28, 12; 32, 1 et seq. The creation of the angels is indirectly attested in Ex. 20, 11: "In six days the Lord made heaven and earth, and the sea, and all things that are in them," and directly in Col. 1, 16: "For in Him (= Christ) were all things created in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones, or dominations or principalities, or powers."

Tradition affirming the existence of the angels is unanimous from the very beginning. The early Christian apologists, in refuting the reproach of atheism, also mention the existence of the angels (St. Justin, Apol. I 6: Athenagoras, Suppl. 10). The first monograph on the angels was composed about 500 A.D. by Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita under the title: De coelesti hierarchia. Among the Latin Fathers, St. Augustine and St. Gregory the Great occupied themselves minutely with angelology. The Liturgy of the Church also offers many testimonies.

Natural reason cannot prove the existence of the angels, since their creation is a free deed of God. From the known sequence of stages of the perfections of the creatures, however, the existence of purely spiritual created essences can, with a high degree of probability, be inferred.

2. Number of the angels

The number of the angels is, according to Holy Writ, very great. The Scriptures speak of myriads (Hebr. 12, 22) of thousands and thousands (Dn. 7, 10. Apoc. 5, 11), of legions (Mt. 26, 53). The various biblical names indicate a gradation and order among the angels. Since the time of Pseudo-Dionysius, nine Choirs or Orders of angels are named of which each three form a hierarchy. In accordance with Holy Scripture these are called: Seraphim, Cherubim, Thrones, Principalities, Powers, Strengths, Highnesses, Archangels, Angels. Cf. Is. 6, 2 et seq., Gn. 3, 24; Col. 1, 16; Eph. 1, 21; 3, 10; Rom. 8, 38 et seq.; Jud. 9; 1 Thess. 4, 16.

The division of the angel-world into nine Orders and the illumination of the lower Orders through the Higher Orders—a teaching which stems from neo-Platonism—is not a truth of Faith, but a free theological opinion. The same applies to the grouping of the angels by the Schoolmen, which goes back to Dn. 7, 10, into angeli assistentes and angeli ministrantes (assistants at the Throne—messengers of God). To the former group are allocated the upper six choirs, to the latter group the lower three. Revelation testifies however that the functions of assisting and of serving are not mutually exclusive. Cf. Tob. 12, 15; Luke 1, 19, 26.

According to the teaching of St. Thomas, which is connected with the doctrine of the principle of individuation, the angels are specifically distinguished from one another; thus each angel forms a separate species. Other theologians, as against this, teach either that all the angels together form one species only (St. Albert the Great) or that the individual hierarchies or choirs form particular species (the Franciscan school, Suarez).

§ 27. The Nature of the Angels

1. Immateriality of the angel nature

The nature of the angels is spiritual. (*De fide.*)

The 4th Lateran and the Vatican Councils speak of a spiritual and a corporeal creation and refer the former to the angels. D 428, 1783: spiritualem et corporalem (creaturam), angelicam videlicet et mundanam.

As distinct from human nature, which is composed of spirit and body, the nature of the angels is purely spiritual, that is, free of all materiality.

Holy Writ explicitly calls the angels spirits (spiritus, πνεύματα). Cf. 3 Kings 22, 21; Dn. 3, 86; Wis. 7, 23; 2 Macc. 3, 24. Mt. 8, 16; Luke 6, 18; 10, 20; 11, 24. 26; Hebr. 1, 14; Apoc. 1, 4. St. Paul contrasts "the spirits of wickedness," that is, the fallen angels, with "flesh and blood," that is, mankind; Eph. 6, 12: "We must not wage battle against flesh and blood, but against the principalities, against the powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness, against the spirits of evil in the world of heaven." The act of contrasting shows that the fallen angels are visualised as immaterial essences.

Jud. 6–7 raises a difficulty concerning the immateriality of the angels if the words "in like manner having given themselves to fornication" (v. 7) be referred to the angels. If this interpretation be correct we have here a reference to the widespread belief of late Judaism, which was accepted also by many Christians in the primitive Church, that some of the angels had had marital relations with women (Gn. 6, 2) and were punished for it by God. The apostle then is not to be taken here as making a statement about the nature of the angels, he is simply using a traditional opinion to emphasise the judgments of God upon wickedness.

A great number of the Fathers, ascribed to the angels a fine ethereal or firelike corporeality. Amongst these was St. Augustine who was influenced in this matter not only by Stoic and Platonic views but also by a misinterpretation of certain passages in Sacred Scripture, e.g., Ps. 103, 4 and Gen. 6, 2. Others, such as Eusebius of Caesarea, St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Pseudo-Dionysius and St. Gregory the Great, affirm the pure spirituality of the angels. St. Gregory the Great says: "The angel is only a spirit, man, on the other hand, flesh and spirit" (Moralia IV 3, 8). In the peak period of Scholasticism, the Franciscan School posited a composition of material and form (undefined and defining), in purely spiritual created substances, while St. Thomas and his School regarded purely spiritual substances as forms without matter (formae subsistentes or substantiae separatae). S. th. I 50, 1–2.

2. Natural immortality of the angels

The angels are by nature immortal. (*Sent. communis.*)

The natural immortality of the angels flows from the pure spirituality of their nature. Cf. Luke 20, 36: "Neither can they (the resurrected) die any more for they are equal to the angels." The blessedness of the good angels, and the rejection of the bad angels is, according to the testimony of the Revelation.

of eternal duration. Mt. 18, 10: "I say to you that their angels in heaven always see the face of my Father, who is in heaven." Mt. 25, 41: "Depart from me ye cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels."

The view put forward by St. John Damascene (de fide orth. II 3) and by many Schoolmen (Scotus, Biel) that the immortality of the angels is a gift of grace, is unsound. In reality immortality is a necessary consequence of their spiritual nature. S. th. I 50, 5.

3. Understanding, will and power of the angels

As spiritual essences, the angels possess understanding and free will. The intellect and will of the angels is, on account of the pure spirituality of their nature, more perfect than those of men, but on account of the finiteness of their nature, infinitely more imperfect than the Knowledge and Will of God. The angels do not know the secrets of God (1 Cor. 2, 11), do not possess a knowledge of the heart (3 Kings 8, 39) and have no certain foreknowledge of the free actions of the future (Is. 46, 9 et seq.): "But that day and hour (of the judgment) no one knoweth." (Mt. 24, 36; Mk. 13, 32). Also their wills are mutable.

The mode of cognition of the angels is, corresponding to their purely spiritual nature, purely spiritual. They gain spiritual concepts (species intelligibiles) not like man by abstractions from sensory perception, but receive them on their creation simultaneously with the natural power of cognition as a communication from God (scientia infusa or indita). Cf.S. th. I 55,2. The natural cognition of God possessed by the angels is a mediately-won knowledge from the contemplation of the perfections of creatures, especially of their own perfections. Cf. S. th. I 56, 3.

Freedom of the will is a presupposition of the fall, through sin, of the bad angels and of their eternal rejection. 2 Peter 2, 4: "God spared not the angels that sinned."

As the angels in their nature are superior to all other creatures, they also possess a higher perfection of power than other creatures. According to 2 Peter 2, 11, the angels are superior in strength and power to men. However, the angels do not possess the power of creation and the power of working miracles in the strict sense. These powers belong to God alone.

§ 28. The Supernatural Exaltation and Probation of the Angels

1. Elevation to the state of grace

God set a supernatural final end for the angels, the immediate vision of God, and endowed them with sanctifying grace in order that they might achieve this end. (*Sent. certa.*)

a) Pope Pius V. rejected the teaching of Baius that not grace but eternal bliss is the reward to the good angels for their naturally good works. D 1003 et seq. Jesus in the warning against scandal assures: "Their angels in heaven always

see the face of my Father, who is in heaven" (Mt. 18, 10). Cf. Tob. 12, 19. However, the indispensable precondition for the achievement of the immediate vision of God is the possession of sanctifying grace.

The Fathers attest the elevation of the angels to the state of grace. St. Augustine teaches that all angels without exception were endowed with habitual grace, in order to be good, and were constantly supported by co-operating grace in order to be able to remain good (De civ. Dei XII 9, 2; De corrept. et gratia c. 11 n. 32). St. John Damascene teaches: "All the angels were created by the Logos and perfected by the Holy Ghost through sanctification; corresponding to their dignity and to their order of rank they became participators in the illumination and the grace" (De fide orth. II 3).

b) As far as the time of the elevation into the state of grace is concerned, Petrus Lombardus (Sent. II d. 4-5), with the medieval Franciscan School, teaches that the angels were created without supernatural endowment, and that they were required to prepare themselves with the help of actual grace for the reception of sanctifying grace. This grace was received by the good angels only. St. Thomas, on the other hand (in his later writings), following St. Augustine, teaches that the angels were created in the state of sanctifying grace; probabilius videtur tenendum et magis dictis sanctorum consonum est, quod fuerunt creati in gratia gratum faciente. S. th. I 62, 3. Cf. St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei XII 9, 2: angelos creavit . . . simul eis et condens naturam et largiens gratiam. The Roman Catechism (I 2, 17) follows the teaching of St. Augustine and St. Thomas in this matter.

2. Probation of the angels

The angels were subjected to a moral testing. (*Sent. certa.* as regards the fallen angels, *Sent. communis* as regards the good.)

They were first in a state of pilgrimage (in statu viae), in which they, through their free co-operation, with grace were required to merit (in statu termini) the Beatific Vision of God. The good angels, who passed the test, entered as a reward therefor into the blessedness of heaven (Mt. 18, 10; Tob. 12, 15; Hebr. 12, 22: Apoc. 5, 11; 7, 11), while the bad angels, who did not pass the test, fell under the ban of eternal damnation (2 Peter 2, 4; Jud. 6).

As far as the fallen angels are concerned, the fact of their moral testing may be inferred from the fact of the fall (2 Peter 2, 4). As regards the good angels, it cannot with certainty be established from Scripture as their blessedness is not expressly represented as a reward for their loyalty. The opinion adopted by many of the Fathers, that the angels were created in a state of glory, is, as regards the bad angels, irreconcilable with the fact of the Fall. The view which was held for a long time by St. Augustine, but which was finally abandoned by him, that from the beginning there were two distinct realms of angels, the higher realm consisting of the angels created in the state of glory, and therefore incapable of sin, and the lower realm of the angels capable of sin, who had first to merit the perfect blessedness by loyal fulfilment of duties, is improbable, as it implies a completely unfounded difference in the original creation of the angels. S. th. I 62, 4-5.

§ 29. The fall through sin and the rejection of the bad angels

1. The fall through sin.

The evil spirits (demons) were created good by God; they became evil through their own fault.

The 4th Lateran Council (1215) declared against the Gnostic-Manichaean dualism: Diabolus enim et alii daemones a Deo quidem natura creati sunt boni, sed ipsi per se facti sunt mali (the Devil and the other demons were created by God good in their nature but they by themselves have made themselves evil). D 428; cf. D 427.

Holy Writ teaches that a section of the angels had not withstood the test, that they fell into grievous sin, and as punishment therefor were cast into hell. 2 Peter 2, 4: "God spared not the angels that sinned, but delivered them, drawn down by infernal ropes to the lower hell, unto torments, to be reserved unto judgment." Jud. 6: "The angels who kept not their principality, but forsook their own habitation, He hath reserved under darkness in everlasting chains, unto the judgment of the great day." Cf. John 8, 44: "He (the devil) stood not in the truth."

The passages Luke 10, 18 ("I saw Satan like lightning falling from heaven") and Apoc. 12, 7 et seq. (battle between Michael and his angels on the one side, and the dragon and his angels on the other side, and the fall of the dragon and his angels to the earth) do not refer to the fall of angels but to the dethronement of Satan through the efficacy of Christ's redemption as is evident from the context. Cf. John 12, 31.

In any case the sin of angels is to be conceived as a sin of the spirit; indeed, following St. Augustine and St. Gregory the Great, it is a sin of pride, not a sin of the flesh, as many of the older Fathers, St Justin, Athenagoras, Tertullian, St. Clement of Alexandria, St. Ambrose thought in view of the Jewish tradition that the marital connections between the "sons of God" mentioned in Gn. 6, 2, referred to angels, and the daughters of man. Apart from the fact that the fall through sin of the angels was anterior in time to Gn. 6, 2, the purely spiritual nature of the angels negatives this interpretation. Cf. Ecclus. 10, 15: "Pride is the beginning of all sin." The Fathers and theologians generally refer to the fall of the devil through sin the words of Jer. 2, 20, which the recusant Israel speaks to its God: "I will not serve," as well as the prophecy of the Prophet Is. 14, 12 et seq., on the king of Babylon: "How art thou fallen from heaven, O Lucifer, who didst rise in the morning (lucifer, qui mane oriebaris)! . . . 13. And they saidst in thy heart: I will ascend into heaven. I will exalt my throne above the stars of God . . . 14. . . . I will be like the most high." Cf. St. Gregory the Great, Moralia XXXIV 21. S. th. I 63, 3: angelus absque omni dubio peccavit appetendo esse ut Deus.

2. Eternal rejection

As the blessedness of the good angels is of eternal duration (Mt. 18, 10) so the punishment of the bad angels is also without end. Mt. 25, 41: "Depart from me ye cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels." Cf. Jud. 6: "in everlasting chains"; Apoc. 20, 10: "and the false prophet shall be tormented day and night for ever and ever."

The belief of Origen and of many of his followers (St. Gregory of Nyssa, Didymus of Alexandria, Evagrius Ponticus) concerning the restoration of all things (ἀποκατάστασις πάντων; cf Act 3, 21), according to which the damned angels and men, after a long period of purification, will be re-established in grace and will return to God, was rejected at a Synod of Constantinople (543) as heretical. D 211; cf. D 429.

§ 30. The Efficacy of the Good Angels

1. Relation to God

The primary task of the good angels is the glorification and the service of God. (*Sent. certa.*)

Holy Writ adjures the angels to praise God and attests that they glorify God by their praise. Cf. Ps. 102, 20 et seq.: "Bless the Lord all ye his angels!" Cf. Ps. 148, 2; Dn. 3, 58; Is. 6, 3; Apoc. 4, 8; 5, 11 et seq.; Hebr. 1, 6. God is served as well as praised. As ambassadors of God the angels transmit revelations and directions to mankind. Cf. Luke 1, 11 et seq.; 1, 26 et seq.; Mt. 1, 20 et seq.; Luke 2, 9 et seq.; Mt. 2, 13. 19 et seq.; Acts 5, 19 et seq.; 8, 26; 10, 3 et seq.; 12, 7 et seq.

2. Relation to Man

a) The secondary task of the good angels is the protection of men and care for their salvation. (*De fide on the ground of general teaching.*)

Since the 16th century the Church celebrates a feast in honour of the guardian angels. The Roman Catechism (IV, 9, 4) teaches: "By God's Providence the task is given to the angels of protecting the human race and individual human beings, so that they may not suffer any serious harm whatever."

Holy Writ testifies that all the angels are in the service of mankind. Hebr. 1, 14: "Are they not all ministering angels, sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation?" Ps. 90, 11 et seq., describes the care of the angels for the just. Cf. Gn. 24, 7; Ex. 23, 20 23; Ps. 33, 8; Jdt. 13, 20; Tob. 5, 27; Dn. 3, 49; 6, 22.

According to Origen (De princ. I Praed. 10) it is "a constituent part of the doctrinal promulgation of the Church that there are angels of God and benevolent powers, which serve Him, in order to complete the salvation of mankind." Cf. Origen, contra Celsum, VIII 34.

b) Every one of the faithful has his own special guardian angel from baptism. (*Sent. certa.*)

According to the general teaching of the theologians, however, not only every baptised person, but every human being, including unbelievers, has his own special guardian angel from his birth. This view is biblically founded on the words of Our Lord. Mt. 18, 10: "See that you do not despise one of

these little ones. For I say to you that their angels in heaven always see the face of my Father who is in heaven." Cf. Acts 12, 15: "It is his (=Peter's) angel."

St. Basil, with reference to Mt. 18, 10, teaches: "Every one of the faithful has an angel standing at his side as educator and guide, directing his life" (Adv. Eunomium III 1). According to the testimony of St. Gregory the Wonder-Worker and of St. Jerome, every person has from his birth his own special guardian angel. St. Jerome comments on Mt. 18, 10: "How great is the value of the (human) soul that every single person has from birth (ab ortu navitatis) received an angel for his protection." Cf. St. Gregory the Wonder-Worker's thanksgiving speech on Origen. c. 4. S. th. I 113, 1–8.

3. Veneration of Angels

The veneration by men of the good angels is justified both by their glorification by God and their relation to men. That which the Council of Trent teaches as to the invocation and veneration of the saints (D 984 et seq.), may also be applied to the angels. The rejection of the veneration of the angels by St. Paul (Col. 2, 18) refers to a false, exaggerated veneration of Gnostic false teachers. St. Justin the Martyr is an early witness to the Church's veneration of the angels.

§ 31. The Power of the Bad Angels

1. Dominion of the Devil over Mankind

The Devil possesses a certain dominion over mankind by reason of Adam's sin. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent names as a consequence of Adam's sin man's subjection to the power of the devil. D 788, 793. The Church's belief finds liturgical expression in the ceremonies of baptism.

Christ designates the Devil as "the prince of this world" (John 12, 31, 14, 30). St. Paul calls him "the god of this world" (2 Cor. 4, 4). By Christ's redemptive act the dominion of the Devil was in principle, conquered. John 12, 31: "Now shall the prince of this world be cast out." Hebr. 2, 14: He took flesh and blood, "that through death He might destroy him who had the empire of death, that is to say, the devil." Cf. Col. 1, 13; 2, 15; 1 John 3, 8. In the General Judgment the dominion of the Devil will be completely and finally broken. Cf. 2 Peter 2, 4; Jud. 6.

2. Forms of the Activity of the Dominion of the Devil

a) The evil spirits seek to do moral injury to mankind through temptation to sin (tentatio seductionis). 1 Peter 5, 8: "Be sober and watch! because your adversary the devil as a roaring lion goeth about seeking whom he may devour." Cf. Mt. 13, 25, 39 (cockle in the wheat). Eph. 6, 12. Biblical examples are the fall through sin of the First Parents (Gn. 3, 1 et seq.; Wis. 2, 24; John 8, 44), Cain's fratricide (Gn. 4, 1 et seq.; John 3, 12), Judas' betrayal (John 13, 2. 27), Peter's denial (Lk. 22, 31). Ananias' lie (Acts 5, 3). Man's will is not forced to sin by the temptation of the devil, but retains its natural freedom. The evil enemy can tempt man only to that extent, which

God in His wisdom permits. Cf. 1 Cor. 10, 13 : " God will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able."

b) The bad spirits seek to harm mankind physically also, through the causing of physical evil (infestatio). Cf. Tob. 3, 8 ; Job. 1, 12 ; 2, 6 ; 1 Cor. 5, 5.

c) A particular kind of demoniac infestation is possession (obsessio, possessio), in which the evil spirit takes forceable possession of the human body, so that the bodily organs and the lower powers of the soul, but not the higher powers of the soul, are dominated by him. The possibility and reality of possession is firmly established by the express testimony of Christ, Who Himself drove out evil spirits (cf. Mk. 1, 23 et seq. ; Mt. 8, 16 ; 8, 28 et seq. ; 9, 32 ; 12, 22 ; 17, 18) and Who bestowed power over the evil spirits on His disciples (Mt. 10, 1. 8 ; Mk. 16, 17 ; Luke 10, 17 et seq.). Cf. the Church's exorcisms.

The rationalistic viewpoint that the possessed mentioned in Holy Writ, were merely ill in mind and body, and that Jesus accommodated Himself to the Jewish belief in demons, is incompatible with the dignity of the Divine Word and with the veracity and sanctity of the Son of God.

In the determination of demoniac influences credulity must be avoided as much as rationalistic unbelief. Since the causing of physical evils is an extraordinary form of diabolic intervention it must first be ascertained whether these ills can be explained by natural reasons.

Towards the end of the middle ages the tendency to ascribe any kind of remarkable phenomena to the work of the devil, led to the lamentable aberration of witch-hunts.

The opinion vouched for by most of the older Christian authors (Pastor Hermae, Origen, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. John Cassian), by the Schoolmen (Petrus Lombardus, Sent. II 11, 1), and by individual theologians of modern times (Suarez, Scheeben), that from birth every person has been allocated a bad angel, in order constantly to excite him to evil (opposite to angel guardian), lacks an adequate basis in the sources of Faith, and is also hardly compatible with the goodness and mercy of God. The passages in Holy Writ which are generally cited in this regard (John 13, 2 ; Ps. 108, 6; Zach. 3, 1 ; Job 1–2 ; 2 Cor. 12, 7) are not valid proofs.

BOOK THREE

The Doctrine of God the Redeemer

PART 1

The Doctrine of the Person of the Redeemer

PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION

§ 1. The historical existence of Jesus Christ

The radical evangelical criticism of Liberal Protestant theology finally led to the denial of the historical existence of Jesus, by Bruno Bauer, Albert Kalthoff, Arthur Drews and others.

The historical existence of Jesus is definitely attested, not merely by Christian, but also by non-Christian authors, who in this matter, from the historical point of view are above suspicion.

1. Pagan Writers

a) Tacitus, in his Annals (about 116) relates the cruel persecution of the Christians in Rome by the Emperor Nero, and incidentally makes the following comment on the originator of the Christian religion. "The Author whose name was Christ was put to death by the Procurator Pontius Pilate during the reign of Tiberius" ("Auctor nominis eius Christus Tiberio imperante per procuratorem Pontium Pilatum supplicio adfectus erat." Annales XV 44).

b) Suetonius reports (about 120) that the Emperor Claudius expelled from Rome the Jews who were constantly causing tumults on the instigation of one Chrestus: "Judaeos impulsore Chresto assidue tumultuantes Roma expulit" (Vita Claudii 25, 4). This distorted report is based on the historic fact that there were intense disputes among the Roman Jews because of their different attitudes towards Christ. Cf. Acts 18, 2.

c) Pliny the Younger, Propraetor in Bithynia, writes (111–113) in a letter to the Emperor Trajan, that the Christians "on a settled day assembled before dawn and sing a hymn of praise to christ as to a god"; stato die ante lucem convenire carmenque christo quasi deo dicere (Ep. X. 96).

d) The Syrian Mara Bar Serapion, an adherent of the Stoic Philosophy, writes in a letter to his son Serapion about Jesus: "Or (what had) the Jews from the execution of their wise King, who at that time was taken away from them in the kingdom? . . . The Jews were destroyed and undone, and driven out of their realm, and now live dispersed everywhere. . . . The wise King is not dead, by virtue of the new law he has given." The letter was written after the year 70, but the exact time is uncertain. (2nd–4th cent. A.D.).

2. Jewish Writers

a) The Jewish writer, Flavius Josephus, mentions in his "Antiquitates" (completed 93–94), that the High Priest Ananus "had the brother of Jesus who was called Christ, named Jacobus, and some others, accused of transgression of the laws, and stoned" (Ant. XX 9, 1). Clearer still, but of very doubtful genuineness, is another passage: "At this time Jesus, a wise man, appeared, if one may call him a man at all; for he was a worker of extraordinary deeds, a teacher of men who joyfully accept the truth; and he attracted to himself many Jews

as well as many of the Greek people. This was the Christ (ὁ Χριστὸς οὗτος ἦν). And when Pilate, on the accusation of the chief men among us, had punished him with the cross, still those who had first loved him did not desert him, for he re-appeared alive to them on the third day. Indeed the Prophets had foretold this and many other wonderful things about him. Up to to-day, the race of Christians, who derive their name from him, have not yet ceased to follow him" (Ant. XVIII 3, 3). It is probable that this passage is basically authentic, but it seems to have been embellished under Christian influence.

The ancient Slav version of the work "De Bello Judaico" (also by Flavius Josephus) contains a testimony concerning Christ which is in some respects similar to the foregoing. In the Greek and Latin versions, however, it is missing. Probably it is an interpolation. The theory built up on this by Robert Eisler, that Jesus was the leader of a revolutionary national movement, and as such had been executed by the Roman Civil Authorities, has not found favour.

b) Again the occasional mention of the Person of Jesus in the Talmud presupposes His historical existence. Judaism, indeed hatefully distorted the picture of Christ by representing Him as the son of an adulteress, a traitor, and the founder of a godless sect, but it has never doubted His historical existence. Cf. the Talmudic Tract Bab. Sanhedrin f. 43 a ; f. 67a. St. Justin, Dial. 17 ; 108.

SECTION 1

The Two Natures in Christ and the Mode and Manner of Their Unification

CHAPTER I

The True Divinity of Christ

§ 2. The Dogma of the True Divinity of Christ, and Its Opponents

1. Dogma

Jesus Christ is True God and True Son of God. (*De fide.*)

The Church's belief in Jesus Christ's Divinity and Divine Sonship is expressed in all the Creeds. Cf. the Creed Quicumque : Est ergo fides recta, ut credamus et confiteamur, quia Dominus noster Jesus Christus Dei Filius, Deus et homo est. Deus est ex substantia Patris ante saecula genitus, et homo est ex substantia matris in saeculo natus, perfectus Deus, perfectus homo (we believe and confess that Our Lord Jesus Christ is the son of God. He is God and man. He is God begotten of the substance of the Father before all ages and man born in time of the substance of His Mother. He is perfect God and perfect man). D 40 ; cf. D 54, 86, 148, 214 et seq., 290. The dogma asserts that Jesus Christ possesses an Infinite Divine Nature with all its Infinite Perfections by virtue of His eternal generation from God the Father.

2. The Heretical Counter-propositions

Christ's true Divinity was denied in Christian antiquity by Cerinthus, the Ebionites, the Dynamic or Adoptian Monarchists, and the Arians and in modern times by the Socinians, by the rationalism of the Enlightenment and by modern liberal theology. (See the Doctrine of the Trinity. Par I.)

In opposition to the older rationalism, modern liberal theology gives to Christ the biblical names " God " and " Son of God," but it has changed their meaning in a rationalistic sense. According to it Christ is not the Son of God in a metaphysical, but only in an ethical sense, since the consciousness that God is our Father has developed in Him in a unique fashion. Christ is the Redeemer of the world, because He communicated to men the unique knowledge of God which He Himself experienced, and revealed God as the Good Father. As Christ is not true God, so He is not the object, but only the subject of religion. Harnack declared : " Not the Son, but the Father only should be spoken of in the Gospel, as Jesus has proclaimed it. The saying, ' I am the Son of God,' has not been put by Jesus Himself in His Gospel, and he who puts it into it as an assertion side by side with others, adds something to the Gospel " (Wesen des Christentums, p. 91 et seq.).

The religio-historical movement within liberal theology admits that the predicates God and Son of God in Holy Writ are intended to be understood in their

proper significance. The early Christians are regarded as having accepted this concept from the religious concepts of heathen religions (Apotheosis).

Through the influence of the liberal theology, Modernism (A. Loisy) also denies the Divinity of Christ. It distinguishes between the Jesus of history who is merely man, and the Christ of Faith, whom Christian piety has idealised and, under the influence of heathen ideas, exalted to the status of a Divine Being. Cf. D 2027-31.

§ 3. The Testimony of the Old Testament

The Old Testament contains mere indications of the True Godhead and Divine Sonship of the Messiah.

The Messianic prophecies describe the coming Redeemer as a prophet (Dt. 18, 15. 18), as a priest (Ps. 109, 4), as a shepherd (Ez. 34, 23 et seq.), as King and Lord (Ps. 2; 44; 109; Zach. 9, 9), as a suffering servant of God (Is. 53), and designate Him the Son of God: Dominus dixit ad me; Filius meus es tu, ego hodie genui te. The Lord hath said to me: Thou art my son, this day I have begotten thee. (Ps. 2, 7; cf. 109, 3). Even if the title "Son of God" was, by reason of the rigid monotheism of the Old Covenant, understood only in a transferred ethical sense, still one is justified, in the light of the New Testament Revelation, in regarding the eternal generation of the Son from the Father as being expressed therein (cf. Hebr. 1, 5).

The Divine dignity of the Messiah is indicated by the appellations: Emmanual =God with us (Is. 7, 14; 8, 8). Wonderful, Counsellor, God the Mighty, the Father of the world to come, the Prince of Peace (Is. 9, 6). The attribute of Eternity is predicated of the coming Messias, in which case, however, it must be noted, that the biblical expression "Eternity" may mean merely a long period of time. Cf. Mich. 5, 2: "His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity" (a diebus aeternitatis). Dan. 7, 14: "His power is an everlasting power that shall not be taken away: and his kingdom that shall not be destroyed."

§ 4. The Testimony of the Synoptic Gospels

A. THE TESTIMONY OF THE HEAVENLY FATHER

At the baptism of Jesus in the Jordan, a voice from Heaven said: "This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased" (Mt. 3, 17; Mk. 1, 11; Luke 3, 22; cf. John 1, 34). At the transfiguration on Tabor a voice from out the clouds spoke: "This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased; hear ye Him" (Mt. 17, 5; Mk. 9, 7; Luke 9, 35; cf. 2 Peter 1, 17).

At His baptism Christ is inducted by His heavenly Father into His Messianic office, and His Divine Sonship is attested by means of a solemn Revelation to St. John. In the transfiguration on Tabor this Divine attestation is repeated before the chief Apostles. The appellation "Son of God" is used in the Old Testament for Christ only. The biblical expression, "Beloved Son" is synonymous with "Only Son" (cf. Gn. 22, 2. 12. 16; Mk. 12, 6). The testimony of the Heavenly Father was understood at the time by St. John and the disciples simply as a Divine assertion of the messianic mission of Christ, since their minds were not yet attuned to the concept of Jesus, consubstantial sonship with God. In

the early church, however, its true significance, as an affirmation of the real Divine sonship of Jesus, was recognised (cf. Jo. 1. 34).

B. THE TESTIMONY OF JESUS

1. Superiority over all creatures

Jesus knows Himself to be sublime over all creatures, men and angels.

He transcends the Prophets and the Kings of the Old Covenant, Jonas and Solomon (Mt. 12, 41 et seq.; Luke 11, 31 et seq.), Moses and Elias (Mt. 17, 3; Mk. 9, 4; Luke 9, 30), David who regards Him as his Lord (Mt. 22, 43 et seq.; Mk. 12, 36 et seq.; Luke 20, 42 et seq.). He is so great that the least in the Kingdom of God established by Him is greater than John the Baptist, who was the greatest of all those born up till then (Mt. 11, 11; Luke 7, 28).

The angels are His servants. Angels appear and minister to Him (Mt. 4, 11; Mk. 1, 13; Luke 4, 13); He has but to ask the Father and He will send Him more than twelve legions of angels (Mt. 26, 53). Angels will accompany Him at His second coming (Mt. 16, 27; Mk. 8, 38; Luke 9, 26; Mt. 25, 31). He will send them forth so that they may assemble the sinners and the just for judgment (Mt. 13, 41; 24, 31; Mk. 13, 27). As Son He stands above men and angels (Mt. 24, 36; Mk. 13, 32).

2. Assimilation to God

Jesus asserts of Himself that which in the Old Testament is said of Jahweh, and thereby makes Himself equal to God.

Like Jahweh He sends out prophets, seers and doctors of the Law (Mt. 23, 34; Luke 11, 49) and gives to them the promise of His assistance (Luke 21, 15; cf. Ex. 4, 15). Like Jahweh He is Lord of the Old Testament Law; in His own perfection of power he completes and changes certain precepts of the Old Testament Law (Mt. 5, 21 et seq.). He is also Lord of the Sabbath (Mt. 12, 8; Mk. 2, 28; Luke 6, 5). Like Jahweh, He makes a covenant with man (Mt. 26, 28; Mk. 14, 24; Luke 22, 20). As Israel is the community of Jahweh, so His disciples are His community (Mt. 16, 18).

3. Divine Demands

Jesus imposes obligations on His disciples, which none but God can impose on men; of belief in His Person and of a supreme degree of love directed to Him personally.

He blames the lack of faith in Israel and praises the readiness to believe of the pagan peoples (Mt. 8, 10-12; 15, 28); He rewards faith (Mt. 8, 13; 9, 2, 22, 29; 15, 28; Mk. 10, 52; Lk. 7, 50; 17, 19), and warns against faint-heartedness (Mt. 16, 8; 17, 20; 21, 21; Mk. 4, 40). The demands for belief made by Jesus refer to His own Person. He wishes to be Himself the content and the object of faith. Cf. Luke 9, 26: "He that shall be ashamed of me and of my words, of him the Son of Man shall be ashamed when He shall come in His majesty and that of His Father and of the holy angels." Mt. 11, 6: "And blessed is he that shall not be scandalized in me."

Jesus demands of His disciples a love which surpasses all earthly love. Mt. 10, 37: "He that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me." He goes as far as to demand the surrender of life for His sake. Mt. 10, 39; Luke 17, 33 "Whosoever shall lose it [life] shall preserve it."

Jesus accepts religious veneration by allowing to Himself the veneration of the falling at the feet (proskynesis), which, according to both Jewish and Christian conceptions (cf. Est. 13, 12 et seq.; Acts 10, 26; Apoc. 19, 10; 22, 9) is due to the True God alone. Cf. Mt. 15, 25; 8, 2; 9, 18; 14, 33; 28, 9, 17.

4. Jesus' Consciousness of Power

Jesus is filled with a consciousness of superhuman power. Cf. Mt. 28, 18: "All power is given to me in heaven and on earth."

He uses His power in numerous miracles, and gives to His disciples the power of working miracles in His name, that is, in virtue of His commission and His power (Mt. 10, 1. 8; Mk. 3, 15; 6, 7; Luke 9, 1, 10, 17). Jesus also claims the power of forgiving sins, which belongs to God alone (Mt. 9, 2; Mk. 2. 5; Luke 5, 20; 7, 48), and manifests by miracles His possession of this power (Mt. 9, 6). Again, He transfers to His apostles the full power to forgive sins (Mt. 16, 19; 18, 18; John 20, 23). In the giving up of His life He sees an adequate means of atonement by which He merits the forgiveness of the sins of all the human race (Mt. 20, 28; 26, 28).

Jesus also appropriates to Himself the office of Judge of the World, which, according to the teaching of the Old Testament, Jahweh would exercise in His Own Person (cf. Ps. 49, 1–6, 95, 12 et seq.; 97, 9. Zach. 14, 5). Mt. 16, 27: "The Son of Man shall come in the glory of His Father, with His angels: and then shall He render to every man according to his works." His judgment extends to every idle word (Mt. 12, 36). His judgment is final and will be executed immediately. Mt. 25, 46: "And these shall go into everlasting punishment: but the just into life everlasting." The exercise of the office of Judge of the World presupposes a being and a power above all nature.

5. Jesus' Consciousness of Being the Son of God

a) Jesus claims to be the Son of God.

Jesus clearly distinguishes His Divine Sonship from that of His disciples. When He speaks of His relation to His Heavenly Father, He says "My Father." When He speaks of the relation of His disciples to the Heavenly Father, He says: "Your Father" and when appropriate "Thy Father." Never does He unite Himself with them in the formula "Our Father," even in those assertions in which He speaks concurrently of Himself and of His disciples. Cf. Mt. 25, 34; 26, 29; Luke 2, 49; 24, 49; John 20, 17. The "Our Father" is not His own prayer, but the prayer for His disciples (Mt. 6, 9).

b) Jesus' first revelation of Himself as Son of God in the Temple.

The first Revelation known to us of Jesus' unique consciousness of being the Son of God was on the occasion of the finding of the 12-year-old Jesus in the Temple. To the reproachful question of His mother: "Child, why hast thou done this? Behold! thy father and I have sought thee sorrowing," Jesus answers: "How is it that ye sought me? Did ye not know that I must be about my Father's business?" (Luke 2, 49).

While His mother exercises her natural mother-rights, Jesus appeals to His child-relationship with the Heavenly Father, and to the higher duties arising from it. His human son-relationship must give place to His Divine

son-relationship. The antithesis demands that the latter, as well as the former, be conceived of in a literal sense.

c) The so-called Johannine passage in the Synoptic Gospels.

The clearest testimony in the Synoptic Gospels to Jesus' consciousness of being the Son of God, and of His relation to the Father, is given in the so-called, Johannine passage Mt. 11, 27 (Luke 10, 22): "All things are delivered to me by my Father; and no one knoweth who the Son is, but the Father; and who the Father is, but the Son, and to whom the Son will reveal Him." All attempts to explain the passage as being wholly or partly spurious, collapse in face of definite manuscript evidence and Patristic testimony (St. Justin, St. Irenaeus, Tertullian).

In this passage Jesus makes clear that He has received from the Father the fullness of the truth of Revelation and the fullness of the Divine Power for the fulfilment of His mission and thus shows Himself to be immensely exalted over all Prophets of the Old Testament. In the words: "No one knoweth who the Son is but the Father," Jesus asserts that His Essence is so perfect that it can be comprehended only by the Infinite Divine Knowledge of the Father. In the words: "And no one knoweth who the Father is but the Son," Jesus implies that His Knowledge is so perfect, that it alone is capable of knowing the Infinite Divine Essence of the Father. Jesus thereby makes His Knowledge equal to the Divine Knowledge. Only through the active Revelation by the Son can we know the Father. In this Revelation of the Father the Son is not bound as if He were an ordinary messenger, but communicates His Knowledge to whom He will. He promulgates the Divine Truth of Revelation side by side and conjointly with the Father. In fact the passage can be adequately understood only on the assumption that Jesus shares the Divine Essence with the Father.

d) Jesus' claim to be Messiah and Son of God in the presence of the Sanhedrin.

Jesus solemnly testified to His Messiahship and Sonship of God before the Sanhedrin, the Supreme Jewish Court of Justice. To the question put by the presiding High Priest Caiphas: "I adjure thee by the living God that thou tell us if thou be the Christ, the Son of God" (Mt. 26, 63), Jesus answered clearly and definitely: "Thou hast said it." (Mt. 26, 64). "I am He" (Mk. 14, 62).

That Jesus in these words wished to designate Himself, not as a purely human Messiah in the Jewish-theocratic sense, but as God and Consubstantial Son of God, is shown by the words, which He added: "Nevertheless I say to ye, hereafter you shall see the Son of Man sitting at the right hand of the Power (= of God) and coming in the clouds of heaven." Cf. Ps. 109, 1; Dn. 7, 13. In Jesus' words, the Sanhedrists perceived a blasphemy against God deserving of death. But, having regard to Jewish ideas it is clear that this blasphemy was not committed because Jesus claimed to be the Messiah but because they perceived that Jesus, a man, claimed to be God.

e) The parable of the evil husbandmen.

Through the testimony of Jesus light is shed on the parable of the evil husbandmen, in which Jesus, in view of His impending death, and with obvious reference to Himself, says: "Now he (the Lord of the vineyard) having yet one son, most dear to him, he also sent him unto them last of all, saying: They will reverence my son. But the husbandmen said one to another:

This is the heir : Come let us kill him and the inheritance shall be ours. And laying hold of him, they killed him, and cast him out of the vineyard."

In this Parable, the Old Testament prophets take the place of servants, and Jesus appears as the only-beloved Son of the Lord of the vineyard, and as the sole lawful heir. In this there lies a clear indication of Jesus' consubstantial sonship of God.

The testimony of Jesus to Himself is supported and strengthened by His miracles and prophecies, by the holiness of His life, and the sublimity of His teaching, and by the fact that He went to His death in vindication of His testimony.

§ 5. The Testimony of the Gospel of St. John

The Gospel of St. John is, as the Evangelist himself assures us, written with the aim of demonstrating the Messiahship of Jesus and His Sonship of God : " But these are written that you may believe, that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God : and that believing you may have life in His name " (John 20, 31).

That St. John had the consubstantial Son of God in mind, flows indubitably from the Prologue, in which he deals with the importance of the Person and of the work of Jesus. The Prologue begins with the description of the pre-existing Logos, Who exists from all eternity, an Independent Person side by side with God, and Who is Himself God, through Whom all extra-Divine things have their being, Who is the Source of eternal life, and Who spiritually enlightens mankind through His Revelation. The Logos stands in the relation of Sonship to God. He is called " The Only Begotten of the Father " (μονογενὴς παρὰ πατρός; 1, 14), and as the " Only-Born God " (μονο-γενὴς θεός; 11, 18). In course of time the Logos existing from all eternity entered the world by becoming flesh (1, 14) in order to bring grace and truth to humanity. The Logos made flesh is identical with the historical Jesus Christ. In a later reference the Evangelist repeats the designation of Jesus as " Only-Begotten Son of God " (ὁ μονογενὴς υἱὸς νοῦ θεοῦ; 3, 16. 18).

THE TESTIMONY OF JESUS IN ST. JOHN'S GOSPEL

1. Jesus' Sonship of God

More often than in the Synoptic Gospels, Jesus, in the Gospel of St. John, calls God : " My Father " or " The Father " and Himself " The Son." He expressly distinguishes His own Sonship of God from that of His disciples. 20, 17 : " Go to my brethren and say to them : I ascend to my Father and to your Father, to my God and to your God."

2. Pre-existence with God

Jesus testifies that He was sent from the Father (5, 23. 37 ; 6, 38 et seq. 44 ; 7, 28 et seq., 33 passim), that He came " from heaven " (3, 13 ; 6, 38. 51) or " from above " (8, 23 ; cf. 3, 31), that He proceeds from God or from the Father (8, 42 ; 16, 27 et seq.). Jesus thereby asserts His pre-existence with God. By affirming His relation to God as Sonship, He asserts His pre-existence from all eternity.

3. The Son's Identity with God

a) On the occasion of the healing of the man who had been sick for 38 years (5, 1 et seq.), Jesus reveals in a specially insistent manner His Divinity and Sonship of God (5, 17–30). He rejects the reproach of His transgression of the Sabbath on the ground: "My Father worketh until now and I work" (17). Jesus claims therein for His work full equality with the work of the Father. As the Sabbath rest does not hinder God from practising His world-conserving and world-governing activity, neither does the commandment of the Sabbath hinder Him [Jesus Christ] from performing the miraculous cure. In the words of Jesus the Pharisees see expressed the identity of His substance with God and His substantial Sonship of God: "For this reason the Jews all the more sought after His life, because not only did He transgress the Sabbath, but also called God His own Father, and made Himself equal to God" (18).

In the following passages, Jesus more minutely details the thought that His actions are in all things identical with the works of the Father. He attributes to Himself the Divine activity of vivification ("vivificat," in the sense of the spiritual supernatural communication of life), and of judging (judicium, in the sense of the practice of the office of Judge at the General Judgment (21–22), and demands for Himself the same Divine Honour that is due to the Father, and absolute belief in His words (23–24). Faith is the subjective pre-condition for the communication of eternal life, and for the preservation from damnation at the judgment. Jesus, in the course of the speech, calls Himself, the "Son of God" (vocem filii Dei 25). Having regard to His claim that He is identical in substance with God, this title can designate nothing else than a true substantial Sonship of God.

b) Similarly Jesus reveals His unity of essence with God on the occasion of His controversy with the Jews on the Feast of the Consecration of the Temple (10,22–39). Jesus says: "I and the Father are one" (30). The context makes it clear that He is not speaking here of a mere moral unity between Jesus and the Father nor of unity of Person (ἕν not εἶς) but of a physical or substantial unity. They accused Him of blasphemy of God: "For a good work we stone thee not, but for blasphemy; and because that thou being a man, makest thyself God" (33).

Jesus rejects the reproach of blasphemy of God and demands belief in Him in virtue of the testimony of the Father contained in the working of miracles: "Believe the works that ye may know and believe that the Father is in me and I in the Father" (38).

c) In His solemn departure speech at the Last Supper Jesus explains in more detail the concept of the mutual immanence and the mutual penetration of substance between the Father and Himself (Perichoresis, Circumincessio). Cf. 14, 9–11.

In His prayer as High Priest Jesus prays for the unity of the Apostles and of the Faithful the model of which is His unity of substance with the Father (17, 11. 21).

4. Divine Attributes and Demands

Jesus attributed Divine qualities and activities to Himself: "Eternity" (8, 58: "Before Abraham was, I am;" cf. 17, 5, 24); "The full knowledge

of the Father" (7, 29; 8, 55; 10, 14 et seq.). "Equal power and efficacy with the Father" (5, 17 et seq.), "The Power of the forgiveness of sins" (8, 11) which He also transfers to others (20, 23), "The Office of Judge of the world" (5, 22. 27), "The right to adoration" (5, 23). He calls Himself: "The Light of the World" (8, 12), and: "The Way, the Truth and the Life" (14, 6).

Jesus makes Divine demands by demanding faith in His Person (14, 1): "You believe in God, believe also in me" (cf. 5, 24; 6, 40, 47; 8, 51; 11, 25 et seq.) and a love for Himself which manifests itself by keeping His commandments (14, 15. 21. 23). As a reward He promises a reciprocal love by Himself and by the Father, His self-revelation and the indwelling of Both in the soul: "And we will come to him and We will make our abode with him" (14, 23). This indwelling is an exclusive privilege of God.

He adjures His disciples to pray in His name to Himself and to the Father and assures them of a hearing (14, 13 et seq.; 16, 23 et seq.).

The solemn confession of the Godhead by the Apostle Thomas: "My Lord and my God!" (20, 28) is accepted by the Risen Christ as an expression of the faith demanded by Him. Cf. D 224.

5. The Testimony of the Works of Jesus

The testimony of His works, that is, of His miracles, must be added to the verbal testimony of Jesus. The miracles, according to the conception of the Fourth Evangelist, are "tokens," by which the Divine "Lordship," dwelling in Christ, that is, the Divine power and majesty, and with it, His Divine Substance, are revealed. Cf. 2, 11; 11, 40. Jesus frequently appeals to the testimony of His works, and represents them as the motive for faith in Him. 10, 25: "The works, that I do in the name of the Father, they give testimony of me." Cf. 5, 36; 10, 37 et seq.; 14, 11; 15, 24.

Appendix: The testimony of the other Johannine writings

The testimony of the Gospel of St. John is reinforced by the testimony of the other Johannine writings. Of special importance is 1 John 5, 20: "And we know that the Son of God is come. And hath given us understanding that we may know the True God and may be in His True Son. This is the True God and life eternal." That the last words are to be understood as referring to Jesus Christ, may be seen from the following consideration: a) The demonstrative pronoun "this" points to the nearest concept, namely to Jesus Christ, b) If it referred to "the True God," that is, God the Father, it would be a tautology, c) The assertion that Jesus Christ is "Eternal Life" is genuinely Johannine, cf. John 1, 2; 5, 11 et seq.); John 1, 4; 11, 25; 14, 6. But if the second assertion is to be related to Jesus Christ, then also the former, d) The confession of the Divinity of Jesus Christ is in complete harmony with the Gospel. (Cf. John 1, 1. 18; 20, 28. Further important declarations concerning the Person and work of Christ are to be found in the following passages: 1 John 1, 1–3. 7b; 2, 1 et seq.; 4, 9 et seq. 14 et seq.; 5, 5 et seq. 10–13; 2 John 3, 7. 9; Apoc. 1, 5–7, 17 et seq.; 5, 12–14; 19, 13 (ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ); 22, 12 et seq.

§ 6. The Testimony of the Pauline Epistles

1. Phil. 2, 5-11

The clearest exposition of Pauline Christology is given in the dogmatically significant passage, Phil. 2, 5-11: "For let this mind be in you which was also in Christ Jesus. 6. Who being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God; 7. But emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man. 8. He humbled Himself, becoming obedient unto death, even to the death of the Cross. 9. For which cause, God also hath exalted Him and hath given Him a name which is above all names: 10. That in the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those that are in heaven, on earth, and under the earth; 11. and that every tongue should confess that the Lord Jesus Christ is in the glory of God the Father."

In this text the Apostle distinguishes three different modes of existence of Christ; a) First He was in the form of God (ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρ χων); b) Then He adopted the form of a servant (μορφὴν δούλου λαβών); c) Finally, He was elevated by God, for His obedience in suffering, over all created things (καὶ ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸν ὑπερύψωσεν).

The expression μορφή was largely understood by the older commentators in the sense of the Aristotelian μορφή, synonymous with οὐσια (essentiality), but in the unphilosophical language of the Apostles it is more correctly to be taken as meaning external appearance, which permits the essence of a thing to be known. In the proper sense one cannot, of course, speak of a form of God, but the expression is made intelligible by the antithesis "form of a servant." The form of God coincides factually with the Divine Glory and Majesty (δόξα), which is predicable of the Divine Essence only and in which God reveals Himself to mankind. The mode of speech, therefore, "in the form of God" presupposes the possession of the Divine Essence. In the form of God, Jesus possessed equality of Being with God (τό εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ), by which must be understood complete equality with God, which comprehends the Essence as well as the appearance (οὐσία and μορφή).

The difficult expression ἁρπαγμός (rapina), which in all Holy Writ occurs in this passage only, is frequently interpreted by the Fathers in the sense of the unlawful forcible taking to oneself, for example, of a thing which is appropriated, in an illegal and violent manner. Accordingly they explain: He did not regard the being equal to God as something which He had acquired or had to acquire in an unlawful, forcible manner, as He already possessed it connaturally. However, the antithesis: "but He humbled Himself," and the consideration that Christ's attitude should be a model of selflessness for the community, may demand the linguistically possible interpretation: "He regarded the being equal to God not as a thing which He should more or less selfishly retain" (ἁρπαγμός and ἅρπαγμα = a thing which one eagerly seizes and retains, an opportunity, which one does not miss, a find, something welcome: cf. Eusebius, Hist. eccl. VIII 12, 2: Vita Constantini II, 31; "In Lc. 6, 20 [Pg. 24, 537 c]; St. Cyril of Alexandria, De Adoratione 1, 25).

The kenosis (debasement) consists in the renunciation (in His human nature) of the Form of God i.e., The Divine Dominion and Majesty, which like

the Divine Essence, belongs to the state of one who is completely equal to and identical with God. In no wise, however, does it signify the giving-up of the Divine Essence or Attributes. The exchange of the form of God for that of a servant followed Christ's Incarnation, for He who in His pre-mundane existence was "God in the form of God" became in His Incarnation "God in the form of a servant" also (F. Tillmann).

As a reward for His further self-abasement during His earthly life, through His obedience even unto the death of the Cross, God exalted Him in His human nature over all created things by bestowing on Him the Jahweh-name Kyrios (Lord) and Divine adoration from all creatures. Christ's human nature was assumed into the (manifest) Divine Glory (which the Logos enjoyed from Eternity) (cf. John 17, 5).

2. Christ is called God

The Apostle St. Paul gives further expression to his conviction of faith in the Godhead of Christ by directly calling Him God (*θεός*). a) Rom. 9, 5 : "Whose are the Father's and of whom is Christ according to the flesh, who is over all things, God blessed for ever." (*ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων θεὸς εὐλογητὸς εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας*).

Liberal Theology separates Verse 5b from 5a and construes it as an independent doxology to God the Father ; "The God (= the Father) who is over all things be praised in eternity." However, the evidence of the context is against this interpretation. (The expression "according to the flesh," that is, according to the human side, demands a completion ; compare the parallel assertion, Rom. 1, 3 et seq.) A comparison with the other Pauline doxologies, which are, as a rule, the solemn conclusion of a thought, and on that account also, linguistically closely associated with the foregoing, confirms this view (cf. Rom. 1, 25 ; Gal. 1, 5 ; 2 Cor. 11, 31 ; Rom. 11, 36 ; Phil. 4, 20). If this were a doxology to the Father it would be (in St. Paul's writings) factually and linguistically unique. The unanimous interpretation of the Fathers refers the whole passage to Christ.

b) Tit. 2, 13 : "Looking for the blessed hope and coming of the glory of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ" (*ἐπιφάνειαν τῆς δόξης τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ καὶ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*).

That the designation "God" is to be understood as referring to Christ, not to God the Father, is indicated both by the linguistic form (composition of the substantive *θεός* and *σωτήρ* under one single article), and especially by the fact that the Epiphany or Parousie is always asserted of Christ, not of the Father. Cf. 1 Tim. 6, 14 ; 2 Tim. 4, 1.

c) Hebr. 1, 8 : "But to the Son (God saith) : Thy throne, O God (*ὁ θεός*), is for ever and ever." That which is asserted of God in Ps. 44, 7, is transferred together with the address "O God" to Christ, the Son of God. The nominative *ὁ θεός* instead of the vocative is a Hebrewism.

According to the literal sense, the words of the Psalm refer to the Israelite King. The salutation "O God" may have occurred through a corruption of the text (jihje="he will be"—Jahweh—Elohim ; or kelohim="like God's [throne]"). The author of the Letter to the Hebrews, however, understands the words to refer to God and applies them to Christ.

In consonance with these assertions the Apostle ascribes to Jesus Christ the entire fullness of the Godhead (Col. 2, 9: "For in Him dwelleth all the fullness of the Godhead corporeally"). Against gnostic Ennoia doctrine (which makes of Christ an "eon" emanating from a inferior to the Father) the Apostle stresses that in Christ the Divine Essence is continuously present with all Its perfections. Cf. Col. 1, 19.

3. Christ is called Lord

Hellenic speech-usage applied to heathen gods, who were the object of special veneration, the religious title Kyrios. The Roman Emperors also adopted the title of Kyrios and caused themselves to be shown divine honours. Among the Jews, Kyrios, as a rendering of the Hebrew God-names Adoni and Jahweh, was applied to the One True God.

In the primitive Christian community of Jerusalem the glorified Christ was, according to the testimony of the Acts of the Apostles (1, 21: 2, 36), called Kyrios in the religious sense. The invocation of the name of the Lord (or of Jesus) was looked upon as the characteristic identifying mark of the Christians (Acts 9, 14, 21; 22, 16). The dying St. Stephen prays: "Lord Jesus, receive my soul ... lay not this sin to their charge" (Acts 7, 59 et seq.).

To the Apostle St. Paul the designation Kyrios was tantamount to a confession of Christ's Godhead. This is made particularly evident in that he transfers Old Testament Kyrios-passages which refer to Jehovah, to the Kyrios Jesus Christus (cf. 1 Cor. 1, 31: "He that glorieth may glory in the Lord"; Rom. 10, 13 et seq.: "For whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved." 2 Thess. 1, 9 et seq.; Hebr. 1, 10 et seq.; 1 Cor. 2, 16). According to Phil. 2, 9 et seq., the name Kyrios is the name which is exalted over every other name that is, the name of God. The Kyrios Jesus Christ is, therefore, for St. Paul, the object of religious veneration the same as God. Cf. Phil. 2, 10: "In the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those that are in heaven, on earth and under the earth." 1 Cor. 8, 5 et seq.: "For although there be that are called gods either in heaven or on earth (for there be gods many and lords many), Yet to us there is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we unto Him." Just as in the pagan notion, the gods are lords and the lords are gods, so in Christian teaching the one God is Lord and the one Lord is God (Cf. Origen, In Rom. VII 13). The invocation of the name: "The Lord Jesus Christ" is for St. Paul the great bond of all Christians (1 Cor. 1, 2). St. Paul beseeches of the Lord Jesus Christ, in the same manner as of God the Father: grace, peace and mercy for the faithful (compare the opening passages of the Epistles).

The Aramaic prayer-appeal: Marana tha="Our Lord, come!" points to the Palestinian, Jewish-Christian origin of the title of Kyrios (1 Cor. 16, 22: Didache 10, 6; cf. Apoc. 22, 20).

4. Ascription to Jesus of Divine Qualities

The Apostle St. Paul further attests his belief in Christ's Divinity by ascribing to Him divine attributes:

a) Omnipotence, which is manifested in the creation of the world and the conservation of the world (Col. 1, 15–17: "All things were created by Him and

in Him . . . and by Him all things consist" ; 1 Cor. 8, 6 : "of whom are all things" ; Hebr. 1, 2 et seq. : "by who, also He made the world" . . . "upholding all things by the word of His power" ; cf. Hebr. 1, 10) ; b) Omniscience (Col. 2, 3 : "in whom are hid all treasures of wisdom and knowledge") ; c) Eternity (Col. 1, 15 : "The firstborn of every creature") ; d) Immutability (Hebr. 1, 12 : "But thou are the self-same" : Hebr. 13, 8 : "Jesus Christ yesterday and today ; the same for ever") ; d) Adorability (Phil. 2, 10 : "That in the name of Jesus every knee should bow" ; Hebr. 1, 6 : "And let all the angels of God adore Him").

5. Christ's Divine Sonship

The Apostle St. Paul defines the relationship of Christ to God more closely as one of Sonship. In view of his other Christological teaching, this Sonship must be conceived as a true and consubstantial Sonship of God. In many passages it is clearly indicated as such, for example, Rom. 8, 3 : "God sent His Own Son (τὸν ἑαυτοῦ υἱὸν πέμψας) ; Rom. 8, 32 : "He that spared not His Own Son" (τοῦ ἰδίου υἱοῦ οὐκ ἐφείσατο) ; Col. 1, 13 : "He hath translated us into the kingdom of the Son of His love" (τοῦ υἱοῦ τῆς ἀγάπης αὐτοῦ). Cf. Rom. 1, 3 et seq. (Son of David and Son of God) ; Gal. 4, 4 et seq. (where St. Paul contrasts Christ's natural Sonship of God with the Sonship-of-God through grace which Christ gives to redeemed humanity). Rom. 8, 29 (Christ the First-Born among many brethren) ; Hebr. 1, 6 (First-Born of God).

The expression "God" and "The Father" of "Our Lord Jesus Christ" is to be understood as corresponding to the concept of "The Son" in the sense of a true fatherhood established by natural generation. Cf. Rom. 15, 6 ; 2 Cor. 1, 3 ; Eph. 1, 3.

In the introduction to the Epistle to the Hebrews the exaltation of Christ over the angels is founded on the fact that He is the Son of God. 1, 4 : "Being made so much better than the angels as He had inherited a more excellent name than they" (namely, the name Son). As the Son of God He is "the brightness of His glory and the figure of His Substance" (1, 3).

§ 7. The Testimony from Tradition

The oldest Church Tradition clearly attests its faith in Jesus Christ's Godhead and in His Sonship of God, founded on Holy Writ. Since the times of the Apostles, numerous martyrs have sealed with their blood their belief in Jesus Christ, the True Son of God. The Apostles' Creed designates Jesus Christ as the Only Son of God (filius unicus, unus, unigenitus).

1. The Apostolic Fathers

a) The Didache acknowledges Christ to be the Lord (10, 6 ; marana tha), the God of David (10, 6), the Son of God (16, 4), and in relation to the prophecy of Isais concerning the Passion, the Servant of God (9, 2. 3 ; 10, 2).

b) St. Clement of Rome (about 96) constantly designates Christ as the Lord and in connection with the Epistle to the Hebrews, calls Him "mirror of the majesty of God, by so much greater than the angels as the name which He has received surpasses them," and stresses His filiation with the Father (Cor. 36. 2–4). He says

of Him: "The sceptre of the majesty of God, Our Lord Jesus Christ, did not appear in pomp and state, although He might have, but in humility" (16, 2)—an indication of His pre-existence with God, and of His self-abasement in the Incarnation. Christ is for him the object of religious veneration as the repeated doxology attests: "Through our Lord Jesus Christ to whom be honour and glory from eternity to eternity. Amen" (20, 11 et seq.; 50, 7), cf. 59, 2–4.

c) Among the Apostolic Fathers, St. Ignatius of Antioch most clearly teaches (about 107) Jesus Christ's Godhead and Sonship of God. He frequently calls Christ, God (Eph. 1, 1; 7, 2; 15, 3; 18, 2; Rom. 6, 3; Smyrn. 1. 1); he regards Him as the Creator of the world by referring to Him the words: "He spoke and it is become" (Eph. 15, 1; cf. Ps. 32, 9; Gn. 1, 3). In addition to the power of creation he ascribes to Christ the Divine Attribute of Omniscience (Eph. 15, 3), Pre-existence from all eternity (Magn. 6, 1: "He who was with the Father before time, and who finally appeared"), the quality of not being generated in time (Eph. 7, 2), of timelessness and dominion over time (Pol. 3, 2). He designates Christ's relationship to God as a true and unique Sonship (Rom., inscr.: Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ μόνου υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ). The principal thoughts of the Ignatian Christology are summarised in Eph. 7, 2: "The Physician is one, in flesh and spirit, generated and ungenerated, God appearing in flesh, true life in flesh, from Mary as well as from God, first capable of suffering and then incapable of suffering, Jesus Christ our Lord."

d) Compare also the Barnabas Letter 5, 5–11; 12, 10. St. Polycarp, Phil. 2, 1; 12, 2. Martyrium Polycarpi 14, 3; 17, 3: "This One we adore because He is the Son of God."

2. The Early Christian Apologists

The Christian Apologists of the second and third centuries (St. Justin, Theophilus of Antioch, St. Hippolytus, Origen), teach the pre-existence and the Godhead of Christ mainly by the application of the Johannine concept of the Logos, but in the determination of the internal Divine relation of the Son to the Father, do not always keep themselves free from subordinationist tendencies.

Aristides of Athens (about 140) thus expresses himself concerning the Christian belief: "The Christians derive their origin from Jesus Christ. The latter is called the son of the Supreme God, and it is said of him that he as God descended from heaven and took flesh of a Hebrew virgin, and adopted it to himself and so the Son of God took up dwelling in a daughter of men" (Apol. 2, 6).

St. Justin Martyr (about 150) in his dialogue with the Jew Tryphon (c. 48–108) supplies a detailed proof of the Godhead and Sonship of God of Jesus Christ from the writings of the Old Testament. He says of Christ, that He, the Son of the Creator of the world, pre-existed as God and that He was born as a man of the maiden (Dial. 48). Cf. Apol. 1, 63.

The universality of the belief in the Godhead of Christ in the later years of the Early Christian Church is manifest in the Creeds. Cf. St. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. I 10, 1: Tertullian, De virg. vel. 1; Adv. Prax. 2: Origen, De princ. I praef. 4.

A testimony from Monumental Theology is the fish-symbol used since the 2nd century (Ἰχθύς = Ἰησοῦς Χριστός θεοῦ υἱὸς σωτήρ). Cf. the Aberkios and the Pectorius inscription.

CHAPTER 2

Christ's True Humanity

§ 8. The Reality of Christ's Human Nature

1. Heretical Teaching

About the end of the 1st and the beginning of the 2nd century heresies emerged which denied the reality of Christ's human Body and stigmatised as fantasy the facts of Christ's earthly life, especially His suffering and death (St. Ignatius, Trall. 10. Smyrn. 2, 1: Christ, it was claimed, "had only apparently suffered"). The point of departure of this "Docetism" was, according to the letters of St. Ignatius, the "scandal of the Cross" (Eph. 18, 1; cf. Gal. 5, 11; 1 Cor. 1, 23).

The later gnostic sects, which either attributed to Christ an apparent body without any reality (Basilides, Marcion) or a heavenly astral body (Apelles, Valentin), proceeded from Gnostic Dualism, according to which a union of the Divine Logos with a human body is not possible, since all material things were regarded not as creatures of God but as proceeding from a primeval principle of evil. This Gnostic Dualism was also the source of the Docetic errors of the Manichaeans and of the Priscillianists.

2. The Teaching of the Church

Christ assumed a real body, not an apparent body. (*De fide.*)

The oldest symbols of Faith mention the most important facts of the earthly life of Jesus, i.e., conception, birth, suffering, dying and resurrection, using the words in their natural sense and thereby exclude the Docetic denial of the reality of Christ's human nature. Cf. the Apostles' Creed and the later Symbols which depend on it. The Council of Chalcedon (451) calls Christ "truly God and truly man" (D 148).

Docetism, which continued in Manichaeism, was condemned in mediaeval times in the "Profession of Faith of Michael Palaeologus" of the 2nd General Council of Lyons (1274), and in the "Decretum pro Jacobitis" of the General Council of Florence (1441). D 462, 710.

3. Proof from the New Testament and Tradition

The Evangelists describe the facts of the earthly life of Jesus in such a fashion that one cannot doubt the reality of His Body and of His Soul and of their specific similarity to the body and to the soul of other men. After the Resurrection, Jesus assures the doubting disciples of the reality of His human body with the words, "Handle and see" (Luke 24, 39). The Apostle St. John designates the act of becoming man as becoming flesh (John 1, 14), and combats false teachers, who deny the coming of Christ in the flesh (1 John 4, 2; 2 John 7; cf. 1 John 1, 1). St. Paul, speaking of Christ as the Mediator calls

Him the "man Jesus Christ" (Rom. 5, 15 ; 1 Cor. 15, 21 ; 1 Tim. 2, 5) and points to the human origin of Christ (Rom. 1, 3 ; 9, 5 ; 2 Tim. 2, 8 ; Gal. 3, 16 ; 4, 4) as well as to His suffering and death on the Cross (1 Cor. 1, 23 : "We preach Christ Crucified").

Docetism was refuted first by St. Ignatius of Antioch († c. 107) and later by St. Irenaeus († c. 202) and Tertullian († 220) especially in their arguments against the Gnostics. In the refutation of Docetism St. Ignatius takes his stand on the authority of the Gospel (Philad. 5, 1) ; he cites the therein reported facts of Jesus' human life and emphasises them with a forceful ἀληθῶς (=truly, really).

As the Fathers stress, Docetism is particularly baneful for the Christian striving after virtue, since it leads to the devaluation of the Suffering and Death of Christ and His Redemption ; it leads to the undermining of the credibility of Holy Writ, and consequently of the whole Christian Faith, and it nullifies the doctrine of the Eucharist.

§ 9. The Integrity of Christ's Human Nature

1. Heretical Teaching ; Arianism and Apollinarianism

Arius († 336) taught that the Logos (the Word) had no human soul but only a soulless body united with Himself. He held that the Logos substituted for Christ's soul. He believed that in this way he could prove that the Logos was a Creature.

Apollinaris of Laodicea († about 390), a zealous defender of the Nicene Creed, under the influence of the Platonic Trichotomism (synthesis of the human being out of flesh, soul and spirit), taught that the Divine Logos had assumed a human body and an animal soul. The Divine Logos had, he asserted, taken the place of the missing spiritual soul. He erroneously believed that only in this manner could the unity of person and the sinlessness of Christ be preserved. He sought a positive foundation for his theory in John 1, 14 (σάρξ body) and in Phil. 2, 7 (ὁμοίωμα=similarity).

2. The Teaching of the Church

Christ assumed not only a body but also a rational soul. (*De fide.*)

Apollinarianism, which was condemned at a particular Synod at Alexandria under the presidency of St. Athanasius (362), was rejected as heretical at the 2nd General Council at Constantinople (381), and at a Roman Synod under Pope Damasus (382). (D 85, 65). The Council of Chalcedon (451) teaches concerning Christ's humanity : "He is perfect . . . according to humanity . . . a true man, consisting of a rational soul and a body. . . . He is identical in substance with us according to His humanity" (D 148). In conformity with the decision of Chalcedon, the Creed "Quicumque" confesses : perfectus homo ex anima rationali et humana carne subsistens (D 40). Cf. D 216. The General Council of Vienne (1311–12) declared against Petrus Johannis Olivi († 1298) that as in all other men so also in Christ the rational soul is in itself and essentially (per se et essentialiter) the form of the body (D 480). Cf. D 710.

3. Proof from the Sources of Faith

Jesus Himself speaks of His human soul. Cf. Mt. 26, 38: "My soul is sorrowful even unto death." Luke 23, 46: "Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit." Holy Writ designates Jesus' death as the "giving up of the ghost" (Mt. 27, 50; John 19, 30; Mk. 15, 37; Luke 23, 46). The spirituality of Christ's soul is especially manifested in His prayer of appeal and thanksgiving, as well as in the subordination of His human will to the Divine Will: "Not my will but Thine" (Luke 22, 42).

St. Clement of Rome refers to both constituent parts of Christ's human nature when he says that Jesus Christ "has given His flesh for our flesh and His soul for our soul" (Cor. 49, 6). St. Ignatius of Antioch calls Christ a "perfect man" (τέλειος ἄνθρωπος; Smyrn. 4, 2). The most important of the early opponents of Apollinaris of Laodicea was St. Gregory of Nyssa.

The Fathers and theologians establish the necessity of the assumption of a rational soul by Christ on the two axioms: Quod assumptum non est, non est sanatum: "That which is not assumed has not been saved" (St. Gregory of Nazianzus. Ep. 101 ad Cledonium), and Verbum assumsit carnem mediante anima (cf. S. th. III 6, 1: "The Word assumed flesh through the medium of the soul"). In connection with the defence against Apollinarianism the formula developed: In Christ there are two natures (divinity and humanity) and three Substances (Logos, rational soul, and body). However this formula was later reprobated by the Provincial Council of Frankfurt (794), on account of the factual identity of nature and substance. Cf. D 284, 295, 312. In spite of this, however, it gained an entry into scholastic theology. Cf. Hugo of St. Victor, De sapientia animae Christi. "Christus unus (est) in una persona, duabus naturis, tribus essentiis . . . divinitate, carne et anima" (Christ is one with one personality, two natures, and three constituents—divinity, flesh, and soul). PL 176, 847. Petrus Lombardus, Sent. III 6, 3.

§ 10. The Adamite Origin of Christ's Human Nature

Christ was truly generated and born of a daughter of Adam, the Virgin Mary. (*De fide.*)

The reality and integrity of Christ's human nature is especially guaranteed by the fact that Christ was truly generated and born of a human mother. Through His descent from a daughter of Adam, He was, as to His humanity, incorporated into the posterity of Adam. He had identity of essence with man and community of race; Christ became our Brother.

While individual Gnostics, such as Valentin and Apelles, relying upon 1 Cor. 15, 47 and Mt. 1, 20, asserted that Christ had descended from heaven to earth in a spirit-form body and had gone through the Virgin without appropriating anything from her "just as the water flows through a canal" (Epiphanius, Haer. 31, 4), the Church in her Symbols of Faith teaches that Christ was generated and born of the Virgin Mary, that is, out of the substance of the Virgin Mary. Cf. The Apostles' Creed: natus ex Maria Virgine; the Creed "Quicumque": ex substantia matris in saeculo natus (D 40). In both the Old and the New Testaments the Messias is designated as of the posterity of Abraham and of David. Cf. Gn. 22, 18; Mt. 1, 1; 9, 27; 12, 23; 22, 42; Rom. 1, 3; 2 Tim. 2, 8. The New Testament explicitly stresses the true

motherhood of Mary. Cf. Mt. 1, 16; Mary, "of whom was born Jesus"; Luke 1, 31: "Behold thou shalt conceive in thy womb and shalt bring forth a son"; Gal. 4, 4: "made of a woman."

Among the Fathers, St. Ignatius of Antioch in particular emphasises that Christ "is truly of the race of David according to the flesh . . . that he was truly born of a virgin (Smyrn. 1, 1; cf. Eph. 18, 2).

Against the Gnostics the Fathers use the proposition ex (not per) in Mt. 1, 16; Gal. 4, 4 and Luke 1, 35 (in the last passage an addition). Cf. Tertullian, De carne Christi 20. S. th. III 4, 6.

The importance, as regards salvation, of the true and complete humanity of Christ, and of His community of race with us lies, on the one hand, in the deed of atonement on the Cross, which He, as our Brother, has performed on our behalf, and on the other hand, in the ideal picture of noble humanity which He afforded us in His moral life. (See the Doctrine of the Redemption.)

CHAPTER 3

The Union of His Two Natures in the one Person, Christ

§ 11. Christ is one Person

1. The heresy of Nestorianism

The false teaching of Nestorius (428 Patriarch of Constantinople; † about 451 in exile) to which the two Heads of the Antioch School of Exegetics, Diodorus of Tarsus († before 394) and his pupil Theodore of Mopsuestia († 428) had subscribed, may, from its refutation (St. Cyril of Alexandria, St. John Cassian), be summarised under the following principal heads:

a) The Son of the Virgin Mary is not the same person as the Son of God (ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλος). In Christ there are, corresponding to the two natures, also two subjects or persons.

b) The two persons are connected with each other by a mere accidental or moral unity (ἕνωσις σχετική, συνάφεια). The man Christ is not God, but a bearer of God (θεοφόρος). The Incarnation does not mean that God the Son became man, but merely that the Divine Logos resided in the man in the same manner as God dwells in the just.

c) The human activities (birth, suffering, death) may be asserted of the Man-Christ only; the Divine activities (creation, omnipotence, eternity) of the God-Logos only (i.e. denial of the communicatio idiomatum).

d) Consequently Mary cannot in the proper sense be designated by the title, customary since the time of Origen, of "Mother of God" (θεοτόκος). She is merely a bearer of man (ἀνθρωποτόκος) or Mother of Christ (χριστοτόκος).

e) The conviction that in Christ there are two persons appears also in the doctrine of authentication peculiar to the Antiochians, according to which the Man-Christ was obliged to merit divine dignity and adoration by his obedience in suffering.

Nestorianising tendencies appear in the Christology of early scholasticism also,

above all in the "habitus" theory, which goes back to Peter Abelard, and which was favoured by Petrus Lombardus (Sent. III 6, 4–6) which compares the assumption of human nature by the Divine Logos to the putting on of a garment. St. Thomas condemns this as heresy, since it implies a mere accidental unification. S. th. III 2, 6.

The teaching of Anton Günther († 1863) also merges into Nestorianism. From his philosophic concept that the essence of personality lies in self-consciousness, there results in the field of Christology the conclusion that in Christ, who has a truly Divine and truly human self-consciousness, there are two different persons, a Divine and a human. In order to evade this conclusion, Günther assumed a "formal unity" between the eternal Son of God and the Son of the Virgin, which consists in the mutual penetration of the self-consciousness. However, the dogma teaches that there is only one Person.

2. The Teaching of the Church

The Divine and the human natures are united hypostatically in Christ, that is, joined to each other in one Person. (*De fide.*)

The dogma asserts that there is in Christ a person, who is the Divine Person of the Logos, and two natures, which belong to the One Divine Person. The human nature is assumed into the unity and dominion of the Divine Person, so that the Divine Person operates in the human nature and through the human nature, as its organ.

The 3rd General Council of Ephesus (431) confirmed the Twelve Anathematisms of St. Cyril of Alexandria, but did not formally define them. D 113-124. They were later recognised by Popes and Councils as an authentic expression of Catholic doctrine. (Cf. D 226 et seq., 269). Their main content may be summarised as follows:

a) Christ Incarnate is a single, that is, a sole Person. He is God and man at the same time (An. 2 and 6).

b) The God-Logos is connected with the flesh by an inner, physical or substantial unification (ἕνωσις φυσική or ἕνωσις καθ' ὑπόστασιν) (An. 2 and 3). Christ is not the bearer of God, but is God really. (An. 5.)

c) The human and the divine activities predicated of Christ in Holy Writ and in the Fathers may not be divided between two persons or hypostases, the Man-Christ and the God-Logos, but must be attributed to the one Christ, the Logos become Flesh (An. 4). It is the Divine Logos, who suffered in the flesh, was crucified, died, and rose again (An. 12).

d) The Holy Virgin is the Mother of God (θεοτόκος) since she truly bore the God-Logos become Flesh (An. 1).

The Council of Chalcedon (451) declared that the two natures of Christ are joined "in one Person and one Hypostasis" (εἰς ἓν πρόσωπον καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν D 148).

St. Cyril uses the expression ἕνωσις καθ' ὑπόστασιν (An. 2) but still understands ὑπόστασις in the sense of οὐσία = essentiality, substance. With this he designates the unification as a substantial one in opposition to the accidental unification of the Nestorians. The Council of Chalcedon does not use the term "hypostatic

union" (ἕνωσις καθ' ὑπόστασιν). This phrase (the hypostatic union) was only adopted by the Fifth General Council of Constantinople (553), against the Nestorian heresy of two persons in Christ and against the monophysite heresy of one nature, as an adequate expression of Catholic doctrine of the union of the two natures in the one Divine personality of Christ. D 217: "If anyone does not confess that the Word of God was united with the flesh in the hypostasis (καθ' ὑπόστασιν) and that for this reason there is only one Person and one Hypostasis let him be anathema." ("Si quis . . . non confitetur Dei Verbum carni secundum, subsistentiam unitum esse, et propter hoc unam eius subsistentiam, seu unam personam" a.s.)

3. Proof from the Sources of Faith

a) Teaching of Holy Scripture

The Catholic doctrine is contained in Holy Writ, though it does not contain the term Hypostatic Union. Scripture attests that Christ is true God and true man. To the one Christ are attributed two series of predicates—one Divine and one human. Since the attributes of both natures (omnipotence eternity, nascence, crucifixion, death) are attributed to Him, it follows that the two natures must belong to one and the same subject. The oneness of Christ's personality is particularly clear in those passages where His human characteristics are predicated of His Person under the title of God, and His Divine characteristics predicated of His Person designated according to His human nature (communicatio idiomatum). Cf. John 8, 57 et seq.; Rom. 9, 5; 1 Cor. 2, 8; Gal. 4, 4; Acts 3, 15; 20, 28.

Since God's immutability excludes the possibility of a transformation of His Divine Nature into His human nature, the Incarnation of the Logos in John 1, 14 can be understood only as signifying that the Divine Logos became man, without ceasing to be God. The Logos, therefore, after the Incarnation possesses not only the Divine but also a human nature, that is, He is a God-Man.

According to Phil. 2, 6 et seq., the same Christ, who was in the figure of God and was equal to God took the form of a servant and became like unto man. This Kenosis, on account of the absolute immutability of God, cannot be understood as a renunciation of the Divine Nature, but only as a renunciation (in His human nature) of the Divine Glory (δόξα). To the Divine nature which He retained, He added the human nature; μένων, ὃ ἦν, ἔλαβεν, ὃ οὐκ ἦν. (St. John Chrysostom, In ep. ad Phil. hom. 7, 2.) The Christ who appeared in the form of a servant is therefore a Divine Person, who possesses the Divine as well as a human nature.

b) The Testimony of Tradition

The Fathers appealed to the Church symbols of Faith in which it is said of the same Jesus Christ that He is the Son of God and that He was born of the Virgin Mary. The Symbols of the Oriental Church specially stress the unity of Christ (πιστεύομεν . . . . εἰς ἕνα κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν) cf. D 13, 54, 86.

The Fathers before the Council of Ephesus attest their faith in the Hypostatic Union by predicating of Christ divine and human characteristics and activities, frequently interchanging the predicates and thus combating the attempt to divide Christ into two subjects (ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος) or into two sons (Son of

God—Son of Man). Cf. St. Ignatius of Antioch, Eph. 1, 1; 7, 2; 18, 2; Rom. 6, 3; Pol. 3, 2. St. Gregory of Nazianzus (423–430) points out that the relationship of nature and person in Christ is to be conceived conversely from that which obtains in the Trinity: "To put it briefly, the Saviour unites in Himself two different things (ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο) but not two different persons far from it (οὐκ ἄλλος δὲ καὶ ἄλλος, μγένοιτο). . . . I say different things, the opposite to the Case of the Trinity; for in that case we have distinct persons, since we may not mix the hypostases, but not distinct things, for the Three are one and the same in the Godhead" (Ep. 101, 4).

The Latin Fathers, principally under the influence of Tertullian, came earlier than the Greek to a clear Trinitarian and Christological terminology. Cf. Tertullian, Adv. Prax. 26: Videmus duplicem statum (=naturam), non confusum, sed conjunctum in una persona, Deum et hominem Jesum (we behold a double state (nature), not mixed with one another but joined in the one person, Jesus God and man). St. Augustine, Ep. 137, 39: in unitate personae copulans, utramque naturam (in unity of person joining both natures). Enchir. 35: in unitatem personae accessit Verbo anima rationalis et caro (in the unity of His person there accrued to the Word a rational soul and a body).

In their speculative refutation of the Nestorian heresy the Fathers point out the fatal consequences of the fundamental Nestorian errors, especially in the doctrine of the Redemption and in the doctrine of the Eucharist: Thus Christ's Passion, as the work of a mere man, would be deprived of its infinite value, and this infinite value is a necessary presupposition of the Redemption (cf. D 124) and again the flesh of Christ in the Eucharist is not "life-giving," if it be not "the very flesh of the God-Logos" (D 123).

In the conflict with the Nestorians St. Cyril of Alexandria makes frequent use of the easily misunderstood formula: "An incarnate nature of the God-Logos" (μία φύσις τοῦ θεοῦ λόγουσεσαρκωμένη). In this context he understood by nature, just as did his opponents, the nature existing in itself=hypostasis. St. Cyril erroneously thought that the formula had the authority of St. Athanasius. In reality it goes back to the confession of Faith made by Apollinaris of Laodicea to the Emperor Jovian "On the incarnation of the God-Logos," which was publicised under the name of St. Athanasius. The Fourth General Council of Constantinople adopted the formula (D 220). Cf. D 258.

§ 12. The Duality of the Natures

1. The heresy of Monophysitism

In the struggle against Nestorianism, Eutyches, Archmandrite of Constantinople, and his adherents, principally Alexandrians (Patriarch Dioscur) went to the other extreme, misinterpreting some phrases of St. Cyril (ἕνωσις φυσική, μία φύσις τοῦ θεοῦ λογου σεσαρκωμένη) and also some older phrases (κρᾶσις μῖξις mixtio, mixtura) they posited in Christ not only One Person but also only one single nature (μόνη φύσις). They taught that Christ is indeed "out of" two natures, but not "in" two natures. In their explanation of the mode and manner of the unification of the Godhead and the humanity, they diverged. Some assumed a transformation of the human nature into the Divine Nature, or an absorption of the human nature in the Divine Nature (ἕνωσις κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν, conversio), others a confusion or mixture of the two natures into one new third nature (ἕνωσις κατὰ σύγχυσιν, confusio), others a composition of the two natures after the fashion of the unification of the body and soul in man (ἕνωσις κατὰ σύνθεσιν compositio). This last was the view of Severus of Antioch.

2. The Teaching of the Church

In the Hypostatic Union each of the two natures of Christ continues unimpaired, untransformed and unmixed with the other. (*De fide.*)

The Catholic doctrine of Faith found its classical expression in the famous Epistola Dogmatica of Pope Leo I to the Patriarch Flavian of Constantinople (449) which was solemnly confirmed (D 143 et seq.) by the Fourth General Council of Chalcedon (451).

This Council, in agreement with the Epistola Dogmatica of Leo I, and the formulations of St. Cyril defined : " We teach that one and the same Christ, the Son, the Lord, the Only-Begotten is to be recognised in two natures δύο (ἐν φύσεσιν) unmixed, untransformed (ἀσυγχύτως ἀτρέπτω—against Monophysitism), undivided, unseparated (ἀδιαιρέτως ἀχωρίστως—against Nestorianism) the difference of the natures in consequence of the unification being in no way abrogated, and the properties (proprietos) of each of the two natures remaining completely undisturbed (" unum eundemque Christum Filium Dominum unigenitum, in duabus naturis inconfuse, immutabiliter, indivise, inseparabiliter agnoscendum, nusquam sublata differentia naturarum propter unitionem magisque salva proprietate utriusque naturae.") (D 148). The last words are taken over from the Epistola Dogmatica of Pope Leo (D 143 : Salva proprietate utriusque naturae).

3. Proof from the Sources of Faith

According to the testimony of Holy Writ, Christ is true God and true Man that is, possessor of the unimpaired Divine Nature and an unimpaired human nature. Cf. John 1, 14 ; Phil. 2, 6 et seq.

Specially deserving of mention among the traditional witnesses is Tertullian who long before the Council of Chalcedon attested the unimpaired continuance of the two natures in classical words. Adv. Prax. 27 : " The identity of each of the two substances remained intact (salva est utriusque proprietas substantiae), so that the spirit (=the Divine Spirit) performed His works in Him, that is miracles and signs, as also the flesh underwent sufferings. As both substances, each in its own condition of being, acted in distinct ways (quia substantiae ambae in statu suo quaeque distincte agebant), each performed the feats and achieved the successes peculiar to it " (namely, on the one hand, miracles, on the other hand, sufferings). Pope Leo I, had recourse to the formulations of Tertullian. Cf. St. Ambrose. De fide, II 9, 77.

The Fathers also point out the intrinsic impossibility of the monophysite doctrine of unification. It contradicts the absolute Immutability and the infinite Perfection of God, and by abrogating the true humanity of Christ, leads to the destruction of the work of redemption.

§ 13. The Duality of Wills and Modes of Operation in Christ

1. The Heresy of Monothelitism

Monothelitism is an offshoot of Monophysitism. In order to win back the Monophysites, the Patriarch Sergius of Constantinople (610–638) suggested the unifying formula In Christ there are indeed two natures, but only one will, namely the Divine Will, and one mode of activity (ἓν θέλημα καὶ μία ἐνέργεια).

In this view the human nature of Christ becomes an instrument without a will of its own in the hand of the Divine Logos. The most prominent opponents of this error and protagonists in defence of the true doctrine of the Church were St. Sophronius, from 634 Patriarch of Jerusalem, and St. Maximus Confessor († 662).

2. The Teaching of the Church

Each of the two natures in Christ possesses its own natural will and its own natural mode of operation. (*De fide.*)

In spite of the real duality of the wills a moral unity subsisted and subsists, because Christ's human will is, in the most perfect fashion, in harmony with, and in free subordination to, the Divine Will.

Monothelitism was rejected by the Church at the Lateran Synod of the year 649 under Pope Martin I (D 263 et seq.), in the Epistola Dogmatica ad Imperatores of Pope Agatho (678–681) (D 288), and at the Sixth General Council of Constantinople (680–681). The last-named completed the Chalcedon decision of Faith by the addition : " Similarly we promulgate, according to the teaching of the Holy Fathers, that in Him are also two natural wills and two natural modes of working, unseparated, untransformed, undivided, unmixed ; and these two natural wills are not opposed to each other, as the impious heretics maintained (D 291).

From the dogma that Christ possesses a true human will there emerges as a theological conclusion, that Christ's human will is free. The libertas contrarietatis, that is, a freedom to choose between good and evil must however, be denied, because He, as a Divine Person, cannot be the subject of sin.

3. Proof from the Sources of Faith

a) According to the testimony of Holy Writ Christ expressly distinguishes His human will from the Divine will, which He possesses in common with the Father ; but at the same time Christ stresses the complete subordination of His human will to His Divine will. Mt. 26, 39 ; " Not as I will but as thou wilt." Luke 22, 42 : " Not my will but thine be done." John 6, 38 : " I came down from heaven, not to do my will but the will of Him that sent me." Christ's relationship of obedience with the Heavenly Father, often stressed in Holy Writ, presupposes a human will. Cf. John 4, 34 ; 5, 30 ; 8, 29 ; 14, 31 ; Phil. 2, 8 ; Rom. 5, 19 ; Hebr. 10, 9. The freedom of choice possessed by Christ's human will is expressed in John 10, 18 : " I lay down my life of myself (=freely, voluntarily), and I have the power to lay it down and I have the power to take it up again." Cf. Is. 53, 7 : " He was offered because it was His own will."

The Fathers' conception is already expressed in the rejection of Apollinarianism and of Monophysitism. In regard to Mt. 26, 39, St. Athanasius expressly teaches the natural duality of the wills of Christ. " He announces two wills here, the human, which is an affair of the flesh, and the Divine which is the affair of God. The human will, on account of the weakness of the flesh, prays for the aversion of suffering, but the Divine Will welcomes it " (De incarn. Dei Verbi et c. Arianos 21). Pope Leo the Great stresses the two different modes of operation

in his Epistola Dogmatica: "Each of the two forms (=nature) operates, in communion with the other, that which is peculiar to it" (D 144).

The scholastic theologians distinguish in Christ's human will the voluntas rationis or spiritus, that is, the spiritual will which subordinates itself to the Divine will, and the voluntas carnis or sensual will, that is, the sensual desire, which strove against suffering; accordingly they speak of Christ's two human wills. Many, with Hugo of St. Victor, add to this the voluntas pietatis, that is, the will of compassion, which feels for the suffering of others, and speak of four wills in Christ. Cf. Hugo's treatise, De quatuor voluntatibus in Christo.

The Fathers speculatively derive the doctrine of the two wills and modes of activity in Christ from the integrity of the two natures (cf. D 288), and base it on the principle that no nature is without activity (cf. St. John of Damascus, De fide orth. III 15). They recall the axiom which is valid for the doctrine of the Trinity and for Christology, that the number of the wills and modes of activity follow the number of the natures, not of the hypostases.

Appendix:

The God-human (Theandric) activities

The expression "God-human activity" (ἐνέργεια θεανδρική), operatio dei-virile, goes back to Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (about 500) (Eph. 4). The Severianians, moderate Monophysites, taught a single God-human mode of operation, corresponding to Christ's nature compounded of the Godhead and a human nature. The Monoenergetics also, spoke of a single mode of activity of Christ, which they conceived as being achieved by the Divine nature by the utilisation of a purely passive human nature possessed of no human will.

The orthodox theologians of the 7th century took over the expression and purified it. St. Maximus the Confessor and the Lateran Synod of the year 649 expressly clarified it in view of the heretical misinterpretation (D 268). According to St. Maximus (in Ep. I. Dionysii) three distinct kinds of activity can be distinguished in Christ:

a) The Divine or the purely Divine activities, which the Logos, as principium quod, in common with the Father and with the Holy Ghost, operates through the Divine nature as principium quo, for example, the Creation, Preservation and Government of the world.

b) The human activities, which the Logos operates as principium quod through the human nature as principium quo, for example, seeing, hearing, eating, drinking, suffering, dying. In so far as these activities are human acts of a Divine Person, they can, in the wider sense, be designated God-human. (Theandric)

c) The mixed activities, which the Logos, as principium quod operates through the Divine nature, in such a fashion, however, that at the same time, He uses the human nature as instrument (instrumentum coniunctum), for example, the miraculous healing of the sick by physical touch, or by a mere word. Closely considered, the mixed activities emerge as two distinct activities, one Divine and one human, through which a joint operation is effected. Activities of this kind are designated God-human activities in the proper and narrower sense. The expressions caro deificata (σὰρξ θεωθεῖσα) voluntas deificata (θέλημα θεωθέν) do not assert a transformation of the human nature into the Divine nature or of the human will into the Divine will, nor a conmixture of both, but simply the assumption of the human nature and of the human will by the hypostasis of the God-Logos. Cf. D 291.

The Question of Honorius

There is no doubt but that Pope Honorius I (625–638) was personally orthodox. However, through his prohibition against speaking of two modes of operation he unwittingly favoured the Monothelite error. The Sixth General Council wrongly condemned him as a heretic. Pope Leo II (682–683) confirmed his anathematisation but not for the reason given by the Council. He did not reproach him with heresy, but with negligence in the suppression of the error.

§ 14. The Beginning and Duration of the Hypostatic Union

1. Beginning of the Hypostatic Union

The Hypostatic Union of Christ's human nature with the Divine Logos took place at the moment of conception. (*De fide.*)

In opposition to the Catholic dogma is the Origenistic doctrine, according to which Christ's human soul pre-existed, and already before the Incarnation was united with the Divine Logos (D 204). Another erroneous view, the Gnostic, held that it was only on the occasion of His Baptism that the Logos first descended on the Man-Jesus.

The Symbols of Faith assert the passive conception of the Son of God, not of the Man-Jesus, as would be correct if the Hypostatic Union of the two natures had occurred at a later point in time. The Apostles' Creed confesses: Filium eius unicum Dominum nostrum, qui conceptus est de Spiritu Sancto (His only son, Our Lord, who was conceived of the Holy Ghost).

The Scriptures corroborate that the Son of God became man in that He was "made," that is, was conceived and born out of the race of David or out of a woman. Rom. 1, 3 (The Gospel) "concerning His Son who was made to Him of the seed of David according to the flesh": Gal. 4, 4: "But when the fullness of time had come, God sent His Son made of a woman."

St. Augustine says: "From the moment in which He began to be man, He is also God" (De Trin. XIII 17, 22). St. Cyril of Alexandria teaches: "The God-Logos from the moment of conception united with Himself the temple assumed of the Holy Virgin (the human nature)" (Ep. 39), "there never was a mere Man Jesus before the connection and unification of God with Him" (Adv. nolentes confiteri s. Virginem esse deiparam 4). Cf. St. Augustinus, Contra serm. Arian. 8; Leo I, Ep. 35, 3.

Mary's true Divine Motherhood demands that the conception of Jesus and the beginning of the Hypostatic Union should coincide in time.

2. Duration of the Hypostatic Union

a) The Hypostatic Union was never interrupted. (*Sent. certa.*)

The Apostles' Creed asserts of the Son of God that He suffered, was crucified, died, was buried (according to the body) and descended into Hell (according to the soul). Christ's death dissolved the connection between body and soul—Christ was therefore during the three days not "man" that is, a compositum

of body and soul (S. th. III 50, 4)—but His death did not dissolve the attachment of Godhead and humanity, or of their parts. Even after their separation the body and the soul separately remained hypostatically united with the Divine Logos.

The teaching of the Church is opposed by the Gnostic-Manichaean teaching, according to which the Logos left the man before the Passion.

The continuance of the Hypostatic Union during the Passion also, is proved by 1 Cor. 2, 8. "If they had known the concealed wisdom of God they would never have crucified the Lord of Glory (=God)."

The passage relied on by the Gnostics is Mt. 27, 46. "My God My God why hast thou forsaken me" is acutely explained by Hugo of St. Victor († 1141): Subtraxit protectionem sed non separavit unionem (He withdrew His protection but He did not separate the union) (De sacr. christ. fidei II 1, 10); similarly by St. Thomas (S. th. III 50, 2). Because of Mt. 27, 46, some Fathers, like St. Ambrose and St. Hilary, wrongly thought that at Christ's death the Godhead left the body.

The conception of the Fathers is expressed in the axiom: Quod verbum semel assumpsit, nunquam dimisit (what the Word once assumed, He never dismissed). In regard to the soul, this had an absolute validity, in regard to the body, only a relative one.

b) The Hypostatic Union will never cease. (*De fide.*)

The doctrine of Marcellus of Ancyra († about 374), according to which the Incarnate Logos will, at the end of time, put off the human nature and revert to God, from whom He proceeded for the purpose of creating the world, was rejected as heresy (D 85) by the Second General Council of Constantinople (381). In opposition to it an addition to the Symbol of Faith was accepted; cuius regni non erit finis (of whose kingdom there shall be no end) (Luke 1, 33) D 86; cf. D 283.

Luke 1, 33, bears witness to the uninterrupted continuance of the Hypostatic Union in the future "And He shall reign in the house of Jacob for ever and ever and of His kingdom there shall be no end." But Christ is King of the Messianic Realm as God-Man. The Letter to the Hebrews corroborates the eternal duration of Christ's priesthood "But this (Christ) for that He continueth for ever, hath an everlasting priesthood" (7, 24). But Christ is a priest as God-Man.

The Fathers reject the doctrine of Marcellus of Ancyra. St. Cyril of Jerusalem says: "If thou shouldst hear that Christ's empire has an end, then hate this heresy" (Cat. 15, 27).

Appendix:

The Precious Blood of Jesus Christ

The Blood in the Living Body of Jesus Christ is an integral constituent part of human nature, immediately, not merely mediately, united with the Person of the Divine Logos. (*Sent. certa.*)

The 5th Anathema of St. Cyril speaks of the unification of the Logos with flesh and blood; Verbum factum est caro et communicavit similiter ut nos

carni et sanguini (the Word was made flesh and like us had flesh and blood). D 117. According to the Jubilee Bull " Unigenitus Dei Filius " of Pope Clement VI (1343), the value of the blood of Christ on account of its union with the Logos (propter unionem ad Verbum) is so great that one little drop would have sufficed for the redemption of the whole human race. As blood of the Divine Logos the blood of Jesus Christ is " the Precious Blood " (1 Petr. 1, 19), " The great price " of our Redemption (1 Cor. 6, 20), and in the same manner as the Body of Christ, nourishment for the supernatural life of the soul (John 6, 53 et seq.).

In regard to the Blood shed on the Cross the sententia communis now teaches that the Blood, when and in so far as it was reassumed into the Body on the Resurrection, remained hypostatically united with the Logos even during the separation from the body. Cf. D 718.

CHAPTER 4

Theological-speculative Discussion on the Hypostatic Union

§ 15. The Supernatural and Mysterious Character of the Hypostatic Union

1. The Hypostatic Union as Grace

The assumption of a created nature into the unity of a Divine Person is absolutely supernatural. It is a *grace* in the most complete sense of the word, that is, an unmerited and unmeritable supernatural gift of God (gratia unionis). Cf. S. th. III 2, 11.

St. Ignatius of Antioch designated Christ simply as χάρισμα = the Gift of Grace (Eph. 17, 2). Cf. Did. 10, 6.

2. The Hypostatic Union as a Mystery

The Hypostatic Union is a mysterium stricte dictum, that is, a mystery of Faith, the reality of which could not be known before its revelation, and the inner possibility of which cannot positively be proved even after its revelation. It is a unique union, for which there are no analogues, of a creature with God. St. Augustine speaks of a " uniquely wonderful or wonderfully unique assumption " (susceptio singulariter mirabilis vel mirabiliter singularis: De corrept. et gratia 11, 30). Cf. D 1655, 1669. St. Paul calls the Incarnation and the work of Redemption of Christ : " A mystery hidden from eternity in God " (sacramentum absconditum a saeculis in Deo ; Eph. 3, 9) and " a great mystery of piety " (magnum pietatis sacramentum ; 1 Tim. 3, 16).

Pope Leo the Great says : " That both substances unite themselves in one Person no speech can explain if Faith does not hold fast to it " (Sermo 29, 1).

The Hypostatic Union is the central mystery of the Christian faith, to which all other mysteries are co-ordinated. Cf. S. c. G. IV 27.

§ 16. Objections against the Dogma of the Hypostatic Union

As a mysterium stricte dictum the Hypostatic Union is indeed elevated beyond human reason (supra rationem) but on account of the harmony of faith and knowledge, it is not contrary to reason (contra rationem). Accordingly, human reason can deal with the objections raised against the dogma

1. From the side of the assuming

In regard to the unique quality of the assuming Divine Person (ex parte assumentis) it is objected that the Hypostatic Union contradicts the immutability of God (Celsus: cf. Origen, C. Celsum IV 14). The rejoinder to this is that the act of becoming man, as an operation of God ad extra, has no more induced a change in the Divine Essence than did the creation of the world, as it is only the execution in time of an eternal unchangeable resolve of will. Neither did the event of the Incarnation result in a change of the Divine Essence; for, after the assumption of a body the Logos was no more perfect and no less perfect than before. No change for the worse took place, because the Logos remains what It was; and no change for the better, because It already possessed in sublime manner all perfections of the human nature from all eternity. The Word becoming man means no more an intensification of the Divine perfection than does God's Creation of the world. The change lay on the side of the human nature only, which was elevated to participation in the Personal Subsistence of the Logos. Cf. St. Thomas Sent. III. d. 6. q. 2. a 3 ad 1: in persona composita quamvis sint plura bona quam in persona simplici . . . tamen persona composita non est maius bonum quam simplex.

2. From the side of the assumed

In regard to the unique character of the assumed human nature (ex parte assumpti) it is objected that each individual complete human nature is a hypostasis or person, and that in consequence Christ's human nature is a human person.

The answer to this depends on the relationship of nature and person. In the sphere of natural things each individual complete substance or nature subsists for itself and is thus a hypostasis. The Revelation of the mystery of the Trinity and of the Incarnation however, leads us to the knowledge that some kind of distinction must exist between the individual complete nature and the hypostasis. A distinction in thought only (distinctio pure mentalis) does not suffice for the explanation of the two dogmas; a real or a virtual distinction is necessary.

a) Against the hypothesis of a real distinction (distinctio realis) it is objected that Christ would lack the reality which every other human being possesses. According to the teaching of the Church, however, Christ is a perfect man (perfectus homo; D 40). The advocates of a real distinction (Thomists, Suarez) reply that the lack of created subsistence in Christ signified no real want, because in the place of the lacking human subsistence there is an infinitely higher perfection, namely, the Divine Subsistence of the Logos. The Church's insistence on the integrity of Christ's human nature and His consubstantiality with us according to our humanity does not contradict this position since the integrity and consubstantiality refer to the human nature or essentiality as such, while a subsistence accrues to a nature as a new reality. It is claimed that Christ's human nature has indeed a natural potency of being a hypostasis in itself. In the concrete, however, on account of its assumption into the subsistence of the Logos, this potency is not reduced to act.

According to Suarez, the individual complete nature becomes a hypostasis by a mode of subsistence proceeding from the nature, but really distinct from it. This was lacking in the human nature of Christ. In its place another created substantial mode appeared, called modus unionis, which united the two natures with each other.

The Thomists posit a real difference, not merely between nature and hypostasis, but also between nature (essence) and existence, and teach that the nature becomes an hypostasis by reason of the fact that it receives existence. Christ's human nature possesses no created existence of its own, but the uncreated existence, the subsistence of the Logos. The Thomists base their argument on the teaching of St. Thomas concerning the unicity of being in Christ (S. th. III 17, 2). However, it appears questionable whether St. Thomas by the Unique Being of Christ understands the existence (esse existentiae) or, as is more probable, the being of the suppositum. Cf. De unione Verbi incarnati a. 4 : Esse enim proprie et vere dicitur de supposito subsistente ("esse" truly and properly is predicated of a subsisting suppositum) In the same Article (ad I) St. Thomas expressly speaks of a dual being of Christ Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod esse humanae naturae non est esse divinae. Nec tamen simpliciter dicendum est, quod Christus sit duo secundum esse, quia non ex aequo respicit utrumque esse suppositum aeternum.

b) The Scotists posit a virtual difference only (distinctio virtualis or distinctio rationis cum fundamento in re) between nature and hypostasis. In their opinion nature becomes an hypostasis by the fact that it remains by itself and is not taken up by a higher hypostasis. The hypostasis adds no new reality to the nature. Christ's human nature, according to them, is not a human hypostasis or person because it is taken up into the divine hypostasis of the Logos. If the human nature of Christ were ever released from the Hypostatic Union, then it would of itself, without the addition of any other reality, be a human person. In this view that which distinguishes the hypostasis from the nature and which makes an individual being an hypostasis is something purely negative. But that which gives a nature its supreme perfection must surely be something positive.

Christ's human nature is, as the Greek Fathers (Leontius of Byzantium, † 543) emphasise, in spite of its lack of its own proper human hypostasis, not without an hypostasis (ἀνυπόστατος). If it is not immediately hypostatic (ἐνυπόστατος), that is, subsis ing by itself, still it is "in-hypostatic" (ὑπόστατος) that is, assumed into the hypostasis of another.

3. From Both Sides

In connection with the relationship of the two natures united with each other (ex parte unitorum) it is objected, that the finite human nature cannot be united with the infinite Divine nature on account of their infinite distance apart. However, the objection merely proves the impossibility of the unification of the two natures in one single nature, which is also rejected by Catholic dogma. The distinction between Creator and creature remains, since both natures remain preserved in their full integrity. It is due to God's Infinity that the hypostasis of the Logos side by side with the Divine nature can also possess a human nature. The appropriateness of the Incarnation may be demonstrated by God's Infinity. As it belongs to the essence of the good to communicate itself to others according to the principle bonum est diffusivum sui, so it is appropriate to the Infinite Goodness of God, to communicate Itself in the most perfect fashion to creatures Cf. S. th. III 1, 1.

Human nature on the ground of its spiritual nature possesses a potentia oboedientialis for its elevation into the subsistence of a Divine Person. Cf. S. th. III 4, 1.

§ 17. The Relationship of the Hypostatic Union to the Trinity

1. The Act of the Hypostatic Union

The Hypostatic Union was effected by the Three Divine Persons acting in common. (*De fide.*)

The Creed of the Eleventh Synod of Toledo (675) states: "It is to be believed that the Whole Trinity effected the Incarnation of the Son of God, because the works of the Trinity are indivisible" D 284. The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) explains: Unigenitus Dei Filius Jesus Christus a tota Trinitate communiter incarnatus. D 429. As a work of God's love (John 3, 16; 1 John 4, 9) the active Incarnation, that is, the effecting of the same, is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, to the subsistent Love of God: "conceived by the Holy Ghost" (Apost. Creed).

In Holy Writ the unity of the operation of the Three Persons is indicated by the fact that the effecting of the Incarnation is attributed to the Father (Hebr. 10, 5) to the Son (Phil. 2, 7) and to the Holy Ghost (Mt. 1, 18. 20; Luke 1, 35).

St. Augustine witnesses: "Mary's conceiving and bringing forth is the work of the Trinity, through Whose creative activity all creation is made" (De Trin. II 5, 9).

The intrinsic reason is the fact that the Divine nature common to the Three Persons is the principium quo of all extra-Divine operation. (See the Doctrine of the Trinity, Par, 20.)

2. The Terminus of the Hypostatic Union

Only the Second Divine Person became Man. (*De fide.*)

Against the teaching of the Sabellians (Patripassians) the Symbols of Faith assert the passive Incarnation exclusively of the Only begotten Son of God. Holy Writ also refers to the Logos or of the Son of God only when it says that He became flesh and came into the world (John 1, 14; 3, 16 et seq. passim).

Contrary to the view of Roscelin the union of human nature with a Divine person does not imply the union of human nature with the other Persons, since the union occurs not in the nature, but in the person, and the persons are really distinct one from another. The Divine nature is only indirectly connected with human nature through the Person of the Logos. Consequently it is in regard to the person of the Logos only (ratione personae Verbi) that the Divinity can be regarded as terminus of the Hypostatic Union. The Synod of Rheims (1148) declared against Gilbert of Poitiers (who rejected the identity of God and His Divinity and therefore rejected as unorthodox the phrase: Divinitas est incarnata) "Credimus ipsam divinitatem . . . incarnatam esse, sed in Filio." D 392. Cf. S. th. III 3, 1-4.

CHAPTER 5

Inferences from the Hypostatic Union

§ 18. The Natural Sonship of God of the Man Jesus Christ

1. The Heresy of Adoptianism

Towards the end of the 8th century, Archbishop Elipandus of Toledo († 802) and Bishop Felix of Urgel († 816) taught a double sonship of Christ: They said that as God He was the natural Son of God, as man, the adopted son of God. In the baptism in the Jordan He was adopted by God through grace. This theory of a double sonship in Jesus Christ logically demands two persons, which is the error of Nestorianism. This erroneous teaching was combated by the Abbot Beatus of Libana, Bishop Etherius of Osma, and the Frankish theologians, especially Alcuin.

2. The Teaching of the Church

Not only as God but also as man Jesus Christ is the natural Son of God. (*De fide*.)

The condemnation of Nestorianism indirectly involves the condemnation of Adoptianism. Pope Hadrian I (772–795), in two doctrinal writings (D 299, 309 et seq.) rejected it as a renewal of the Nestorian error, and confirmed the decisions of the Plenary Council of Frankfurt (794) which rejected Adoptianism as a heresy on the ground that He who was born of the Virgin, was true God, and could, therefore, not be adopted. (D 311 et seq.)

We may thus summarise the dogma: The person subsisting in the human nature is the natural son of God. The expression "Christ as man" (Christus ut homo) is not to be conceived in the reduplicative sense (=Christus secundum humanitatem) as if the ground for his natural sonship of God lay in the human nature. Rather it is to be conceived in the specificative sense, that is, Christus ut hic homo or Christus ut hypostasis subsistens in humana natura (est Filius Naturalis Dei). Cf. S. th. III 16, 11.

3. Proof from the Sources of Faith

Holy Writ never calls the Man Christ the adopted Son of God, but the proper and Only-begotten Son of God. Rom. 8, 32: "He (God) has not spared even His own son, but delivered Him up for us all." John, 3, 16: "For God so loved the world, as to give His only begotten Son." Cf. John 1, 14, 18; Mt. 3, 17.

In the struggle against Nestorianism the Fathers rejected the doctrine of a double sonship in Christ, and stressed that the Son of Man is the same as the Son of God. They also expressly excluded an adoptive sonship of Christ. St. Augustine points to Holy Writ: "Read the Scriptures; you will never find it said of Christ that He is, through adoption, the Son of God (C. Secundinum Manich. 5). Many traditional texts, for example, those of St. Hilary (De Trin. II 27) and the Mozarabic liturgy, employ the expressions adoptare and adoptio in the wider sense of assumere and assumptio.

4. Argument from reason

Sonship belongs to the hypostasis or the person, not the nature: Filiatio proprie convenit hypostasi vel personae, non autem naturae (S. th. III 23, 4). As there is in Christ only one single hypostasis or person, which proceeds through eternal generation from God the Father, so also only one single sonship of God may be predicated of Christ, the natural sonship of God. The view of medieval theologians (Durandus, † 1334, many Scotists), that the man Jesus Christ is at the same time the natural Son of God and by reason of the endowment of grace the adopted son of God, is to be rejected, as one and the same person cannot be both the natural son and an adopted son of the same father.

Appendix:

Christ as " Servant of God " and " Predestined " Son of God

The Adoptianists referred the appellation "servant of God" (servus Dei) to the person and presupposed thereby a human person in Christ side by side with the Divine Person, to whom this appellation cannot be applied. Pope Hadrian I, and the Council of Frankfurt (794) reprobated it (the term Servant of God) in this sense (ratione personae). With regard to His assumed human nature, which is subject to the dominion of God (ratione humanae naturae), Christ can, however, in a true sense, be called servant of God. Cf. Is. 42, 1; Mt. 12, 17 et seq.; Phil. 2, 7. S. th. III 20, 1 ad 2.

The passage Rom. 1, 4: qui praedestinatus est Filius Dei in virtute (Who was predestined to be the Son of God in power), cannot, as the Adoptianists would suggest, be understood of the predestination of Christ to the adopted sonship of God. The Vulgate renders the original text wrongly (praedestinatus instead of destinatus = ὁρισθείς). The Apostle expresses the thought that Christ manifested Himself in power after the Resurrection in consonance with the Divine Pneuma dwelling in Him (according to another explanation: was installed as " the Son of God in might," that is, in the condition of exaltation). Having regard to the general teaching of the Vulgate, the passage must be interpreted in an orthodox way: God predetermined from all eternity that the bearer of Christ's human nature is the natural son of God. Cf. S. th. III 24, 1 ad 2.

§ 19. Christ's Right to Adoration

1. The Teaching of the Church

The God-Man Jesus Christ is to be venerated with one single mode of Worship, the absolute Worship of Latria which is due to God alone. (*De fide.*)

In St. Cyril's eight Anathemas the Council of Ephesus (431) rejected the Nestorian "co-veneration" (συμπροσκύνησις) of the Man Jesus Christ with the Word (Logos), and laid down as Catholic teaching that the Incarnate Word (by virtue of His unity of person) is to be adored with one single adoration (μιᾷ προσκυνήσει). D 120.

In opposition to the double veneration proposed by the Nestorians, and the single veneration of the Monophysites, directed to the Divine nature alone, or to an ostensible mixed nature, the Fifth General Council of Constantinople (553), declared that the Incarnate Logos with His own flesh (*μετὰ τῆς ἰδίας αὐτοῦ σαρκός*) is the object of the one adoration.

Christ's humanity is, through the hypostatic union, a constituent part (quasi pars) of the Incarnate Logos, and is adored, therefore, in and with the Logos. It is indeed in itself the object of the adoration, but not for its own sake (in se, sed non propter se), but on account of its hypostatic union with the Logos. Against the false teaching of the Synod of Pistoia (1786): Pope Pius VI declared: "humanitas ipsaque caro vivifica Christi adoratur, non quidem propter se et tanquam nuda caro, sed prout unita divinitati" (The Humanity and the vivifying flesh of Christ Itself is adored not because of itself and as mere flesh but inasmuch as it is united with the Divinity). D 1561.

2. Proof from the Sources of Faith

Christ accepted worship by genuflection (*προσκύνησις*) which after the Resurrection becomes latriatic veneration (cf. Mt. 28, 9. 17). According to John 5, 23, He claims for Himself the same veneration which is due to the Father: "That all men may honour the Son, as they honour the Father." The Apostle St. Paul witnessed to the divine adoration due to Christ in His humanity in Phil. 2, 10: "That in the name of Jesus every knee should bow," and in Hebr. 1, 6. "and let all the angels of God adore Him." Cf. Apoc 5, 12.

"The Martyrdom of Polycarp" (156) distinguishes clearly between the adoration due to Christ and the veneration due to the martyrs: "This One (Christ) we adore because He is the Son of God; but the martyrs we duly love as disciples and imitators of the Lord on account of their unsurpassable affection toward their King and Teacher" (17, 3). The Fathers reject the reproach made by the Apollinarists that we adore the flesh of Christ (*σαρκολατρεία*), the man Christ (*ἀνθρωπολατρεία*) on the ground that Divine veneration is shown to Christ's humanity, not on its own account and separately from the Word, but on account of its hypostatic union with the Word. The veneration is intended for the Incarnate Word. Cf. St. Athanasius, Ep. ad Adelphium 3 · St. John Damascene, De fide orth. III 8; IV 3; Ambrose, De Spiritu S. III 11, 79; Augustine, Ennarr. in Ps. 98, 9.

3. Speculative Foundation

The veneration is, in the proper sense, shown to the person only. In Christ there is only the one Divine Person of the Logos, thus there belongs to Him one veneration only. The human nature, however, cannot be excluded from it, as it is inseparably united with the Divine Person. Cf. S. th. III 25, 2: "The honour of the adoration belongs in the proper sense to the subsisting hypostasis. . . The adoration of Christ's flesh means nothing else than the adoration of the Word become Flesh, as the veneration of the King's garment signifies nothing else than the veneration of the clothed King."

The whole object (obiectum materiale totale) of the adoration offered to Christ is the Incarnate Word. The human nature hypostatically united to the Word is the partial object (obiectum partiale). The ground (obiectum formale) for the adoration is the infinite perfection of the Divine Person.

§ 20. Adoration of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus

Just as Latria is due to the whole Human Nature of Christ, so is it due to the individual parts of His nature. (*Sent.* certa.)

Although in and for themselves all parts of Christ's human nature are in equal manner worthy of veneration, still, since the times of the Crusades, a special veneration has developed for individual parts of His human nature, for the Five Holy Wounds and the members associated with them, the Most Precious Blood, the Holy Face, the Head of the Suffering Redeemer, and the Most Sacred Heart. Again, the mysteries of His life, His suffering, His death, His conception, birth, etc., are analogically objects of the worship of Latria. The reason why these parts of the human nature, or these facts of Christ's life are specially venerated, lies in the fact that in them the redeeming love of Christ is especially clearly revealed (obiectum manifestationis).

1. Dogmatic Basis of the Veneration

The cult of the Heart of Jesus, which was bitterly assailed by the Jansenists, and which originated in the German mysticism of the Middle Ages, has its dogmatic basis in the dogma of the Hypostatic Union. Against the slanders of the Jansenists, Pope Pius VI declared that the Heart of Jesus is not separated or dissolved from the Godhead (cum separatione vel praecisione a divinitate), but rather adored as "the heart of the Person of the Word, with which it is inseparably united" (cor personae Verbi, cui inseparabiliter unitum est). D 1563.

2. Object of the Veneration

a) The immediate object (obiectum proximum, ob. materiale partiale) of the cult of the Heart of Jesus is the corporeal Heart of Jesus as an essential constituent part of the human nature of Christ, hypostatically united with the Logos, and not merely the heart in the metaphorical sense (=love). This is clear from the controversy with the Jansenists and from the liturgical Texts.

b) The whole object (ob. materiale totale) is the Word Incarnate, the God-Man Jesus Christ.

c) The formal object is the infinite perfection of the Divine Person.

d) The reason why, of all the parts of Christ's humanity, the heart is specially venerated is that the heart is the most perfect symbol of Christ's redeeming love for mankind. Cf. the appeal in the Litany of the Heart of Jesus: "Heart of Jesus, burning furnace of love!"

According to the customary language of Holy Writ (cf. Dt. 6, 5; 10, 12; 13, 3· Prov. 2, 2: 23, 26; Mt. 22 37, John 16, 6. 22 Rom. 5, 5), and in the popular view, the heart is the seat of the affections, especially the affection of love. As love is the motive of the Redemption (cf. John 3, 16; I John 4, 9 et seq.), special love and veneration is shown to the organ of the Redeemer which is regarded as the symbol of love. The Heart of Jesus as a symbol of His redeeming love is the adequate object of the official Church veneration of the Heart of Jesus. As Christ's redeeming love is particularly manifested in His bitter suffering and death and in the Holy Eucharist, so the veneration of the Passion of Christ and the veneration of the Eucharist stand in close association with the veneration of the Heart of Jesus.

3. Purpose of the Veneration

The purpose of the veneration of the Heart of Jesus is that firstly, men may be stirred up to return love for love to Christ and to imitate the virtues of the human heart of the Incarnate God (Mt. 11, 29) and secondly, to promote a desire to atone for the insults offered to the Heart of Jesus. Cf. the Encyclical " Miserentissimus Redemptor " (1928) and " Caritate Christi compulsi " (1932) of Pope Pius XI.

Appendix: Veneration of pictures and relics of Christ. According to the teaching of St. Thomas, a relative Latria is due to pictures and relics of Christ, for example to the Holy Cross. As the ground (ob. formale) of the veneration does not lie in these things themselves, but in the Person of Christ which they represent or to which they refer, the veneration shown to them is not absolute but relative. However, it is a true Latria since it refers in the last resort to the Divine Person of Christ. S. th. III 25, 3 and 4.

§ 21. The Communication of Idioms

The ontological basis of the communication of idioms is the community and mutual communication of the Divine and human properties and activities in Christ. This derives from the unity of the Person in such fashion that the human properties are predicated of the Word and the Divine properties of the Man-Christ. The communicatio idiomatum in the logical sense (predication of idioms) obviously derives from the onotological reality.

Christ's Divine and Human characteristics and activities are to be predicated of the one Word Incarnate. (*De fide.*)

The Apostles' Creed attributes to the Son of God the human properties of conception and birth, of suffering and crucifixion, of dying and of being buried. The Council of Ephesus (431) teaches with St. Cyril of Alexandria against Nestorius, that the assertions concerning Christ contained in Holy Writ may not be divided between two Persons, the God-Logos and the human Christ, but must be referred to the one Word made flesh (D 116). As Christ's Divine Person subsists in two natures, and may be referred to either of these two natures, so human things can be asserted of the Son of God and Divine things of the Son of Man.

The old Lutheran Doctrinal Theology inclines to the monophysitic error which posits a real transference of Divine attributes such as omniscience, omnipotence, ubiquity, by reason of the Hypostatic Union, to the human nature of Christ, and teaches that " Christ, not only as God, but also *as man* knows all, can do all, and is present to all created things " (formula concordiae I 8, 11).

1. The Communication of Idioms and the Sources of Faith

Holy Writ makes an extensive use of the communication of idioms, for example, John 8, 58: " Before Abraham was, I am " (the Man-Christ). Acts 3, 15: " The Author of life ye have killed." Acts 20, 28; " to rule the Church of God which He (God) hath purchased with His own blood "; Rom. 8, 32: " He (God) hath spared not even His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all ": 1 Cor. 2, 8 " For if they had known (the wisdom of God) they would never have crucified the Lord of Glory " (God).

In consonance with the language of Holy Scripture, St. Ignatius of Antioch speaks of the blood of God (Eph. 1, 1), of the sufferings of God (Rom. 6, 3), and of the birth of God ex Maria (Eph. 18, 2). It was Origen who first expressly adverted to the exchange of predication (De princ. II 6, 3).

2. Rules Concerning the Predication of Idioms

The nature of the Hypostatic Union is such that while on the one hand things pertaining to both the Divine and the human nature can be attributed to the person of Christ, on the other hand things specifically belonging to one nature cannot be predicated of the other nature. Since concrete terms (God, Son of God, Man, Son of Man, Christ the Almighty) designate the Hypostasis and abstract terms (Godhead, humanity, omnipotence) the nature, the following rule may be laid down : communicatio idiomatum fit in concreto, non in abstracto. The communication of idioms is valid for concrete terms not for abstract ones. So, for example : The Son of Man died on the Cross ; Jesus created the world. The rule is not valid if there be reduplication, by reduplication the concrete term is limited to one nature. Thus it is false to say " Christ has suffered as God." " Christ created the world as a human being." It must also be observed that the essential parts of the human nature, body and soul are referred to the nature, whose parts they are. Thus it is false to say : " Christ's soul is omniscient," " Christ's body is ubiquitous."

Further, predication of idioms is valid in positive statements not in negative ones, as nothing may be denied to Christ which belongs to Him according to either nature. One, therefore, may not say : " The Son of God has not suffered," " Jesus is not almighty." Assertions liable to be misunderstood should be protected by clarifying additions like " as God," " as man," for example. " Christ, as man, is a creature."

§ 22. The Christological Perichoresis

The Two Natures of Christ exist in the closest union (*Sent. communis.*)

The two natures, despite the real distinction between them, do not exist side by side, as the Nestorians taught, but in a most close and intimate union. From the Hypostatic Union there derives a mutual intimate union and penetration of one nature by the other. This penetration of one nature by the other is designated by a term which goes back to St. Gregory Nazianzus (Ep. 101, 6) " Christological Perichoresis " (*περιχώρησις*, circumincessio, called by the later Schoolmen: circuminsessio). The power which unites the two natures and holds them together, proceeds exclusively from the Divine nature. The penetration, therefore, having regard to its active component, is not a mutual but a one-sided penetration. It results, however, in the mutual intimate union of the two natures. The Godhead, which itself is impenetrable, penetrates and inhabits humanity, which is thereby deified without suffering any change (D 291 *σὰρξ θεωθεῖσα, θέλημα θεωθέν*).

The older Fathers teach the doctrine of the perichoresis when they inaccurately designate the union of the two natures as a fusion (*μῖξις, σύμμιξις, κρᾶσις, σύγκρασις*). Since the Nestorian controversies, the question has been minutely discussed. It was treated in detail by St. John Damascene (De fide orth. III 3 and 7) and later by the Scholastics.

SECTION 2

The Attributes of Christ's Human Nature

CHAPTER I

The Prerogatives of Christ's Human Nature

Preliminary

Christ is a true man (consubstantialis nobis secundum humanitatem : D 148) but, by virtue of the Hypostatic Union, no mere and ordinary man. The hypostatic union of the humanity of Christ with the Divine Logos effected in a unique perfect way a supernatural endowment and enriching of Christ's human nature. The limits of this perfection arise from the finiteness of the created nature and the special needs of the redemptive vocation of Christ. In the light of this we shall consider in Christ's human nature the prerogatives of human knowledge, human will and human power.

I. The Prerogative of Christ in the Domain of Human Knowledge.

§ 23. The Immediate Vision of God

1. Actuality of the Immediate Vision of God

a) Teaching of the Church

Christ's soul possessed the immediate vision of God from the first moment of its existence. (*Sent. certa.*)

While the immediate knowledge of God, which is absolutely supernatural, is vouchsafed to other men only in the next world (in statu termini), Christ's soul possessed it in this world (in statu viae), and indeed, from the very moment of its union with the Divine Person of the Word, that is, from the Conception. Christ was therefore, as the Schoolmen say, viator simul et comprehensor, that is, at the same time a pilgrim on earth and at the destination of His earthly pilgrimage. It follows from this that He could not possess the theological virtues of faith and hope.

Some of the newer Theologians, such as H. Klee, A. Günther, J. Th. Laurent and H. Schell, denied that Christ possessed the Immediate Vision of God while on earth because they considered it to be contradictory to individual assertions of Holy Writ, and to the fact of the Passion of Christ. The Modernists (A. Loisy) denied it also and maintained that the natural sense of Scriptural texts cannot be reconciled with the teaching of theologians concerning the consciousness and infallible knowledge of Christ (D 2032).

In 1918, in answer to an inquiry, the Holy Office decided that the following statement could not be taught with certainty, that is, without danger to the Faith: non constat, fuisse in anima Christi inter homines degentis scientiam, quam habent beati seu comprehensores (D 2183).

Pope Pius XII, in the Encyclical "Mystici Corporis" (1943) declared: "Also that knowledge which is called vision, He possesses in such fullness that in breadth and clarity it far exceeds the Beatific Vision of all the saints in Heaven" . . ." in virtue of the Beatific Vision which He enjoyed from the time when He was received into the womb of the mother of God, He has forever and continuously had present to Him all the members of His mystical Body and embraced them with His saving love" (D 2289).

b) Proof from the Sources of Faith

A stringent scriptural proof is not possible as for the most part the assertions of Holy Scripture regarding the perfection of Christ's knowledge cannot be taken with certainty as referring to Christ's human or Divine knowledge. A certain measure of support is offered by those assertions in which the clear knowledge of the Father is attributed to Christ as well as the Divine truth which He proclaims to mankind. Cf. John 8, 55: "And you have not known Him (the Father) but I know Him. And if I shall say that I know Him not I shall be like unto you, a liar. But I do know Him and do keep His word." As Christ can keep the word of God only as man, so also the clear knowledge of the Father and consequently of the whole Trinity appears to be due to Him, not merely in so far as He is God, but also in so far as He is man. Cf. John 1, 17 et seq.; 3, 11.

The Fathers implicitly teach the doctrine that Christ's soul always enjoyed the Beatific Vision by reason of the fact that they teach that Christ as man had fullness of knowledge as a consequence of the Hypostatic Union. The doctrine was expressly attested to by St. Fulgentius, who, on an inquiry made by his disciple Ferrandus, replied: "It is very difficult and quite irreconcilable with the integrity of the Faith to assume that Christ's soul did not possess a full knowledge of its divinity, with which, according to the Faith, it physically possesses one person" (Ep. 14, 3, 26). However, St. Fulgentius goes too far when he ascribes a "full," that is, a comprehensive knowledge of God to Christ's soul.

The main proof derives from the Schoolmen, who unanimously accepted the thesis that Christ while here on earth possessed the Beatific Vision.

α) The Beatific Vision, according to its nature, is simply the consummation of sanctifying grace, which in turn is a participation in the Divine Nature (consortium divinae naturae; 2 Peter 1, 4): Gloria est gratia consummata (Glory is grace consummated). The attachment of the soul to God through grace and glory is an accidental union. The attachment of Christ's soul to God, is, however, a substantial union and therefore much more intimate. If, then, Christ's soul on earth was already much more intimately joined to God than the Blessed are in Heaven, it seems impossible that the immediate knowledge of God, which is vouchsafed to them should be denied to It. St. Thomas adduces the principle: "The nearer any recipient is to an inflowing cause, the more does it partake of its influence" (S. th. III 7, 1).

β) Christ, through the acts of His humanity, through His life and especially through His Passion and Death for humanity, is the source of salvation (Hebr. 2, 10), that is, of the immediate vision of God. According to the principle:

"The original cause must always be superior to the instrumental." Christ Himself must possess in outstanding fashion that which He is to communicate to others. Cf. S. th. III 9, 2.

γ) Christ is the Head of the angels and of mankind. The angels, who according to Mt. 4, 11, appeared and ministered to Him, were at the time of the earthly life of Jesus already in possession of the Beatific Vision (Mt. 18, 10). It is incompatible with the status of the Head that he should lack any prerogative that was vouchsafed to a section of the members.

δ) Christ as the Originator and Completer of faith (Hebr. 12, 2), could not Himself walk in the darkness of faith. The perfection of the self-consciousness of the man Jesus can be explained only on the understanding that He possessed immediate knowledge of the Godhead with which He was united.

2. Compatibility of the Passion with the Scientia Beata

The Immediate Vision of God effects supreme happiness in creatures endowed with reason. From this the question arises: How can the profound sorrow and sadness which Christ felt in the Garden of Olives during His Agony, and in His Desertion by God on the Cross be reconciled with the perfect happiness which flows from the Beatific Vision?

a) The fact of Christ's bodily suffering is easily reconciled with His scientia beata, as bodily sorrow is felt with the lower sensitive powers of the soul, while spiritual sorrow is felt with the higher spiritual power of the soul. By Divine ordinance the joy deriving from the Beatific Vision was in Christ limited to His spiritual soul. The overflow of the bliss into the body does not belong to the nature of the glory, but is merely an accidental consequence of it, which in this case was suspended. Cf. S. th. III, 15, 5 ad 3.

b) The main difficulty lies in the compatibility of spiritual joy and spiritual sorrow. Melchior Cano, O.P. († 1560) sought to solve the difficulty by assuming in the act of the immediate vision of God a real distinction between the confirmation of the reason (visio) and the activity of the will (gaudium, delectatio), and by teaching that the vision of God possessed by Christ's soul continued on the Cross, while the happiness naturally proceeding from the vision of God was interrupted by a miracle of the Divine Omnipotence. (De locis theol. XII 12.) Against this suspension theory it is objected that heavenly bliss necessarily proceeds from the vision of God.

According to the teaching of St. Thomas, the miraculous intervention of God consisted only in that the bliss proceeding from the immediate vision of God did not overflow from the ratio superior (= the higher spiritual knowledge and will directed to the bonum increatum) to the ratio inferior (= human knowledge and will directed to the bonum creatum) nor from the soul to the body: dum Christus erat viator, non fiebat redundantia gloriae a superiori parte in inferiorem nac ab anima in corpus (S. th. III 46, 8). Christ's soul, therefore, remained sensitive to sorrow and sadness.

3. Object and Scope of Christ's Scientia Beata

a) The primary object of the immediate vision of God is the Divine Essence (Deus sicuti est: I John 3, 2). As Christ's soul, by reason of the Hypostatic Union, is more closely connected with God than the angels and the blessed in heaven, it beholds God more perfectly than any other creature. Cf. S.th. III 10, 4. On account, however, of the finiteness of human nature the Beatific Vision of Christ as man is not comprehensive knowledge of God. S. th. III 10, 1: infinitum

non comprehenditur a finito, et ideo dicendum, quod anima Christi nullo modo comprehendit divinam essentiam.

b) The secondary object of the Beatific Vision lies in things external to God, which are beheld in God as the Origin of all things. The scope of this knowledge is proportioned to the perfection with which God is known. According to the teaching of St. Thomas, it includes at any rate all that knowledge that pertains to the individual who is blessed (quae ad ipsum spectant). When one applies this principle to Christ, it follows that even on earth Christ's soul knew all extra-Divine things in the Divine Essence, to the extent that such knowledge was necessary or useful for His vocation as Redeemer. Since Christ is the Head and the Lord of the whole Creation, and the Judge of all mankind, St. Thomas concluded that Christ's soul already on earth knew in the Divine Essence, all real things of the past, the present and the future, including, of course, the thoughts of mankind. Christ's human knowlege, however, did not extend to all possible things which God in His Omnipotence could effect, but never has effected or will effect; for such knowledge of all possible things is synonymous with the comprehensive knowledge of the Divine Power and of the Divine Essence which is identical with it. Thus, according to St. Thomas, Christ's soul possessed, not an absolute, but a relative omniscience. S. th. III 10, 2. In 1918, in reply to an inquiry, the Holy Office reprobated the opinion of some modern Theologians, which was opposed to the teaching of the Schoolmen, by declaring that the following statement could not with certainty be taught: "The opinion cannot be designated as certain which states that Christ's soul was ignorant of nothing, but from the beginning knew all in the Divine Word, the past, the present and the future, that is, all which God knows with the knowledge of vision." D 2184; cf. 2185.

4. Freedom of Christ's Human Knowledge from Ignorance and Error

Christ's human knowledge was free from positive ignorance and from error. (*Sent. certa.*) Cf. D 2184 et seq.

a) Christ's freedom from ignorance was denied by the Arians, the Nestorians, and especially by the Agnoetes, a monophysitic sect of the 6th century. The last-mentioned, appealing to Mk. 13, 32; Mt. 24, 36: "But of that day and hour no one knoweth; no, not the angels in Heaven, but the Father alone," attributed to Christ ignorance, notably in regard to the day and the hour of the General Judgment. The leading exponent of this error was the Deacon Themistios of Alexandria.

Christ calls Himself the Word become Man, the Light of the World (John 8, 12), which is come into the world, in order to bring the true knowledge to mankind (John 12, 46); He calls Himself the Truth (John 14, 6), and gives as the purpose of His coming into the world the giving of testimony to the truth (John 18, 37); He permits Himself to be called Teacher (John 13, 13). He is, as Holy Writ witnesses, full of grace and truth (John 1, 14), full of wisdom (Luke 2, 40); in Him are all treasures of wisdom and knowledge hidden (Col. 2, 3). He knows about happenings which occur far away (John 1, 48; 4, 50; 11, 14), and sees through the heart of man (John 1, 47; 2, 24 et seq.; 4. 16 et seq.; 6, 71). With this is irreconcilable the notion that Christ's human knowledge is defective or erroneous.

In the struggle against the Arians who held that the Logos did not know the day of the General Judgment in order to show that He was a creature, individual Fathers (St. Athanasius, St. Gregory of Nazianzus, St. Cyril of Alexandria) ascribed ignorance to Christ's soul. In the defence against Agnoetism, however, the Fathers generally acquitted Christ's human soul of ignorance and error, and condemned as heresy the doctrine of the Agnoetes. The Patriarch Euologius of Alexandria, the chief opponent of the Agnoetes, teaches: "Christ's humanity which was taken up in the hypostasis of the inaccessible and substantial wisdom of Christ cannot be ignorant of anything of the past or of the future" (Photius, Bibl. Cod. 230 n. 10). Pope Gregory the Great approved the teaching of Eulogius, basing it upon the Hypostatic Union, from which Christ derives a communication of the knowledge from His Divine to His human nature. Only if one accepts Nestorianism can ignorance on the part of Christ be maintained: "He who is not a Nestorian cannot possibly be an Agnoet." He expressly calls the Agnoetes heretics(Ex. X 39; D 248). Cf. The Libellus emendationis (N 10) of the Gallic Monk Leporius.

In explanation of the scriptural passage Mk. 13, 32, apart from the inadmissible mystic interpretation (the Son=the Body of Christ) the Fathers submit the following two interpretations:

a) The ignorance of the day of the General Judgment (Acts 1, 7): "It is not for you to know the times or the moments, which the Father hath put in His own power," is a so-called economic ignorance that is οἰκονομία θεοῦ founded on God's decree, or a scientia noncommunicanda, that is, Christ should not, in accordance with the will of the Father, reveal the moment of the General Judgment to mankind: "It was no part of His teaching duty to make it (the day of the General Judgment) known to us" (St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps. 36, Sermo 1, 1).

b) In consequence of His innermost connection with the Logos, Christ as man knew the day of the General Judgment indeed, but He did not have this knowledge from his human nature (Pope Gregory the Great); D 248.

Modernism, with liberal Protestant Theology, teaches that Christ erred in believing that the end of the world and His coming-again (Parousia) was immediately imminent. D 2033.

In fact, however, Christ left the time of His Second Coming undetermined. The assertion in the great Parousia Discourse: "This generation shall not pass till all these things be done" (Mt. 24, 34; Mk, 13, 30; Luke 21, 32) does not refer to the end of the world itself nor to the Parousia, but to the portents of the Parousia among which is reckoned the destruction of Jerusalem. Christ presupposes that the Gospel will be preached to the whole world before the onset of the end of the world (Mt. 24, 14; Mk. 13, 10; cf. Mt. 28, 19 et seq.; Mk. 16, 15), that the elect from all the ends of the earth will be assembled for judgment (Mt. 24, 31; Mk. 13, 27), that after the destruction of Jerusalem the world will continue on its course (Mt. 24, 21; Mk. 13, 19) and that the "times of the nations" will follow (Luke 21, 24). In other passages Christ even expressly guarantees that the Disciples will not experience the day of the Parousia(Luke 17, 22; Mt. 12, 41). (Compare Eschatology, Par. 6, 3.)

The intrinsic reason for the impossibility of error in Christ lies in the Hypostatic Union. In consequence of the finiteness of human nature, the human actions of Christ are indeed subject to the general human imperfections. It is, however, irreconcilable with the dignity of the Divine Person in act, to ascribe to Him special imperfections such as error or moral deficiency.

§ 24. Christ's Infused Knowledge

From the beginning of Christ's life, His soul possessed infused knowledge (scientia infusa). (*Sent. communis.*)

Scientia infusa is knowledge by means of spiritual concepts which are immediately and habitually communicated to a Spirit by God. It is distinguished from scientia beata in that through it things are known in their proper nature through infused concepts (per species proprias), and from acquired knowledge in that its concepts are not acquired by a process of abstraction from objects known in the first instance by sense perception, but are communicated by God in a finished way to the Spirit.

No definite scriptural proof can be adduced of the existence in Christ of scientia infusa. Speculatively, it may be demonstrated not as necessary but as very appropriate. The dignity of the human nature assumed by the Word demands that It should lack no perfection, of which human nature is capable. Scientia infusa is such a perfection. Again Christ's position as head of angels and men makes it appear appropriate that He should possess the mode of cognition which is natural for the angels, and which was bestowed as a preternatural gift on the progenitors of the race. Cf. S. th. III 9, 3.

According to the teaching of St. Thomas, Christ's scientia infusa extends, on the one hand to all which can be the natural object of human cognition and, on the other hand, to all which is communicated through supernatural Revelation from God to man. It does not include, however, the Divine Essence itself, which is the object of scientia beata. Cf. S. th. III 11, 1.

§ 25. Christ's Acquired Knowledge and the Progress of His Human Knowledge

1. Christ's Acquired Knowledge

Christ's soul possessed also an acquired knowledge or experimental knowledge (scientia acquisita, sc. experimentalis). (*Sent. communis.*)

Acquired knowledge is the natural human knowledge which proceeds from sense perception, and which is achieved through the abstracting activity of the intellect.

That Christ possessed this kind of knowledge follows as a necessary consequence from the reality and the completeness of His human nature since the specific human capacity to know and the natural human activity of cognition which comes from it belong to complete human nature. The denial of experimental knowledge in Christ leads finally to Docetism. Cf. S. th. III 9, 4 (otherwise in the Commentary on the Sentences).

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2. The Progress in Christ's Human Knowledge

According to Luke 2, 52, there was a progress in the human knowledge of Christ. In His scientia beata and in His scientia infusa, according to St. Thomas, a real progress of knowledge (profectus secundum essentiam) was not possible, as both modes of cognition, from the very beginning, encompassed all real things of the past, the present and the future. In regard to these two modes of cognition, a progress can be spoken of only in the sense of a successive manifestation corresponding to His different age-stages of the knowledge which He had from the beginning (profectus secundum effectum).

In His scientia acquisita a real progress was possible in so far as the habit of knowledge acquired in the natural way could be increased step by step by the abstracting activity of His intellect. As the knowledge which Christ acquired through His experimental knowledge was already contained in His scientia beata and in His scientia infusa, it was new, not in its content, but only in the mode by which Christ attained it. Cf. S. th. III 12, 2.

II. Christ's Holiness

§ 26. Christ's Sinlessness and Impeccability

1. Sinlessness (impeccantia)

Christ was free from all sin, from original sin as well as from all personal sin. (*De fide.*)

a) Christ's freedom from original sin is expressed in the Decretum pro Jacobitis of the Council of Florence (1441) ; sine peccato conceptus. D 711. According to Luke 1, 35, Christ entered into His earthly existence in a state of holiness : " The Holy which shall be born of thee." As original sin is propagated by natural generation, and since Christ entered life in a supernatural manner through conception by the Holy Ghost (Mt. 1, 18 et seq. ; Luke 1, 26 et seq.) it follows that He was not subject to the general law of original sin.

The Fathers and the theologians infer Christ's freedom from original sin from the Hypostatic Union, which being a most intimate connection with God, excludes the condition of separation from God implied by original sin. They also point to the supernatural manner of His entry into the world. Cf. Tertullian, De carne Christi 16 ; St. Augustine, Enchir. 13, 41 : " Christ was generated or conceived without any concupiscence of the flesh, and thus remained free from every stain of original sin."

From the freedom from original sin there flows the freedom from concupiscence. As Christ was not subject to original sin, there was no need for Him to take on Himself this consequence of original sin, nor was it demanded by His redemptive task. Christ's sensual nature was, therefore, completely subordinate to the direction of reason. The Fifth General Council of Constantinople (553) rejected the teaching of Theodor of Mopsuestia, that Christ

"was burdened with the passions of the soul and with the desires of the flesh" (D 224).

St. Augustine declared: "Let everyone that believes that the flesh of Christ revolted against His spirit, be excluded" (Opus imperfectum c. Iul, IV 47).

b) Christ's freedom from all personal sin (and at the same time from original sin) is expressed in the 10th Anathema of St. Cyril: "for He did not need oblation who was entirely free from sin" (D 122), and in the decision of faith of the Council of Chalcedon: "similar to us in all things, except sin" (D 148).

Jesus was conscious of His freedom from all personal sin. Cf. John 8, 46: "Which of you shall convince me of sin?" John 8, 29: "For I do always the things that please Him (the Father)." John 14, 30: "For the prince of this world (Satan) cometh, and in me he hath not anything." The Apostles also attest Jesus' complete impeccancy. Cf. John 3, 5: "And in Him there is no sin." 1 Peter 2, 22: "*Who did no sin, neither was guile found in His mouth.*" 2 Cor. 5, 21: "Him who knew no sin He hath made sin (that is, a bearer of sin) for us." Hebr. 4, 15: "Tempted in all things like as we are, without sin." Hebr. 7, 26: "It was fitting that we should have such a high priest, holy, innocent, undefiled, separated from sinners, and made higher than the heavens."

In Christ's perfect impeccancy the Fathers see a pre-condition of His universal atonement. Origen remarks: "He was capable of taking all the sins of the world on Himself, of redeeming, of eradicating, of removing them because He did no sin, and no deceit was found in His mouth, and because He knew not sin" (Comment. in Ioan. 28, 18, 160).

2. Impeccability (impeccabilitas)

Christ has not merely not actually sinned, but also could not sin. (*Sent. fidei proxima.*)

The Fifth General Council of Constantinople (553) condemned the teaching of Theodor of Mopsuestia, which asserted that Christ only became completely impeccable after the Resurrection. D 224. It follows from this that He was already impeccable.

The intrinsic reason of Christ's impeccability lies, as the Fathers stress, in the Hypostatic Union. Since the Word is the principium quod of His human activity, it follows that His human actions are actions of a Divine Person. Obviously it is incompatible with God's absolute sanctity that a Divine Person should be the responsible subject of a sinful deed. Further, the Hypostatic Union effected an intrinsic penetration and control of Christ's human will by the Divine Will. (Cf. D 291: *θέλημα θεωθέν*.)

From the Hypostatic Union there arises a physical impossibility of sinning and from the Beatific Vision a moral impossibility that is, it involves such a close connection with God in knowledge and love that a turning away from God is actually excluded.

§ 27. Christ's Sanctity and Fullness of Grace

1. Christ's Substantial Sanctity Derives from the Gratia Unionis

By reason of the Hypostatic Union, Christ's human nature, through the Uncreated Holiness of the Word, is substantially Holy. (*Sent. communis.*) Cf. Luke 1, 35.

The Fathers derive the doctrine of the substantial sanctification of Christ's humanity from the anointing and the sanctifying of Christ's human nature by the Godhead which was signified by the name of Christ. St. Gregory Nazianzus says: "He is called Christ on account of the Godhead; for this is the anointing of humanity; it sanctifies not through an alienation of power, as in the case of other anointed, but through the presence of the totality of Him who anoints." (Orat. 30, 21). St. Augustine says: "Then (when the Word became flesh) He sanctified Himself in Himself, that is, Himself the man in Himself the Word, because the Word and the man is one Christ, who there and thus sanctifies the man in the Word" (In Ioan. tr. 108, 5).

The Hypostatic Union sanctifies the human nature of Christ directly and therefore formally (i.e., not merely causally and radically, by promoting and effecting sanctifying grace, as the Scotists teach). Independently then of His created sanctifying grace, Christ's humanity is holy through uncreated Divine holiness. As the Divine attributes cannot belong to a created nature, so the substantial holiness of Christ is not to be conceived as a form inhering in Christ's humanity. It derives exclusively from the personal union of Christ's humanity with the Logos.

2. Christ's accidental holiness by reason of sanctifying grace

By reason of His endowment with the fullness of created habitual grace, Christ's soul is also accidentally holy. (*Sent. certa.*)

Pope Pius XII, in the Encyclical "Mystici Corporis" (1943) declares: "In Him (Christ) dwells the Holy Ghost with such a fullness of grace that greater cannot be conceived."

Sacred Scripture bears witness to the sanctification of Christ's humanity through created grace. Jn. 1, 14: "Full of grace and truth"; Acts 10, 38, "How God anointed Him with the Holy Ghost"; Is. 11, 2: "And the Spirit of the Lord shall rest on Him"; Is. 61, 1 (=Luke 4, 18): "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because the Lord hath anointed me."

St. Augustine, referring to many of the quoted passages, teaches: "The Lord Jesus has not alone as God given the Holy Ghost, but as man has also received Him; therefore He was called 'full of grace' (John 1, 14) and 'full of the Holy Ghost' (Luke 4, 1). Again, the Acts of the Apostles still more distinctly witness of Him: 'God anointed Him with the Holy Ghost' (10, 38) not with visible oil, but with the gift of grace, which is symbolised in the visible unction with which the Church anoints the baptised" (De Trin. XV 26, 46).

St. Thomas (S. th. III 7, 1) speculatively establishes the sanctification of Christ's

humanity through Sanctifying Grace : a) Upon the Hypostatic Union, which, being the closest possible union with God, the Prime Source of all grace, demands as a consequence the perfection of Sanctifying Grace in Christ's soul, according to the principle : "The nearer an effect is to its cause, the more does it partake of its influence." b) Upon the incomparable nobility of Christ's soul, its activities (knowledge and love) reaching out to most perfect union with God. For this however, the elevation of His human nature into the supernatural order through grace was necessary. c) Upon the relationship of Christ to men, on whom His fullness of grace is to pour.

3. The Grace of the Head (gratia capitis)

Sanctifying Grace overflows from Christ, the Head, to the Members of His Mystical Body. (*Sent. communis.*)

Pope Pius XII declared in the Encyclical "Mystici Corporis" (1943): "From Him there flows out into the body of the Church all light through which the faithful receive supernatural enlightenment, and every grace, through which they become holy, as He Himself is holy. . . . Christ is the founder and the originator of holiness. . . . Grace and glory well up from His inexhaustible fullness."

Christ's fullness of Grace, which derives from the Hypostatic Union, is the reason why the Grace of Christ, the Head, overflows to the members of His Mystical Body. Christ's gratia singularis or personalis is therefore also gratia capitis.

Concerning the Word Incarnate, who is full of Grace and Truth, St. John says : "And of His fullness we have all received : and grace for grace" (John 1, 16). St. Paul teaches that Christ as man is the head of the Church, which is His Mystical Body. Eph. 1, 22 et seq. : "and He hath subjected all things under His feet and hath made Him Head over all the Church, which is His body." Cf. Eph. 4, 15 et seq. ; Col. 1, 18 ; Rom. 12, 4 et seq. ; Cor. 12, 12 et seq. Just as a person's life is regarded as being sited principally in his head, so the supernatural life-power of grace flows from Christ, the Head, to the members of His Mystical Body. Cf. S. th. III 8, 1.

In regard to the mode and manner of the bestowal of grace by the Head to the members of the Mystical Body, it must be observed that Christ as God, bestows grace *auctoritative*, that is, of His own power ; as man, on the other hand, instrumentaliter only, that is, as instrument of the Godhead. By reason of His Divine Dignity He merited grace (causa meritoria) through His human activities, especially through His Passion and death. As causa instrumentalis (instrumentum coniunctum) He confers grace, which proceeds from God as Causa Principalis, upon individual souls through the ordinary channels and by means of the Sacraments (instrumenta separata). Cf. S. th. III 8, 1 ad 1.

The activity of Christ, the Head, in bestowing grace, extends to all the members of the Mystical Body; to the actual members who are associated with Him through sanctifying grace, or at least through faith, and also to the potential members, who are connected with Him neither by sanctifying grace nor faith, but who have the potentiality of becoming actual members of His Mystical Body. The damned alone are excluded from His beneficent influence. Cf. S. th. III 8, 3.

III. The Perfection of Christ's Human Power

§ 28. Christ's Power

Christ's Humanity, as instrument of the Logos, possesses the power of producing supernatural effects. (*Sent. certa.*)

Side by side with its own proper power (virtus propria), which it has either from nature or from grace, Christ's Humanity, as instrument of the Word, possesses instrumental power (virtus instrumentalis) of producing all supernatural works in the physical order (miracles) and in the moral order (forgiveness of sins, sanctification) which serve the purpose of Redemption (habuit instrumentalem virtutem ad omnes immutationes miraculosas faciendas ordinabiles ad incarnationis finem, qui est instaurare omnia). In all these operations Christ's Godhead is the causa principalis (principal cause), His humanity is the causa instrumentalis, seu ministerialis (instrumental cause) but in a unique fashion as it is an instrument which is continuously hypostatically united with the Word (instrumentum coniunctum Verbo). Cf. S. th. III 13, 2.

The Sacred Scriptures manifest the power of Christ's humanity in His many miracles, for example, in His healing of a sick person, and the pouring-out of His power on the sick. Luke 6, 19 : " And the multitude sought to touch Him ; for a virtue went out of Him and healed all." Cf. Luke 8, 46 : " Somebody hath touched me, for I know that virtue is gone out of me." Christ attributed to Himself, as the Son of Man, that is, as Man, the power of the forgiveness of sins. Mt. 9, 6 : " The Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive sins." He attributes to His flesh and blood in the Eucharist the supernatural communication of life. " He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood hath everlasting life." (John 6, 55). In His prayer as High Priest He confesses that the Father has given Him power over " all flesh," that is, over all mankind ; " As thou hast given Him (the Son) power over all flesh, that He may give eternal life to all whom thou hast given Him " (John 17, 2).

The Fathers regarded Christ's humanity as an instrument of the Godhead (ὄργανον τῆς θεότητος ; Cf. St. Athanasius, Adv. Arianos or. 3, 31) and for this reason ascribed to the flesh of Christ the power of giving life (σάρξ ζωοποιός). St. Cyril of Alexandria says of the Eucharistic flesh of Christ : " As the flesh of the Redeemer, through His union with substantial life, that is, with the Word stemming from God, is become life-giving, we, when we enjoy it, have life in us " (In Ioan. 6, 55) cf. D 123. The efficacy of Christ's humanity, according to the teaching of St. Thomas (cf. S. th. III 8, 1 ad 1) and of his school, is not merely a moral, but also a physical efficacy. The moral efficacy consists in this that the Divine Will produces a definite supernatural effect in virtue of its eternal foreknowledge of Christ's human activity. The physical efficacy consists in this, that Christ's humanity, as instrument of the Divine Word, produces by Itself a definite supernatural effect through the power received from God. The Scotists teach a moral efficacy only. Tradition is more in favour of the Thomistic teaching.

CHAPTER 2

The Defects or the Passibility of Christ's Human Nature

§ 29. Christ's Capacity for Suffering

1. The Corporeal Defects of Christ (defectus corporis)

Christ's human nature was passible. (*De fide.*)

The monophysite sect of the Aphthartodocetae founded by Bishop Halicarnassus at the beginning of the 6th century, taught that Christ's body was incorruptible ("ἄφθαρτος") from the beginning of the Incarnation, that is, that He was not subject to dissolution and decay. This view necessarily leads to the denial of the reality of the Passion and death of Christ.

As against this view, the Church, in its symbols of faith, teaches that Christ (really) suffered and died. The Fourth Lateran council, and the Union Council of Florence expressly stress, not merely the fact of the Passion, but also the passibility of Christ. D 429: secundum humanitatem factus est passibilis et mortalis (in [His] humanity He was made capable of suffering and mortal) D 708: passibilis ex conditione assumptae humanitatis (passible [i.e., capable of suffering] by reason of the humanity [He] assumed).

The Messianic prophecies of the Old Testament foretell the grievous suffering of the coming Redeemer. Is. 53, 4: "Surely He hath borne our infirmities and carried our sorrows." Cf. Ps. 21 and 68. According to the testimony of the Evangelists, Christ was subject to the general defects of the body, such as hunger (Mt. 4, 2), thirst (John 19, 28), weariness (John 4, 6), sleep (Mt. 8, 24), suffering and death. Christ's Passion was intended to be a model to the faithful (cf. 1 Petr. 2, 21).

The Fathers' general conviction of Christ's passibility finds expression in the unanimous rejection of Docetism. The chief opponents of Aphthartodocetism were the Monophysite Patriarch Severus of Antioch, and on the Catholic side Leontius of Byzantium († about 543). Individual Fathers, like St. Hilary of Poitiers († 367), and Hesychius of Jerusalem († after 451) believed that impassibility was Christ's normal condition, and that He produced the capacity for suffering only through a special effort of will or through a miracle. The view of St. Hilary was a subject of keen discussion in the theology of early Scholasticism. Some of the Schoolmen, e.g., Abelard's pupil, Hermann, rejected it as an error; others, e.g., Petrus Lombardus, interpreted it in a favourable fashion; others, e.g., Philip of Harvengst, adopted it; others, e.g., Stephen Langton, maintained that St. Hilary had himself recanted his error.

In Christ, by virtue of His freedom from original sin, bodily defects were not as in other men, consequences of original sin, but He voluntarily adopted them, in order a) to make vicarious atonement for the sins of mankind, b) to demonstrate the reality of His human nature, and c) to afford mankind a model of patience in the bearing of suffering. Cf. S. th. III 14, 1. These defects were, however, natural to Christ, because they belong to human nature as such. Cf. S. th. III 14, 2.

Christ's work of redemption required only that He assume the general human defects of human nature as such (defectus or passiones universales sive irreprehensibiles, e.g., hunger, thirst, weariness, feeling of pain, mortality, which do not contradict His intellectual and moral perfections). He did not assume particular defects, e.g., illness of His body or soul. Cf. S. th. III 14, 4.

2. The Emotions of Christ's Soul (passiones animae)

By the passiones animae are understood the emotions of the sensual appetite: proprissime dicuntur passiones animae affectiones appetitus sensitivi (S. th. III 15, 4).

Christ's soul was subject to sensual emotions. (*Sent. certa.*)

According to the testimony of Holy Writ, Christ possessed a truly human soul with the corresponding emotions, for example, sadness (Mt. 26, 37: "He began to grow sorrowful and to be sad"), fear (Mk. 14, 33: "He began to fear and to be heavy"), anger (Mk. 3, 5: "He looked round about on them with anger"), love (Mk. 10, 21: "He (Jesus) loved Him"; John 11, 36; 19, 26), Joy (John 11, 15: "And I am glad for your sakes"). He wept with emotion at the sight of the City of Jerusalem doomed to destruction because of its unbelief (Luke 19, 41), and at the grave of His friend Lazarus (John 11, 35) and rejoiced in the Holy Ghost at the thought of the efficacy of the grace of God (Luke 10, 21). Cf. Hebr. 2, 17; 4, 15; 5, 2.

The sensual emotions appertain to the nature of mankind, and are therefore also natural to Christ. In consequence of His freedom from concupiscence, however, in Christ they could not be directed towards an unlawful object, could not arise in Him without His consent or against His Will, and could not achieve dominion over His Reason. Theologians therefore following St. Jerome (In Mt. 26, 37) call them propassiones (=initiatory excitations and not passions properly so-called). On account of their being free from moral disorder the Greek Fathers call them *πάθη ἀνυπαίτια* or *ἀναμάρτητα*. Cf. St. John Damascene, De fide orth. III 20; S. th. III 15, 4.

PART 2

The Work of the Redeemer

CHAPTER I

The Redemption in General

§ 1. The Purpose of the Incarnation

The Son of God became man in order to redeem men. (*De fide.*)

The Nicene Creed confesses: Qui propter nos homines et propter nostram salutem descendit de coelis et incarnatus est. D 86. (Who for us men and for our salvation descended from heaven and was made flesh.)

Holy Writ testifies that Christ came into the world to save all men, to redeem them from their sins. The Prophet Isaias prophesied in the Old Covenant: "God Himself will come and save you" (35, 4). The name Jesus indicates His redemptive task. Cf. Mt. 1, 21: "Thou shalt call His name Jesus for He shall save His people from their sins." The Angel proclaimed the birth of Christ to the shepherds of Bethlehem with the words: "For this day is born to you a Saviour, who is Christ the Lord, in the City of David." Luke 2, 11. The Prophet Simeon praised God for the grace of being permitted to see the salvation of all peoples. "Because my eyes have seen thy salvation, which thou hast prepared before the face of peoples" (Luke 2, 30 et seq.). Jesus Himself designated it as His task "to seek and to save that which was lost" (Luke 19, 10; cf. Mt. 9, 13). The Apostle St. Paul summarises Christ's life work in the words: "Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners (1 Tim. 1, 15). Similarly John 3, 17: "God sent not His son into the world to judge the world; but that the world may be saved by Him."

Holy Scripture suggests another purpose of the Incarnation, that is the Glory of God, which is the supreme and ultimate purpose of all God's works. Cf. Luke 2, 14: "Glory be to God in the highest!" In His prayer as High Priest Jesus says: "I have glorified thee on earth; I have finished the work which thou gavest me to do" (John 17, 4).

§ 2. Controversy as to the Conditioned or Unconditioned Predestination of the Incarnation

There is a controversy between the Thomists and the Scotists as to whether the prime motive of the Incarnation of the Son of God was the redemption of mankind, so that without the Fall of the first parents the Incarnation would

not have taken place (conditioned predestination of the Incarnation) or whether it was the glory of God. In the Scotist view the Son of God, in order to crown the work of the Creation, would have become man even without the Fall, but in an impassible body (unconditioned or absolute predestination of the Incarnation). The conditioned predestination of the Incarnation is taught by the Thomists, the unconditioned by the Scotists (and even before Scotus by Isaac of Ninive [7th cent.], Rupert of Deutz, St. Albert the Great) and by many modern theologians.

1. Conditioned Predestination

The testimony of Holy Writ favours the Thomistic view (cf. S. th. III 1, 3). In numerous passages (see Par. 1) it names the Redemption of mankind from sin as the motive of the Incarnation, while it never mentions that the Incarnation would have occurred even without the Fall.

The Fathers are unanimous in teaching that the Incarnation of the Son of God was solely to redeem mankind. St. Augustine says: " If mankind had not fallen, the Son of Man would not have come. . . . Why did He come into the world? To save sinners (1 Tim. 1, 15). There was no other reason for His coming into the world " (Sermo 174, 2, 2, 7, 8).

2. Unconditioned Predestination

The Scotists seek a biblical basis for their view in the teaching of St. Paul that the whole Creation is co-ordinated to Christ as its destination and head. Cf. Col. 1, 15–19. However, it must be observed that in the Verses 15–17, in which Christ is represented as the " First-born of every creature," as the Creator of the universe, including the angel-world, as the goal of Creation (" In Him were all things created in heaven and on earth") and as conservator of the world, the fact of the Incarnation is entirely prescinded from, so that He appears as the goal of the Creation not as man but as God. Since it is as God that He is the Creator, so it is also as God that He is the goal of the Creation. The position of Head which is attributed to Him in V. 18 in regard to the Church, has its foundation in the fact of the Redemption. That in God's plan, Christ, independent of sin and redemption, should take the position of Head is not thereby asserted. In Hebr. 2, 10, the relative words: " for whom are all things and by whom are all things," is to be understood as referring not to Christ, but to God the Father. Those assertions of Holy Writ which make the Redemption of mankind the purpose of the Incarnation, are regarded by the Scotists as referring solely to the factual order of Salvation initiated by sin, in which the Son of God came into the world with a passible body. However, it is remarkable that Holy Writ should be silent concerning the possibility of His coming in an impassible condition.

The speculative foundation of the Scotist thesis is that the end cannot be of less importance than the means to the end. Therefore the Incarnation, as the most sublime of all God's works, could not have been effected primarily for the purpose of saving creatures. The Thomists reply that the Redemption is indeed the proximate purpose of the Incarnation but its ultmate purpose is, of course, God's glory.

Again the Scotists find it inappropriate that sin, which God hates, should be the occasion for the most glorious Revelation of God. The Thomists see therein all the greater proof of God's love and mercy: cf. O felix culpa, quae talem ac tantum meruit habere Redemptorem! (Exultet of the Vigil of Easter).

According to the Scotist view, all grace, not only the grace of fallen mankind, but also the grace of man in Paradise, and the grace of the angels, derives from the merits of the God-Man. Thus Christ assumes a central all-transcending position in the Divine world-plan.

The Thomist view is less ambitious than that of the Scotists, but appears to be better supported in the sources of the Faith.

§ 3. Concept and Possibility of the Redemption

1. Concept of the Redemption

We may regard the Redemption objectively or subjectively. Objectively the Redemption is the work of the Redeemer, subjectively the Redemption is the realisation of the Redemption in individual men, or the application of the fruits of the Redemption to individual men (Justification). Christ's work of Redemption effected the salvation of humanity from the burden of sin. But sin, by its very nature, is a turning away from God (aversio a Deo) and a turning towards the creature (conversio ad creaturam). Accordingly, the work of the Redemption must consist in the turning away from the creature, and the turning towards God (cf. Col. 1, 13).

Redemption signifies the freeing of men from the tyranny of sin and its attendant evils (servitude to the devil and death). As such it is called, απολύτωσις, redemptio(= ransoming in the narrower sense). Cf. Rom. 3, 24 ; 1 Cor. 1, 30 ; Eph. 1, 7 ; Col. 1, 14 ; Hebr. 9, 15. It also signifies the restoration of man's supernatural union with God, which was destroyed by sin. As such it is called ταταλλαγή= atonement. Cf. Rom. 5, 10 et seq. ; 2 Cor. 5, 18 et seq. ; Col. 1, 20. The Redemption objectively considered, was fulfilled through the teaching and directing activity of Christ. In a supreme degree, however, it was effected by the vicarious atonement and the merits of Christ in His sacrificial death on the Cross. Through the Atonement, the insult offered to God by sin was counterbalanced, and the injury to the honour of God repaired. Through the merits of Christ the supernatural riches of salvation were acquired which are to be dispensed in the subjective Redemption.

2. Possibility of Redemption

The possibility of the Redemption through Christ's atonement and through His merits derives from His Divine-human constitution, in virtue of which He is the mediator between God and mankind. 1 Tim. 2, 5 : "There is one God ; and but one mediator between God and men, the man Jesus Christ, 6, who gave Himself a Redemption for all." Hebr. 9, 15 : "He is the mediator of the New Testament." Cf. D 143, 711, 790.

In the ontological and ethical order, that is, in the order of being and activity, the God-Man Jesus Christ is the natural and, as such, the sole mediator between God and man. The supernatural mediation deriving from grace in all other than Christ (Moses, according to Dt. 5, 5, the Prophets and the Apostles, the priests of the Old and New Covenants, the angels and the saints) is imperfect and subordinated to the one natural mediation of Christ. Christ exercised and exercises the activity of mediation through the actions of His human nature (homo Christus Jesus). In consequence of the real distinction between the two natures, it was possible that He could perform mediatory acts as man and receive them as God. This solves the objection that Christ could not act as mediator between Himself and mankind. Cf. S. th. III 26, 1-2.

§ 4. Necessity for and Freedom of the Redemption

1. Necessity from the Side of Man

Fallen man cannot redeem himself. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent teaches: "cum omnes homines in praevaricatione Adae innocentiam perdidissent facti immundi et . . . natura filii irae . . . usque adeo servi erant peccati et sub potestati diaboli et mortis ut non modo gentes per vim naturae sed ne Judaei quidem per ipsam etiam literam Legis Moysi inde liberari aut surgere possent" (since all men had lost their innocence in Adam's sin, being made unclean and by nature children of wrath, they were servants of sin and under the power of the devil and death to such an extent that neither the Gentiles by the power of nature nor the Jews through the letter of the Mosaic Law could liberate themselves or rise from it) D. 793.

This Dogma is contradicted by Pelagianism, which attributed the power of self-redemption to free will; and by Modern Rationalism with its various theories of self-redemption.

In his Epistle to the Romans, the Apostle St. Paul teaches that all men, Jews and heathens, stand under the curse of sin, and that they are justified by a free gift of the Divine love in virtue of the Redemption. Rom. 3, 23, et seq.: "For all have sinned and need the glory of God (=grace of Redemption), being justified freely by His grace through the Redemption that is in Christ Jesus."

The Patristic teaching is expressed in the words of St. Augustine: "They can sell themselves but cannot redeem themselves" (Vendere se potuerunt, sed redimere non potuerunt: Enarr. In Ps. 95, 5.

The intrinsic reason for the absolute necessity of Redemption for fallen man lies, on the one hand, in the infinity of man's guilt, and on the other hand, in the absolute supernaturalness of the state of grace. As a deed of a creature (offensa Dei activa) sin is indeed finite, but as insult to the Infinite God (offensa Dei passiva) it is infinite, and accordingly demands an atonement of infinite value. But a mere man cannot supply such an atonement. Cf. S. th. III 1, 2 ad 2.

2. Freedom from the Side of God

a) God was not compelled to redeem mankind by either an internal or an external compulsion. (*Sent. certa.*)

The Redemption is an entirely free deed of Divine Love and Divine Mercy (libertas contradictionis). Since even the elevation of man into the supernatural state is a free gift of Divine Love, then all the more free is the restoration of the supernatural unity with God which was destroyed by grievous sin. The Apostle St. Paul begins the Epistle to the Ephesians with a eulogy on the grace of God which so magnificently manifests itself in the Redemption through Jesus Christ. He designates the Redemption as a "Mystery of the Divine will, which He has made known to us according to His good pleasure" (Eph. 1, 9), cf. Eph. 2, 4 et seq.

The view of St. Athanasius (Or. de incarn Verbi 6) that God's honour demanded the Redemption, is to be understood as a high appropriateness, since elsewhere he decisively stresses the gratuitous nature of the Redemption. St. Anselm of Canterbury (Cur Deus homo II, 4) teaches that God was constrained to

redeem us by reason of the immutability of His Decree of blessedness for man. He held that when God, in spite of His fore-knowledge of sin, resolved from all eternity to create man and to bless him, there followed from this free Divine resolve a necessity to redeem mankind (necessitas consequens).

b) Even on the presupposition of the Divine Resolve of Redemption, the Incarnation was not absolutely necessary. (*Sent. communis.*)

St. Thomas, like St. Augustine (De agone Christ. 11, 12), teaches against St. Anselm of Canterbury (Cur Deus homo II 6 et seq.) that God through His Omnipotence, could have redeemed mankind in many other ways (libertas specificationis). S. th. III, 2.

It would be undue limitation of the Divine Omnipotence, Wisdom and Mercy, if the Incarnation were to be represented as the sole means of Redemption. God can, without injury to His justice, bestow forgiveness and grace on the repentant sinner even without a condign (adequate) atonement, or any atonement.

c) If God demanded a full atonement the Incarnation of a Divine Person was necessary. (*Sent. communis.*)

The infinite insult to God inherent in grievous sin can be fully counterbalanced by an infinite act of atonement only. None but a Divine Person can perform such an atonement. To this extent a hypothetical (conditioned) necessity of the Incarnation can be maintained.

In a wider sense one can also speak of a necessitas congruentiae, in so far as the Incarnation of a Divine Person was the most appropriate means of Redemption, because it most gloriously reveals the perfections of God and gives the strongest motives to the striving of mankind for religious and moral perfection. S. John Damascene, De Fid. Orth. I. B. I.; S. th. III 1, 1-2.

CHAPTER 2

The Realisation of the Redemption through the Three Offices of Christ

By Christ's offices are understood the functions through which the purpose of the Redemption was realised. Christ fulfilled the work of Redemption through his threefold office: the teaching office, the pastoral office and the sacerdotal office. The three offices are indicated in John 14, 6: "I am the way (pastoral office), the truth (teaching office), and the life (sacerdotal office)."

I. The Teaching Office

§ 5. Christ's Teaching or Prophetical Office

1. The Soteriological Significance of Christ's Teaching Office

The soteriological significance of Christ's teaching office flows from this that religious ignorance is a consequence of sin, which came into the world through the seduction of the devil, the father of lies (John 8, 44). Cf. Rom. 1, 18 et seq.;

John 1, 5; 3, 19. The Redeemer who came "to destroy the works of the devil" (1 John 3, 8) and to free mankind from his slavery, had first to take away from humanity the spiritual darkness stemming from sin, and to bring the light of true knowledge. Christ bears witness to the redeeming power of truth in the words: "The truth shall make you free" (John 8, 32).

2. Christ as Teacher and Prophet according to the Testimony of the Sources of Faith

Christ is the Supreme Prophet promised in the Old Covenant and the absolute teacher of humanity. (*Sent. certa.*)

The prophecy of Moses in Dt. 18, 15: "The Lord thy God will raise up to thee a PROPHET of thy nation and of thy brethren like unto me. Him shalt thou hear," is, in the New Testament, referred to Christ. Cf. Acts 3, 22; John 1, 45; 6, 14.

Christ designates Himself as the Light of the World (John 8, 12; 12, 46), calls Himself the Truth (John 14, 6), and regards the announcing of the truth as one of His essential tasks (John 18, 37; 8, 40), approves of the salutation, "Master and Lord" (John 13, 13) and claims to be the "sole teacher" of men: "Neither be ye called masters: for One is your Master, Christ" (Mt. 23, 10). In the consciousness of His unique teaching authority, Christ transfers His right to teach all men to others (Mt. 28, 19; Mk. 16, 15 et seq.). His hearers speak of the powerful impression made by His teaching: "Never did man speak like this man." (John 7, 46; cf. Mk. 1, 22).

St. Paul sees in Christ the ultimate and the supreme bearer of God's Revelation (Hebr. 1, 1 et seq.): "At sundry times and in divers manners God spake in times past to the Fathers and by the Prophets, last of all in these days to us by His Son."

The Fathers extol Christ as the teacher of the truth. St. Ignatius of Antioch († about 107) calls Him "the candid mouth through which the Father has spoken the truth" (Rom. 8, 2), "our only teacher" (Magn. 9, 1). The early Christian apologists in particular stress the sublimity of the Christian teaching above all human wisdom, as it was revealed and guaranteed by the Incarnate Word, the Divine Wisdom which appeared in human form. Cf. St. Justin, Apol. 11, 10.

The ultimate basis of the unique authority of Christ's Teaching lies in the Hypostatic Union.

II. The Pastoral Office

§ 6. Christ's Pastoral or Kingly Office

1. The Soteriological Significance of Christ's Pastoral Office

The purpose of Christ's pastoral office was to show fallen mankind the right way to its supernatural final end. While the teaching office is directed to the understanding, by the preaching of Divine Truth, the pastoral office is concerned with

man's will, the inculcating the demands in it of the Divine Law and of a spirit of obedience to God's commands.

2. The Functions of Christ's Pastoral Office

The pastoral office includes legislative, judicial and punitive power. Accordingly Christ's pastoral office manifests itself in legislation, in judicial functions, and in the execution of His judgments.

3. Christ as the Lawgiver and Judge of Mankind

The Council of Trent declared against the teaching of Luther (according to which Christ had given not commands, but merely promises), that Christ is not only our Redeemer, but also our Lawgiver : Si quis dixerit, Jesum Christum a Deo hominibus datum fuisse ut redemptorem, cui fidant, non etiam ut legislatorem, cui oboediant, A.S. D 831.

The Creeds attest the Kingship of the Risen Christ and His second coming at the General Judgment. The Apostles' Creed confesses : sedet ad dexteram Dei Patris omnipotentis, inde venturus est iudicare vivos et mortuos. The Nicene Creed proclaims the eternal duration of the Kingdom of Christ : cuius regni non erit finis (D 86). Pope Pius XI, in 1925, established a special feast by the Encyclical, "Quas primas," in honour of the Kingship of Christ. D 2194 et seq.

The New Testament confirms the Old Testament prophecies of the Messianic Kingship (cf. Ps. 2 ; 44 ; 71 ; Is. 9, 6 et seq. ; Dn. 7, 13 et seq.). The Angel Gabriel announces : "The Lord God shall give unto Him the throne of David His Father; and He shall reign in the House of Jacob for ever. And of His Kingdom there shall be no end." (Luke 1, 32). Christ, before Pilate, confesses Himself to be a king. In reply to Pilate's question : "Art thou a King ?" He gives the affirmative answer : "Thou sayest that I am a king" (John 18, 37), but at the same time stresses the celestial character of His Kingdom : "My kingdom is not of this world" (John 18, 36 ; cf. John 6, 15 ; Mt. 22, 21). His royal power encompasses heaven and earth. "All power is given to me in heaven and on earth" (Mt. 28, 18). In the Apocalypse, St. John calls Christ : "the Prince of the Kings of the earth" (1, 5). "King of Kings, and Lord of Lords" (19, 16).

Christ has particularly confirmed His lawgiving power in the promulgation of the basic law of His kingdom (Sermon on the Mount), and in the organisation of the Kingdom of God on earth, i.e., of the Church. He authoritatively decides concerning the obligation of the Mosaic Law, gives the new law of love (John 13, 34 ; 15, 12) and demands strict observance of His commandments (John 14, 15 ; 15, 10 ; Mt. 28, 20).

To His supreme lawgiving power there corresponds His supreme judicial power. Jesus bears witness : "For neither doth the Father judge any man, but hath given all judgment to the Son." (John 5, 22). The judgment that the Son shall pass will be immediately executed : "And these (the evil ones) shall go into everlasting punishment : but the just into life everlasting" (Mt. 25, 46)

The Fathers, relying on the Old Testament prophecies and on His own claim, attribute to Christ the title of King. Cf. Martyrium Polycarpi, 9, 3; 17, 3; St. Irenaeus, Ad. haer. I 10, 1. As early as the beginning of the second century we have a Christian interpolation to Ps. 95, 10: Dominus regnavit a ligno. Cf. Barnabas Letter 8, 5: St. Justin, Apol. I 41; Dial. 73. The King ruling from the wood (of the Cross) is Christ, the King.

Pope Pius XI teaches in the Encyclical, "Quas primas," that Christ, by reason of the Hypostatic Union, possesses not merely an indirect, but also a direct power over temporal things, even though He made no use of this during His earthly life. D 2196.

III. The Priestly Office

According to the teaching of modern Rationalists, Christ's redemptive activity had a pedagogic significance only. It is limited to His teaching and His example, by which man is to be moved to his personal sanctifying activity. Accordingly Christ's efforts offer simply a support to our self-redemption.

According to the teaching of Revelation, not only did Christ bring to mankind new knowledge of God and of His demands, but He also removed the abyss between God and mankind which had been made by sin. Christ effected this reconciliation of fallen mankind with God through His priestly office.

§ 7. Reality of Christ's Priestly Office

The God-Man Jesus Christ is a High Priest. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Ephesus (431) teaches with St. Cyril of Alexandria, that the Word Himself stemming from God became our High Priest, when He became man and flesh like us "Si quis ergo Pontificem et Apostolum nostrum dicit factum non ipsum Dei Verbum, quando caro factum est . . .A.S." (D 122). Thus as man He is a priest. The Council of Trent declared: opportuit . . . sacerdotem alium secundum ordinem Melchisedech surgere, Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum. D 938.

In the Old Covenant Christ's priesthood is foretold in Ps. 109, 4: "The Lord hath sworn and he will not repent: Thou art a priest for ever according to the Order of Melchisedech." The Messianic character of these words is confirmed by Mt. 22, 42 et seq.; Hebr. 5, 6, 10; 7, 17, 21.

The Epistle to the Hebrews contains a formal treatise on Christ's priesthood (3, 1; 4, 14 et seq.; 7, 1 et seq.). The author points out that Christ personally fulfilled all demands of the priesthood. "For every high priest taken from among men is ordained for men in the things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices for sins" (5, 1); Christ had human nature in common with us men so that he might have sympathy with our

weaknesses (4, 15); He was called by God to the priesthood (5, 5 et seq.); for all those who obey Him He is the author of eternal salvation (5, 9); by offering Himself on the Cross as a sacrifice of expiation (7, 27; 9, 28).

Christ's priesthood is exalted over the Levitic priesthood of the Old Covenant. Compare the relation of Melchisedech who was a model of Christ, to Abraham (7, 1 et seq.). According to Ps. 109, 4, Christ was installed in the priestly office through an oath of God (7, 20 et seq.); He possesses a priesthood which does not pass (7, 23 et seq.); He is holy, innocent, immaculate, separated from all sinners (7, 26 et seq.); He is the Son of God consummated in eternity (7, 28); through His unique act of self-sacrifice He washed away the sins of men (7, 27).

The Fathers, from the very beginning, reiterate the thoughts of the Epistle to the Hebrews. St. Clement of Rome calls Christ: "the High Priest of our sacrificial gifts" (Cor. 36, 1). St. Ignatius of Antioch says in regard to Christ's priesthood: "Good are the priests (of the Old Covenant), but better is the High Priest to Whom the All-Highest is entrusted" (=Jesus Christ; Philad. 9, 1). St. Polycarp calls Jesus Christ, "The Eternal High Priest" (Phil. 12, 2).

Christ's priesthood begins with the Hypostatic Union. The proper task of the priest consists in being a mediator between God and men (S. th. III 22, 1). The ontological middle position which is a presupposition for the exercise of the mediating activity, belongs to Christ by reason of the Hypostatic Union.

Christ's priesthood is of eternal duration, as the sacerdotal dignity of Christ founded in the Hypostatic Union remains for ever, and also because the operation of His priesthood endures eternally in those redeemed who enjoy for ever the Beatific Vision. Again, Christ's sacrificial disposition, as far as it consists in praise and thanksgiving, endures for eternity. Cf. S. th. III 22, 5.

§ 8. The Exercise of the Sacerdotal Office or Christ's Sacrifice

1. Concept of Sacrifice

The most essential function of the sacerdotal office is sacrifice. Hebr. 8, 3: "For every high priest is appointed to offer gifts and sacrifices." The Council of Trent declares: "Sacrifice and priesthood are, through God's ordinance, so connected with each other that both existed in every order of salvation (in omni lege)" D 957.

By sacrifice is understood in the widest sense, the surrender of some good for the sake of a good aim. The religious meaning attaching to sacrifice in the wider sense is every inner act of self-surrender to God, and every outer manifestation of the inner sacrificial disposition, e.g., prayer, alms-giving, mortification. Cf. Ps. 50, 19; 140, 2; Os. 14, 3; Ecclus. 35, 4; Rom. 12, 1. In the narrower liturgical sense one takes sacrifice to mean an external religious act, in which a gift perceptible to the senses is offered by an ordained servant of God in recognition of the absolute sovereignty and majesty of God, and, since the Fall, in atonement to God. In a sacrifice we distinguish: a) A visible sacrificial gift (res oblata) which represents the thing being sacrificed, b) A sacrificing priest (minister sacrificii) who is authorised to appear before God as the representative of the community, c) The purpose of the sacrifice (finis sacrificii), which primarily consists in the recognition of the absolute majesty of God through adoration, thanksgiving,

entreaties, and secondarily in the reconciliation with God through atonement, d) An act of sacrifice (actio sacrifica, sacrificium visibile), which represents in a way apparent to the senses the inner sacrificial disposition (sacrificium invisibile) through the offering of the sacrificial gift.

2. Christ's Sacrifice on the Cross

Christ offered Himself on the Cross as a true and proper sacrifice. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Ephesus (431) teaches with St. Cyril of Alexandria: "He (Christ) offered Himself for us as a sweet odour (that is, as a pleasing sacrifice) to the God and Father" (obtulit autem semetipsum pro nobis in adorem suavitatis Deo et Patri) (D 122). The doctrinal decisions of the Council of Trent on the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass presuppose the sacrificial character of Christ's death on the Cross. D 940: qui in ara crucis semel se ipsum cruente obtulit. Cf. D 938, 951. Rationalism is opposed to this dogma. Cf. D 2038. According to Hebr. 8–10, the sacrifices of the Old Covenant were models of the death of Christ on the Cross. The Prophet Isaias foretells not only the Passion and Death of the future Messiah, but also that He would voluntarily accept it as a "guilt-sacrifice" for the sins of mankind. Cf. Is. 53, 7-12. St. John the Baptist, the last of the Prophets, following Isaias, sees in Christ the Lamb of Sacrifice, who took on Himself the sins of all mankind, in order to atone for them. John 1, 29: "Behold the Lamb of God who taketh away the sins of the world!"

St. Paul, most clearly of all, bears witness to the sacrificial character of Christ's death on the Cross. Eph. 5, 2: "Christ also hath loved us and hath delivered Himself for us, an oblation and a sacrifice (προσοορὰν καὶ θυσίαν), to God as a sweet odour (as a pleasing sacrifice)." 1 Cor. 5, 7: "For Christ our Pasch is sacrificed." Rom. 3, 25: "Whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation (ἱλαστήριον) through faith in His blood." The atoning blood is, however, according to Holy Scripture (cf. Lv. 17, 11) sacrificial blood. Hebr. 9, 1-10, 18 describes the superiority of the sacrifice offered by Christ on the Cross over the Old Testament sacrifices, 9, 28: "So also Christ was offered to exhaust the sins of many." Cf. 1 John 2, 2.

Christ Himself indirectly designated His death on the Cross as a sacrifice for the sins of men, by using the biblical sacrificial terms "giving up of life" and "shedding of blood." Mt. 20, 28 (Mk. 10, 45): "For the Son of Man also is not come to be administered unto; but to minister and to give His life a Redemption for many." In the inauguration of the Holy Eucharist He indicates the sacrificial character of His death. Luke 22, 19: "This is my body which is given for you." Mt. 26, 28: "This is my blood of the New Testament which shall be shed for many unto remission of sins."

The Fathers, from the very beginning, regarded Christ's death on the Cross as a sacrifice for the sins of mankind. The author of the Barnabas Letter, 7, 3, says: "He Himself wished to offer the vessel of life (=His Body) as a sacrifice for our sins, so that the model would be fulfilled, which was given in Isaac, which was offered on the altar of sacrifice." Cf. St. Clement of Alexandria, Paedagogus, 5, 23, 1; St. Augustine, De civ. Dei X 20; De Trin. IV 14, 19.

The sacrificial character of Christ's death on the Cross may be established, speculatively, in that all the demands of a sacrificial act were fulfilled. Christ as man was at the same time sacrificing priest and sacrificial gift. As God together with the Father and with the Holy Ghost, He was also the receiver of the sacrifice. The act of sacrifice consisted in the fact that Christ, in a disposition of the most perfect self-surrender, voluntarily gave up His life to God by permitting His enemies to kill Him, although He had the power of preventing it. Cf. John 10, 18.

§ 9. The Soteriological Importance of Christ's Sacrifice

Even though all Christ's individual activities have redemptive value for us, and as a whole compose the work of the Redemption, still His redemptive activity finds its apogee in the death of sacrifice on the Cross. On this account it is, by excellence but not exclusively, the efficient cause of our redemption.

1. Teaching of the Church

Christ by His Sacrifice on the Cross has ransomed us and reconciled us with God. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent teaches that Our Lord offered His life on the Cross for our eternal redemption : "Is igitur Deus et Dominus noster (etsi) semel se ipsum in ara crucis, morte intercedente, Deo Patri oblaturus erat, ut aeternam illis redemptionem operaretur," D 938. The same Council refers to the one mediator Jesus Christ : "who in His blood has reconciled us with God made unto us justice and sanctification and redemption" (1 Cor. 1, 30). D 790.

2. Testimony of the Sources of Faith

a) Christ regards the giving of His life as "a redemption for many" (*λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν* ; Mt. 20, 28 ; Mk. 10, 45). In agreement with this St. Paul teaches that Christ gave Himself up as ransom for mankind and that the effect of His death of sacrifice was our ransom. 1 Tim. 2, 6 : "Who gave Himself a redemption (*ἀντίλυτρον*) for all." Rom. 3, 24 : "Being justified freely by His grace, through the redemption that is in Jesus Christ (*διὰ τῆς ἀπολυτρώσεως*)." Cf. Eph. 1, 7 ; Col. 1, 14 ; 1 Cor. 6, 20 ; 1 Peter 1, 18 ; Apoc. 5, 9. The slavery from which Christ purchased mankind through His sacrificial death is the slavery of sin (Tit. 2, 14 : "Who gave Himself for us that He might redeem us from all iniquity" ; cf. Eph. 1, 7 ; Col. 1, 14 ; Hebr. 9, 12 et seq.), the slavery of the Mosaic Law (Gal. 3, 13 : "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law" ; cf. Gal. 4, 5 ; Rom. 7, 1 et seq.,) the slavery of the Devil (Col. 1, 13 : "Who hath delivered us from the power of darkness" ; cf. 2, 15 ; Hebr. 2, 14) and the slavery of death (2 Tim. 1, 10 : "He hath destroyed death" ; cf. Hebr. 2, 14, et seq.).

b) Christ indicates the atoning power of His death in the inauguration of the Eucharist : "This is my blood of the New Testament, which shall be shed for many unto the remission of sin" (Mt. 26, 28). St. Paul ascribes the reconciliation of sinners with God, that is, the restoration of the original relationship of child to parent and friendship with God, to Christ's death. Rom. 5, 10 : "When we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of His Son." Col. 1, 20 : "It hath well pleased the Father through Him

(Christ) to reconcile all things unto Himself, making peace through the blood of His Cross," cf. 2 Cor. 5, 19; Eph. 2, 13 et seq.; 1 Peter 3, 18; 1 John 1, 7; 2, 2; 4, 10.

From the beginning the Fathers insist on the scriptural ideas of ransom and atonement. St. Irenaeus, appealing to the passages in the Epistle to the Ephesians (1, 7; 2, 13 et seq.), says: "Since between Him (Christ) and us there exists a community (namely the community of the flesh and blood), the Lord reconciled mankind with God, by reconciling us through the body of His flesh and ransomed us through His blood." (Adv. haer. V 14, 3).

3. Inadequate Patristic Theories of the Redemption

From the efforts to explain the dogma of the Redemption speculatively, various theories of the Redemption developed in Patristic times.

a) St. Irenaeus of Lyons († about 202) initiated the so-called recapitulation theory or mystic theory of Redemption, which, starting from Eph. 1, 10 (ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι=recapitulare: Vulg.: instaurare) teaches that Christ as the second Adam, saved and united with God the whole human race. In this view salvation of man had already taken place in principle through the Incarnation of the Son of God. Side by side with this theory which gave to the Passion and Death of Christ a subordinate significance only, St. Irenaeus also expounds the Pauline teaching of the ransoming and reconciling through Christ's death on the Cross. Cf. Adv. haer. III 16, 9; IV 5, 4; V 1, 1 et seq.; 14, 2-5; 16, 3; 17, 1.

b) Origen († 254) changed the Pauline teaching of man's ransom from the dominion of the devil to an unbiblical ransom-theory. He held that the devil by Adam's sin, had acquired a formal dominion over mankind. In order to liberate mankind from this tyranny Christ gave his life to the devil as ransom price. But the devil was deceived, as he was not able to maintain for long his dominion of death over Christ. Others explained that the devil lost his dominion over mankind by unjustly trying to extend this right to Christ also. Despite the fact that this error was widespread, Patristic teaching held firmly to the biblical teaching of man's reconciliation with God through Christ's death on the Cross. The notion of a dominion of the devil over fallen mankind was energetically refuted by St. Anselm of Canterbury.

§ 10. Christ's Vicarious Atonement

1. The Notion of Atonement

By atonement in general is understood the satisfaction of a demand. In the narrower sense it is taken to mean the reparation of an insult: satisfactio nihil aliud est quam injuriae alteri illatae compensatio (Cat. Rom. II 5, 59). This occurs through a voluntary performance which outweighs the injustice done. If such a performance through its intrinsic value completely counterbalances the grievousness of the guilt according to the demands of justice, the atonement is adequate or of full value (satisfactio condigna, aequivalens sive ad aequalitatem iustitiae); if it is not commensurate with the grievousness of the offence and is accepted as sufficient purely out of gracious consideration, it is inadequate or not of complete value (satisfactio congruo sive ad benignitatem condonantis). If the atonement is not performed by the offender himself, but by another in his stead, it is vicarious atonement (satisfactio vicaria).

2. Reality of Christ's Vicarious Atonement

Christ, through His Suffering and Death rendered vicarious atonement to God for the sins of man. (*Sent. fidei proxima.*)

The Council of Ephesus teaches with St. Cyril of Alexandria: "If any one says that He (Christ) offered the oblation for Himself, and not rather solely for us, let him be excluded." D 122. The Council of Trent says of Jesus Christus: Qui sua sanctissima passione in ligno crucis . . . pro nobis Deo Patri satisfecit. D 799 (who by His most holy Passion on the Cross offered satisfaction for us to God the Father). The Vatican Council intended to raise the teaching of Christ's vicarious satisfaction to the status of a formal dogma (Coll. Lac. VII 566). Holy Writ contains the teaching of the vicarious atonement, not indeed explicitly but by implication. Isaias (53, 4 et seq.) foretells of the Servant of God, that is, of the Messiah, that He, the Sinless One, for our sins and in our stead, would suffer and die like an innocent lamb of sacrifice, to obtain for us peace and justification. Christ expressed the idea of the vicarious atonement in the words: "The Son of Man is come . . . to give His life a redemption for many" (Mt. 20, 28). "I lay down my life for my sheep" (John 10, 15). The notion of the vicarious atonement appears distinctly in St. Paul also 2 Cor. 5, 21: "Him who knew no sin He hath made sin for us: that we might be made the justice of God in Him (ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν = ἀντὶ ἡμῶν)"; Gal. 3, 13: "Christ hath redeemed us free from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us." According to Rom. 3, 25 et seq., God's justice is revealed in the demand for and the acceptance of Christ's vicarious atonement-sacrifice, "to the shewing of His justice." Cf. 1 Peter 2, 24; 3, 18.

From the very beginning the Fathers were familiar with the idea of Christ's vicarious atonement. The Apostles' disciple, St. Clement of Rome, comments: "For the sake of the love which He had for us Our Lord Jesus Christ, according to the will of the Father has given His blood for us, His flesh for our flesh, and His soul for our souls" (Cor. 49, 6). Cf. The Letter to Diognetus, 9, 2.

St. Anselm of Canterbury († 1199) in his dialogue: "Cur Deus Homo" has speculatively penetrated and built up to a systematic theory of Redemption the idea of the vicarious atonement of Christ which is based in Scripture and tradition. While the Fathers, in the explanation of Christ's work of sanctification, proceed more from the contemplation of the consequences of the Redemption, and therefore stress the negative side of the Redemption, namely, the ransoming from the slavery of sin and of the devil, St. Anselm proceeds from the contemplation of the guilt of sin. This, as an insult offered to God, is infinite, and therefore demands an infinite expiation. Such expiation, however, can be achieved by a Divine Person only. To be capable of thus representing mankind, this person must be, at the same time, man and God.

3. The Intrinsic Perfection of Christ's Atonement

a) Christ's Vicarious Atonement is adequate or of full value, by reason of its intrinsic merit. (*Sent. communior.*)

When Holy Scripture designates Christ's precious blood, or the giving up of His life, as a ransom-price for our sins, the basic thought is that the atonement

offered is of equal value to the guilt of the sins. Cf. 1 Peter 1, 19; 1 Cor. 6, 20; 1 Tim. 2, 6.

The intrinsic reason of the adequacy of Christ's atonement lies in the Hypostatic Union. Christ's actions possess an intrinsic infinite value, because the principium quod is the Divine Person of the Logos. Thus Christ's atonement was, through its intrinsic value, sufficient to counterbalance the infinite insult offered to God, which is inherent in sin. According to the teaching of the Scotists and the Nominalists, it was adequate only by virtue of God's external acceptance.

b) Christ's Vicarious Atonement is superabundant, that is, the positive value of the expiation is greater than the negative value of the sin. (*Sent. communis.*)

Pope Clement VI declared in the Jubilee Bull " Unigenitus Dei filius " of the year 1343, that Christ had shed His blood copiously, as it were, in streams, even though one little drop of the blood, on account of the Hypostatic union with the Logos, would have sufficed for the Redemption of the whole human race. D 550.

In the parallel between Adam and Christ (Rom. 5, 12 et seq.) St. Paul teaches that the measure of the blessing going forth from Christ far surpasses the measure of the curse going forth from Adam. V. 20: " Wherever sins increase there grace has become superabundantly copious."

St. Cyril of Jerusalem says: " The injustice of sinners was not so great as the justice of Him who died for us; we have not sinned to the extent that He transcends through righteousness, who gave up His life for us " (Cat. 13, 33). Cf. St. J. Chryst. In ep. ad Rom. 10, 2.

4. The External Perfection of Christ's Atonement

a) (i) Christ did not die for the predestined only. (*De fide.*)

(ii) Christ died not for the Faithful only, but for all mankind without exception. (*Sent. fidei proxima.*)

In the year 1653, Pope Innocent X condemned as heretical the proposition that Christ died for the salvation of the predestined exclusively. D 1096. In the year 1690, Pope Alexander VIII rejected the assertion that Christ offered Himself to God for the Faithful only (pro omnibus et solis fidelibus). D 1294. The Council of Trent laid down: " Hence it was that the Heavenly Father sent His Son to men that He might redeem the Jews who were under the Law and that the gentiles who followed not after justice might receive justice and that all might receive the adoption of sons. Him God hath proposed to be a propitiation through faith in his blood for our sins and not alone for ours but for those of the whole world." D 794. Cf. D 319, 795.

Holy Scripture clearly teaches the universality of the deed of Redemption, and with it indirectly the atonement of Christ. 1 John 2, 2: " He (Christ) is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but for the sins of the whole world." Cf. John 3, 16 et seq.; 11, 51 et seq.; 2 Cor. 5, 15: " He died for us all." 1 Tim. 2, 6: " He gave Himself a Redemption for all." Cf. Rom. 5, 18.

The Fathers living before the outbreak of the Pelagian controversy unanimously teach both the generality of God's will of sanctification and the generality of Christ's vicarious atonement. St. Clement of Rome writes: "Let us behold the blood of Christ and let us realise how precious it is to God His Father because it, shed for our salvation, has brought the grace of repentance to the whole world" (Cor. 7, 4). Cf. St. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. III 22, 4. On Good Friday, the commemorative day of Christ's death of redemption, the Church prays for the salvation of all mankind.

The universality of Christ's vicarious atonement refers to the objective Redemption only. Christ made sufficient atonement for all men without exception. The subjective appropriation of the fruits of Redemption is, however dependent on the fulfilment of certain conditions, on faith (Mk. 16, 16), and on the observation of the Commandments (Hebr. 5, 9; 2 Peter 1, 10). Accordingly the Schoolmen distinguish between sufficientia (adequacy) and efficacia (efficacy, success) of the atonement, and teach that Christ offered atonement for all mankind, secundum sufficientiam, but not secundum efficaciam. In other words: in acto primo Christ's atonement is universal; in actu secundo, it is particular. Cf. S.c.G. IV 55.

b) Christ's Atonement does not extend to the fallen angels.

The teaching of Origen, according to which the restoration of all things (apokatastasis; cf. Acts, 3, 21) by virtue of Christ's Atonement will also liberate the fallen angels out of hell, was rejected as heresy by a Synod at Constantinople (543). D 211. It contradicts the eternal nature of the pains of hell which is clearly attested in Holy Writ. Cf. Mt. 25, 46; 18, 8; 3, 12; 2 Thess. 1 9.

§ 11. Christ's Merits

1. The Notion of Merit

By merit is understood a work completed for the benefit of another on whom it establishes a claim for reward, or the claim for rewards founded on the work. According as the reward is due in justice or merely out of graciousness, the merit is a meritum de condigno or a meritum de congruo. Christ's work of Redemption is at one and the same time satisfactory and meritorious, inasmuch as, on the one hand, it removes the relationship of guilt between humanity and God, and on the other hand, establishes a claim to recompense on the part of God.

2. Meritoriousness of Christ's Passion and Death

Christ, through His Passion and Death, merited reward from God. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent teaches that the origin of the merit of Jesus Christ's justification is that He, through His most holy Passion, has merited justification for us (qui sua sanctissima passione . . . nobis justificationem meruit). D 799. The same Council lays down that original sin is removed by the merits of Jesus Christ only, and that through Baptism the merits of Christ are applied to adults and children. D 790. Holy Writ does not use the word "merit," but it explicitly teaches the doctrine of Christ's merit. Cf. Phil. 2, 9: "for which

cause (becoming obedient unto death) God hath exalted Him." Hebr. 2, 9: "We see Jesus . . . for the suffering of death crowned with glory and honour." Exaltation is the reward for His obedience in suffering.

The meritoriousness of Christ's actions may be speculatively established by reason of the fact that all the conditions of a true and proper merit were fulfilled. They were *free, morally good, supernatural, performed in the state of earthly pilgrimage* and *in the state of grace*, and had *the Divine promise of reward* (Is. 53, 10). As actions of a Divine Person they possessed an infinite meritorious value. Cf. D 552: infinita Christi merita. As the whole life-work of Christ, not merely His Passion and Death, has an atoning value, it is meritorious also.

3. Object of Christ's Merit

a) Christ merited for Himself the condition of exaltation (Resurrection, Transfiguration of the body, Ascension into Heaven). (*Sent. certa.*)

Cf. Phil. 2, 8 et seq.; Hebr. 2, 9; John 17, 4; Luke 24, 26; Apoc. 5, 12, The Latin Fathers, relying on Phil. 2, 8 et seq., speak of the merits of humility and of obedience, and designate the glorification of Christ as His reward and remuneration (retributio, praemium, merces). St. Hilary of Poitiers says: "On account of the merit of humility (ob humilitatis meritum) He recovers the form of God in the lowliness which He assumed" (In Ps. 53, 5). St. Augustine comments: "Through humiliation He merited the transfiguration. Transfiguration is the reward for humiliation" (humilitas claritatis est meritum, claritas humilitatis est praemium: In Ioan. tr. 104, 3). Cf. S. th. III 19, 3.

b) Christ merited all supernatural graces received by fallen mankind. (*Sent. certa.*)

The Decretum pro Jacobitis declares that "nobody has been freed from the power of the Devil except through the merits of the mediator Jesus Christ." D 711. According to the teaching of the Council of Trent, "no one can be just to whom the merits of Christ's Passion have not been communicated." D 800. Cf. D 790, 795, 797, 799.

It is a fundamental doctrine of St. Paul that salvation can be acquired only by the grace merited by Christ. Rom. 3, 24 et seq.; 5, 15 et seq.; 7, 24 et seq.; Eph. 2, 4 et seq. The Apostle St. Peter testified before the High Council: "Neither is there salvation in any other." Acts 4, 12.

The Fathers designate supernatural grace as *gratia Dei per Jesus Christum* or *gratia Christi*. Cf. D 103 et seq. The word meritum is applied in Patristic literature to the merit which Christ acquired for Himself only.

CHAPTER 3

The Glorious Conclusion of Christ's Work of Redemption

Christ's Exaltation

§ 12. Christ's Descent into Hell

After His Death, Christ's soul, which was separated from His body, descended into the underworld. (*De fide.*)

The underworld is the place of detention for the souls of the just of the pre-Christian era, the so-called vestibule of hell (limbus Patrum).

The later version of the Apostles' Creed (5th century) contains the article: descendit ad inferos; similarly the Creed Quicumque (D 40). The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) more explicitly declares: descendit ad inferos, . . . sed descendit in anima. D 429. Cf. D 385.

The doctrine of Christ's descent into hell does not, as rationalism maintains, draw its inspiration from heathen myths, but from the Old Testament Revelation of the intermediate condition between death and resurrection, in which the departed souls sojourn in the underworld (Scheol). In regard to His stay in the underworld during the period between death and resurrection, Jesus says: "For as Jonas was in the whale's belly three days and three nights; so shall the Son of Man be in the heart of the earth three days and three nights." (Mt. 12, 40). The expression "heart of the earth" (καρδία τῆς γῆς) does not signify the grave, but the underworld, which was visualised as being localised in the interior of the earth, as it were in its heart. This interpretation is supported by the parallel to Jon. 2, 3 ("belly of hell") (κοιλία ᾄδου) as well as by the Old Testament visualisation that the point of departure of the resurrection is the underworld, the place of detention of the departed souls. St. Peter, speaking of Christ's Resurrection, says: "God hath raised Him up having loosed the sorrows of hell (of the empire of death) as it was impossible that He should be holden by it death." Acts. 2, 24. The dissolution of the "blasts of death" (according to another way of reading: "of the winds of Hades") is a symbol of the freeing of the dead from the underworld (cf. 4 Esr. 4, 41; Col. 1, 18: "The firstborn from the dead"). Referring to the Psalm passage 15, 10: "Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell; nor wilt thou give thy holy one to see corruption," we read: "Foreseeing this He (David) spoke of the Resurrection of Christ, for neither was He left in hell: neither did His flesh see corruption" (Acts 2, 31).

St. Paul in Rom. 10, 6 et seq., bears witness to Christ's stay in the underworld: "But the justice which is of Faith speaketh thus: *Say not in thy heart: Who shall ascend into heaven?* That is to bring Christ down; *or who shall descend*

into the deep? That is to bring up Christ again from the dead." Of note also is the formula which was in frequent use: "to raise up or to awake from the dead" (ἐκ νεκρῶν), and which in its application to Christ asserts that His soul before the Resurrection was in the Empire of the Dead, that is, in the underworld.

The passage Eph. 4, 9: "'He ascended,' what is it but because He also descended into the lower parts of the earth?" is, according to the context, to be understood, not of Christ's descent into the underworld, but of His descent in the Incarnation from heaven "into the lower parts of the earth." The interpretation of the passage 1 Peter 3, 19 et seq.: "In which (=in the spirit) also coming He preached to these spirits that were in prison which had been some time (in the days of Noah) incredulous," is uncertain; however, the uncertainty refers not so much to the fact as to the purpose of Christ's descent to the underworld.

Tradition unanimously bears witness to the fact of Christ's descent into the underworld. St. Ignatius of Antioch writes that Christ had "awakened the Prophets from the dead, who were His disciples in spirit, and who awaited Him as their teacher on His arrival" (Magn. 9, 2). St. Justin and St. Irenaeus quote an apocryphal passage in Jeremias, in which they see Christ's descent into hell clearly foretold: "The Lord, the Holy God of Israel, bethought Him of His dead who slept in the earth of the grave, and He went down to them in order to announce to them the salvation" (St. Irenaeus Adv. haer. IV 33, 1, 12 and V 31, 1: "in order to release them and to save them"). Cf. St. Justin, Dial. 72; 99; St. Irenaeus Adv. haer. III 20, 4; IV 22, 1; IV 33, 1. 12; V 31, 1 (with Scriptural proof); Epid. 78. Tertullian, De anima 7; 55. St. Hippolyt, De antichristo 26; 45. St. Augustine attests the general belief of the Church when he says: "Who other than an unbeliever can deny that Christ was in the underworld?" (Ep. 164, 2, 3). Further, the apocryphal literature witnesses to the Church belief in Christ's descent into Hell. Compare the Odes of Solomon (a Christian composition of the 2nd century) Nos. 17 and 42.

The purpose of the descent into Hell was, according to the general teaching of theologians, the freeing of the just in Limbo by the application of the fruits of the Redemption, that is, by the communication of the Beatific Vision. Cf. S. th. III 52, 5. Cat. Rom. I 6, 6.

§ 13. Christ's Resurrection

1. Dogma

On the third day after His Death Christ rose gloriously from the dead. (*De fide.*)

The Resurrection of Christ is a basic truth of Christianity, which is expressed in all the symbols of Faith and in all rules of Faith of the ancient Church.

Christ, as the Eleventh Synod of Toledo (675) emphasizes, rose through His own power (virtute propria sua) (D 286). The source of His Resurrection is the Hypostatic Union. The Principal Cause of the Resurrection was the Word, together with the Father and the Holy Ghost; the Instrumental Cause was the parts of the humanity of Christ, soul and body which were hypostatically united with the Godhead. When Holy Writ (for example Acts 2, 24; Gal. 1, 1) asserts that Christ was awakened by God or by the Father,

these assertions are to be taken as referring to His humanity. Cf. Cat. Rom. I 6. 8.

All forms of rationalism in ancient and modern times (deceit hypothesis, apparent death hypothesis, vision hypothesis), deny Christ's Resurrection. Compare the condemnation of Modernism by Pope Pius X. D 2036 et seq.

2. Foundation

In the Old Testament, Christ's Resurrection is, according to the exposition of St. Peter and St. Paul (Acts 2, 24 et seq. ; 13, 35 et seq.), announced in Ps. 15, 10 : " Because thou wilt not leave my soul in hell nor wilt thou give thy holy one to see corruption." Cf. D 2272. The Resurrection of the Messias is presupposed also in Is. 53, 10 : The servant of God who has given Himself as a sacrifice for guilt " shall see a long-lived seed " and execute the plan of the Lord.

Christ definitely prophesied that He would rise from the dead on the third day after His death. Cf. Mt. 12, 40 ; 16, 21 ; 17, 22 ; 20, 19 ; 27, 63, 28, 6 ; John 2, 19. The reality of the Resurrection is proved by the fact of the empty tomb—a furtive removal of the corpse was, in the circumstances, out of the question—and of the many appearances during which Jesus spoke with His disciples, allowed Himself to be touched by them, and ate with them. Cf. Mt. 28 ; Mk. 16 ; Luke 24 ; John 20–21 ; 1 Cor. 15, 3 et seq. ; Christ's Resurrection is the centre of the Apostolic doctrinal teaching. The Apostles give forceful testimony of the Resurrection of the Lord Jesus Christ ; cf. Acts 1, 22 ; 2, 24, 32 ; 3, 15 ; 13, 30 et seq. ; 17, 3, 18 ; 26, 23.

The Body of the Risen Christ was in a state of glory as is apparent from a study of the circumstances of the appearances, and from the Risen Christ's supremacy over the bonds of space and time. The Risen Christ retained the wounds in His transfigured body as tokens of His triumph over death. John 20, 27 : " Put thy finger hither and see my hands. And bring hither thy hand and put it into my side and be not faithless but believing."

The Fathers attest the Resurrection of the Lord with great emphasis and with a complete unanimity against heathen materialism and against the Jewish unbelief.

3. Significance

For Christ Himself the Resurrection was the entry into the condition of Glory which was the reward for His self-abasement in suffering.

From the soteriological point of view the Resurrection, unlike Christ's Death, is not the meritorious cause of our Redemption, but it is the victorious completion of the work of Redemption. It belongs however to the completeness of the Redemption, and is therefore associated in the Holy Scriptures, with the death on the Cross, as one complete whole. Cf. Rom. 4, 25. It is the model of our spiritual Resurrection from sin (Rom. 6, 3 et seq.) and the model and pledge of the resurrection of our bodies (1 Cor. 15, 20 et seq. ; Phil. 3, 21).

From the apologetic point of view, the Resurrection is the greatest of all Christ's miracles, and as the fulfilment of prophecy, the strongest proof of the truth of His teaching. Cf. 1 Cor. 15, 14 et seq.

§ 14. Christ's Ascension into Heaven

1. Dogma

Christ ascended body and soul into Heaven and sits at the right hand of the Father. (*De fide.*)

All Creeds in agreement with that of the Apostles confess: ascendit ad coelos, sedet ad dexteram Dei Patris omnipotentis. The Caput Firmiter says more exactly: ascendit pariter in utroque (sc. in anima et in carne). D 429.

Christ ascended into Heaven of His own power and indeed as God in Divine Power and as man in the power of His transfigured soul which moves His transfigured body, as it will. In regard to the human nature of Christ, one can also, following the Scriptures, assert that it was taken up or elevated into Heaven (by God) (Mark 16, 19; Luke 24, 51; Acts 1, 9, 11). Cf. S. th. III 57, 3; Cat. Rom. I 7, 2.

Rationalism is opposed to this dogma, and seeks to explain the origin of the belief in the Ascension by a borrowing from the Old Testament (Gn. 5. 24; carrying off of Henoch; 4 Kings 2, 11; ascension of Elias) or from pagan mythology, but in doing so omits to see the basic differences. Similarity, if there be such, by no means signifies dependence. The definite testimony of the Apostolic era leaves no room for the formation of legends.

2. Foundation

Christ foretold His Ascension (cf. John 6, 63; 14, 2, 16, 28; 20, 17) and accomplished this on the fortieth day after His Resurrection in the presence of many witnesses. Mark 16, 19: "And the Lord Jesus, after He had spoken to them, was taken up into Heaven and sitteth on the right hand of God." f. Luke 24, 51; 1 Peter 3, 22.

The Fathers give unanimous testimony of Christ's Ascension. All the ancient rules of Faith mention it together with the Death and the Resurrection. Cf. St. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. I 10, 1; III 4, 2; Tertullian, De praescr. 13; De virg. vel. 1; Adv. Prax. 2; Origen, De princ. I praef. 4.

The biblical expression "to sit at the right hand of God," which goes back to Ps. 109, 1 and which is frequently used in the Epistles of the Apostles (Rom. 8, 34; Eph. 1, 20. Col. 3, 1; Hebr. 1, 3; 8, 1; 10, 12; 12, 2; 1 Peter 3, 22) asserts that Christ, elevated in His humanity over all the angels and saints, takes up a place of honour and participates in the honour and glory, and in the jurisdictive and judicial power of God. Cf. St. John of Damascus, De fide orth. IV 2.

3. Significance

From the christological angle the Ascension means the final elevation of Christ's human nature into the condition of Divine glory.

From the soteriological angle it is the crowning conclusion of the work of the Redemption. According to the general teaching of the Church, the souls of the just of the pre-Christian era also moved with the Saviour into the glory of Heaven. Cf. Eph. 4, 8 (after Ps. 67, 19) "He ascended on high; He led captivity captive" (Ascendens in altum captivam duxit captivitatem). In Heaven He prepares a place for His own (John 14, 2 et seq.), intercedes for them (Hebr. 7, 25);

"always living to make intercession for them" (Vulg.: for us) (Hebr. 9, 24; Romans 8, 34; 1 John 2, 1) and sends them His gifts of grace, especially the Holy Ghost (John 14, 16; 16, 7). At the end of the world He is to come again with great power and glory to judge the world (Mt. 24, 30). Christ's Ascension is the archetype and the pledge of our own ascension into Heaven. Eph. 2, 6: "Through Jesus Christ" (that is on account of our mystic unity with Christ, the Head) "He hath raised us up together and hath made us sit together in the Heavenly places."

PART 3

The Mother of the Redeemer

CHAPTER I

Mary's Motherhood of God

§ 1. Reality of Mary's Motherhood of God

1. The Nestorian Heresy.

The denial of the true humanity of Christ involves the denial of the true motherhood of Mary and the denial of the Divinity of Christ logically also leads to the denial of Mary's motherhood of God. Thus the Nestorians refused to recognise Mary's title θεοτόκος (=Mother of God), and designated her by the names ἀνθρωποτόκος (=Mother of Man) or χριστοτόκος (=Mother of Christ).

2. The Dogma.

Mary is truly the Mother of God. (*De fide.*)

In the Apostles' Creed the Church professes her belief in the Son of God, "born of the Virgin Mary." As the Mother of the Son of God, Mary is the Mother of God. The Council of Ephesus (431) with St. Cyril of Alexandria declared against Nestorius: "If any one does not confess that the Emmanuel (Christ) in truth is God and that on this account the Holy Virgin is the Mother of God (θεοτόκος)—since according to the flesh she brought forth the Word of God made flesh—let him be anathema." D 113. The subsequent General Councils repeated and confirmed this doctrine. Cf. D 148, 218, 290.

The dogma of Mary's motherhood of God contains two truths—

a) Mary is truly a mother, that is, she contributed everything to he formation of the human nature of Christ, that every other mother contributes to the formation of the fruit of her body;

b) Mary is truly the Mother of God, that is, she conceived and bore the Second Person of the Divinity, not indeed according to the Divine Nature, but according to the assumed human nature.

3. Proof from Scripture and Tradition.

Scripture implicitly affirms Mary's Divine motherhood by attesting, on the one hand, the true Divinity of Christ (see Christology), and on the other hand, Mary's true motherhood. Thus Mary is called: "Mother of Jesus" (John 2, 1); "His Mother" (Mt. 1, 18; 2, 11. 13. 20; 12, 46; 13, 55); "Mother of the Lord" (Luke 1, 43). Mary's true motherhood is clearly foretold by the Prophet Isaias: "Behold a virgin shall conceive and bear a Son and his name shall be called Emmanuel" (7, 14). In similar words the angel transmits to Mary the message: "Behold thou shalt conceive in thy womb, and shalt bring forth a Son and thou shalt call his name Jesus" (Luke 1, 31). The motherhood of God is included in the words of St. Luke 1, 35:

"The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee. And therefore also the Holy which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God," and in the words of Gal. 4, 4: "God sent His Son made of a woman." The woman who bore the Son of God is the Progenitress of God, or the Mother of God.

The Fathers also teach Mary's true motherhood of God, not explicitly, but implicitly. St. Ignatius of Antioch says: "For our God Jesus Christ was carried in Mary's womb according to God's resolve of salvation"; From the seed of David, it is true but by the Holy Ghost (Eph. 18, 2). St. Irenaeus says: "This Christ, who as Logos of the Father was with the Father . . . was born of a virgin" (Epid. 53). The title "θεοτόκος" became current after the third century. It is attested to by Origen (an ostensibly earlier testimony of St. Hippolytus of Rome is probably an interpolation), St. Alexander of Alexandria, Eusebius of Caesarea, St. Athanasius, St. Epiphanius, by the Cappadocians and others, as well as by Arius and Apollinaris of Laodicea. St. Gregory Nazianzus (about the year 382) writes: "If anyone does not recognise the Holy Mary as the Mother of God, he is separated from the Divinity" (Ep. 101, 4). The principal defender against Nestorius of the Marian title of honour is St. Cyril of Alexandria.

To the objection made by Nestorius that Mary is not the Mother of God because from her was taken the human nature only, but not the Divine Nature, it is replied that not the nature as such, but the person was conceived and born. As Mary conceived and bore the Person of the God-Logos subsisting in human nature, she is truly the Mother of God. Thus the title of Theotokos includes a confession of the Divinity.

§ 2. Mary's Fullness of Grace and Her Dignity Deriving from Her Motherhood of God

1. Mary's Objective Dignity

As the mother of God, Mary transcends in dignity all created persons, angels and men, because the dignity of a creature is the greater the nearer it is to God. And of all created things after the human nature of Christ, which is hypostatically united with the Person of the Logos, Mary is nearest to the Triune God. As a true mother she is related by blood to the Son of God according to His human nature. Through the Son she is associated intimately also with the Father and the Holy Ghost. The Church honours her on account of her position as Mother of God, and on account of her high endowment with grace deriving from her position as daughter of the Heavenly Father and Spouse of the Holy Ghost. In a certain sense (secundum quid) Mary's dignity is infinite, since she is the mother of an Infinite Divine Person. Cf. S. th. I 25, 6 ad 4.

In order to express the sublime dignity of the Mother of God, the Church, following the Fathers, applies many Old Testament literary passages in an accommodated sense for Mary: a) passages from the Psalms, which depict the glory of the magnificence of the tent of the Covenant, of the Temple and of the City of Sion (86, 3; 45, 5; 131, 13); b) passages from the Sapiential Books which refer to the Divine Wisdom and transferred to Mary "Sedes Sapientae" (Prov. 8, 22 et seq.; Ecclus 11, 23 et seq.); c) passages from the Song of Songs, in which the bride is glorified (for example, 4, 7), and transferred to Mary the "Bride of the Holy Ghost."

The Fathers call Mary, on account of her sublime dignity, Lady and Queen. St. John Damascene says: "Verily she is in the proper and true sense the Mother of God and The Lady; she rules over all Creation as she is both maid and the Mother of the Creator" (De fide orth. IV 14).

2. Mary's Plenitude of Grace

a) Mary is full of Grace.

Pope Pius XII in the Encyclical Mystici Corporis (1943) says of the Virgin Mother of God: "Her most holy soul, more than the souls of all others of God's creatures, was filled with the Divine Spirit of Jesus Christ."

Mary's plenitude of grace is declared in the greeting of the angel (Luke 1, 28): "Hail, full of grace (κεχαριτωμένη) the Lord is with thee." According to the context, Mary's special endowment with grace is an accompaniment of her vocation to be the Mother of the Messiah or the Mother of God. This vocation demands a specially rich measure of Sanctifying Grace.

The Fathers stress the connection between Mary's fullness of grace and her dignity as Mother of God. St. Augustine, having based her sinlessness on her dignity as Mother of God, says: "Whence, then, do we know with what excess of grace she was endowed, in order to conquer sin in every regard, who merited to conceive and to bear Him of whom it is certain that He had no sin?" (De natura et gratia, 36, 42).

St. Thomas sees in Mary's fullness of grace a verification of the axiom: The nearer a thing is to a principle, the more it receives from the operation of that principle. But of all creatures Mary His Mother stands nearest to Christ, who is the source of Grace, as God auctoritative, as man instrumentaliter. Consequently she duly received from Him a supreme measure of Grace. But above all Mary's vocation to be the Mother of God demands for her the richest endowment with Grace. S. th. III 27, 5.

b) Limits to Mary's fullness of grace.

The measure of grace of the Mother of God falls as much short of Christ's fullness of grace as the dignity of the Mother of God falls short of the Hypostatic Union. On the other hand the fullness of grace of the Mother of God as much transcends the fullness of grace of even the highest angels and saints as the dignity of the Mother of God surpasses the supernatural excellences of the angels and the saints. But all possible supernatural excellences cannot be summarily derived from Mary's fullness of grace. There are no grounds for ascribing to the Mother of God all the gifts of grace possessed by Adam and Eve in the state of primitive innocence or the possession of the Beatific Vision during her earthly life, or the gifts of self-consciousness and the use of reason from the first moment of her creation or a unique knowledge of the mysteries of Faith or an extraordinary knowledge of profane things or even the infused knowledge of the angels. That she did not possess the Beatific Vision is proved by Luke 1, 45: "Blessed art thou who has believed." On the other hand, it is consonant with the dignity of the Mother of God that to her are attributed a high degree of supernatural knowledge of Faith, and, after her conception of Christ, a special grace of mystical contemplation. Cf. S. th. III 27, 5 ad 3.

While Christ's fullness of grace was perfect from the beginning, the Mother of God increased in grace and holiness up to her death. Cf. S. th. III 27, 5 ad 2.

CHAPTER 2

The Privileges of the Mother of God

§ 3. Mary's Immaculate Conception

1. Dogma

Mary was conceived without stain of original sin. (*De fide.*)

On the 8th December, 1854, Pope Pius IX, in the Bull "Ineffabilis" promulgated the following doctrine as revealed by God, and therefore to be believed firmly and constantly by all the faithful : "The Most Holy Virgin Mary was, in the first moment of her conception, by a unique gift of grace and privilege of Almighty God, in view of the merits of Jesus Christ, the Redeemer of mankind, preserved free from all stain of original sin." D 1641.

Explanation of the dogma :

a) By conception is to be understood the passive conception. The first moment of the conception is that moment of time in which the soul was created by God and infused into the bodily matter prepared by her parents. b) The essence of original sin consists (formaliter) in the lack of sanctifying grace, in consequence of the fall of Adam. Mary was preserved from this defect, so that she entered existence in the state of sanctifying grace.

c) Mary's freedom from original sin was an unmerited gift of God (gratia), and an exception from the law (privilegium) which was vouchsafed to her only (singulare).

d) The efficient cause (causa efficiens) of the Immaculate Conception of Mary was Almighty God.

e) The meritorious cause (causa meritoria) was the Redemption by Jesus Christ. It follows from this that even Mary was in need of redemption, and was in fact redeemed. By reason of her natural origin, she, like all other children of Adam, was subject to the necessity of contracting original sin (debitum contrahendi peccatum originale), but by a special intervention of God, she was preserved from stain of original sin ; debuit contrahere peccatum, sed non contraxit. Thus Mary also was redeemed "by the grace of Christ" but in a more perfect manner than other human beings. While these are freed from original sin present in their souls (redemptio reparativa), Mary the Mother of the Redeemer, was preserved from the contagion of original sin (redemptio praeservativa or praeredemptio). Thus the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of Mary in no way contradicts the dogma that all children of Adam are subject to Original Sin and need redemption.

f) The final cause (causa finalis proxima) of the Immaculate Conception of Mary is her Motherhood of God : dignum Filio tuo habitaculum praeparasti (Prayer of the Feast).

2. Proof from Holy Writ and Tradition

a) The doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of Mary is not explicitly revealed in Scripture. According to many theologians it is contained implicitly (implicite) in the following passages:

α) Gn. 3, 15 (Protoevangelium): Inimicitas ponam inter te et mulierem et semen tuum et semen illius; ipsa conteret caput tuum, et tu insidiaberis calcaneo eius. The translation of these words, according to the original text, is: "I will put enmity between you and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed. He (the seed of the woman) shall crush thy head, and thou shalt crush his heel."

The *literal sense* of the passage is possibly the following: Between Satan and his followers on the one hand, and Eve and her posterity on the other hand, there is to be constant moral warfare. The posterity of Eve will achieve a complete and final victory over Satan and his followers, even if it is wounded in the struggle. The posterity of Eve includes the Messias, in whose power humanity will win a victory over Satan. Thus the passage is indirectly messianic. Cf. D 2123.

The seed of the woman was understood as referring to the Redeemer (the αὐτός of the Septuagint), and thus the Mother of the Redeemer came to be seen in the woman. Since the second century this direct messianic-marian interpretation has been expounded by individual Fathers, for example, St. Irenaeus, St. Epiphanius, Isidor of Pelusium, St. Cyprian, the author of the Epistola ad amicum aegrotum, St. Leo the Great. However, it is not found in the writings of the majority of the Fathers, among them the great teachers of the East and West. According to this interpretation, Mary stands with Christ in a perfect and victorious enmity towards Satan and his following. Many of the later scholastics and a great many modern theologians argue, in the light of this interpretation of the Protoevangelium that: Mary's victory over Satan would not have been perfect, if she had ever been under his dominion. Consequently she must have entered this world without the stain of original sin.

The Bull "Ineffabilis" approves of this messianic-marianic interpretation. It draws from it the inference that Mary, in consequence of her intimate association with Christ, "with Him and through Him had eternal enmity towards the poisonous serpent, triumphed in the most complete fashion over him, and crushed its head with her immaculate foot." The Bull does not give any authentic explanation of the passage. It must also be observed that the infallibility of the Papal doctrinal decision extends only to the dogma as such and not to the reasons given as leading up to the dogma.

β) Luke 1, 28: "Hail, full of grace!" The expression "full of grace" (κεχαριτωμένη) in the angel's salutation, represents the proper name, and must on this account express a characteristic quality of Mary. The principal reason why the pleasure of God rests in special fashion on her, is her election to the dignity of the Mother of God. Accordingly, Mary's endowment with grace proceeding from God's pleasure must also be of unique perfection. However, it is perfect only if it be perfect not only intensively but also extensively, that is, if it extends over her whole life, beginning with her entry into the world.

γ) Luke 1, 41: Elizabeth, filled with the Holy Ghost, speaks to Mary: "Blessed art thou (εὐλογημένη) among women, and blessed is the fruit

of thy womb." The blessing of God which rests upon Mary is made parallel to the blessing of God which rests upon Christ in His humanity. This parallelism suggests that Mary, just like Christ, was from the beginning of her existence, free from all sin.

b) Neither the Greek nor the Latin Fathers explicitly (explicite) teach the Immaculate Conception of Mary. Still, they teach it implicitly (implicite), in two fundamental notions :

α) *Mary's most perfect purity and holiness.* St. Ephrem says : "Thou and thy mother are the only ones who are totally beautiful in every respect ; for in thee, O Lord, there is no spot, and in thy Mother no stain" (Carm. Nisib. 27). St. Augustine says that all men must confess themselves sinners, "except the Holy Virgin Mary, whom I desire, for the sake of the honour of the Lord, to leave entirely out of the question, when the talk is of sin" (excepta sancta virgine Maria, de qua propter honorem Domini nullam prorsus, cum de peccatis agitur, haberi volo quaestionem : De natura et gratia 36, 42). According to the context, however, this must be taken as referring to freedom from personal sins

β) *The similarity and contrast between Mary and Eve.* Mary, is on the one hand, a replica of Eve in her purity and integrity before the Fall, on the other hand, the antitype of Eve, in so far as Eve is the cause of corruption, and Mary the cause of salvation. St. Ephrem teaches : "Mary and Eve, two people without guilt, two simple people, were identical. Later, however, one became the cause of our death, the other the cause of our life" (Op. syr. II 327). Cf. St. Justin, Dial. 100, St. Irenaeus Adv. haer. III 22, 4 ; Tertullian, de carne Christi, 17.

3. Historical Development of Dogmas

Since the seventh century a Feast of the Conception of St. Anne (Conceptio S. Annae), that is, of the passive conception of Mary, was celebrated in the Greek Eastern Church. The celebration and the Feast spread later to the West, first to southern Italy, then to Ireland and England, under the title, Conceptio Beatae Mariae Virginis. The object of the celebration of the feast was initially the active conception of St. Anne, which, according to the Proto-Gospel of St. James, occurred after a long period of childlessness, and was foretold by an angel, as an extraordinary manifestation of God's grace.

At the beginning of the twelfth century, the British monk Eadmer, a pupil of St. Anselm of Canterbury, and Osbert of Clare, advocated the Immaculate (passive) Conception of Mary, that is, her conception free from original sin. Eadmer wrote the first monograph on this subject. On the other hand, St. Bernard of Clairvaux, on the occasion of the institution of the Feast in Lyons (about 1140), warned the faithful that this was an unfounded innovation, and taught that Mary was sanctified after conception only, that is, when she was already in the womb (Ep. 174). Under the influence of St. Bernard, the leading theologians of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries (Petrus Lombardus, St. Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, St. Albert the Great, St. Thomas Aquinas ; cf. S. th. III 27, 2), rejected the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception. Their difficulty was that they had not yet found the way to bring Mary's freedom from original sin into consonance with the universality of original sin, and with the necessity of all men for redemption.

The correct approach to the final solution of the problem was first achieved by the Franciscan theologian, William of Ware, and this was perfected by his great

pupil John Duns Scotus († 1308). The latter taught that the animation (animatio) need not precede the sanctification in order of time (ordo temporis) but only in order of concept (ordo naturae). Through the introduction of the concept of praeredemptio (preredemption), he succeeded in reconciling Mary's freedom from original sin with her necessity for redemption. The preservation from original sin, is, according to Scotus, the most perfect kind of redemption. Thus, it was fitting that Christ should redeem His mother in this manner. The Franciscan Order allied itself with Scotus, and in contrast to the Dominican Order, decisively advocated the doctrine and the Feast of the Immaculate Conception of Mary.

In the year 1439, the Council of Basle, in its Thirty-sixth Session, which, however, had no ecumenical validity, declared in favour of the Immaculate Conception. Pope Sixtus IV (1471–1484) endowed the celebration of the Feast with indulgences, and forbade the mutual censuring of the disputing factions (D 734 et seq.). The Council of Trent, in its Decree on original sin, makes the significant declaration " that it was not its intention to involve Mary, the Blessed and Immaculate Virgin and Mother of God in this Decree " (D 792). In 1567, Pope Pius V condemned the proposition advanced by Baius, that nobody but Christ had been free from original sin, and that Mary's sorrows and her death were a punishment for actual sins or for original sin (D 1073). Popes Paul V (1616), Gregory XV (1622) and Alexander VII (1661), advocated the doctrine. Cf. D 1100. On the eighth day of December, 1854, Pope Pius IX, having consulted the entire episcopate, and speaking Ex Cathedra, declared the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception to be a Dogma of the Faith.

4. Argument from Reason

Reason bases the dogma on the Scholastic axiom, which is already found in the writings of Eadmer ; Potuit, decuit, ergo fecit (God could do it, He ought to do it, therefore He did it). This, it is true, gives no certainty, but still, it rationally establishes for the dogma a high degree of probability.

§ 4. Mary's Freedom from Evil Concupiscence and from Every Personal Sin

1. Freedom from Concupiscence

From her conception Mary was free from all motions of concupiscence. (*Sent. communis.*)

Freedom from original sin does not necessarily involve freedom from all defects which came into the world as a punishment for sin. Mary, like Christ Himself, was subject to the general human defects, in so far as these involve no moral imperfection. Concupiscence cannot be reckoned among these since it excites a person to commit acts which are materially contrary to God's Law, even where, through lack of assent, they are not formal sins. It would be incompatible with Mary's fullness of grace and her perfect purity and immaculate state to be subject to motions of inordinate desire.

Mary's merits are no more prejudiced by her freedom from concupiscence than are the merits of Christ, since concupiscence is indeed an occasion, but not an indispensable pre-condition of merit. Mary acquired rich merits,

not by any struggle against sensual desire, but by her love of God, and by other virtues (faith, humility, obedience). Cf. S. th. III 27, 3 ad 2.

Many of the older theologians, with St. Thomas, distinguish between the binding (ligatio) and the complete removal or extinction (sublatio, extinctio) of the fomes peccati, that is, of concupiscence. In the sanctification of Mary in the mother's womb, concupiscence was so bound that every inordinate motion of the senses was excluded. In Christ's conception, concupiscence was completely removed, so that the powers of the senses were completely subject to the direction of reason (S. th. III 27, 3). The distinction made by St. Thomas rests on the assumption that Mary was cleansed from original sin. Since she was preserved from original sin, it is logical to assume that she was, from the very beginning, entirely free from concupiscence.

2. Freedom from Actual Sin

In consequence of a Special Privilege of Grace from God, Mary was free from every personal sin during her whole life. (*Sent. fidei proxima.*)

The Council of Trent declared : " No justified person can for his whole life avoid all sins, even venial sins, except on the ground of a special privilege from God such as the Church holds was given to the Blessed Virgin " (nisi ex speciali Dei privilegio, quemadmodum de beata Virgine tenet Ecclesia). D 833. Pope Pius XII says in the Encyclical " Mystici Corporis " of the Virgin Mother of God, that : " she was immune from all sin, personal or inherited."

Mary's sinlessness may be deduced from the text : Luke 1, 28 : " Hail, full of grace ! ", since personal moral defects are irreconcilable with fullness of grace.

While individual Greek Fathers (Origen, St. Basil, St. John Chrysostom, St. Cyril of Alexandria) taught that Mary suffered from venial personal faults, such as ambition and vanity, doubt about the message of the Angel, and lack of faith under the Cross, the Latin Patristic authors unanimously teach the doctrine of the sinlessness of Mary. St. Augustine teaches that every personal sin must be excluded from the Blessed Virgin Mary for the sake of the honour of God (propter honorem Domini). (De natura et gratia, 36, 42.) St. Ephrem the Syrian puts Mary, in her immaculateness, on the same plane as Christ (see Par. 3). According to the teaching of St. Thomas, the fullness of grace which Mary received in the active conception (according to modern theology, in the passive conception) implied confirmation in grace and therefore sinlessness. S. th. III 27, 5 ad 2.

§ 5. Mary's Perpetual Virginity

Mary was a Virgin before, during and after the Birth of Jesus Christ.

The Lateran Synod of the year 649, under Pope Martin I, stressed the threefold character of Mary's virginity teaching of the " blessed ever-virginal and immaculate Mary " that : " she conceived without seed, of the Holy Ghost, generated without injury (to her virginity), and her virginity continued un-

impaired after the birth" (D 256). Pope Paul IV declared (1555): Beatissimam Virginem Mariam . . . perstitisse semper in virginitatis integritate, ante partum scilicet, in partu et perpetuo post partum. D 993

Mary's virginity includes virginitas mentis, that is, a constant virginal disposition, virginitas sensus, that is, freedom from inordinate motions of sexual desire, and virginitas corporis, that is, physical integrity. The Church doctrine refers primarily to Her bodily integrity.

1. Virginity Before the Birth

Mary conceived by the Holy Ghost without the co-operation of man. (*De fide.*)

Early opponents of the virginal conception of Mary were the Jews and the pagans (Celsus, Julian the Apostate, Cerinth and the Ebionites). In modern times, the Rationalists seek to derive the belief in the Immaculate Conception either from Is. 7, 14 or from pagan mythology.

The Church's faith in Mary's (active) virginal conception is expressed in all the symbols of Faith. The Apostles' Creed declares: "Qui conceptus est de Spiritu Sancto." Cf. D 86, 256, 993. That Mary led a virginal life up to the moment of her active conception is attested by Luke 1, 26 et seq.: "The angel Gabriel was sent from God . . . to a virgin . . . and the virgin's name was Mary."

Mary's virginal conception was already foretold in the Old Covenant by the Prophet Isaias in the famous Emmanuel prophecy. Is. 7, 14: "Therefore the Lord Himself shall give a sign: Behold a virgin (ha 'alma; G, ἡ παρθένος) shall conceive and bear a son and his name shall be called Emmanuel (=God with us)."

The Jews did not recognise this passage as Messianic. From the beginning however Christians took it as referring to the Messias, since the sign had been fulfilled. Cf. Mt. 1, 22 et seq. The Jewish objection that the Septuagint wrongly rendered the Hebrew word ha 'alma by ἡ παρθένος=the virgin, instead of by ἡ νεᾶνις=the young woman (thus Aquilas, Theodotion, Symmachus), is unfounded, as the word ha 'alma in biblical language means an untouched marriageable maiden. Compare Gn. 24, 43 with Gn. 24, 16; Ex. 2, 8. Ps. 67, 26; Hl. 1, 2 (M 1, 3); 6, 7 (M 6, 8). The context demands the interpretation "virgin"; for an extraordinary sign would exist only if a virgin, as a virgin, conceives and gives birth.

The fulfilment of the Isaianic prophecy is narrated by Mt. 1, 18 et seq., and Luke 1, 26 et seq. Mt. 1, 18: "When Mary His mother was espoused to Joseph before they came together, she was found with child by the Holy Ghost." Luke 1, 34: "And Mary said to the angel: How shall this be done, because I know not man? And the angel answering, said to her: The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee." As Mary was living in lawful wedlock with Joseph, the latter was the legal father of Jesus. Luke 3, 23: "The son of Joseph, as it was supposed." Cf. Luke 2, 23. 48.

The scruples of rationalist critics (A. Harnack) against the genuineness of Luke 1, 34-35 derive simply from presuppositions inherent in their philosophy of

life. The unorthodox interpretation of the text of Mt. 1, 16 which is found in Syrus Sinaiticus.: " But James begot Joseph, and Joseph, who was espoused to the Virgin Mary, begot Jesus," cannot be accepted as correct. The ancient Syrian translator apparently referred to the fatherhood of Joseph in a purely legal sense since in the subsequent passages (1, 18 et seq.) in agreement with all the other texts, he speaks of the conception of Jesus by the Holy Ghost. The unorthodox interpretation arose from an improper reading of the text. The proper reading as may be seen by a comparison with the Western text, is as follows : " And James begat Joseph, who (was) espoused to the Virgin Mary (who) begat (= bore) Jesus, who is called Christ."

The Fathers affirm the virginal conception of Mary with complete unanimity. The Fathers attest the virginal conception of Mary with complete unanimity. Cf. St. Ignatius of Antioch, Smyrn. 1, 1 : " truly born of a virgin " ; Trall 9, 1 ; Eph. 7, 2 ; 18, 2 ; 19, 1. Starting with St. Justin, the Fathers defend the Messianic interpretation of Is. 7, 14, and stress that the words are to be understood in such a manner, that the Mother of the Emmanuel conceived and brought forth while still remaining a virgin (in sensu composito, not in sensu diviso). Cf. St. Justin, Dial. 43 ; 66–68 ; 77 ; Apol. I 33 ; St. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. III 21 ; Origen, Contra Celsum I 34 et seq. S. th. III 28, 1.

2. Virginity During the Birth of Jesus

Mary bore her Son without any violation of her virginal integrity. (*De fide on the ground of the general promulgation of doctrine.*)

The dogma merely asserts the *fact* of the continuance of Mary's physical virginity without determining more closely how this is to be physiologically explained. In general the Fathers and the Schoolmen conceived it as non-injury to the hymen, and accordingly taught that Mary gave birth in miraculous fashion without opening of the womb and injury to the hymen, and consequently also without pains (cf. S. th. III 28, 2).

However, according to modern natural scientific knowledge, the purely physical side of virginity consists in the non-fulfilment of the sex act (" sex-act virginity ") and in the non-contact of the female egg by the male seed (" seed-act virginity ") (A. Mitterer). Thus, injury to the hymen in birth does not destroy virginity, while, on the other hand, its rupture seems to belong to complete natural motherhood. It follows from this that from the concept of virginity alone the miraculous character of the process of birth cannot be inferred, if it cannot be, and must not be derived from other facts of Revelation. Holy Writ attests Mary's active rôle in the act of birth (Mt. 1, 25 ; Luke 2, 7 : " She brought forth ") which does not seem to indicate a miraculous process.

But the Fathers, with few exceptions, vouch for the miraculous character of the birth. However, the question is whether in so doing they attest a truth of Revelation or whether they wrongly interpret a truth of Revelation, that is, Mary's virginity, from an inadequate natural scientific point of view. It seems hardly possible to demonstrate that the dignity of the Son of God or the dignity of the Mother of God demands a miraculous birth.

Mary's virginity during the birth of Jesus was contested in the Early Church by Tertullian (De carne Christi 23) and especially by Jovinian, an opponent of the Church ideal of virginal purity ; and in modern times by Rationalists (Harnack calls it : " a Gnostic invention ").

Jovinian's teaching (virgo concepit, sed non virgo generavit) was rejected

at a Synod at Milan (390) under the presidency of St. Ambrose (cf. Ep. 42), which recalled the invocation of the Apostles' Creed : Natus ex Maria virgine. Her virginity during the birth of Jesus is included in the title of honour "perpetual virgin" (ἀειπαρθένος), which was given to Mary by the Fifth General Council at Constantinople (553) (D 214, 218, 227). The doctrine is expressly taught by Pope St. Leo I in the Epistola Dogmatica ad Flavianum (Ep. 28, 2) which was approved by the Council of Chalcedon ; it was taught also by the Lateran Synod (649) and by Pope Paul IV (1555) (D 256, 993). Pope Pius XII in the Encyclical "Mystici Corporis" says : "It was she who gave miraculous birth to Christ our Lord (mirando partu edidit)." The Church's general teaching is expressed in her Liturgy also. Cf. the Responsorium to the fifth Lesson of the Feast of Christmas, and to the eighth Lesson of the Feast of the Circumcision of Our Lord.

Is. 7. 14 announces that the maiden (as a virgin) would give birth. The Fathers also, in a typical sense, refer to the virgin birth of Our Lord the words of the Prophet Ezechiel on the closed gates (Ez. 44, 2 ; cf. St. Ambrose Ep. 42, 6 ; St. Jerome, Ep. 49, 21) ; the words of the Prophet Isaias on the painless birth (Is. 66, 7 ; cf. St. Irenaeus, Epis. 54 ; St. John Damascene, De fide orth. IV 14 : and the words of the Song of Songs on the closed garden and the sealed well (Hl. 4, 12 ; cf. St. Jerome, Adv. Jov. I 31, Ep. 49, 21).

St. Ignatius of Antioch characterises, not merely Mary's virginity, but also the bringing forth of her Son as a "mystery which must be proclaimed aloud" (Eph. 19, 1). Christ's virginal birth is accepted without question in the apocryphal writings of the second century (Odes of Solomon, 19, 7 et seq. ; Proto-Gospel of St. James 19 et seq. ; ascension into heaven of Isaias 11, 7 et seq.), and also by Church authors such as St. Irenaeus (Epid. 54 ; adv. haer. III 21, 4–6) ; St. Clement of Alexandria (Strom. VII 16, 93) ; Origen (In. Lev. hom. 8, 2 ; otherwise in Luc. hom. 14). St. Ambrose (Ep. 42, 4–7), St. Jerome (Adv. Jov. I 31 ; Ep. 49, 21) and St. Augustine (Enchir. 34) defend the traditional Church doctrine against Jovinian. For the illustration of the mystery the Fathers and Theologians employ various analogues—the emergence of Christ from the sealed tomb, His going through closed doors, the penetration of the ray of sun through glass, the birth of the Logos from the bosom of the Father, the going out of human thought from the human spirit.

Christ's miraculous emergence from the unimpaired womb of the Virgin Mother finds its ultimate explanation in the Omnipotence of God. St. Augustine says : "in such things the whole ground of the mystery is the might of Him who permits it to happen" (Ep. 137, 2, 8). Cf. S. th. III 28, 2.

3. Virginity After the Birth of Jesus

Also after the Birth of Jesus Mary remained a Virgin. (*De fide.*)

Mary's virginity after the birth of Jesus was denied in the Early Church by Tertullian (De monog. 8), Eunomius, Jovinian, Helvidius, Bonosus of Sardica and the Antidicomarianites. At the present day it is contested by the majority of Protestants, as well as by both the Liberal and the Conservative schools of thought.

Pope St. Siricius (392) rejected the teaching of Bonosus. D 91. The Fifth General Council (553) gives Mary the title of honour "perpetual virgin

(ἀειπαρθνος). D 214, 218, 227. Cf. the declarations of the Lateran Synod 649 and of Pope Paul IV (1555). D. 256, 993. The Liturgy also honours Mary as the " perpetual Virgin." Cf. the Prayer *Communicantes* in the Canon of the Mass. The Church prays : post partum, Virgo inviolata permansisti. Holy Writ only indirectly attests the continuance of Mary's virginity after the birth. From the question which Mary puts to the Angel, Luke, 1, 34 : " How shall this be done, because I know not man ? " it is inferred that she had taken the resolve of constant virginity on the ground of a special Divine enlightenment. In the light of this text St. Augustine and many Fathers and theologians believed that Mary made a formal vow of virginity. However, the subsequent espousals can hardly be reconciled with this. We note that the fact that the dying Redeemer entrusted His Mother to the protection of the Disciple John (John 19, 26 : " Woman, behold thy Son "), presupposes that Mary had no other children but Jesus. Cf. Origen, In Ioan, 1, 4 (6) 23.

By the " brethren of Jesus," often named in the Holy Scriptures, and who are characteristically never called " Sons of Mary " are to be understood near-relatives of Jesus. Compare Mt. 13, 55 with Mt. 27, 56, John 19, 25 and Gal. 1, 19. From the passage Luke 2, 7 : " and she brought forth her first-born son " (cf. Mt. 1, 25 according to the Vulgate) it cannot be inferred that Mary had more children after Jesus, as among the Jews an only son was also known as " first-born son " since the " first-born " had special privileges and duties. The passages Mt. 1. 18 : " Before they came together," and Mt. 1, 25 : " he knew her not till she brought forth her first-born son," assert that up to a definite point in time the marriage was not consummated, but not by any means that it was consummated after this. Cf. Gn. 8, 7 ; 2 Sm. 6, 23 ; Mt. 28, 20.

Among the Fathers many upheld the teaching of Mary's virginity after the birth of Jesus : Origen (In Luc. hom. 7.), St. Ambrose (De inst. virg et S. Mariae virginitate perpetua), St. Jerome (De perpetua virginitate B. Mariae adv. Helvidium), St. Augustine (De haeresibus 56, 84), St. Epiphanius (Haer. 78 ; against the Antidicomarianites), St. Basil remarks : " The friends of Christ do not tolerate hearing that the Mother of God ever ceased to be a virgin " (Hom. in S. Christi generationem n. 5.). Cf. St. John Damascene, De fide orth. IV. 14. S. th. III 28, 3.

From the fourth century onwards the Fathers, for example Zeno of Verona (Tract. I 5, 3 ; II 8, 2), St. Augustine (Sermo 196, 1, 1 ; De cat. rud. 22, 40), St. Peter Chrysologus (Sermo 117) affirm the virginity of Mary in formulas, such as : Virgo concepit, virgo peperit, virgo permansit (St. Augustine, Sermos 51, 11, 18).

§ 6. The Bodily Assumption of Mary into Heaven

1. Mary's Death

Mary suffered a temporal death. (*Sent. communior.*)

Even if reliable historical reports as to the place (Ephesus, Jerusalem), the time, and the circumstances of Mary's death are lacking, still the fact of her death is almost generally accepted by the Fathers and Theologians, and is expressly affirmed in the Liturgy of the Church. The Sacramentarium Gregorianum, which Pope Hadrian I transmitted to Charles the Great (784/91), contains the

prayer : Veneranda nobis, Domine, huius est diei festivitas, in qua sancta Dei Genitrix mortem subiit temporalem, nec tamen mortis nexibus deprimi potuit quae Filium tuum Dominum nostrum de se genuit incarnatum. The "Oratio super oblata" of the same Sacramentary reads : Subveniat, Domine, plebi tuae Dei Genitricis oratio, quam etsi pro condicione carnis migrasse cognoscimus, in caelesti gloria apud te pro nobis intercedere sentiamus.

Origen (In Ioan 2, 12 ; fragm. 31), St. Ephrem (Hymnus 15. 2), Severian of Gabala (De mundi creatione or. 6, 10), St Jerome (Adv. Ruf. 11, 5), St. Augustine (In Ioan tr. 8, 9) mention the fact of her death incidentally. St. Epiphanius, who had already instituted researches into the close of Mary's life says : "Nobody knows how she departed this world." He leaves undecided whether she died a natural death, or whether (according to Luke 2, 35) she died by violence, or whether she (cf. Apoc. 12, 14) still lives on immortal in some place unknown to us (Haer 78, 11. 24). The unknown author of a sermon which has come down to us under the name of the Presbyter Timotheus of Jerusalem (6th–8th cent.) is of the opinion that "the virgin is up to now immortal (that is, did not die), as He who (in her) lived, translated her into the place of reception (that is, into the Heavenly Paradise)" (Or. in Symeonem). For Mary, death, in consequence of her freedom from original sin and from personal sin, was not a consequence of punishment of sin (cf. D 1073). However, it seems fitting that Mary's body, which was by nature mortal, should be, in conformity with that of her Divine Son, subject to the general law of death.

2. The Bodily Assumption of Mary into Heaven

a) Dogma

Mary was assumed body and soul into Heaven. (*De fide.*)

After Pope Pius XII, on 1st May, 1946, had addressed to all bishops in the world the official query whether the bodily assumption of Mary into Heaven could be defined as a proposition of faith, and whether they with their clergy and people desired the definition, and when almost all the bishops had replied in the affirmative, on 1st November, 1950, he promulgated by the Apostolic Constitution "Munificentissimus Deus" as a dogma revealed by God that : "Mary, the immaculate perpetually Virgin Mother of God, after the completion of her earthly life, was assumed body and soul into the glory of Heaven" (pronuntiamus, declaramus et definimus divinitus revelatum dogma esse : Immaculatam Deiparam semper Virginem Mariam, expleto terrestris vitae cursu, fuisse corpore et anima ad caelestem gloriam assumptam).

In the Marian Epilogue to the Encyclical "Mystici Corporis" (1943) Pope Pius XII had already taught that Mary "resplendent in glory in body and soul reigns in heaven with her Son" (D 2291).

b) Proof from Scripture and Tradition

Direct and express scriptural proofs are not to be had. The possibility of the bodily assumption before the second coming of Christ is not excluded by 1 Cor. 15, 23, as the objective Redemption was completed with the sacrificial death of Christ, and the beginning of the final era foretold by the prophets commenced. Its probability is suggested by Mt. 27, 52–53 : "And the graves were opened : and many bodies of the saints that had slept arose, and coming

out of the tombs after His Resurrection came into the holy city and appeared to many." According to the more probable explanation, which was already expounded by the Fathers, the awakening of the "saints" was a final resurrection and transfiguration. If, however, the justified of the Old Covenant were called to the perfection of salvation immediately after the conclusion of the redemptive work of Christ, then it is possible and probable that the Mother of the Lord was called to it also.

From her fullness of grace spoken of in Luke 1, 28, Scholastic theology derives the doctrine of the bodily assumption and glorification of Mary. Since she was full of grace she remained preserved from the three-fold curse of sin (Gn. 3, 16-19), as well as from her return to dust (cf. S. Thomas, Expos. salut. ang). In the woman of the Apocalypse clothed with the sun (12, 1), which in its literal sense, must be taken to mean the Church, Scholastic theology sees also the transfigured mother of Christ. The Fathers too refer passages such as Ps. 131, 8 in a typical sense to the mystery of the bodily assumption: "Arise, O Lord, into thy resting place; thou and the ark which thou hast sanctified, the ark of the Covenant made from incorruptible wood (a type of the incorruptible body of Mary)." Apoc. 11, 19: "And the temple of God was opened in Heaven and the ark of His Covenant was seen in His temple." Cant. of Cant. 8, 5: "Who is this that cometh up from the desert, flowing with delights, leaning upon her beloved?" Modern theology usually cites Gn. 3, 15 in support of the doctrine. Since by the seed of the woman it understands Christ, and by the woman, Mary, it is argued that as Mary had an intimate share in Christ's battle against Satan and in His victory over Satan and sin, she must also have participated intimately in His victory over death. It is true that the literal reference of the text is to Eve and not Mary, but already since the end of the second century (St. Justin) Tradition has seen in Mary the new Eve.

The speculative grounds on which the Fathers of the closing Patristic era, and the theologians of the scholastic movement, led by Ps.-Augustine (ninth century) base the incorruptibility and transfiguration of the body of Mary, are also based upon Revelation: These are:

α) Freedom from sin. As the dissolution of the body is a punishment consequent on sin, and as Mary, the immaculately conceived and sinless one, was exempt from the general curse of sin, it was fitting that her body should be excepted from the general law of dissolution and immediately assumed into the glory of Heaven, in accordance with God's original plan for mankind.

β) Motherhood of God. As the body of Christ originated from the body of Mary (caro Jesu caro est Mariae: Ps.-Augustine) it was fitting that Mary's body, should share the lot of the body of Christ. As a physico-spiritual relationship the Motherhood of Mary demands a likeness to her Divine Son in body and soul.

γ) Perpetual virginity. As Mary's body was preserved unimpaired in virginal integrity, it was fitting that it should not be subject to destruction after death.

δ) Participation in the work of Christ. As Mary, in her capacity of Mother of the Redeemer, took a most intimate share in the redemptive work of her Son it was fitting that, on the completion of her earthly life, she should attain to the full fruit of the Redemption, which consists in the glorification of soul and body. The idea of the bodily assumption of Mary is first expressed in certain transitus-narratives of the fifth and sixth centuries. Even though these are

apocryphal they bear witness to the faith of the generation in which they were written despite their legendary clothing. The first Church author to speak of the bodily ascension of Mary, in association with an apocryphal transitus B.M.V., is St. Gregory of Tours († 594). Early sermons on the Feast of Mary's entry into heaven are those of Ps.-Modestus of Jerusalem (about 700), Germanus of Constantinople († 733), Andrew of Crete († 740), St. John Damascene († 749) and Theodore of Studion († 826).

In the East, at least since the sixth century, and at Rome, at any rate, since the end of the seventh century (Sergius I, 687–701) the Church celebrated the Feast of the Sleeping of Mary (Dormitio, κοίμησις). The object of the Feast was originally the death of Mary, but very soon the thought appeared of the incorruptibility of her body and of its assumption into Heaven. The original title Dormitio (Sleeping) was changed into assumptio (Sacramentarium Gregorianum). In the Liturgical and Patristic texts of the eighth and ninth centuries, the idea of the bodily assumption is clearly attested. Under the influence of Ps.-Hieronymus, there was uncertainty for a long time as to whether or not the assumption of the body was signified by the Feast. Since the peak period of the Middle Ages, the affirmative view has gained precedence, and has now been dominant for a long time.

c) Historical Development of the Dogma.

A hindrance to the development of the dogma of the Assumption in the West was a pseudo-Augustinian sermon (Sermo 208 : " Adest nobis ") ; a letter forged under the name of Jerome (Ep. 9 : " Cogitis me ") ; and the Martyrology of the Monk, Usuard. Ps.-Augustine (probably Ambrosius Autpertus, † 784) takes up the stand that we know nothing of the fate of Mary's body. *Ps.*-Hieronymus (Paschasius Radbertus, † 865) leaves the question open, whether Mary was assumed into heaven with or without her body, but maintains the incorruptibility of her body. Usuard († about 875) praises the reticence of the Church which prefers not to know the spot " in which that venerable Temple of the Holy Ghost was hidden from view by Divine command," than to maintain it as something legendary. Usuard's Martyrology was extensively used in many monasteries and chapters during choir prayers; Part of the letter of Ps.-Hieronymus found its way into the breviary. This delayed the acceptance of the dogma into the theological thought of the Middle Ages.

In favour of the dogma, an anonymous tract appeared (" Ad interrogata ") in the twelfth century, which has been attributed to St. Augustine but the origin of which is not yet certain (9th–11th centuries), decisively advocating, on rational grounds, the bodily assumption of Mary. Since the thirteenth century, the view represented by Ps.-Augustine has gained the upper hand. The great theologians of the scholastic era declared for it. St. Thomas teaches : Ab hac (maledictione, sc. ut in pulverem revertertur) . . . immunis fuit Beata Virgo, quia cum corpore ascendit in coelum (Epos. salut. ang). On the reform of the Breviary under Pope Pius V (1568) the Ps.-Hieronymian lessons were expunged and replaced by others which advocated the bodily assumption. In the year 1668 a violent dispute flamed up in France on the doctrine of the Assumption, when part of the Chapter of Notre-Dame in Paris wished to revert to the Martyrologium of Usuard, which was abolished in 1540 (or 1549). Jean Launoy († 1678) energetically defended Usuard's standpoint. Pope Benedict XIV (1740–58) declared the doctrine of the Assumption to be a pious and probable opinion, but in so doing, did not declare that it belonged to the depositum fidei. In the year 1849 the first petitions for dogmatisation were addressed

to the Apostolic See. At the Vatican Council nearly 200 Bishops signed a motion for dogmatisation. Since the beginning of this century, the movement grew apace. After the whole Episcopate, following an official inquiry of the Pope (1946) almost unanimously affirmed the possibility of and the desire for the definition, Pope Pius XII confirmed: "the unanimous doctrine of the ordinary Church Teaching Office, and the unanimous belief of the Christian people" in a solemn definition on November 1st, 1950.

3. The Queenship of Mary.

After being assumed into Heaven and being raised above all angels and saints, Mary reigns with Christ, her Divine Son. The Fathers from ancient times honoured her as the Patroness, Lady, Queen, Queen of the creation (John of Damascus, De fide orth. IV 14), Queen of Men (Andrew of Crete, Hom. 2 in Dormit. ss. Deiparae). The Liturgy honours her as the Queen of Heaven and Earth, and so do the Popes in their Encyclicals (Pius IX, Leo XIII, Pius XII).

Mary's right to reign as Queen of Heaven is a consequence of her Divine Motherhood. Since Christ, because of the hypostatic union, is as man the Lord and King above all creation (cf. Lk. 1, 32 f.; Apc. 19, 16), so Mary as "the Mother of the Lord" (Lk. 1, 43) shares in the royal dignity of her Son, even if only in an analogical way. Furthermore, Mary's royal merit is based on her intrinsic connection with Christ in His work of Redemption. Just as Christ is also our Lord and King because He has redeemed us with His precious Blood (1 Cor. 6, 20; 1 Petr. 1, 18 f.), so, in an analogical way, Mary is our Lady and Queen because she the new Eve has shared intimately in the redemptive work of Christ, the new Adam, by suffering with Him and offering Him up to the Eternal Father. Mary's sublime dignity as the Queen of Heaven and Earth make her supremely powerful in her maternal intercession for her children on earth. Cf. Enc. "Ad coeli reginam" Pius XII (1954).

CHAPTER 3

Mary's Co-operation in the Work of Redemption

§ 7. The Mediatorship of Mary

Although Christ is the Sole Mediator between God and man (1 Tim. 2, 5), since He alone, by His death on the Cross, fully reconciled mankind with God, this does not exclude a secondary mediatorship, subordinated to Christ (cf. S. th. III 26, 1). "To unite men to God perfectively (perfective) appertains to Christ according to 2 Cor. V. 19. Therefore Christ alone is the perfect mediator between God and man, inasmuch as He reconciled mankind with God by His death. . . . But there is nothing to prevent others in a certain way (secundum quid) from being called mediators between God and man, in so far as they, by preparing or serving (dispositive vel ministeraliter), co-operate in uniting men to God."

The Fathers called Mary the "Go-between" (*μεσίτης*, mediatrix). A prayer ascribed to St. Ephrem says of her: "After the Mediator thou art the mediatrix of the whole world" (post mediatorem mediatrix totius mundi: Oratio IV ad Deiparam. 4th Lesson of the Office of the Feast). The title Mediatrix is

attached to Mary in official Church documents also, for example, in the Bull "Ineffabilis" of Pope Pius IX (1854); in the Rosary Encyclicals "Adiutricem" and "Fidentem" (D 1940 a) of Pope Leo XIII. (1895 and 1896); in the Encyclical "Ad diem illum" of Pope Pius X (1904). It has also been received into the Liturgy of the Church through the introduction of the Feast of M. Mariae Virginis omnium gratiarum Mediatricis (1921).

Mary is designated mediatrix of all graces in a double sense:

1. Mary gave the Redeemer, the Source of all graces, to the world, and in this way she is the channel of all graces. (*Sent. certa.*)

2. Since Mary's Assumption into Heaven no grace is conferred on man without her actual intercessory co-operation. (*Sent. pia et probabilis*).

1. Mary is the Mediatrix of all graces by her co-operation in the Incarnation. (*Mediatio in universali.*)

Mary freely and deliberately co-operated in giving the Redeemer to the world. Instructed by the angel as to the person and the task of Her Son she freely assented to be Mother of God. Luke 1, 38: "Behold the handmaid of the Lord: be it done unto me according to thy word." The Incarnation of the Son of God, and the Redemption of mankind by the vicarious atonement of Christ were dependent on her assent. In this significant moment in the history of Salvation Mary represented humanity. St. Thomas says: "At the Annunciation the concurrence of the maiden was awaited as a representative of all human nature (loco totius humanae naturae)" (S. th. III 30, 1). In regard to these words, Pope Leo XIII remarks: "To a certain extent she (Mary) represented the whole human race" (quae ipsius generis humani personam quodammodo agebat). D 1940 a.

The Fathers contrast Mary's obedience at the Annunciation with Eve's disobedience. Mary by her obedience became the cause of the Salvation, while Eve by her disobedience became the cause of death. St. Irenaeus teaches: "As she (Eve) who had Adam as her husband, but was nevertheless a virgin, was disobedient, and thereby became the cause of death to herself and to the whole of mankind, so also Mary, who had a pre-ordained husband, and was still a virgin, by her obedience became a cause of her own salvation and the salvation of the whole human race" (et sibi et universo generi humano causa facta est salutis: Adv. haer. III 22, 4; cf. V 19, 1). St. Jerome says: "By a woman the whole world was saved" (per mulierem totus mundus salvatus est; Tract. de Ps. 96). Cf. Tertullian, De carne Christi 17.

Mary's co-operation in the Redemption.

The title Corredemptrix=Coredemptress, which has been current since the fifteenth century, and which also appears in some official Church documents under Pius X (cf. D 1978 a), must not be conceived in the sense of an equation of the efficacy of Mary with the redemptive activity of Christ, the sole Redeemer of humanity (1 Tim. 2, 5). As she herself required redemption and in fact was redeemed by Christ, she could not of herself merit the grace of the redemption of humanity in accordance with the principle: Principium meriti non cadit sub eodem merito. (The author of an act of merit cannot be a recipient of the same

act of merit.) Her co-operation in the objective redemption is an indirect, remote co-operation, and derives from this that she voluntarily devoted her whole life to the service of the Redeemer, and, under the Cross, suffered and sacrificed with Him. As Pope Pius XII says in the Encyclical " Mystici Corporis " (1943), she " offered Him on Golgotha to the Eternal Father together with the holocaust of her maternal rights and her motherly love like a new Eve for all children of Adam " (D 2291). As " The New Eve " she is, as the same Pope declares, in the Apostolic Constitution " Munificentissimus Deus " (1950) " the sublime associate of our Redeemer " (alma Redemptoris nostri socia [cf. Gn. 3, 12]). Cf. D. 3031 : generoso Divini Redemptoris socia.

Christ alone truly offered the sacrifice of atonement on the Cross ; Mary merely gave Him moral support in this action. Thus Mary is not entitled to the title " Priest " (sacerdos). Indeed this is expressly laid down by the Holy Office (1916, 1927). Christ, as the Church teaches, " conquered the enemy of the human race alone (solus) " (D 711) ; in the same way, He alone acquired the grace of Redemption for the whole human race, including Mary. The words of Luke 1, 38 : " Behold the handmaid of the Lord," imply Mary's mediate, remote co-operation in the Redemption. St. Ambrose expressly teaches : " Christ's Passion did not require any support " (De inst. virg. 7). In the power of the grace of Redemption merited by Christ, Mary, by her spiritual entering into the sacrifice of her Divine Son for men, made atonement for the sins of men, and (de congruo) merited the application of the redemptive grace of Christ. In this manner she co-operates in the subjective redemption of mankind.

The statement of Pope Pius X in the Encyclical " Ad diem illum " (1904) : (Beata Virgo) de congruo, ut aiunt, promeret nobis, quae Christus de condigno promeruit (D 1978 a) (The Blessed Virgin merits for us de congruo what Christ merited de condigno) is, as the present tense " promeret " shows, not indeed to be taken as referring to the historical objective Redemption, which occurred once and for all, but to her ever-present, intercessory co-operation in the subjective redemption.

2. Mary is the Mediatrix of all graces by her intercession in Heaven. (*Mediatio in speciali.*)

Since her assumption into Heaven, Mary co-operates in the application of the grace of Redemption to man. She participates in the distribution of grace by her maternal intercession which is far inferior in efficacy to that of the intercessory prayer of Christ, the High Priest, but surpasses far the intercessory prayer of all the other saints.

According to the view of the older, and of many of the modern, theologians Mary's intercessory co-operation extends to all graces, which are conferred on mankind, so that no grace accrues to men, without the intercession of Mary. The implication of this is not that we are obliged to beg for all graces through Mary, nor that Mary's intercession is intrinsically necessary for the application of the grace, but that, according to God's positive ordinance, the redemptive grace of Christ is conferred on nobody without the actual intercessory co-operation of Mary.

Recent Popes have declared in favour of this doctrine. Leo XIII says in the Rosary Encyclical " Octobri mense " (1891) : " From that great treasure of

all graces, which the Lord has brought, nothing, according to the will of God, comes to us except through Mary, so that, as nobody can approach the Supreme Father except through the Son, similarly nobody can approach Christ except through the Mother" (1940 a). Pope Pius X calls Mary "the dispenser of all gifts, which Jesus has acquired for us by His death and His blood" (D 1978 a). Pope Benedict XV declared: "All gifts which the Author of all good has deigned to communicate to the unhappy posterity of Adam, are, according to the loving resolve of His Divine Providence, dispensed by the hands of the Most Holy Virgin" (AAS 9, 1917, 266). The same Pope calls Mary: "the mediatrix with God of all graces" (gratiarum omnium apud Deum sequestra: AAS 11 1919, 227).

Pope Pius XI in the Encyclical "Ingravescentibus malis" (1937) quotes with approval the words of Saint Bernard: "Thus it is His (God's) will that we should have everything through Mary" (AAS 29, 1937, 373). Similarly Pope Pius XII in the Encyclical "Mediator Dei" (1947).

Express scriptural proofs are lacking. Theologians seek a biblical foundation in the words of Christ, John 19, 26 et seq.: "Woman behold thy son, son behold thy mother." According to the literal sense these words refer only to the persons addressed, Mary and John. The mystical interpretation, which became dominant in the West in the late Middle Ages (Dionysius the Carthusian), sees in John the representative of the whole human race. In him Mary was given as a mother to all the redeemed. Moreover, it corresponds to the position of Mary as the spiritual mother of the whole of redeemed humanity that she, by her powerful intercession, should procure for her children in need of help all graces by which they can attain eternal salvation.

The idea of the spiritual Motherhood of Mary is part of the Ancient Christian tradition, independently of the interpretation of John 19, 26 et seq. According to Origen the perfect Christ had Mary as mother: "Every perfect person no longer lives (of himself) but Christ lives in him; and because Christ lives in him, it is said of him to Mary: Behold thy son Christ" (Com. in Ioan. I 4, 23). St. Epiphanius derives Mary's spiritual Motherhood from the Eve-Mary parallel: "She (Mary) is she of whom Eve is the prototype, who, as such received the appellation 'mother of the living' . . . as to externals the whole human race on earth stemmed from that Eve. Thus in truth, through Mary, the very life of the world was borne, so that she bore the Living One, and became the Mother of the Living. Thus in prototype Mary was called 'Mother of the living'" (Haer. 78, 18). St. Augustine bases Mary's spiritual Motherhood on the mystical unity of the faithful with Christ. As the bodily Mother of God, she is, in a spiritual fashion, also the mother of those who are articulated with Christ. Cf. De s. virginitate 6, 6.

Express testimonies, though few in number, to Mary's position as mediatrix of grace are found since the eighth century. They became more numerous during the peak period of the Middle Ages. St. Germanus of Constantinople († 733) says: "Nobody can achieve salvation except through thee . . . O Most Holy One . nobody can receive a gift of grace except through thee . . . O Most Chaste One" (Or. 9, 5. Lesson of the Office of the Feast). St. Bernard of Clairvaux († 1153) says of Mary: "God wished that we have nothing, except by the hands of Mary" (In Vig. Nativit. Domini serm. 3, 10). Ps.-Albert the Great calls Mary: "The universal dispenser of all riches" (omnium bonitatum universaliter distributiva; Super Missus est q. 29). In modern times the doctrine

that Mary is the Universal Mediatrix of Grace was advocated by St. Peter Canisius, Suarez, St. Alphonsus Liguori, Scheeben, and it is supported by the opinion of numerous theologians at the present day.

Speculatively the doctrine of Mary's Universal Mediation is based on her co-operation in the Incarnation and the Redemption, as well as on her relationship to the Church :

a) Since Mary gave the source of all grace to men, it is to be expected that she would also co-operate in the distribution of all grace.

b) As Mary became the spiritual Mother of all the redeemed, it is fitting that she, by her constant motherly intercession should care for the supernatural life of all her children.

c) As Mary is " the prototype of the Church (St. Ambrose, Expos. ev. sec. Luc. II 7), and as all grace of redemption is obtained by the Church, it is to be assumed that Mary, by her heavenly intercession, is the universal mediatrix of grace.

Definability
The doctrine of Mary's Universal Mediation of Grace based on her co-operation in the Incarnation is so definitely manifest in the sources of the Faith, that nothing stands in the way of a dogmatic definition. Her position as Mediatrix of Grace in virtue of her intercession in Heaven is less definitely attested. Since however it is organically associated with Mary's Spiritual Motherhood which in turn is based on Scripture and with her intimate participation in the work of her Divine Son, its definition does not seem impossible.

8. The Veneration of Mary

Mary, the Mother of God, is entitled to the Cult of Hyperdulia. (*Sent certa.*)

1. Theological Proof
In view of her dignity as the Mother of God and her fullness of grace, a special veneration is due to Mary. This is substantially less than the cultus latriae (=adoration) which is due to God alone, but it is higher than the cultus Duliae (=veneration) due to the angels and to the other saints. The special veneration thus given to Mary is called cultus hyperduliae.
The Scriptural source of the special veneration due to the Mother of God is to be found in Luke 1, 28 : " Hail, full of grace, the Lord is with thee," in the praise of Elizabeth, filled with the Holy Ghost, Luke 1, 42 : " Blessed art thou amongst women, and blessed is the fruit of thy womb," in the prophetic words of the Mother of God, Luke 1, 48 : " For behold, from henceforth all generations shall call me blessed," in the words of the woman in the multitude, Luke 11, 27 : " Blessed is the womb that bore thee, and the paps that gave thee suck."

2. Historical Development
During the first three centuries, the veneration of Mary was intimately connected with the veneration of Christ. From the fourth century onwards we find a formal veneration of Mary herself. The hymns of St. Ephrem the Syrian († 373) on the birth of the Lord " are almost equally songs of praise for the Virgin Mother" (Bardenhewer, Sermons on Mary II). St. Gregory Nazianzus

(† about 390) refers to the invocation of Mary's intercession by saying of the Christian maiden Justina, that she had "besought the Virgin Mary to assist a maiden in danger," when her virginity was threatened (Or. 24, 11). St. Epiphanius († 403) teaches in opposition to the sect of the Collyridians whose members paid an idolatrous veneration to Mary: "Mary should be honoured, but the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost should be adored. Nobody should adore Mary" (Haer. 79, 7). Saints Ambrose and Jerome depict Mary as the prototype of virginity, and demand that she should be imitated (St. Ambrose, De virginibus, II 2, 6–17; St. Jerome, Ep. 22, 38; 107, 7).

The veneration of Mary was greatly promoted by the definition of her dignity as Mother of God, advocated by St. Cyril of Alexandria, at the Council of Ephesus (431). In the years following Mary was glorified in numerous sermons and hymns; in her honour Churches were built and feasts instituted. Side by side with the Candlemas of Mary (Hypapante = meeting), and the Annunciation, which were originally feasts of the Lord, there emerged, even in Patristic times, the Feast of the Home-Going (Assumption) of Mary, and of the Birth of Mary. The veneration of Mary achieved its richest development in the Middle Ages.

Luther, fearing that Divine honour would be paid to a creature, and that the unique mediatorship of Christ would be prejudiced, sharply criticised many forms of the veneration paid to Mary, but held fast to the traditional belief in Mary's Motherhood of God, her perpetual virginity, her Immaculate Conception, and her intercession. He paid homage to her as the model of humility and faith, and recommended that appeal be made to her intercession. (Interpretation of the Magnificat 1521). Zwingli also acknowledged the Church's belief in Mary, and held to the veneration of Mary, but rejected the practice of making petition to her. The same attitude was adopted by most of the Old Lutheran Theologians, although it must be remarked that they often confounded petition with adoration. A resolute opponent of the veneration paid to Mary was Calvin, who rejected it as adoration of idols. Even within the framework of Lutheranism the three biblically founded Feasts of Mary, the Annunciation, the Purification, and the Visitation were solemnised up to the time of the Enlightenment, while the Feasts of the Birth of Mary and Her Assumption, after they had been maintained for some time, as Luther wished, were abandoned in the sixteenth century. Under the influence of rationalism the religious veneration of Mary deteriorated and sank to the level of regarding her as a sublimely moral model but a merely natural person. Wherever in Protestantism belief in the Incarnation is still living, veneration of the Mother of God is not entirely extinguished.

BOOK FOUR

The Doctrine of God the Sanctifier

PART 1

The Doctrine of Grace

INTRODUCTION

Of grace in general

§ 1. The Subjective Redemption in General

The God-Man Jesus Christ, by His vicarious atonement and His merit in the Redemption, achieved the reconciliation of humanity with God in principle and objectively. The Objective Redemption must be accepted by each man so that thereby he may bring to fruition in himself the subjective Redemption. The act of the application of the fruits of the Redemption to the individual man is called Justification (δικαίωσις, iustificatio) or Sanctification (ἁγιασμός, sanctificatio). The fruit of the Redemption itself is called grace.

The source of the Subjective Redemption is the Triune God. Since however, the communication of grace is a work of the Divine Love, it is "appropriated" to the Holy Ghost, i.e., to the Personal Divine Love. Nevertheless it is effected by the Three Persons in common. The Subjective Redemption, however, is not the work of God alone. By reason of the fact that God has endowed human nature with reason and free will, Justification requires the free co-operation of men (D 799). The unfathomable mystery of the doctrine of grace lies in this intimate mutual co-operation of Divine power and human freedom. All the controversies and the heresies that have arisen concerning Justification derive from the difficulties posed by this mystery of co-operation. In the working-out of man's Subjective Redemption, God supports man, not merely by an inner principle, grace, but also by an outward principle, the efficacy of the Church in its doctrine, its guidance of men and its work of dispensing the grace of Christ through the Sacraments. The final object of the Subjective Redemption is the Beatific Vision.

§ 2. The Concept of Grace

1. The Notion of Grace in S. Scripture

a) In scriptural terminology, grace (χάρις=gratia) in its subjective sense, signifies a disposition of condescension or benevolence shown by a highly-placed person to one in a lower place, and especially of God towards mankind (gratia=benevolence). Cf. Gn. 30, 27; Luke 1, 30.

b) In the objective sense grace signifies an unmerited gift (gratia=beneficium or donum gratis datum) proceeding from this benevolent disposition.

The gift, as such, is the material element; the lack of any claims, i.e., the gratuitous nature of the gift, is the formal element. Cf. Rom. 11, 6.

c) Grace may also mean pleasing charm. Cf. Ps. 44, 3 ; Prov. 31, 30.

d) Grace again signifies thanks for favours received. Cf. Luke 17, 9 ; 1 Cor. 10, 30.

2. The Language of theology

Theology takes the word Grace in the objective sense and understands by it a gift from God to man, not due from God, and not merited by man. In this wider sense one can also speak of a natural grace (for example, the Creation and gifts of the natural order, such as bodily health and mental soundness).

In the narrower and proper sense one understands by grace a supernatural gift, which God of His free benevolence, bestows on rational creatures for their eternal salvation ; donum supernaturale gratis a Deo creaturae rationali concessum in ordine ad vitam aeternam. To this belong above all, the dona supernaturalia quoad substantiam, which in their inner nature transcend the being, the powers and the claims of created nature (sanctifying grace, the infused virtues, the gifts of the Holy Ghost, actual grace, the Beatific Vision). To this belong also in a secondary sense the dona supernaturalia quoad modum which in the manner and degree of their production surpass the natural capability of the recipient (miraculous healing, the gift of tongues, gift of prophecy). In a more remote sense it refers to the dona praeternaturalia, which perfect human nature within its own order (freedom from concupiscence, from suffering and death).

3. Causes of Grace

Causa Efficiens Principalis (Principal Efficient Cause) of grace is the Triune God ; Causa Efficiens Instrumentalis (Efficient Instrumental Cause) is Christ's Humanity and the sacraments ; Causa Meritoria (Meritorius Cause) of the grace conferred on fallen mankind is the God-Man Jesus Christ, by reason of the Redemption ; Causa Finalis Primaria (the Primary Final Cause) is the glorification of God ; Causa Finalis Secundaria (the Secondary Final Cause) is the eternal salvation of man.

§ 3. Classification of Grace

The First Division :

1. Gratia Increata—Gratia Creata

The Uncreated Grace is God Himself in so far as He, in His love, from all eternity has pre-determined the gifts of grace, in so far as He has communicated Himself in the Incarnation of Christ's Humanity (gratia unionis), in so far as He indwells in the souls of the justified, and in so far as He gives Himself to the blessed for possession and enjoyment in the Beatific Vision. The Hypostatic Union, The Indwelling and The Beatific Vision, considered as acts, are indeed created graces, for they had a beginning in time. But the gift which is conferred on a creature in these acts is uncreated.

Created Grace is a supernatural gift or operation really distinct from God

The Second Division :

2. Gratia Dei (Creatoris)—Gratia Christi (Redemptoris)

The Grace of God or *of the Creator* is the grace which God, from the sole motive of love, bestowed on the angels and on our First Parents in Paradise, who, in consequence of their sinlessness, were only negatively unworthy of the reception of grace (non digni) leaving aside the question of the merits of Christ.

The Grace of Christ or *of the Redeemer* is the grace, which God (from the double motive of love and mercy for men, who, in consequence of the Fall, were positively unworthy (indigni) of the reception of grace), has bestowed and continues to bestow, in view of the merits of Christ's Redemption. Both the Grace of God and the Grace of Christ elevate the receiver into the supernatural order of being and activity (gratia elevans). In addition the Grace of Christ has the task of curing the wounds inflicted by sin (gratia elevans et sanans or medicinalis).

In virtue of their theory that the Incarnation would have taken place apart from the Fall, the Scotists include the grace of the angels and of the First Parents in Paradise in the Grace of Christ, not, however, in so far as He is the Redeemer (gratia Christi tamquam Redemptoris), but in so far as He is the Head of all Creation (gratia Christi tamquam capitis omnis creaturae). (See Doctrine of Redemption, Par 2.)

3. The Third Division :

3. Gratia Externa—Gratia Interna

External Grace is any benevolent deed of God for the salvation of men, which is external to man and which affects man in a moral way only, for example : Revelation ; Christ's teaching and example ; sermons ; the Liturgy ; the Sacraments ; the example of the saints.

Internal Grace affects the soul and its powers intrinsically, and operates physically on it, for example : sanctifying grace ; the infused virtues ; actual grace. Outward graces dispose men for the reception of inner graces. Cf. 1 Cor. 3, 6.

4. The Fourth Division :

4. Gratia Gratis Data—Gratia Gratum Faciens

Although every grace is gratis data, i.e., a free gift of the Divine Goodness the term *Gratia Gratis Data* is given specifically to every grace which is conferred on particular persons for the salvation of others. To this class belong such extraordinary gifts of grace as charismata (prophecy, gift of miracles, gift of tongues ; cf. 1 Cor. 12, 8 et seq.), the priestly power of consecration, the hierarchical power of jurisdiction. The possession of these gifts is independent of the personal moral composition of their possessor (cf. Mt. 7, 22 et seq. ; John 11, 49-52).

Gratia Gratum Faciens or the grace of sanctification is for all men, and its purpose is the personal sanctification of him who receives it. It makes the receiver pleasing to God (gratum) either by formally sanctifying him (sanctifying

grace) or by preparing him for sanctification, or by preserving and increasing his sanctification (actual grace). Gratia gratis data is given to secure for men gratia gratum faciens. This latter then is more sublime and more valuable than the former. Cf. 1 Cor. 12, 31 et seq.

The Fifth Division :

5. Gratia Habitualis (sanctificans)—Gratia Actualis

Gratia gratum faciens embraces both gratia habitualis and gratia actualis. *Habitual grace* is a constant supernatural quality of the soul which sanctifies man intrinsically and makes him just and pleasing to God (sanctifying grace or justifying grace).

Actual grace or assisting grace or helping grace is a temporary supernatural intervention by God by which the powers of the soul are stirred up to perform a salutary act which is directed to the attaining or preservation or increase of sanctifying grace.

The Sixth Division :

6. Gratia Actualis is distinguished into :

a) *Gratia illuminationis*, i.e., the enlightenment of the intellect and *gratia inspirationis*, i.e., the strengthening of the will.

b) *Gratia Praeveniens* (antecedens, excitans, vocans, operans) which precedes and affects a deliberate act of will, and *Gratia subsequens* (adjuvans, concomitans, co-operans) which accompanies and supports the deliberate act.

c) *Sufficient Grace* (gratia sufficiens) and *efficacious grace* (gratia efficax). The former gives a person the power to accomplish the salutary act, the latter de facto secures that the salutary act is accomplished.

§ 4. The Principal Errors concerning Grace

Pelagianism

The founder of Pelagianism was a lay-monk named Pelagius, of very austere life and probably a native of Ireland. He was the author of a commentary on St. Paul, and of various ascetical writings († after 418). The outstanding exponents of the error concerning grace which he originated were the Presbyter Caelestius and Bishop Julian of Eclanum. The defender of the Church doctrine, who towers in this matter above all the others is St. Augustine, called "Doctor Gratiae," who devoted the last two decades of his life to contesting the Pelagian error. Cf. De natura et gratia, 62, 73 ; pro gratia Christi clamo, sine qua nemo iustificatur. Side by side with him other defenders of the Christian teaching appeared. Chief amongst these are : St. Jerome, the Presbyter Orosius, and the layman Marius Mercator. The Pelagian error was scientifically refuted by St. Augustine, and condemned by the Church at numerous particular synods (Carthage 411, 416, 418, Milevis 416), and finally at the Third General Council of Ephesus, 431. Cf. D 101–108, 126 et seq.

Pelagianism denies the elevation of man into the supernatural state, and denies

original sin. According to the Pelagians the sin of Adam affected his decendants by way of bad example only. Thus, Christ's deed of Redemption consists above all in His teaching and in His example of virtue. Pelagianism regarded grace as within the natural capacity of man. Man in this view has a natural capacity to live a sinless and holy life and merit eternal bliss by exercising his free will (gratia possibilitatis=liberum arbitrium); this natural moral striving is facilitated by outward grace, the Mosaic Law, the Gospel, and the example of virtue set by Christ (adiutorium possibilitatis); man thus achieves the remission of sins by his own power, by the act of the turning away of his will from sin. Pelagianism is, of course, pure naturalism, influenced by Stoic ethics.

2. Semi-Pelagianism

This developed by way of reaction against the Augustinian doctrine of grace. It was expounded principally in the monasteries of Southern Gaul, especially in Marseilles and Lerins (John Cassian, St. Vincent of Lerins, Bishop Faustus of Riez). It was combated by St. Augustine, Prosper of Aquitania, and Bishop St. Fulgentius of Ruspe, and condemned by the Church at the Second Synod of Orange in the year 529, under the presidency of Archbishop Caesarius of Arles. The resolutions of the Synod were confirmed by Pope Boniface II. Cf. D 174 et seq.: 200 a et seq.

Semi-Pelagianism recognises the supernatural elevation of man, original sin, and the necessity of inner supernatural grace for preparation for justification and for the achievement of salvation, but limits the necessity and gratuitous nature of grace. Striving to preserve the freedom of the will and the personal co-operation of man in the process of sanctification, the originators of the error came to the following conclusions: a) The primary desire for salvation proceeds from the natural powers of man (initium fidei, pius credulitatis affectus, pia studia). b) Man does not require supernatural help to persevere in virtue to the end. c) Man can merit *de congruo* the first grace by his own natural endeavours.

3. The Reformers

While Pelagius denied the supernatural endowment of man, Luther, who strained the doctrine of St. Augustine beyond its proper limits, made grace an essential constituent part of human nature. By its loss human nature was entirely corrupted, as its essential constituent parts were taken away nd concupiscence, in which, according to Luther, original sin consists, has ever since ruled man. In Luther's view, therefore: fallen man is, of his own proper power, incapable of achieving knowledge of religious truth, or of performing morally good actions; Man's will is no longer free, and of itself can do nothing but sin; Grace is not capable of saving or intrinsically renewing and sanctifying human nature, since this is fully and entirely vitiated; What justification effects is merely an external covering of man's sinful state but man himself remains unchanged intrinsically. Man's will is purely passive and does not co-operate with grace, grace alone performing the work of justification. Cf. Luther, In Genesis., c. 19.

Historically, the Rationalism of the 17th and 18th centuries is a reaction against Luther's doctrine of the irreformable corruption of human nature. With an unbounded confidence in man's capacity to think, will and act in virtue of his own inner power, Rationalism rejected the doctrines of Revelation and Grace.

Baius, Jansenius, Quesnel

a) Michael Baius († 1589), appealing to St. Augustine like Luther denied the supernatural nature of the gifts of man in the state of innocence, holding them to be things pertaining to the perfection of human nature. Like Luther, he equated original sin and habitual concupiscence. According to him, the will has become intrinsically unfree. All actions of men proceed either from cupiditas, i.e., evil concupiscence, or from the charity infused by God. The former actions are morally bad, the latter morally good. In the year 1567, Pope Pius V condemned 79 propositions from the writings of Baius (D 1001–1080).

b) The error of Cornelius Jansenius († 1638) is a logical extension of Baianism. According to Jansenius, man's will, in consequence of the Fall, is not free and is incapable of any goodness. All man's actions proceed either from earthly desires which stem from concupiscence (delectatio terrena sive carnalis) or from heavenly desires, which are produced by grace (delectatio coelestis). Each exercises an urgent influence on the human will, which in consequence of its lack of freedom always follows the pressure of the stronger desire (delectatio victrix). According therefore as the earthly or the heavenly desire preponderates in a man so his actions are sinful or morally good. If the delectatio coelestis is victorious, it is called gratia efficax or irrestibilis; if it be overcome by earthly desire it is gratia parva or mere sufficiens. In the year 1653, Pope Innocent X condemned five propositions of Jansenius, taken from the latter's work "Augustinus." D 1092–96.

c) Paschasius Quesnel († 1719) popularised the views of Baius and Jansenius and specially stressed the irresistibility of the Grace of Christ. In the year 1713, Pope Clement XI in the Bull "Unigenitus" condemned 101 propositions from Quesnel's writings. D 1351–1451.

Modern Rationalism

Modern rationalism, which denies everything supernatural and also original sin, in effect accepts the doctrine of Pelagianism.

SECTION 1

Actual Grace

CHAPTER 1

The Nature of Actual Grace

§ 5. Enlightening and Strengthening Grace

1. Concept of Actual Grace

Actual grace is a temporary supernatural act of God directed towards the spiritual power of man for the purpose of moving him to a salutary act. By reason of its temporary character actual grace is distinguished from habitual grace, and from the infused virtues, which inhere as permanent qualities in the soul. By reason of its supernatural character and its ordination to salutary acts (i.e., to activities, which are intimately associated with the supernatural final objective), actual grace is distinguished from God's natural co-operation in the activities of His creatures (concursus Dei naturalis). The expression "gratia actualis" emerged in the later scholastic period (Capreolus) and gained general currency only after the Council of Trent, which did not use the term.

2. The Nature of Actual Grace

a) Teaching of the Church.

Actual Grace internally and directly enlightens the understanding and strengthens the will. (*Sent. certa.*)

The Second Council of Orange (529) declared the following proposition to be heretical: Man, by the power of nature alone and without the enlightenment and inspiration of the Holy Ghost, can think and act as he ought to, and be saved, that is assent to the preaching of the Gospel " Si quis per naturae vigorem bonum aliquid quod ad ealutem pertinet vitae aeternae, cogitare ut expedit, aut eligere sive salvari id est evangelicae praedicationi consentire posse confirmat absque illuminatione et inspiratione Spiritus Sancti" (D 180). Cf. D 1791 104, 797. The teaching of the Church therefore is that man needs a power exceeding his natural capacity (i.e., a supernatural power), for the performance of salutary acts. The supernatural help of God in salutary activities extends to the two faculties of the soul, the reason and the will. Actual grace consists in a direct enternal enlightenment of the understanding and a direct internal strengthening of the will.

From the direct internal enlightenment of the understanding and the strengthening of the will must be distinguished the indirect enlightenment of the understanding, which occurs naturally by outward means (gratiae externae), e.g., the teaching of Revelation, sermons, readings, and the consequent indirect strengthening of the will, which in the course of nature, follows from the enlightenment of the understanding. A salutary act exists only when the faculties of the soul are immediately and intrinsically moved by grace.

b) Proof from Scripture and Tradition.

The existence of an immediate intrinsic Divine enlightenment of the understanding and its necessity for the performance of salutary acts is testified to in Sacred Scripture: 2 Cor. 3, 5: "Not as if we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves: but our sufficiency is from God." In these words St. Paul teaches that we are by nature incapable of salutary acts which lead to our eternal salvation. To perform supernatural acts we need supernatural light from God. 1 Cor. 3, 6 et seq.: "I have planted, Apollo watered, but God gave the increase. Therefore, neither he that planteth is anything, nor he that watereth: but God that giveth the increase." Here the Apostle expresses the thought that the Apostolic preaching is unfruitful if our inner enlightenment by God is not added to the outward enlightenment by the preacher. Cf. Eph. 1, 17 et seq.; Acts 16, 14; 1 John 2, 27.

The need for a supernatural strengthening of the will to move a person to salutary acts emerges also from Sacred Scripture. Thus in Phil. 2, 13 we read: "For it is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will"; and in John 6, 44: "No man can come to me (that is, believe in me) except the Father, who hath sent me, draw him."

Among the Fathers, St. Augustine, especially in the struggle against the Pelagians who denied inner grace, emphasised the necessity of inner grace of understanding and inner grace of will. Cf. In Ep. I. Ioan. tr. 3, 13: De gratia Christi 26, 27.

c) Proof from Reason.

The direct intrinsic enlightenment of the understanding and strengthening of the will is demanded by the intimate connection between man's supernatural final destination and his salutary acts. The means must be of the same order of Being as the end. The end is entitatively supernatural, consequently the means, the salutary acts proceeding by way of knowledge from the will, must also be entitatively supernatural.

§ 6. Antecedent and Consequent Grace

1. Antecedent Grace

> **There is a supernatural intervention of God in the faculties of the soul, which precedes the free act of the will. (*De fide.*)**

In this case God works alone "in us, without us" (in nobis sine nobis, sc. libere cooperantibus), and produces spontaneous indeliberate acts of knowledge and

will (actus indeliberati). This grace is called gratia praeveniens (also antecedens, excitans, vocans, operans).

The Church's teaching of the existence of antecedent grace and its necessity for the achieving of justification was defined at the Council of Trent. D 797: "In adults the beginning of justification must proceed from the antecedent grace of God acquired by Jesus Christ (a Dei per Christum Jesum praeveniente gratia)." Cf. D. 813.

Holy Scripture indicates the working of antecedent grace in the metaphors of standing and knocking at the door (Apoc. 3, 20), of the drawing by the Fathei (John 6, 44), of the invocation of God (Jer. 17, 23; Ps. 94, 8).

2. Consequent Grace

There is a supernatural influence of God in the faculties of the soul which coincides in time with man's free act of will. (*De fide.*)

In salutary acts God and man work together. God works "in us, with us" (in nobis nobiscum; cf. D 182), so that they are a conjoint work of God's grace and of man's activity under the control of his will. The grace which supports and accompanies the solutary act (having regard to the operation of grace which preceded the act of the will), is called adiuvans, concomitans, cooperans.

The Church's teaching regarding the reality and necessity of consequent grace is expressed in the Decree of the Council of Trent. D 797. The sinner returns to justification: "by freely assenting to and co-operating with grace (gratiae libere assentiendo et cooperando)." D 810: "God's Goodness towards all men is so great that He wishes them to merit what are His gifts. . . . Who renders to everyone according to his works." Cf. D 141.

St. Paul emphasises the all-importance of grace in salutary human acts: 1 Cor. 15, 10: "But by the grace of God I am what I am. And his grace in me hath not been void: but I have laboured more abundantly than all they. Yet not I, but the grace of God with me (gratia Dei mecum)."

St. Augustine thus describes the operation of antecedent and subsequent grace: "God works in man many good things to which man does not contribute; but man does not work any good things apart from God since it is from God man receives the power to do the good things which he does" (Contra. duas Ep. Pel. II 9, 21=D 193). "The Lord prepares the will, and perfects by His co-operation that which He begins by His working. For the same God works in the beginning so that we may will to do good . . . He willingly co-operates with the willing one and perfects him. . . . In order that we may will (to do good), He works without (=before) us; but if we will (to do good), and so will that in fact we do it, He works with us. But without Him Who so works that we may will (to do good) and co-operates with us when we will, we can do nothing in regard to the good works of piety" (De gratia et lib. arb. 17, 33). Cf. St. Gregory the Great, Moral, XVI 25, 30, and the Prayer Actiones nostras.

§ 7. Controversy as to the Nature of Actual Grace

1. The doctrine preached by Paschasius Quesnel, according to which actual grace is identical with the Omnipotent Will of God, must be rejected. Cf. the propositio damnata 19 : Dei gratia nihil aliud est quam eius omnipotens voluntas (D 1369 ; cf. 1360 et seq.). God's Will being identical with the Divine Essence cannot be actual grace is a finite implementing of God's desire for salvation distinct from God (gratia creata). Quesnel's purpose was, in accord with his theory of pre-destination, to establish the irresistible efficacy of grace.

2. According to the Molinists actual grace does not add any real entity to our faculties but it consists formally in a vital (indeliberate) act of the soul (i.e. an act of understanding or willing) which God (constituting with our faculties one adequate principle of operation) produces by His Divine Power. In support of their view they appeal to the names given to actual grace in Tradition and in doctrinal utterances of the Church : cogitatio pia (pious thought), cognitio (knowledge), scientia (knowledge) or bona voluntas (good will), sanctum desiderium (a holy desire or wish), cupiditas boni (desire for good), voluptas (pleasure), delectatio (delectation), etc., all which expressions signify acts of the soul.

3. The Thomists define actual grace as a supernatural (entitative) gift or power which precedes the vital act of the soul (not in time but by nature) and by which our faculties are intrinsically excited, moved and elevated into action. This supernatural power (actual grace) communicated by God, unites itself with the faculties of intellect and will, effecting with them one united principle from which the supernatural act proceeds.

The Thomists seek to establish this thesis from the teaching of Holy Writ, the Fathers and the Synods, in which antecedent grace is represented as a calling, enlightening, knocking, awakening, drawing, a touching by God. All these expressions designate an activity of God, which precedes the vital acts of the soul and which enables them to be.

The supernatural power, which illuminates the intellect and strengthens the will temporarily so that they perform supernatural acts, is called by the Thomists a transient or " flowing " quality (qualitas fluens), in contradistinction to sanctifying grace, which is a permanent quality. The teaching of St. Thomas (S. th. I II 110, 2) does not contradict this, although he expressly says of actual grace that : " it is not a quality, but a motion of the soul " (non est qualitas sed motus quidam animae) ; for by " quality " he understands a permanent disposition, and by " motion of the soul " he understands, not a vital act of the soul, but a movement which consists in the acceptance of the grace proceeding from God (anima hominis movetur a Deo ad aliquid cognoscendum vel volendum vel agendum).

Against the Molinistic conception there is the consideration that the supernatural vital acts of the soul are conjointly produced by God and the powers of the soul, while grace is caused by God alone. Hence the notion that the vital acts themselves are actual grace seems to be unacceptable.

CHAPTER 2

The Necessity of Actual Grace

§ 8. The Necessity of Grace for the Acts of the Supernatural Order.

1. Necessity of Grace for Every Salutary Act

For every salutary act internal supernatural grace of God (gratia elevans) is absolutely necessary. (*De fide.*)

The Second Council of Orange (529) teaches in Can. 9 : quoties bona agimus, Deus in nobis atque nobiscum, ut operemur, operatur ("as often as we do good God operates in us and with us, so that we may operate") (D 182), in Can. 20 ; nulla facit homo bona, quae non Deus praestat, ut faciat homo (man does no good except that which God brings about that man performs) (D 193 : cf. 180). The Council of Trent confirmed this doctrine in its Justification Decree, Can. 1-3 (D 811-813). The Church's teaching is opposed to Pelagianism and modern Rationalism.

In John 15, 1 et seq., in the parable of the vine and the grapes, Christ vividly represents the influence of grace going out from Him to souls, which brings forth fruits of eternal life, i.e., salutary acts. V. 5 : "I am the vine : you the branches. He that abideth in me, and I in him, the same beareth much fruit : for without me you can do nothing" (sine me nihil potestis facere). St. Paul expresses the same idea by the notion of the connection between the head and the limbs (Eph. 4, 15 et seq. : Col. 2, 19). For every salutary thought (2 Cor. 3, 5) ; for every good resolve of the will (Rom. 9, 16), and for every good work (Phil. 2, 13 ; 1 Cor. 12, 3), the Apostle demands the assistance of the Divine grace. 1 Cor. 12, 3 : "No man can say 'the Lord Jesus' but by the Holy Ghost."

The Fathers stigmatised the teaching of Pelagius as an innovation which contradicted the tradition of Faith. St. Augustine thus comments on John 15, 5 : "Lest any one think that the vine could of itself produce fruit, He does not say 'Without me ye can do little,' but 'without me you can do nothing.' Be it then little or much, nothing can happen without Him, without Whom nothing can happen" (In Ioan tr. 81, 3).

The absolute necessity of grace for every salutary act may be shown by considering the entitative supernatural nature of man's final end. From this it follows that the salutary act, which is the means to end, must also be supernatural. Cf. S. th. 1 II 109. 5.

2. Necessity of Grace for the Beginning of Faith and of Salvation

Internal supernatural grace is absolutely necessary for the beginning of faith and of salvation. (*De fide.*)

The Second Council of Orange (529) declares in Can. 5, in opposition to the teaching of the Semi-Pelagians : Si quis . . . initium fidei ipsumque credulitatis affectum . . . non per gratiae donum, id est per inspirationem Spiritus

sancti . . . sed naturaliter nobis inesse dicit, Apostolicis dogmatibus adversarius approbatur (If anybody says that the . . . beginning of Faith and the Act of Faith itself . . . is in us naturally and not by a gift of grace that is by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, he is opposed to Apostolic teaching) (D 178). The Council of Trent similarly teaches that the starting-point of justification is the antecedent grace of God. Cf. D 797 et seq., 813.

Holy Writ teaches that Faith, which is the subjective condition of justification, is a gift of God. Eph. 2, 8 et seq.: "For by grace you are saved through faith: and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God: not of works, that no man may glory." John 6, 66: "No man can come to me (i.e., believe in me) unless it be given him by my Father." According to Hebr. 12, 2, Christ is "the finisher of faith." Cf. Phil. 1, 6; 1, 29, 1 Cor. 4, 7.

The scriptural passage invoked by the Semi-Pelagians: Zach. 1, 3: "Turn ye to me, and I will turn to you"; Prov. 8, 17: "I love them that love me"; Mt. 7, 7: "Ask, and it shall be given you": Acts 16, 31: "Believe in the Lord Jesus, and thou shalt be saved"; Eph. 5, 14: "Rise, thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead: and Christ shall enlighten thee", are, to be explained in consonance with other scriptural teaching, and therefore in such a manner that the turning of man to God has already commenced under the influence of actual grace, which does not exclude the free activity of the will. The turning of God to man referred to in these texts is not to be understood of the conferring of the first grace, but of the communication of further graces.

In the work, De dono perseverantiae (19, 48–50), St. Augustine adduces the testimonies of St. Cyprian, St. Ambrose, and St. Gregory Nazianzus as a proof from tradition of the doctrine. He cites the prayer of the Church for the conversion of infidels: "If faith is simply a matter of free will and is not given by God, why then do we pray for those who do not wish to believe, that they might believe?" (De gratia et lib arb. 14, 29). In earlier writings, dating from the time previous to his appointment as Bishop of Hippo (395) St. Augustine himself had expounded the false opinion that faith is not a gift of God, but the exclusive work of man. What brought him to the knowledge that faith also is a gift of God was the words of St. Paul: 1 Cor. 4, 7: "What hast thou that thou hast not received?" Cf. De praedest. sanct. 3, 7.

Many assertions of the pre-Augustinian Fathers which seem to savour of semi-Pelagianism are to be explained by the struggle against pagan fatalism and Manichaeism, which denied freedom of the will. St. John Chrysostom, to whom the Semi-Pelagians mainly appealed, comments on Hebr. 12, 2: "He Himself implanted the Faith in us, He Himself made the start" (In ep. ad Hebr. hom. 28, 2).

The gratuity of grace demands that the beginning of faith and of salvation be the work of God. In the completion of the act of faith the first grasp of the credibility of Revelation (iudicium credibilitatis) and the readiness to believe (pius credulitatis affectus) are to be ascribed to the influence of immediate enlightening and strengthening grace.

3. Necessity of Actual Grace for the Salutary Acts of the Justified

The justified also require actual grace for the performance of salutary acts. (*Sent. communis.*)

Since the just are in a state of habitual grace, actual grace for them is gratia excitans by which the soul is enabled to initiate salutary acts and also gratia

adjuvans, which supports the soul during the act and also gratia sanans in that it heals the soul of the wounds left after sin has been forgiven.

No definite decision of the Church has been given regarding the necessity of this grace. However, the definitions of the Second Council of Orange and of the Council of Trent speak of the influence of the grace of God and of Christ on the good works of the justified, without expressly distinguishing between actual and habitual grace. D 809: "Christ Jesus Himself . . . allows His strength to pour out into the justified incessantly. This constantly goes before their good works, accompanies them, and follows them." Cf. D 182. According to the practice of the Church, the justified pray for Divine assistance for every good work they propose to do (Actiones nostras, etc.).

Christ's assertion: "Without me you can do nothing" (John 15, 5) suggests that the just also require the assistance of actual grace for the performance of salutary acts. St. Paul teaches that God prompts and perfects the salutary work of the justified. Phil. 2, 13: "It is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will." 2 Thess. 2, 17: "Exhort your hearts and confirm you in every good work and word." Hebr. 13, 21: "May the Lord of peace fit you in every goodness, that you may do His will."

St. Augustine extends the necessity of actual grace to the just also. "Even as the eye in the body, though it be entirely healthy, cannot see, if it is not assisted by the brilliance of the light, so also man, even if he is entirely justified, cannot live rightly if he is not assisted by the light of the eternal justice of God" (De nat. et grat. 26, 29).

Speculatively, the necessity of actual grace for the works of the just is founded on this, that every creature, on account of his entire dependence on the Creator, requires for the strengthening of the powers at his disposal an actual influence on the part of God (gratia excitans and adiuvans). As the consequences of original sin remains even in the justified man, it is clear that also, on this ground, he requires a special assistance of grace to counterbalance his moral weakness (gratia sanans). Cf. S. th. 1 II 109, 9.

4. Necessity of Grace for Final Perseverance

Without the special help of God the justified cannot persevere to the end in justification. (*De fide.*)

The Second Council of Orange teaches, in opposition to the Semi-Pelagians, that the regenerate also must constantly pray for the help of God, so that they may attain to a good end, and that they may be able to persevere to the end (D 183). The Council of Trent calls perseverance to the end: "a great gift" (magnum illud usque in finem perseverantiae donum; D 826), and teaches that the justified without the special help of God cannot persist in the justification received: Si quis dixerit, iustificatum vel sine speciali auxilio Dei in accepta iustitia perseverare posse vel cum eo non posse, A.S. (D 832) The "special help of God" necessary for final perseverance, consists in a number of actual graces.

We may distinguish :

a) perseverantia temporalis or imperfecta, i.e., transient perseverance, and perseverentia finalis or perfecta, i.e., perseverance to the end of life.

b) Perseverantia (finalis) passiva, i.e., the coincidence of death with the state of grace, and perseverantia (finalis) activa, i.e., the constant co-operation of the justified with grace. The perseverance of the child before the use of reason is purely passive, that of the adult as a rule is both passive and active at the same time. The proposition applies only to the latter.

c) Potentia perseverandi (posse perseverare), i.e., the ability to persevere, and perseverantia actualis (actu perseverare), i.e., perseverance in fact. While the ability to persevere is, on the ground of God's universal desire for salvation, the prerogative of all the justified, actual perseverance is the lot of the predestined only.

Holy Script ascribes the perfection of the work of salvation to God : Phil. 1, 6 : " that He who hath begun a good work in you will perfect it unto the day of Christ Jesus." Cf. Phil. 2, 13 : 1 Peter 5, 10. It stresses the necessity of incessant prayer in order to be able to combat the dangers to salvation (Luke 18, 1 : " We ought always to pray, and not to faint." 1 Thess. 5, 17 : " Pray without ceasing "), and at the same time the necessity of loyal co-operation with Divine grace (Mt. 26, 41 : "Watch ye ! and pray that ye enter not into temptation "); cf. Luke 21, 36.

Towards the end of his life, St. Augustine wrote a monograph, De dono perseverantiae, against the Semi-Pelagians, in which he specially refers to the prayer-practice of the Church : " Why is this perseverance besought of God, if it is not given by God ? Or is this prayer to be a mockery, in that man seeks something from Him, of Whom one knows that it is not He who gives, but rather, that it lies in the power of man?" (2, 3).

If final perseverance as a grace cannot (de condigno) be merited, still it can with unfailing success, be achieved by proper prayer (performed and persevered in, in the state of grace) : Hoc Dei donum suppliciter emeri potest (De dono persev. 6, 10). The certainty of the prayer being heard is founded on the promise of Jesus (John 16, 23). As, however, the possibility of a fall always exists for man, to the extent that he is not unshakably rooted in good, nobody without a special revelation can know with infallible certainty whether he will, in fact, persevere to the end. Cf. D 826. Phil. 2, 12 : 1 Cor. 10, 12.

The intrinsic basis of the necessity of grace of perseverance is that the human will in consequence of the constant revolt of the flesh against the spirit, has not of itself the power to stand fast and unshakably in virtue (active perseverance). Again, it is beyond the power of man to secure that the moment of death coincides with the state of grace (passive perseverance). Cf. S. th. 1 II 109, 10.

5. Necessity of a Special Privilege of Grace for the Permanent Avoiding of All Venial Sins

The justified person is not able for his whole life long to avoid all sins, even venial sins, without the special privilege of the grace of God. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent declared against the teaching of the Pelagians, according to which man, of his own natural powers, can avoid all sins his whole life long, that for this a special privilege of grace is necessary : Si quis hominem

semel iustificatum dixerit . . . posse in tota vita peccata omnia, etiam venialia vitare, nisi ex speciali Dei privilegio, quemadmodum de beata Virgine tenet Ecclesia, A.S. (D 833); cf. D 107 et seq.; 804.

For the proper understanding of the dogma, the following must be observed: By "peccata venialia" are to be understood chiefly peccata semideliberata. "Omnia" is not to be conceived collectively, but distributively, that is, individual venial sins can be avoided with the help of ordinary grace, but not all venial sin, together. "Tota vita" means a long space of time. The "non posse" designates a moral impossibility. The "speciale privilegium" referred to embraces a total of actual graces, which form an exception to the usual order of grace, and indeed a very rare (speciale) exception.

According to Holy Writ, nobody is entirely free from all sin. James 3, 2: "For in many things we all offend." Our Lord teaches the just also to pray: "forgive us our trespasses" (Mt. 6, 12). The Council of Carthage (418) rejected the Pelagian interpretation, according to which the saints ask for forgiveness, not for themselves but for others, or not according to the truth but only out of humility (humiliter, non veraciter) (D 107 et seq.; cf. 804).

St. Augustine makes this charge against the Pelagians: If all the saints could be assembled on earth and asked if they were without sin, they would, with one voice, answer with the Apostle St. John (1 John 1, 8): "If we were to say that we were without sin, then we would deceive ourselves, and the truth would not be in us" (De nat. et grat. 36, 42).

The intrinsic reason lies in the weakness of man's fallen will in face of his disordered motions, and in the wise ordinance of Divine providence, which permits lesser faults, in order to preserve the just man in humility and in the consciousness of his entire dependence on God. Cf. S. th. 1 II 109, 8.

§ 9. Human Nature's Capacity to Act without Grace, and the Limits of This Capacity

The Catholic doctrine of grace stands between two extremes. Against the naturalism of the Pelagians and of modern Rationalism, it defends the absolute necessity of gratia elevans, and the moral necessity of gratia sanans. Against the exaggerated supernaturalism of the Reformers, Baians, and Jansenists it defends man's natural capacity to act in the sphere of religion and morals without grace. In opposition to both extremes, Catholic Theology distinguishes sharply between a natural and a supernatural order, between a natural and a supernatural religion and morality.

1. The Capacity of the Merely Natural Man to Act

a) Even in the fallen state, man can, by his natural intellectual power, know religious and moral truths. (*De fide.*)

This possibility is founded on the fact that man's natural powers were not destroyed in the Fall (naturalia permanserunt integra), although they were weakened by the loss of the preternatural gifts. Cf. D 788, 793, 815.

Pope Clement XI rejected the Jansenistic proposition that without faith, Christ and charity, we are but darkness, confusion and sin. D 1398; cf. 1391

The Vatican Council dogmatically defined that man can know God by the sole light of reason. This is clearly stated in Wis. 13, 1 et seq., and Rom. 1, 20. D 1785, 1806, cf. 2145 (demonstrability of the existence of God). The natural knowability of the moral law is attested by Rom. 2, 14 et seq. The highly developed culture of many pagan peoples gives testimony of the capacity of natural human reason. (See doctrine of God, Par. 1-2.)

b) For the performance of a morally good action Sanctifying Grace is not required. (*De fide.*)

Although the sinner does not possess the grace of justification, he can still perform morally good actions and, with the help of actual grace, even supernaturally good (though not meritorious) works, and through them prepare himself for justification. Thus all works of the person in mortal sin are not sins. The Council of Trent declared: Si quis dixerit, opera omnia, quae ante iustificationem fiunt, quacunque ratione facta sint, vere esse peccata vel odium Dei mereri . . . A.S.D 817; cf. 1035, 1040, 1399.

Holy Scripture enjoins the sinner to prepare himself for justification by works of penance. Ez. 18, 30: "Be converted and do penance for all your iniquities." Cf. Zach. 1, 3; Ps. 50, 19; Mt. 3, 2. It is inconceivable that actions enjoined by God and intended to prepare for justification could be sinful. The Church's penitential and catechumenical practice would be meaningless, if all works performed without grace of justification were sins. The words of Mt. 7, 18: "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit," no more denies the possibility of a morally good work to the sinner, than the parallel words: "a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit," denies the possibility of sinning to the justified.

St. Augustine teaches that even the life of the worst man is hardly without some good works (De spiritu et litt. 28, 48). The phrase of St. Augustine invoked by the Jansenists: Regnat carnalis cupiditas, ubi non est Dei caritas (Enchir. 117) does not prove that every single action of the sinner is sinful, but expresses the idea that there are in the moral life two directions, one dominated by the striving after the good (love of God in the wider sense), and the other by the disordered concupiscence (love of the world and love of self). Cf. Mt. 6, 24: "No man can serve two masters." Luke 11, 23: "He that is not with me, is against me." For the significance of the concept of charity in St. Augustine, cf. De Trin. VIII 10, 14; caritas=amor boni: De gratia Christi, 21, 22: caritas=bona voluptas; Contra duas ep. Pel. II 9, 21; caritas=boni cupiditas.

c) The Grace of Faith is not necessary for the performance of a morally good action. (*Sent. certa.*)

Even infidels can do morally good works. Thus not all the works of infidels are sins. Pope Pius V condemned the following proposition of Baius: Omnia opera infidelium sunt peccata et philsophorum virtutes sunt vitia. D 1025; cf. 1298.

Holy Scripture recognises the ability of pagans to perform morally good works. Cf. Dn. 4, 24; Mt. 5, 47. According to Rom. 2, 14 pagans are by nature able to fulfil the prescriptions of the moral law. "For when the Gentiles who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law; these having not the law are a law unto themselves"

St. Paul had in mind real pagans, not lapsed Christians, as Baius wrongly held (D 1022). The passage Rom. 14, 23 : Omne autem, quod non est ex fide, peccatum est, does not refer to the Christian Faith as such, but to the conscience (πίστις = firm conviction, judgment of the conscience).

The Fathers unreservedly admit the ability of infidels to perform morally good works. St. Augustine praises the temperance, selflessness and incorruptibility of his friend Alypius, who, at that time, was not yet a Christian (Conf. VI 7, 10) and the civic virtues of the ancient Romans (Ep. 138, 3, 17). When we find in his writings many sentences which are almost word for word in agreement with Baius in which he appears to depict the good works and virtues of pagans as sins and evils (cf. De Spirit et litt. 3, 5), these are to be explained by his polemic attitude towards Pelagian naturalism, according to which he admits as truly good and as truly virtuous only that which bears on the supernatural end of man. Cf. St. Augustine, Contra Julianum, IV, 3, 17. 21. 25.

d) Actual Grace is not necessary for the performance of a morally good action. (*Sent. certa.*)

Fallen man can perform good works without help of Divine grace, by his natural powers alone. Therefore not all works which are achieved without actual grace are sins. Pope Pius V condemned the following proposition of Baius : Liberum arbitrium, sine gratiae Dei adiutorio, non nisi ad peccandum valet. (Free will, without the help of God's grace acts only in order to sin.) D 1027 ; cf. 1037, 1389.

The necessity of actual co-operating grace for all morally good works cannot be proved from Scripture, or from the older Tradition. Opponents wrongly invoked St. Augustine. When the latter repeatedly declares that without the grace of God no work free from sin is possible, it must be observed that he calls everything sin, which does not bear on man's supernatural final end using the word sin therefore in a special sense. In this sense, also, can. 22 of the Second Council of Orange must be understood : Nemo habet de suo nisi mendacium et peccatum (Nobody has anything of his own save untruth and sin) (D 195 = Augustinus, In Ioan. tr. 5, 1).

2. Limits of Natural Capability

a) In the state of fallen nature it is morally impossible for man without Supernatural Revelation, to know easily, with absolute certainty and without admixture of error, all religious and moral truths of the natural order. (*De fide.*)

The Vatican Council declared in concurrence with St. Thomas (S. th. I 1, 1) : " It must be ascribed to this Divine Revelation that those Divine things which are not inaccessible to the human understanding in itself, can also in the present condition of the human race be understood by all easily, with definite certainty, and without admixture of error." D 1786.

The reason why, without supernatural Revelation, in point of fact only few men achieve a perfect knowledge of God and of the natural moral law lies in the " wound of ignorance " (vulnus ignorantiae) caused by the Fall, that is in the weakening of man's power of cognition.

b) In the condition of fallen nature it is morally impossible for man without restoring grace (gratia sanans) to fulfil the entire moral law and to overcome all serious temptations for any considerable period of time. (*Sent. certa.*)

As, according to the doctrine of the Council of Trent, the justified "require a special help of God," that is, an actual assistance of grace, in order permanently to avoid all serious sin, and thus to preserve the state of grace (806, 832), there is all the more reason for teaching that the non-justified man without the actual help of grace, cannot avoid all serious sins for any considerable time, even if in virtue of his natural freedom, he is able to avoid individual sins, and to fulfil individual commandments.

In Rom. 7, 14–25, the Apostle St. Paul describes the weakness of fallen nature by reason of concupiscence, against the assaults of temptations, and stresses the necessity of Divine help in order to overcome them.

CHAPTER 3

The Distribution of Actual Grace

§ 10. God's Freedom in the Distribution of Grace or the Gratuity of Grace

1. Grace cannot be merited by natural works either de condigno or de congruo. (*De Fide.*)

Against the Semi-Pelagians and the Pelagians, the Second Council of Orange teaches that no supernatural merit precedes grace: Nullis meritis gratiam praevenientibus debetur merces bonis operibus, si fiant. D 191. The Council of Trent teaches that justification in adults commences with antecedent grace, i.e., "from their vocation, to which they are called, without merits existing on their part" (nullis eorum existentibus meritis). D 797. In the Epistle to the Romans St. Paul says that justification can be achieved neither by works of the Old Testament Law nor by observance of the natural law, but that it is a free gift of the love of God, "being justified freely by His grace" (δωρεάν; gratia) (3, 24), cf. Rom. 3, 9. 23; 9, 16. The concepts grace and natural merit are mutually exclusive. Rom. 11, 6: "And if by grace, it is not now by works: otherwise grace is no longer grace." Cf. Eph. 2, 8 et seq.; 2 Tim. 1, 9; Tit. 3, 4 et seq.; 1 Cor. 4, 7.

Amongst the Fathers, St. Augustine especially defended the gratuity of grace against the Pelagians. Cf. Enarr, in Ps. 30 Sermo 1, 6: "Why grace? Because it is given as a gift (gratis). Why is it given as a gift? Because thy merits have not gone before it." In Ioan tr. 86, 2: "It is not grace if merits have preceded it. But it is grace; therefore grace did not discover merits; it effected them." That the first grace cannot be merited is obvious from this that there is an intrinic

lack of a proportion between nature and grace (gratia excedit proportionem naturae) and because of the impossibility of meriting the grace which is essential to supernatural merit (Principium meriti non cadit sub eodem merito). Cf. S. th. 1 II 114, 5.

2. Grace cannot be obtained by petitions deriving from purely natural prayer. (*Sent. Certa.*)

The Second Council of Orange teaches against the Semi-Pelagians that grace is not bestowed as a result of human petitions, but rather that grace works in us and makes us call upon God. D 176.

According to St. Paul's teaching, right prayer is a fruit of a grace from the Holy Ghost. Rom. 8, 26: "Likewise, the Spirit also helpeth our infirmity. For, we know not what we should pray for as we ought; but the Spirit himself asketh for us with unspeakable groanings." 1 Cor. 12, 3: "And no man can say the Lord Jesus, but by the Holy Ghost."

St. Augustine teaches that salutary prayer is an operation of the Holy Ghost. In view of Rom. 8, 15, he says: "From this we know that also this is a gift of God that with sincere hearts and in the spirit we call to God. Thus they may imagine how much those deceive themselves who believe it is from ourselves, it is not given to us, that we ask, seek, knock." De dono persev. 23, 64.

Since the initiative in the work of salvation is from God, salutary prayer is possible only with the assistance of a grace which precedes our prayer.

3. Man of himself cannot acquire any positive disposition for grace. (*Sent. certa.*)

By disposition is understood the receptivity of a subject for a form. A negative disposition merely removes obstacles which stand in the way of the assumption of the form, a positive disposition on the other hand makes a subject suitable for the assumption of the form in such a manner that he achieves a certain adaptation for the form in question, and the form appears as its natural perfection. Positive disposition for the reception of grace must be carefully distinguished from the so-called potentia obeodientialis for grace, i.e., from the passive capacity immanent in the spiritual nature of the human soul (or in the nature of the angels) of receiving grace. A natural positive disposition for grace is not possible, since between nature and grace there is no inner proportion.

The Second Council of Orange teaches that the desire for purification from sin does not come from the natural desire of man, but is prompted by an antecedent grace given by the Holy Ghost. D. 177; cf. 179.

Holy Scripture ascribes the beginning of salvation and the whole work of salvation to the grace of God. Cf. John 6, 44; 15, 5; 1 Cor. 4, 7; Eph. 2, 8.

St. Augustine, in his earlier writings, taught a natural positive disposition to grace (cf. De div. quaest. 83, q. 68 n. 4: Praecedit ergo aliquid in peccatoribus, quo, quamvis nondum sint iustificati, digni efficiantur iustificatione; previously he had spoken of occultissima merita). In his later writings commencing with his ad Simplicianum (397) of grace he decisively rejects the possibility of a natural positive disposition to grace, and defends the absolutely gratuitous nature of grace. Cf. De dono persev. 21. 55. As biblical proof he quotes by preference Prov. 8, 35, in the form of the old Latin translation, which goes back to the Septuagint: Praeparatur voluntas a Domino (Vulg.: hauriet salutem a Domino; M: "He achieves the goodwill of Jahweh").

In the work of St. Thomas also a development of doctrine is to be observed. While in his earlier writings (Sent II d. 28 q. 1 a. 4 and Sent. IV d. 17 q. 1 a. 2), in agreement with the older theologians, he teaches that man without inner grace by his free will alone can acquire a positive disposition to sanctifying grace; in his later works he insists on the necessity of that which intrinsically moves the soul, that is, actual grace by way of preparation for the reception of sanctifying grace. Cf. S. th. 1 II 109, 6; 112, 2; Quodl. 1, 7.

Addendum: The scholastic axiom "Facienti quod est in se, Deus non denegat gratiam"

a) Possible explanations

α) This axiom which first appeared in the theology of the twelfth century. and which goes back to Peter Abelard is explained by St. Thomas in his later writings, which may be taken to be the final expression of his teaching, in the sense of co-operation with grace: He, who does with the help of grace that which lies in his power, is not denied further grace by God. Cf. S. th. 1 II 109, 6 ad 2; 112, 3 ad 1; In Rom. 10. lect. 3.

β) In agreement with many Molinists the axiom may be understood also of the natural negative disposition, which consists in the avoiding of sin. But in this it must be noted, that the connection between the negative disposition and the communication of grace is not a causal connection, but a factual one founded on the generality of the Divine will for salvation. God does not give grace, because man avoids sin, but because He earnestly desires the salvation of all mankind.

b) Inadequate explanations

α) The explanation that the natural endeavours of many by their intrinsic value establish a congruous claim (meritum de congruo) to the bestowal of grace is Semi-Pelagian. This interpretation comes close to the view of the earlier Schoolmen and to the explanation given by the disciples of St. Thomas (Sent. II d. 28 q. I a. 4).

β) The Nominalists similarly understand the axiom as referring to the natural moral efforts of man, and thus admit the establishment of a congruous claim to grace. They do not make the communication of grace dependent on the intrinsic value of such efforts, but on God's external acceptation. God gives grace to him who does all in his power, because according to Mt. 7. 7, He has promised to do so. " Ask and it shall be given to you, etc." According to the teaching of Revelation, sanctification proceeds from God, not from man. Accordingly also the asking, seeking and knocking in Mt. 7, 7 is to be understood as referring, not to the natural moral endeavour, but to an act of co-operation with grace. At first Luther explained the axiom in the sense of the Nominalists; later he rejected it as Pelagian.

§ 11. The Universality of Grace

Although grace is a free gift of the Divine Love and Mercy, still, by reason of God's general Will of salvation, it is given to all men. But since, in fact not all men attain eternal salvation, it follows that there is a double will or resolve of God in regard to the salvation of mankind, namely:

a) God's general (universal) will of salvation which wishes the salvation of all men on the condition that they die in the state of grace (voluntas antecedens et conditionata).

b) God's special (particular) will of salvation which, in consideration of the moral state of each person at the hour of death, unconditionally desires the salvation of all those who depart this life in a state of grace (voluntas consequens et absoluta). This coincides with predestination. In so far as the consequent, unconditional will of God refers to the exclusion of a person from eternal bliss, it is called reprobation. Cf. St. John Damascene, De fide orth. II 29.

1. God's universal will for salvation considered in itself

Despite men's sins God truly and earnestly desires the salvation of all men. (*Sent. fidei proxima.*)

That God desires the salvation, not only of the predestined, but at least of all the faithful, is formally defined.

The Church has rejected as heretical the limitation of the Divine will for salvation to the predestined by the Predestinarians, the Calvinists and the Jansenists. Cf. D 318 et seq., 827, 1096. The Divine Will of salvation embraces at least all the faithful, as is evident from the official profession of faith of the Church, in which the faithful pray: qui propter nos homines et propter nostram salutem descendit de coelis. That it extends beyond the faithful flows from the condemnation by Pope Alexander VIII. D 1294 et seq., of two propositions which deny this.

Jesus shows in his lament for Jerusalem that He desires the salvation of those also, who sin (Mt. 23, 37; Luke 19, 41.) It is evident from John 3, 16 that God desires the salvation of all the faithful, at least; for He gave His Son, "that whosoever believeth in Him may not perish." In 1 Tim. 2, 4, we read that the Divine will for salvation embraces all men without exception: "He (God) will have all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth."

The pre-Augustinian Fathers affirm the universality of the Divine will for salvation. Ambrosiaster comments on 1 Tim. 2, 4. "He hath excepted none from salvation" (nullum excepit a salute). St. Augustine also, in his earlier writings, accepted this doctrine (cf. De spiritu et litt. 33, 58). In his later writings however, in accordance with his rigid predestination-teaching he would limit God's Will for salvation to the predestined, and thus explains the passage in Timothy: a) God wishes that men from all classes and conditions should be saved (Enchir. 103). b) All men who are saved will be saved by His will (Contra Julianum IV 8, 44; Enchir. 103). c) God gives us the desire that all will be saved (De corrept. et grat. 15, 47). Some theologians have interpreted this later view as signifying merely that God's voluntas consequens et absoluta of salvation is not universal. This is a forced explanation and there is a considerable doubt as to whether in his later years he acknowledged the universality of God's voluntas antecedens for salvation. His teaching concerning predestination, that God freely chooses for salvation one part alone of mankind out of the "mass of corruption" does not seem to be compatible with a sincere universal (antecedent) will of salvation.

2. God's universal desire for salvation in its practical operation

a) God gives all the just sufficient grace (gratia proxime vel remote sufficiens) for the observation of the Divine Commandments. (*De fide.*)

Gratia proxime sufficiens enables one to perform a salutary act directly; *Gratia remote sufficiens* enables one to perform an act which disposes one to receive grace to perform a salutary act, e.g., the grace of prayer in a person lacking sanctifying grace.

The Second Council of Orange, having already stated this doctrine (D 200), the Council of Trent declared that God's commandments are not incapable of fulfilment by man: Si quis dixerit, Dei praecepta homini etiam iustificato et sub gratia constituto esse ad observandum impossibilia, A.S. D 828. The contrary teaching of Jansenius was rejected by the Church as heretical. D 1092. According to the testimony of Holy Writ, God directs His special care towards the just. Cf. Ps. 32, 18 et seq., 36, 25 et seq., Mt. 12, 50; John 14, 21; Rom. 5, 8–10. God's commandments are easily fulfilled by the just; Mt. 11, 30. "My yoke is sweet, and my burden is light." 1 John 5, 3 et seq.: "For this is the charity of God: when we love God and keep His commandments. And His commandments are not heavy. For whatsoever is born of God overcometh the world." 1 Cor. 10, 13: "And God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above what you are able: but will make also with temptation issue, that you may be able to bear it."

St. Augustine advanced the proposition which was adopted by the Council of Trent: "God does not abandon the just unless they first abandon Him." D 804; cf. St. Aug., De nat. et grat. 26, 29.

From reason it is clear that God is obliged by His fidelity to bestow sufficient grace on the just to enable them to reach Heaven to which they have been called.

b) God gives all the faithful who are sinners sufficient grace (gratia saltem remote sufficiens) for conversion. (*Sent. communis.*)

God does not entirely withdraw His grace even from blinded and hardened sinners.

The Church teaches that the baptised who have fallen into serious sin, "can always be restored by true repentence" (D 430). This implies that God gives them sufficient grace for conversion. Cf. D 911, 321.

The many admonishments to sinners to repent, contained in Holy Writ, presuppose the possibility of repentance with the help of Divine grace. Ez. 33, 11: "I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live." 2 Peter 3, 9: "The Lord dealeth patiently for your sake, not willing that any should perish, but that all should return to penance." Rom. 2, 4: "Knowest thou not that the benignity of God leadeth thee to penance?" Those passages in Holy Writ which describe the hardening of the sinner toward God (Ex. 7, 3; 9, 12. Rom. 9, 18) must be understood in the sense that God permits evil by withdrawing grace from the sinner as a punishment. Repentance is thus made more difficult, but not impossible.

According to the general teaching of the Fathers, even the greatest sinners are

not excluded from God's mercy. St. Augustine says : " One must not despair of even the greatest sinner as long as he lives here on earth " (Retract. I 19, 7). The psychological basis for the possibility of conversion of even the most stubborn sinners lies in this that the will of a person on this earth can change, in contrast to the immutable will of the damned in hell.

c) God gives all innocent unbelievers (infideles negativi) sufficient grace to achieve eternal salvation. (*Sent. certa.*)

Pope Alexander VIII, in 1690, condemned the Jansenistic propositions that Christ died for the faithful only and that Pagans, Jews and heretics receive no grace from Him. D. 1294 et seq., cf. D 1376 et seq.

Holy Writ attests the universality of the Divine will for salvation (in 1 Tim. 2, 4 ; 2 Peter 3, 9), and the universality of Christ's deed of redemption (in 1 John 2, 2 ; 2 Cor. 5, 15 ; 1 Tim. 2, 6 ; Rom. 5, 18). It is irreconcilable with this that a great part of mankind should be deprived of the grace necessary and sufficient for salvation.

The Fathers interpret John 1, 9 (illuminat omnem hominem) as the illumination of all men, even unbelievers, by Divine grace. Cf. St. John Chrysostom ; In Ioan. hom. 8, 1. A Patristic monograph on God's universal bestowal of grace is found in the anonymous writing: "De vocatione omnium gentium " (about 450), which probably was written by Prosper of Aquitania. This seeks to find a middle way between the Semi-Pelagians and the adherents of the Augustinian doctrine of grace, and defends the universality of the Divine desire for salvation and of the Divine communication of grace.

As faith " is the beginning of salvation, the basis and the root of all justification " (D 801), so faith is indispensable for the justification of unbelievers also. Hebr 11, 6 : " Without faith it is impossible to please God. For he that cometh to God must believe that He is : and is a rewarder to them that seek Him." A mere natural faith does not suffice. Pope Innocent XI rejected the proposition : Fides late dicta ex testimonio creaturarum similive motivo ad iustificationem sufficit (D 1173). Theological faith, that is, a supernatural faith in Revelation, is necessary, and this is an effect of grace (D 1789) ; nemini unquam sine illa contigit iustificatio (D 1793). As far as the content of this faith is concerned, according to Hebr. 11, 6, at least the existence of God and retribution in the other world must be firmly held, necessitate medii (by the necessity of means) with explicit faith. In regard to the Trinity and the Incarnation, implicit faith suffices. The supernatural faith necessary for justification is attained when God grants to the unbeliever by internal inspiration or external teaching a knowledge of the truths of Revelation, and actual grace to make the supernatural act of faith. Cf. De verit. 14, 11.

Objection. Against the universality of the Divine desire for salvation it is objected that God does not sincerely and earnestly desire the salvation of children dying without baptism. To this it is replied : God is not obliged by virtue of His desire for salvation, to remove, by miraculous intervention, all individual impediments which arise in the world-order created by Him. These impediments arise from the created econdary causes which have been established by the Divine Prime Cause, and which, in many cases, make vain the execution of the Divine desire for salvation. There is also the possibility that God, in an

extraordinary manner, remits original sin to those children who die without baptism, and communicates grace to them, as His power is not limited by the Church's means of grace. However, the existence of such an extra-sacramental communication of grace cannot be proved. (See Doctrine of the Creation, Par. 25.)

§ 12. The Mystery of Predestination

1. Concept and Reality of Predestination

a) Concept

In the widest sense Predestination is taken to mean every eternal Divine Resolve of Will. In the narrower sense one understands by it that eternal Divine Resolve of Will, which refers to the supernatural final destination of rational creatures, whether the object of this be their acceptance into eternal bliss or their exclusion therefrom. In the narrowest sense it is taken to mean the eternal Divine Resolve of Will to assume certain rational creatures into the bliss of Heaven : Praedestinatio est quaedam ratio ordinis aliquorum in salutem aeternam in mente divina existens (S. th. I 23, 2).

Predestination implies an act of the Divine Intellect and of the Divine Will of pre-science and predetermination. According to its efficacy in time it is distinguished as *praedestinatio incompleta or inadaequata*, which signifies either Predestination to grace only (praedestinatio ad gratiam tantum) or Predestination to glory (praedestinatio ad gloriam tantum), or *praedestinatio completa* or *adaequata* which is a Predestination to both grace and glory. St Thomas defines Complete Predestination as : "praeparatio gratiae in praesenti et gloriae in futuro" (the preparation of grace in the present life and of glory in the future) (S. th. I 23, 2 ob. 4).

b) Reality

God, by His Eternal Resolve of Will, has predetermined certain men to eternal blessedness. (*De fide.*)

This doctrine is proposed by the Ordinary and General Teaching of the Church as a truth of Revelation. The doctrinal definitions of the Council of Trent presuppose it. D 805, 825, 827. Cf. D 316 et seq., 320 et seq.

The reality of Predestination is clearly attested to in Rom. 8, 29 et seq. : "For whom he foreknew, he also predestinated to be made comformable to the image of His Son : that He might be the firstborn amongst many brethren. And whom He predestinated, them He also called. And whom He called, them He also justified. And whom He justified, them He also glorified." This text stresses all the elements necessary for complete predestination, the activity of reason and of will (praescire, praedestinare) and the principal stages of its temporal realisation (vocare, iustificare, glorificare). Cf. Mt. 25, 34 ; John 10, 27 et seq. : Acts 13, 48 ; Eph. 1, 4 et seq.

St. Augustine and his disciples defend Predestination against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians, as a tradition of Faith. St. Augustine comments : "The belief in this predetermination, which is now being zealously defended against new errors, has always been held by the Church." (De dono persev. 23, 65).

Predestination is a part of the Eternal Divine Plan of Providence. (See Doctrine of Creation, Par. 10.)

2. Basis of Predestination

a) The problem.

The main difficulty of the doctrine of Predestination lies in the question whether God's eternal resolve of Predestination has been taken with or without consideration of the merits of the man (post or ante praevisa merita).

Only incomplete Predestination to grace is independent of every merit (ante praevisa merita), as the first grace cannot be merited. In the same way, complete Predestination to grace and glory conjointly is independent of every merit, as the first grace cannot be merited, and the consequent graces, as well as the merits acquired with these graces and their reward, depend like the links of a chain, on the first grace. If Predestination is conceived as Predestination to glory alone, then the question arises whether the Predestination to eternal bliss occurs by reason of the foreseen supernatural merits of man (post praevisa merita) or without consideration of them (ante praevisa merita). According to the former view, the Divine Resolve of Predestination is conditioned (hypothetical) according to the latter, it is unconditioned (absolute).

b) Attempts at solution.

α) The Thomists, the Augustinians, the majority of the Scotists and also individual older Molinists (Suarez, St. Bellarmine) teach an absolute Predestination (ad gloriam tantum), therefore ante praevisa merita. According to them, God freely resolves from all Eternity, without consideration of the merits of man's grace, to call certain men to beatification and therefore to bestow on them graces which will infallibly secure the execution of the Divine Decree (ordo intentionis). In time God first gives to the predestined effective graces and then eternal bliss as a reward for the merits which flow from their free co-operation with grace (ordo executionis). The ordo intentionis and the ordo executionis are in inverse relation to each other (glory-grace ; grace-glory).

β) Most of the Molinists, and also St. Francis of Sales († 1622), teach a conditioned Predestination (ad gloriam tantum), that is, post and propter praevisa merita. According to them, God, by His scientia media, sees beforehand how men would freely react to various orders of grace. In the light of this knowledge He chooses, according to His free pleasure a fixed and definite order of grace. Now by His scientia visionis, He knows infallibly in advance what use the individual man will make of the grace bestowed on him. He elects for eternal bliss those who by virtue of their foreseen merits perseveringly cooperate with grace, while He determines for eternal punishment of hell, those who, on account of their foreseen demerits, deny their co-operation. The ordo intentionis and the ordo executionis coincide (grace-glory ; grace-glory). Both attempts at explanation are ecclesiastically permissible (cf. D 1090). The scriptural proofs are not decisive for either side. The Thomists quote above all passages from the Letter to the Romans, in which the Divine factor in salvation is brought strongly to the foreground (Rom. 8, 29 ; 9, 11–13 ; 9, 20 et seq.) However, the Apostle does not speak of the Predestination to glory alone, but of the Predestination to grace and glory conjointly, which is independent of every merit. The Molinists invoke the passages which attest the universality of the Divine desire for salvation, especially 1 Tim. 2, 4, as well as the sentence to be pronounced by the Judge of the World (Mt. 25, 34–36), in which the works of mercy are given as ground for the acceptance into the Heavenly Kingdom. But that these are also the basis for the "preparation" for the Kingdom, that is, for the eternal resolve of Predestination, cannot be definitely proved from them.

Citations from the Fathers or from the scholastics are not cogent, as the question arose in post-Tridentine Theology only. While the pre-Augustinian tradition is in favour of the Molinistic explanation, St. Augustine, at least in his later writings, is more in favour of the Thomistic explanation. The Thomist view emphasises God's universal causality while the other view stresses the universality of the Divine salvific will, man's freedom and his cooperation in his salvation. The difficulties remaining on both sides prove that Predestination even for reason enlightened by faith, is an unfathomable mystery (Rom. XI, 33 et seq.).

3. Properties of Predestination

a) Immutability

The Resolve of Predestination, as an act of the Divine knowledge and will, is as immutable as the Divine Essence Itself. The number of those who are registered in the "Book of Life" (Phil. 4, 3; Apoc. 17, 8; cf. Luke 10, 20) is formally and materially fixed, that is, God knows and determines with infallible certainty in advance, how many and which men will be saved. What the number of the predestined is, God alone knows: Deus, cui soli cognitus est numerus electorum in superna felicitate locandus (Secreta pro vivis et defunctis). In contrast to the rigoristic view of Mt. 7, 13 et seq. (cf. Mt. 22, 14), with which St. Thomas agreed (S. th. I 23, 7), that the number of the predestined is smaller than the number of the reprobate, one might well assume, in view of God's universal desire for salvation, and of Christ's universal deed of salvation, that the Kingdom of Christ is not smaller than the Kingdom of Satan.

b) Uncertainty

The Council of Trent declared against Calvin, that certainty in regard to one's predestination can be attained by special Revelation only; Nisi ex speciali revelatione sciri non potest, quos Deus sibi elegerit. D 805; cf. 825 et seq. Holy Scripture enjoins man to work out his salvation in fear and trembling (Phil. 2, 12). He who imagines that he will stand should take care lest he fall (1 Cor. 10, 12). In spite of this uncertainty there are signs of Predetermination (signa praedestinationis) which indicate a high probability of one's predestination, e.g., a persevering practice of the virtues recommended in the Eight Beatitudes, frequent reception of Holy Communion, active love of one's neighbour, love for Christ and for the Church, veneration of the Mother of God.

§ 13. The Mystery of Reprobation

1. Concept and Reality of Reprobation

By Reprobation is understood the eternal Resolve of God's Will to exclude certain rational creatures from eternal bliss. While God, by His grace, positively co-operates in the supernatural merits, which lead to beatification, He merely permits sin, which leads to eternal damnation.

Regarding the content of the resolve of Reprobation, a distinction is made between positive and negative Reprobation, according as the Divine resolve of Reprobation has for its object condemnation to the eternal punishment of hell, or exclusion from the Beatific Vision. Having regard to the reason for Reprobation, a distinction is made between conditioned and unconditioned (absolute) Reprobation, in so far as the Divine resolve of Reprobation is dependent on, or independent of the prevision of future demerits.

God, by an Eternal Resolve of His Will, predestines certain men, on account of their foreseen sins, to eternal rejection. (*De fide.*)

The reality of Reprobation is not formally defined, but it is the general teaching of the Church. The Synod of Valence (855) teaches: fatemur praedestinationem impiorum ad mortem (D 322). It is declared in Mt. 25, 41: "Depart from me ye cursed into everlasting fire which was prepared for the devil and his angels," and by Rom. 9, 22: "Vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction."

2. Positive Reprobation

a) Heretical Predestinationism in its various forms (the Southern Gallic priest Lucidus in the 5th century; the monk Gottschalk in the 9th century, according to reports of his opponents, which, however, find no confirmation in his recently re-discovered writings; Wycliffe, Huss, and especially Calvin), teaches a positive predetermination to sin, and an unconditional Predestination to the eternal punishment of hell, that is, without consideration of future demerits. This was rejected as false doctrine by the Particular Synods of Orange (D 200), Quiercy and Valence (D 316. 322) and by the Council of Trent (D 827). Unconditioned positive Reprobation leads to a denial of the universality of the Divine Desire for salvation, and of the Redemption, and contradicts the Justice and Holiness of God as well as the freedom of man.

b) According to the teaching of the Church, there is a conditioned positive reprobation, that is, it occurs with consideration of foreseen future demerits (post et propter praevisa demerita).

The conditional nature of Positive Reprobation is demanded by the generality of the Divine Resolve of salvation. This excludes God's desiring in advance the damnation of certain men (cf. 1 Tim. 2, 4; Ez. 33, 11; 2 Peter 3, 9).

St. Augustine teaches: "God is good, God is just. He can save a person without good works, because He is good; but He cannot condemn anyone without evil works, because He is just" (Contra Jul. III 18, 35).

3. Negative Reprobation

In the question of Reprobation, the Thomist view favour not an absolute, but only a negative Reprobation. This is conceived by most Thomists as non-election to eternal bliss (non-electio), together with the Divine resolve to permit some rational creatures to fall into sin, and thus by their own guilt to lose eternal salvation. In contrast to the absolute Positive Reprobation of the Predestinarians, Thomists insist on the universality of the Divine Resolve of Salvation and Redemption, the allocation of sufficient graces to the reprobate, and the freedom of man's will. However, it is difficult to find an intrinsic concordance between unconditioned non-election and the universality of the Divine Resolve of salvation. In practice, the unconditioned negative Reprobation of the Thomists involves the same result as the unconditioned positive Reprobation of the heretical Predestinarians, since outside Heaven and Hell there is no third final state.

Properties of Reprobation

Like the Resolve of Predestination the Divine Resolve of Reprobation is immutable, but, without special revelation, its incidence is unknown to men.

CHAPTER 4

The Relation between Grace and Freedom

§ 14. The Teaching of the Church on Grace and Freedom

Since God gives sufficient grace to all men, in order that they may work out their salvation, and since, in fact, only a part of mankind achieves salvation, there are graces which have as a consequence the salutary effect intended by God, i.e., efficacious graces (gratiae efficaces), and graces, which do not have this effect, i.e., merely sufficient graces (gratiae mere sufficientes). There is a question as to whether the ground for this difference in efficacy lies in the grace itself or in human freedom. The Reformers and the Jansenists sought to solve this difficult question radically by denying the freedom of the will. Cf. Luther, De Servo arbitrio. The solutions found in the various Catholic systems of grace are not opposed to the teaching of the Church.

1. Freedom of the Will under the Influence of Efficacious Grace

The Human Will remains free under the influence of efficacious grace, which is not irresistible. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent declared against the Reformers: If any one says that man's free will, moved and awakened by God, does in no manner co-operate when it assents to God, Who excites and calls it, thereby disposing and preparing itself to receive the grace of justification; and (if any one says) that it cannot dissent if it wishes, but that, like some inanimate thing, it does nothing whatever, and only remains passive, let him be anathema. D 814.

Innocent X condemned as heretical the following proposition of Cornelius Jansen: "In the condition of fallen nature interior grace is never resisted." D 1093, cf. D 797, 815 et seq., 1094 et seq.

Holy Scripture stresses both the human factor of the freedom of the will, and the Divine factor of grace. The numerous admonishments to penance and to good works presuppose that grace does not abrogate the freedom of the will. The freedom of the will as against grace is expressly affirmed in Dt. 30, 19; Ecclus. 15, 18; 31, 10; Mt. 23, 37: "How often would I have gathered together thy children, and thou wouldst not:" Acts 7, 51: "You always resist the Holy Ghost." The co-operation of grace and free will is stressed by St. Paul. 1 Cor. 15, 10: "By the grace of God I am what I am, and His grace towards me has not been void, but I have laboured more abundantly than all they. Yet not I but the grace of God with me (non ego autem, sed gratia Dei mecum). Cf. 2 Cor. 6, 1; Phil. 2, 12 et seq.

St. Augustine, to whom the opponents of this doctrine appeal, never denied the freedom of the will in relation to grace. In defence of the freedom of the will

he wrote, in the year 426 or 427, the work, De gratia et libero arbitrio, in which he seeks to instruct and to appease those, "who believe that free will is denied, if grace is defended, and who so defend free will, that they deny grace and maintain that grace is given according to our merits" (1, 1). Justification is not only a work of grace, but at the same time a work of the free will: "He who created thee without thy help does not justify thee without thy help" (Sermo 169, 11, 13). When St. Augustine comments that we necessarily do that which pleases us more (quod enim amplius nos delectat, secundum id operemur necesse est; Expositio ep. ad Gal. 49), he is not thinking of a superior good or evil pleasure, which precedes and determines the decision of the will, as the Jansenists declare, but of a superior pleasure which is included in the decision of the will.

The freedom of the will under the influence of grace is the necessary presupposition for the meritoriousness of good works. The testimony of human self-consciousness also supports Catholic teaching.

2. Gratia vere et mere Sufficiens

There is a grace which is truly sufficient and yet remains inefficacious (gratia vere et mere sufficiens). (*De fide.*)

By merely sufficient grace is understood a grace which, in consideration of the concrete circumstances, makes a salutary act possible (vere et relative sufficiens) but which, on account of the resistance of the will, remains inefficacious (mere vel pure sufficiens). The existence of gratia vere et mere sufficiens is denied by the Reformers and the Jansenists, because, according to their view, grace exercises a necessitating influence on man's will. Therefore, according to them, sufficient grace is always efficacious.

According to the teaching of the Council of Trent, man can prepare himself for the grace of Justification with the help of prevenient grace (vere sufficiens); but he can also refuse his assent, if he will (mere sufficiens); posse dissentire, si velit. D 814. Cf. 797. Pope Alexander VIII rejected the Jansenistic teaching that gratia sufficiens, understood in the sense of small inadequate grace (inadequate gratia parva), is an evil, since it makes men debtors before God. D 1296. Holy Scripture witnesses that man often leaves the grace offered to him unused. Cf. Mt. 23, 37; Acts, 7, 51.

Tradition clearly teaches the reality of sufficient grace, which through man's fault remains inefficacious. St. Augustine also knows substantially the difference between merely sufficient grace and efficacious grace. Cf. De spiritu et litt. 34, 60: "His mercy comes before us in everything. But to assent to or dissent from the call of God is a matter for one's own will." If St. Augustine does not recognise the grace which gives one the capacity merely to do good (gratia quae dat posse) as true grace, it is because he has in mind the term "gratia possibilitatis" subsisting in the free will, which was expounded in a heretical manner by the Pelagians. The efficacy of gratia vere et mere sufficiens is established from reason by considering on the one hand the universality of the Divine will for salvation and grace and, on the other hand, the fact that not all men achieve eternal salvation.

§ 15. Theological Speculation on the Relation between Grace and Freedom

1. The Problem

The great theological controversy going on since the end of the 16th century on the relation of efficacious grace to the freedom of the will revolves round the question: How does efficacious grace secure salvation with infallible certainty for the person who receives it? Does this efficacy lie in the grace itself or in the free assent of the human will foreseen by God, i.e., is the grace efficacious by its intrinsic power (per se sive ab intrinseco) or is it efficacious by the free assent of the will (per accidens sive ab extrinseco)? This gives rise to the further question: Is efficacious grace intrinsically different from sufficient grace or only extrinsically different by reason of the free assent of the will?

2. Thomistic Teaching

The Thomistic teaching on this question derives from the Spanish Dominican theologian Dominicus Bañez († 1604), and it is accepted by most of the Dominican theologians. According to his teaching God has predetermined from all eternity that certain people shall be saved, and for the realisation of this bestows effective grace on these people. In this way He physically affects the free will of the elect, and so secures that they decide *freely* to co-operate with grace. Efficacious grace, by its inner power (per se sive ab intrinseco) infallibly brings about that the elect freely consent to do those salutary acts which merit eternal salvation. Thus it is intrinsically and substantially different from sufficient grace, which merely confers the power or potency to do a salutary act. In order that this potency may be translated into act, another new, intrinsically different grace (gratia efficax) must appear. From all eternity God has decreea the free assent of the human will to the efficacious grace whereby He brings about salvation for those who fall within His decree.

The Thomistic teaching is entirely in consonance with the principle that God is the Prime Cause of all created activities, and that the creature, both in his being, and his action, is entirely dependent on God. But the question as to how gratia sufficiens is truly sufficient, and how the freedom of will is to be reconciled with gratia efficax give rise to serious difficulties in this system.

2. Augustinianism

Augustinianism, which was developed in the 17th and 18th centuries by members of the Augustinian Order of Hermits, notably by Cardinal Heinrich Noris († 1704) and Laurentius Berti († 1766), assumes, like Thomism, an efficacious grace (gratia per se sive ab intrinseco efficax). However, as distinct from Thomism, it teaches that this efficacious grace determines the will to perform the salutary act not by physical but by moral pressure, so that the will is led by an irresistible desire to perform freely those salutary acts which lead to salvation.

Augustinianism seeks to preserve the freedom of the will, but conceives grace too one-sidedly as delectatio, and does not adequately explain the infallible success of efficacious grace, or the Divine prescience.

3. Molinism

Molinism, which derives from the Spanish Jesuit Louis Molina († 1600), and which is principally supported by the theologians of the Society of Jesus, teaches that there is no intrinsic substantial difference, but only an external accidental

difference between sufficient and efficacious grace. God equips the faculty of will with sufficient grace for supernatural activity, so that man if he wishes can perform salutary acts leading to salvation. If the free will assents to the grace and with it accomplishes the salutary act, sufficient grace is, ipso facto, efficacious grace. If the free will refuses its assent the grace remains sufficient only. God from all Eternity foresees the free assent of the will by reason of His Scientia Media. The Molinistic system upholds the freedom of the human will in the salutary act, but it seems to detract somewhat from the Divinity as Prima Causa. The explanation of the infallible foreknowledge by God of the outcome of man's free choice by Scientia Media and the consequent infallible efficacy of gratia efficax is very obscure in this system.

4. Congruism

Congruism, which was developed by Francis Suarez († 1617), by St. Robert Bellarmine († 1621), by the Jesuit General Claudius Aquaviva (1613) and which was prescribed as a doctrine of the Order, is a further extension of Molinism. According to the system of congruism, the difference between efficacious and sufficient grace lies not only in the assent of the free will, but also in the congruity of the grace to the individual circumstances of the recipient. When the grace suits the individual inner and outer conditions of the man (gratia congrua), it becomes effective by the free assent of the will: if it does not (gratia incongrua), it remains, by lack of the free assent of the will, ineffective. God, by Scientia Media, foresees the congruity of the grace and its infallible success.
Congruism, as compared with Molinism, has as its aim the emphasis on the supremacy of the Divine Will in determining man's salvation.

5. Syncretism

The Syncretistic System, principally represented by the theologians of the Sorbonne Nicholas Ysambert († 1642); Isaac Habert († 1668); Honoré Tournely († 1729), and by St. Alphonsis of Ligouri († 1787), seeks to take a middle path between the above-named systems. It distinguishes two kinds of efficacious grace. With Molinism and Congruism it agrees that for the easier good works, especially prayer, gratia ab extrinseco efficax is sufficient. With Thomism and Augustinianism, it requires for the performance of more difficult works, and for the conquering of more difficult temptations, gratia ab intrinseco efficax, which, however, predetermines the free will, not physically, but (in the sense of Augustinianism) morally only (praedeterminatio moralis). Those who co-operate with an extrinsic effective grace, especially the grace of prayer, infallibly receive grace which is intrinsically effective since God has guaranteed that He will hear prayer.

The Syncretistic System unites in itself almost all the difficulties of the various systems of grace. However, the thought that prayer plays an important rôle in the achieving of salvation is certainly correct.

SECTION 2

Habitual Grace

CHAPTER I

The Process of Justification

§ 16. The Concept of Justification

1. The Reformers' Concept of Justification

The point of departure of Luther's doctrine of Justification is the conviction that human nature was completely corrupted by Adam's sin, and that original sin consists formally in evil concupiscence. Luther conceives Justification as a juridical act (actus forensis) by which God declares the sinner to be justified, although he remains intrinsically unjust and sinful. On the negative side, Justification is not a real eradication of sin, but merely a non-imputation or covering of sin. On the positive side it is not an inner renewal and sanctification, but merely an external imputation of Christ's justice. The subjective condition of Justification is fiducial faith, that is, the confidence of man, which is associated with the certainty of salvation, that the merciful God will forgive him his sins for Christ's sake. Cf. Conf. Aug. and Apol. Conf. Art. 4 : Art. Smalc. P. III Art. 13 : Formula Concordiae P. II c. 3.

2. The True Concept of Justification

The Council of Trent, referring to Col. 1, 13, defined Justification as: " translation from that condition in which man is born as the son of the first Adam into the state of grace and adoption among the children of God through the second Adam, Jesus Christ, our Saviour " (translatio ab eo statu, in quo homo nascitur filius primi Adae, in statum gratiae et adoptionis filiorum Dei per secundum Adam Jesus Christum Salvatorem nostrum). D 796. On the negative side it is a true eradication of sin ; on the positive side it is a supernatural sanctifying and renewal of the inner man : non est sola peccatorum remissio, sed et sanctificatio et renovatio interioris hominis (D 799). The Reformers' teaching of the merely external imputation of Christ's justice was rejected, by the Council of Trent, as heretical. D 792, 821.

As to the negative side, Holy Writ conceives the forgiveness of sins as a real and complete removal of the sins. This is clear from its use of the following expressions : a) delere=to wash away, to eradicate (Ps. 50, 3 ; Is. 43, 25 ; 44, 22 ; Acts 3, 19), auferre or transferre=to take away, to remove (2 Sm. 12, 13 ; 1 Chr. 21, 8 ; Mich. 7, 18) ; tollere=to take away (John 1, 29)? longe facere=to remove (Ps. 102, 12) ; b) lavare, abluere=to wash away; mundare=to purify (Ps. 50, 4 ; Is. 1, 16 ; Ez. 36, 25 ; Acts 22, 16 ; 1 Cor. 6, 11 ; Hebr. 1, 3 ; 1 John 1, 7) ; c) remittere or dimittere=to send away, to remit (Ps. 31, 1 ; 84, 3 : Mt. 9, 2, 6 ; Luke 7, 47 et seq. ; John 20, 23 ; Mt. 26, 28 ; Eph. 1, 7).

The few scriptural texts, which speak of a covering or non-imputation of sins (Ps. 31, 1 et seq.; 84, 3; 2 Cor. 5, 19), must be understood in the light of the parallel expressions (remittere in Ps. 31, 1; 84, 3), and of the other clear scriptural teaching of a real eradication of sins. In the passages, Prov. 10, 12: ("Charity covereth all sin"), and 1 Peter 4, 8: ("Charity covereth a multitude of sin") there is no question of forgiveness of sins by God, but of mutual forgiveness by men.

On the positive side, scripture represents Justification as a re-birth from God, that is, as a generation of a new, supernatural life in the former sinner (John 3, 5; Tit. 3, 5 et seq.), as a new creation (2 Cor. 5, 17; Gal. 6, 15), as an inner renewal (Eph. 4, 23 et seq.), as a sanctification (1 Cor. 6, 11), as a translation from the state of death into the condition of life (1 John 3, 14), from the state of darkness into the state of light (Col. 1, 13; Eph. 5, 8), as a permanent community of man with God (John 14, 23; 15, 5), as participation in the Divine nature (2 Peter 1, 4: divinae consortes naturae). When St. Paul says that Christ has become our justice (1 Cor. 1, 30; cf. Rom. 5, 18), he thereby expresses the meritorious cause of our Justification.

The Fathers conceive the forgiveness of sins as a real eradication of sins. St. Augustine rejects the Pelagian error that according to his teaching baptism does not completely wash away sins, but merely "whittles them away" to a certain extent: Dicimus baptisma dare omnium indulgentiam peccatorum et auferre crimina, non radere (Contra duas ep. Pelag. I 13, 26). The Fathers frequently apply the designation deification (θείωσις: deificatio) to the sanctification accomplished in justification. St. Augustine explains that the Pauline iustitia Dei is not that justice by which God Himself is just, but that by which He makes us just (cf. D 799); on this account it is called God's justice because it is given to us by God (De gratia Christi 13, 14).

It would be incompatible with the veracity and the sanctity of God that He should declare the sinner to be justified, if he remains in reality sinful.

§ 17. The Causes of Justification

The Council of Trent (D 799) defined the following causes of justification:

1. The final cause (causa finalis) is the honour of God and of Christ (primaria) and the eternal life of men (secundaria).

2. The efficient cause (causa efficiens), more exactly, the main efficient cause (i.e. principalis), is the mercy of God.

3. The meritorious cause (causa meritoria) is Jesus Christ, who as mediator between God and man, has made atonement for us and merited the grace by which we are justified.

4. The instrumental cause (causa instrumentalis) of the first justification is the Sacrament of Baptism. The declaration of the Council adds: quod est sacramentum fidei, sine qua nulli unquam contigit iustificatio. Thus it defines that Faith is a necessary pre-condition for justification (of adults) (causa dispositiva).

5. The formal cause (causa formalis) is God's justice, not by which He is Himself just, but by which He makes us just (iustitia Dei, non qua ipse iustus est, sed qua nos iustos facit), that is, Sanctifying Grace. Cf. D 820.

According to the teaching of the Council of Trent, sanctifying grace is the

sole formal cause of justification (unica formalis causa). This means that the infusion of sanctifying grace effects the eradication of sin as well as inner sanctification. With this the Council rejects the doctrine of double justice which was expounded by some Reformers (Calvin, Martin Butzer), and also by individual Catholic theologians (Girolamo Seripando, Gasparo Contrarini, Albert Pighius, Johannes Gropper), which taught that the forgiveness of sins was accomplished by the imputed justice of Christ, positive sanctification, however, by a righteousness inhering in the soul.

According to the teaching of Scripture, grace and sin stand to each other in direct contrast like light and darkness, life and death. Thus the communication of grace necessarily effects the remission of sins. Cf. 2 Cor. 6, 14: "For what participation hath justice with injustice? Or what fellowship hath light with darkness?" Col. 2, 13: "You when you were dead in your sins and the uncircumcision of the flesh. . . . He hath quickened with Him (Christ)." Cf. 1 John 3, 14; St. th. 1 II 113, 6 ad 2.

§ 18. The Preparation for Justification

1. Possibility and Necessity of Preparation

The sinner can and must prepare himself by the help of actual grace for the reception of the grace by which he is justified. (*De fide.*)

The Reformers denied the possibility and necessity of a preparation for justification, and based their denial on the assumption that man's will, in consequence of the complete corruption of human nature by Adam's sin, had become incapable of goodness of any kind. As against this teaching, the Council of Trent declares: Si quis dixerit, . . . nulla ex parte necesse esse eum (sc. impium) suae voluntatis motu praeparari atque disponi, A.S. D 819. Cf. D 797 et seq., 814, 817.

As scriptural proof, the Council adduces Zach. 1, 3. (D 797): "Turn ye to me and I will turn to you," and Lament. 5, 21: "Convert us, O Lord, to thee, and we shall be converted." The first passage stresses the freedom of movement of our will towards God; the second emphasises the necessity of the prevenient grace of God. Cf. the numerous injunctions in Holy Writ of the Old and New Testaments to repentance and conversion.

The ancient Church catechumenate and penitential practice implied the need of a very intensive preparation for the reception of the grace of justification. St. Augustine teaches: He who has created thee without thyself, does not justify thee without thyself. Thus He created thee without thy knowledge, but only with thy agreement and thy will does He justify thee. (Sermo 169, II, 13.) Cf. S. th. 1 II 113, 3.

2. Faith and Justification

The justification of an adult is not possible without Faith. (*De fide.*)

According to the teaching of the Council of Trent, faith is "the beginning of human salvation, the basis and the root of all justice": per fidem iustificari

dicimur, quia fides est humanae salutis initium, fundamentum et radix omnis iustificationis. D 801. Cf. D 799 : sine qua (sc. fide) nulli unquam contigit iustificatio ; similarly D 1793.

As far as the content of justifying faith is concerned, the so-called fiducial faith does not suffice. What is demanded is theological or dogmatic faith (confessional faith) which consists in the firm acceptance of the Divine truths of Revelation, on the authority of God Revealing. The Council of Trent declares : Si quis dixerit, fidem iustificantem nihil aliud esse quam fiduciam divinae misercordiae . . . A.S. D 822. Cf. D 798 : credentes vera esse, quae divinitus revelata et promissa sunt ; D 1789 (definition of faith).

According to the testimony of Holy Writ, faith and indeed dogmatic faith, is the indispensable prerequisite for the achieving of eternal salvation. Mk. 16, 16 : "Preach the Gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptised shall be saved. But he that believeth not shall be condemned." John 20, 31 : "These are written that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God : and that believing, you may have life in His name." Hebr. 11, 6 : "Without faith it is impossible to please God. For he that cometh to God must believe that He is : and is a rewarder to them that seek Him." Cf. John 3, 14 et seq. ; 8, 24 ; 11, 26 ; Hom. 10, 8 et seq.

The passages adduced by the opponents, which strongly stress the element of confidence (Rom. 4, 3 et seq. ; Mt. 9, 2 ; Luke 17, 19 ; 7, 50 ; Hebr. 11, 1), do not exclude dogmatic faith ; for confidence in the Divine mercy is a necessary consequence of faith in the truth of Divine Revelation.

A real Patristic proof of the necessity of dogmatic faith for justification is the instruction of the catechumens in the truths of Christian Faith and the making of the confession of faith before the reception of the Sacrament of Baptism. Tertullian calls Baptism a sealing of the faith known before the reception of Baptism (obsignatio fidei, signaculum fidei : De paenit ; 6 ; De spect. 24). St. Augustine says : "The beginning of the good life, to which the eternal life also belongs, is true faith" (Sermo 43, 1, 1).

3. Necessity of other acts of disposition besides Faith

Besides faith, further acts of disposition must be present. (*De fide.*)

According to the teaching of the Reformers, faith, in the sense of fiducial faith, is the sole cause of justification (sola fides doctrine). In opposition to this teaching, the Council of Trent declares that, side by side with faith, other acts of disposition are demanded (D 819). As such are named : fear of Divine justice ; hope in the mercy of God for the sake of the merits of Christ ; the beginning of the love of God ; hate and detestation of sin ; and the purpose of receiving Baptism and of beginning a new life. The Council describes the ordinary psychological course of the process of justification, without thereby defining that all individual acts must be present in the given sequence, and that only these can be present. Just as faith, as the beginning of salvation, must never be absent, so also sorrow for sins committed must never be lacking, as forgiveness is not possible without an inner aversion from sin. D 798, cf. D 897.

In addition to faith, Holy Writ demands other acts of preparation, for example: the fear of God (Ecclus. 1, 27 et seq. ; Prov. 14, 27), hope (Ecclus. 2, 9), love of God (Luke 7, 27 ; 1 John 3, 14), sorrow and penance (Ez. 18, 30 ; 33, 11 ; Mt. 4, 17 ; Acts 2, 38 ; 3, 19).

When St. Paul teaches that we are saved by faith without works of the Law (Rom. 3, 28 : "For we account a man to be justified by faith, without the works of the law," cf. Gal. 2, 16) he understands by faith, living faith, active through love (Gal. 5, 6) ; by the works of the law he means the works of the law of the Old Testament, for example, circumcision ; by justification, the inner purification and sanctification of the non-Christian sinner by the acceptance of the Christian Faith. When St. James, in apparent contradiction to this, teaches that we are justified by works, not merely by faith (James 2, 24 : "Do you see that by works a man is justified, and not by faith only"), he understands by faith, dead faith. (James, 2, 17 ; cf. Mt. 7, 21) ; by works, the good works proceeding from Christian Faith ; by justification, the declaration of the righteousness of the Christian before the judgment seat of God. St. Paul is inveighing against Judaists who made much of the works of the Law. Hence the stressing of the good works. The two Apostles concur in demanding a living, active faith.

In consonance with the old Christian practice of the catechumenate, the Fathers teach that faith alone does not suffice for justification. St. Augustine says : "Without love faith can indeed exist, but can be of no avail." (De Trin. XV 18, 32.) Cf. S. th. 1 II 113, 5.

CHAPTER 2

The State of Justification

§ 19. The Nature of Sanctifying Grace

1. Ontological Definition of Sanctifying Grace

a) Sanctifying Grace is a created supernatural gift really distinct from God. (*Sent. fidei proxima.*)

According to the view of Petrus Lombardus (Sent. I d. 17) the grace by which we are justified is not a created grace, but the uncreated Holy Ghost Himself, Who dwells in the souls of the just, and immediately, of Himself (non mediante aliquo habitu), effects the acts of love of God and love of one's neighbour. Cf. S. th. 2 II 23, 2.

The Tridentine definition of Sanctifying Grace as "God's justice, not by means of which He is Himself just, but by which He makes us just" (D 799) excludes the identity of Sanctifying Grace with the Holy Ghost. The Holy Ghost is not the formal cause, but the efficient cause of justification. According to Rom. 5, 5 : "The charity of God is poured forth in our heart by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us." The Holy Ghost is the mediator of the love of God, which is given to us in the justification, and is therefore distinguished from Sanctifying Grace, as the gift from the giver.

b) Sanctifying Grace is a supernatural state of being which is infused by God, and which permanently inheres in the soul. (*Sent. certa.*)

According to the viewpoint of the Nominalists, the grace by which we are justified is the permanent goodwill of God, by which He remits sins to the sinner for the sake of the merits of Christ, and bestows on him the actual grace necessary for the effecting of his salvation. In a similar fashion, Luther defines the grace by which we are justified as condescension of God to sinners, which takes effect in the non-imputation of sin, and in the imputation of Christ's justice.

The expressions used by the Council of Trent "diffunditur, infunditur, inhaeret" (D 800, 809, 821) indicate that the grace by which we are justified is a permanent condition in the justified. The Roman Catechism, issued at the direction of the Council of Trent, calls sanctifying grace "a divine quality inhering in the soul" (divina qualitas in anima inhaerens : II 2, 49). That the grace by which we are justified is a permanent condition of grace in the justified, is clear when we consider the justification of young children. Cf. D 410, 483, 790 et seq.

Holy Writ represents justification as the presence of a divine seed in man (1 John 3, 9): "Whosoever is born of God committeth not sin, for His seed abideth in him"; as the anointing, seal and pledge of the Holy Ghost (2 Cor. 1, 21 et seq.); as a participation in the divine nature (2 Peter 1, 4); as eternal life (John 3, 15 et seq., passim). It designates justification as rebirth (John 3, 5; Tit. 3, 5); as a new creation (2 Cor. 5, 17; Gal. 6, 15); as inner renewal (Eph. 4, 23 et seq.). These different assertions cannot be understood of individual transient interventions of God in the soul for the purpose of the production of salutary acts, but demand a permanent supernatural state of being inhering in the soul. The new, supernatural life in the justified presupposes a permanent, supernatural life-principle.

St. Cyril of Alexandria calls the grace by which we are justified a quality (*ποιότης*) which sanctifies us (Hom. pasch. 10, 2: "a certain Divine form"; *θείαμ τινα μορφωσαν*), which the Holy Ghost infuses into us (in Is. IV 2). Cf. S. th. 1 II 110, 2.

c) Sanctifying grace is not a substance, but a real accident, which inheres in the soul-substance. (*Sent. certa.*)

The Council of Trent uses the expression "inhaerere" (D 800, 809, 821) which an accidental mode of being.

As a state of the soul, sanctifying grace falls more closely into the category of quality and as a lasting state, into the species of habit. As sanctifying grace immediately perfects the soul-substance, and only mediately refers to the activity, it is defined as habitus entitativus (as distinct from habitus operativus). According to the manner and degree of its coming into the soul the habitus of sanctifying grace is defined as hab tus infusus (as distinct from habitus innatus and habitus acquisitus).

d) Sanctifying grace is really distinct from charity. (*Sent. communior.*)

According to the teaching of St. Thomas and his school, sanctifying grace, as the perfecting of the soul-substance (habitus entitativus), is really distinct from charity, which is a perfecting of the faculty of Will (habitus operativus). The Scotists define grace as a habitus of activity, which is materially identical with caritas, and thus assert a virtual difference only between grace and charity. The Council of Trent has not decided the question. While, in one passage, (D 821) it differentiates between grace and charity (exclusa gratia et caritate), in another (D 800), in association with Rom. 5, 5, it speaks of the infusion of charity only. The analogy between the supernatural order and the natural order, is in favour of the Thomistic opinion. This suggests that the supernatural endowment of the soul is just as really distinct from the endowment of the faculties as the soul is from its faculties. Cf. S. th. 1 II 110, 3-4.

2. Theological Definition of Supernatural Grace

a) Supernatural grace is a participation in the divine nature. (*Sent. certa.*)

The Church prays in the Offertory of the Holy Mass: "Grant that by the mystery of this water and wine, we may be made partakers of His divinity, who vouchsafed to become partaker of our humanity." Similarly in the Preface of the Feast of Christ's Ascension into Heaven: "He was assumed into Heaven in order that we might be partakers in His divinity." Cf. D 1021.

a) According to 2 Peter 1, 4, the Christian is elevated to participation in the Divine nature: "By which (His own power and glory) He (God) hath given us most great and precious promises, that by these you may be made partakers of the Divine nature." Again, the scriptural texts which represent justification as generation or birth from God (John 1, 12 et seq.; 3, 5; 1 John 3, 1. 9; Tit. 3, 5; James 1, 18; 1 Peter 1, 23), indirectly teach the participation of man in the Divine nature, as generation consists in the communication of the nature of the generator to the generated.

From the scriptural texts cited, and from others (Ps. 81, 1. 6; John 10, 34 et seq.), the Fathers derived the teaching of the deification of man by grace (θείωσις, deificatio). It is a firm conviction of the Fathers that God became man so that man might become God, that is, be deified. Cf. St. Athanasius, Or. de incarn Verbi 54: "The Word became man, so that we might become God (=be deified)." Similarly C. Arianos. or. I 38 et seq.; Ps.-Augustinus, Sermo 128, 1. Factus est Deus homo, ut homo fieret Deus. Ps.-Dionysius declares deification to be "the greatest possible assimilation to and unification with God" (De eccl. hier, 1, 3).

b) In view of the nature and degree of the participation in the divine nature, two extremes are to be avoided:

It must not be conceived in the pantheistic sense of the transformation of the soul into the Divinity; the infinite distance between Creator and created remains. D 433, 510, 1225.

Neither must it be conceived as a mere moral communion with God, which

consists in the imitation of the moral perfections of God, analogous to the sinner's childhood of the devil. Cf. Jn. 8, 44.

Positively, it represents a physical communion of man with God. This consists in an accidental unification which is accomplished by a created gift of God; this assimilates the soul to God and unifies it with Him in a manner transcending all created powers. Man, who is by nature, in his body, an incorporation of a Divine Idea, a vestigium Dei, and in his spirit, an image of the Divine Spirit, imago Dei, becomes by sanctifiyng grace, similitudo Dei, that is, becomes elevated to a higher supernatural grade of assimilation to God. Cf. S. th. III 2, 10 ad 1: gratia, quae est accidens, est quaedam similitudo divinitatis participata in homine.

The supernatural similarity to God is defined by Ripalda as an assimilation to the sanctity of God, by Suarez more aptly as an assimilation to the spirituality of God. As this is for God, the principle of the Divine Life, of the Divine Self-Knowledge and Self-Love, so sanctifying grace as participation in the same, is the principle of the Divine life in man endowed with grace.

Man's supernatural assimilation to God, which on earth is based on sanctifying grace, is completed in the other world by the Beatific Vision of God, that is, by a participation in the Divine Self-Knowledge, and in the bliss proceeding therefrom. Grace and glory are to each other as seed and fruit. Grace is the beginning of glory (gloria inchoata), glory the perfection of grace (gratia consummata), Cf. S. th. 2 II 24, 3 ad 2: gratia et gloria ad idem genus referuntur, quia gratia nihil est aliud quam quaedem inchoatio gloriae in nobis. Scripture affirms the substantial identity of grace and glory by teaching that the just man already bears in himself eternal life. Cf. John 3, 15; 3, 36; 4, 14; 6, 54.

§ 20. The Formal Effects of Sanctifying Grace

1. Sanctification of the Soul

Sanctifying grace sanctifies the soul. (*De fide.*)

According to the teaching of the Council of Trent justification is "a sanctifying and renewal of the inner man" (sanctificatio et renovatio interioris hominis: D 799). St. Paul writes to the Christian Community of Corinth: "But you are washed: but you are sanctified: but you are justified: in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ and the Spirit of our God." (1 Cor. 6, 11.) He calls the Christians "saints" (cf. the opening passage of the Letters), and enjoins them: "Put on the new man, who according to God is created in justice and holiness of truth." (Eph. 4, 24).

Sanctity negatively signifies freedom from grievous sin, and positively, a permanent supernatural attachment to God.

2. Beauty of the Soul

Sanctifying grace bestows supernatural beauty on the soul. (*Sent. communis.*)

The Roman Catechism says of sanctifying grace: "Grace is . . . as it were a certain brilliance or light which cleanses all stains from our souls and makes them more beautiful and more brilliant" (II 2, 49).

In the bride of the Song of Songs the Fathers see a symbol of the soul adorned by grace. S. Thomas says: Gratia divina pulchrificat, sicut lux (In Ps. 25, 8).

As a participation in the Divine nature, sanctifying grace effects in the soul an image of the Uncreated Beauty of God and remoulds the soul to the image of the Son of God (Rom. 8, 29; Gal. 4, 19), which, according to Hebr. 1, 3, is the reflection of the Glory of God and the image of His Substance.

3. Friendship with God

Sanctifying grace makes the just man a friend of God. (*De fide.*)

According to the teaching of the Council of Trent, one is changed by justification "from an unjust person into a just person and from an enemy into a friend (of God)": ex inimico amicus. D 799. Cf. D 803: amici Dei ac domestici facti. Jesus says to the Apostles: "You are my friends, if you do the things that I command you. I will not now call you servants: for the servant knoweth not what his lord doth. But I have called you friends: because all things, whatsoever I have heard of my Father, I have made known to you" (John 15, 14 et seq.). Cf. Wis. 7, 14; Eph. 2, 19; Rom. 5, 10.

St. John Chrysostom says of the grace by which we are justified: "He has found thee as a dead person, as a lost one, as a prisoner, an enemy, and has made thee a friend, a son, a freeman, a just man, an heir." (In ep. ad Rom. hom. 14, 6.) Love between friends is, as St. Thomas developing Aristotle (Ethica Nic. VIII 2–4) shows, a mutual love of goodwill, which is based on something held in common (S. th. 2 II 23, 1). The basis of the friendship of God is a participation in the Divine nature bestowed by God (consortium divinae naturae). The theological virtue of charity which is inseparably connected with the state of grace enables the justified to love God in return for the benevolent love of God.

4. Kinship with God

Sanctifying grace makes the just man a child of God and gives him a claim to the inheritance of Heaven. (*De fide.*)

According to the teaching of the Council of Trent, justification is "a translation into the state of grace and of acceptance into the kinship of God": translatio . . . in statum gratiae et adoptionis filiorum Dei (D 796). The just is "heir according to the hope of life everlasting": heres secundum spem vitae aeternae (Tit. 3, 7; D 799). Holy Writ depicts the condition of justification as a childlike relationship of man towards God. Rom. 8, 15: "For you have not received the spirit of bondage again in fear: but you have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father). 16. For the Spirit Himself giveth testimony to our spirit that we are the sons of God. 17. And if sons, heirs also; heirs indeed of God and joint heirs with Christ." Cf. Gal. 4, 5 et seq.; John 1, 12 et seq.; 1 John 3, 1. 2. 9.

Adoption is the gratuitous acceptance of a person outside one's offspring to be one's son and heir (personae extraneae in filium et heredem gratuita assumptio). While human adoption presupposes a community of nature between the adopter and the adopted and establishes solely a moral and juridical relationship between them, in the Divine adoption there is accomplished the communication of a

supernatural life, a participation in the Divine nature, analogous to generation (John 1 13; 3, 3 et seq.) which establishes a physical communion between the adopted child and God. The model of the Divine adoptive kinship is Christ's sonship of God, founded on eternal generation. Rom. 8, 29: "that He might be the first-born among many brethren." Cf. S. th. III 23, 1.

5. Indwelling of the Holy Ghost

Sanctifying grace makes the just man a Temple of the Holy Ghost. (*Sent. certa.*)

The Holy Ghost dwells in the souls of the just, not merely by means of the created gifts of grace, which He dispenses, but by His uncreated Divine nature (inhabitatio substantialis sive personalis) Cf. D 898, 1015. Holy Writ guarantees the fact of the personal indwelling of the Holy Ghost. 1 Cor. 3, 16: "Know you not that you are the temple of God and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?" Cf. Rom. 5, 5; 8, 11; 1 Cor. 6, 19.

The Fathers bear witness to the clear teaching of Holy Writ. Cf. St. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. V 6, 1 et seq. Against the Macedonians they prove the Divinity of the Holy Ghost from the personal indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the just. Cf. St. Athanasius, Ep. ad Serap. 1, 24.

The personal indwelling of the Holy Ghost does not effect a substantial, but only an accidental unification of the Holy Ghost with the soul of the just. As the indwelling of the Holy Ghost is an operation of God ad extra, and as the operations of God ad extra are common to the Three Persons, so the indwelling of the Holy Ghost inevitably implies the indwelling of the Three Divine Persons. This indwelling, as a manifestation of the love of God, the personal love of the Father and of the Son, is *appropriated* to the Holy Ghost. Holy Scripture speaks of the indwelling of the Father and of the Son also. John 14, 23: "If any one love me, he will keep my word. And my Father will love him: and we will come to him and will make our abode with him." 2 Cor. 6, 16: "You are the temple of the living God."

Individual theologians (Petavius, Passaglia, Hurter, Scheeben, Schell), influenced by the writings of some of the Greek Fathers believe that, in addition to the indwelling of the Trinity, there is also a special (non-appropriated) indwelling of the Holy Ghost which is proper to the Third Person exclusively. However, this view is scarcely compatible with the doctrine of the unity of the Divine operation ad extra.

§ 21. The Comity of sanctifying grace

Associated with sanctifying grace are supernatural gifts, which are, indeed, really distinct from it, but which are innerly related to it. These, following the Roman Catechism, are known as the comity of Sanctifying Grace: "With sanctifying grace is associated the most pre-eminent comity of all virtues (nobilissimus omnium virtutum comitatus), which is infused into the soul by God concurrently with grace" (II 2, 50). These are:

1. The Theological Virtues

The three Divine or theological virtues of faith, hope and charity are infused with sanctifying grace. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent teaches: "In justification, man receives simultaneously with the remission of sins all the three virtues of faith, hope and charity, which are infused by Jesus Christ in him in whom He is implanted (D 800).

The virtues named are conferred on the soul as a habit or disposition, not as an act. The expression "infuse" (infundere) designates the communication of a habit. As regards charity, the Council expressly declares that this is infused by the Holy Ghost into the hearts of men, and inheres in them, that is, remains as a habit in them (D 821: quae, sc. caritas, in cordibus eorum per Spiritum Sanctum diffundatur atque illis inhaereat).

The teaching of the Council is based, above all, on Rom. 5, 5: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost who is given to us." Cf. 1 Cor. 13, 8: "Charity never falleth away." Just as charity, so also are faith and hope a permanent state or condition in the just. 1 Cor. 13, 13: "And now there remain faith, hope and charity."

In connection with the effects of baptism, St. John Chrysostom says: Thou hast faith, hope and charity which remain. Seek these; they are greater than signs (=miracles). Nothing is equal to charity. (In Actus Apost. hom. 40, 2.) Even if the infused virtue of charity is not materially identical with Sanctifying Grace, as the Scotists teach, still the two are inseparably connected. The habit of love is infused at the same time as grace, and is lost with it. Cf. D 1031 et seq. The habits of faith and of hope are separable from grace. They are not lost by every serious sin, as are grace and charity, but only by those sins directed against their nature—faith by unbelief, hope by unbelief and despair. D 808, 838. By reason of their separability from grace and charity, many theologians (for example, Suarez) hold that they are infused as virtutes informes before justification, if a satisfactory disposition is present. This view does not contradict the teaching of the Council of Trent (D 800; simul infusa), as the Council has in mind only the fides formata and the spes formata.

2. The Moral Virtues

The moral virtues also are infused with sanctifying grace. (*Sent. communis.*)

The Council of Vienne (1311/12) speaks generally, without limiting itself to the theological virtues, of the infusion of the virtues and of informing grace in the mode of a habit; virtutes ac informans gratia infunduntur quoad habitum (D 483). The Roman Catechism (II 2, 50) speaks of "the most pre-eminent comity of all virtues."

The infusion of the moral virtues cannot be definitely proved from Holy Writ; but it is suggested by Wis. 8, 7 (the four cardinal virtues a bridal gift of the Divine Wisdom), Ez. 11, 19 et seq. (walk in the commandments of the Lord, a fruit of the new "heart"), and particularly by 2 Peter 1, 4 et seq., where, side by side with the participation in the Divine nature, a series of other gifts is named (faith, fortitude, knowledge, moderation, patience, godliness, brotherly

love, love of God). St. Augustine says of the four cardinal virtues from which all moral virtues may be derived : " By the grace of God these virtues are given to us now in this valley of tears " (Enarr. in Ps. 83, 11). Cf. St. Augustine. In ep. I Ioan. tr. 8, 1. Cf. S. th. 1 II 63, 3.

3. The Gifts of the Holy Ghost

The Gifts of the Holy Ghost also are infused with sanctifying grace. (*Sent. communis.*)

The scriptural basis is Is. 11, 2 et seq., in which the spiritual endowment of the future Messiah is depicted : " And the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon Him : the spirit of wisdom and of understanding, the spirit of counsel and of fortitude, the spirit of knowledge and of the fear of the Lord. 3. And in the fear of the Lord He has His pleasure." (Sept. and Vulg. : ". . . the spirit of knowledge and of godliness [εὐσέβεια, pietas], 3. and He shall be filled with the spirit of the fear of the Lord".) The Massorah details six gifts, in addition to the spirit of the Lord. The Septuagint and the Vulgate enumerate seven, as they render the concept " fruit of the Lord " in V. 2 and V. 3 differently. The sevenfold number, which goes back to the Septuagint, is not essential. The Liturgy, the Fathers (for example, St. Ambrose, De Sacramentis III 2, 8 ; De mysteris, 7, 42), and the theologians have inferred from this passage that these gifts are bestowed on all the just, as the just are shaped after the image of Christ (Rom. 8, 29). Cf. the rite of Confirmation and the hymns used in the Liturgy " Veni Sancte Spiritus " and " Veni Creator Spiritus," and also the Holy Ghost Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII " Divinum illud " (1897).

There is some uncertainty regarding the nature of the gifts of the Holy Ghost and their bearing on the infused gifts. According to the teaching of St. Thomas, which is generally accepted to-day, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are supernatural, permanent, dispositions (habitus) of the faculties of the soul, really distinct from the infused virtues, and by means of which man is enabled easily and joyfully to respond to the stirrings and promptings of the Holy Ghost : dona sunt quidam habitus perficientes hominem ad hoc, quod prompte sequatur instinctum Spiritus Sancti (S. th. 1 II 68, 4).

The gifts of the Holy Ghost refer partly to the intellect (wisdom, understanding, knowledge, counsel), partly to the will (piety, fear of the Lord). They are different from the infused virtues in that the motivating principles of the virtues are the supernaturally endowed faculties of the soul, whereas the motivating principle of the gifts is the Holy Ghost immediately. While the virtues enable one to perform the ordinary acts of Christian life of virtue, the gifts of the Holy Ghost enable one to perform extraordinary and heroic acts. The gifts are distinguished from charismata in that they are bestowed for the salvation of the recipient and are always infused when justification takes place. S. th. 1 II 68, 1-8.

§ 22. The Attributes of the State of Grace

1. Uncertainty

Without special Divine Revelation no one can know with the certainty of faith, if he be in the state of grace. (*De fide.*)

Against the teaching of the Reformers, that the justified possess certainty of faith which excludes all doubt about their justification, the Council of Trent

declared : "If one considers his own weakness and his defective disposition, he may well be fearful and anxious as to his state of grace, as nobody knows with the certainty of faith, which permits of no error, that he has achieved the grace of God." D 802.

S. Scripture bears witness to the uncertainty of the state of justification. 1 Cor. 4, 4 : "For I am not conscious to myself of anything. Yet am I not hereby justified." Phil. 2, 12 : "With fear and trembling work out your salvation."

The reason for the uncertainty of the state of grace lies in this that without a special revelation nobody can with certainty of faith know whether or not he has fulfilled all the conditions which are necessary for the achieving of justification. The impossibility of the certainty of faith, however, by no means excludes a high moral certainty supported by the testimony of conscience. Cf. S. th. 1 II 112, 5.

2. Inequality

The degree of justifying grace is not identical in all the just. (*De fide.*)

Grace can be increased by good works. (*De fide.*)

As the Reformers wrongly regarded justification as a merely external imputation of Christ's justice, they were obliged also to hold that justification is identical in all men. The Council of Trent, however, declared that the measure of the grace of justification received varies in the individual person who is justified, according to the measure of God's free distribution, and to the disposition and the co-operation of the recipient himself. D 799.

In regard to the increase of the state of grace, the Council of Trent declared against the Reformers, who asserted that good works are only a fruit of the achieved justification, that the justice already in the soul is increased by good works : Si quis dixerit, iustitiam acceptam non conservari atque etiam non augeri coram Dei per bona opera . . . A.S. D 834. Cf. D 803, 842. The various good works are rewarded by different grades of grace.

S. Scripture teaches us that the measure of the grace bestowed on each individual just person varies. Eph. 4, 7 : "But to every one of us is given grace, according to the measure of the giving of Christ." 1 Cor. 12, 11 : "But all these things, one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as He will." In S. Scripture we read also of an increase of grace. 2 Peter 3, 18 : "Grow in grace." Apoc. 22, 11 : "He that is just let him be justified still."

St. Jerome combated the errors of Jovinian, who, under the influence of the Stoic teaching of the similarity of all the virtues, ascribed to all the just the same grade of justice, and to all the blessed the same grade of heavenly bliss (Adv. Jov. II 23). St. Augustine teaches : "The saints are clothed with justice, the one more, the other less" (Ep. 167, 3, 13).

The intrinsic reason of the possibility of different grades of grace lies in this that grace is a real quality of the soul. As such it permits of more or less. Cf. S. th. 1 II 112, 4.

3. Possibility of Losing Grace

a) Loss of grace.

The grace by which we are justified may be lost, and is lost by every grievous sin. (*De fide.*)

As opposed to Calvin's teaching of the absolute impossibility of losing the state of grace, and Luther's teaching that justice is lost only by the sin of unbelief, that is, by the abandonment of fiducial faith, the Council of Trent declared that the state of grace is lost, not by unbelief alone, but also by every mortal sin. D 808, cf. 833, 837. Venial sin neither destroys nor lessens the state of grace. D 804.

S. Scripture both explicitly and in the examples it gives (the fallen angels, our First Parents, Judas, S. Peter) makes clear that grace can be lost. Cf. Ez. 18, 24; 33, 12; Mt. 26, 41: "Watch ye and pray that ye enter not into temptation." 1 Cor. 10, 12: "He that thinketh himself to stand, let him take heed lest he fall!" In 1 Cor. 6, 9 et seq., St. Paul enumerates side by side with unbelief, many other sins, which debar from the Kingdom of Heaven, and consequently also involve the loss of the grace by which we are justified.

St. Jerome defended the possibility of losing grace against Jovinian, who sought to establish the impossibility of losing it on 1 John 3, 9 (Adv. Jov. II, 1–4). The practice of penance in the Primitive Church presupposes the conviction that the state of grace is lost by every serious sin.

Speculatively, the dogma of the possibility of losing the state of grace may be demonstrated by considering on the one hand, human freedom, which implies the possibility of sinning, and on the other hand, the nature of grievous sin which, as a turning away from God and a turning towards the creature, is absolutely opposed to sanctifying grace which is a supernatural communion with the life of God.

b) Loss of the infused virtues and gifts of the Holy Ghost.

The loss of sanctifying grace always involves the loss of Charity.

Charity and grievous sin are mutually exclusive. The contrary teaching of Baius was rejected. D 1031 et seq.

The theological virtue of faith is, as the Council of Trent expressly defined, not always lost with the state of grace. The faith remaining behind is a true faith, even if it be not a living faith (D 838). The virtue of faith is lost by the sin of unbelief, which is directed against the nature of faith.

The theological virtue of hope can exist without charity (cf. D 1407), not however, without faith. It is lost by the sin of despair, which is directed against the nature of hope, and by the sin of unbelief.

The moral virtues and the gifts of the Holy Ghost are, according to the general teaching of theologians, lost when grace and charity are lost.

CHAPTER 3

The Consequences or Fruits of Justification or the Doctrine Concerning Merit

§ 23. The Reality of Supernatural Merit

1. Heresies

The Reformers denied the reality of supernatural merit. While Luther at first taught that all works of the just man are sinful in themselves, on account of the sin remaining in him (cf. D 771: In omni opere bono iustus peccat), he later admitted that a just man with the help of the Holy Ghost, which he has received, can and must perform good works (cf. Conf. Aug. Art. 20: docent nostri, quod necesse sit bona opera facere), but he denied that these are meritorious. According to Calvin (Inst. III 12, 4), all works of man are before God "impurity and dirt" (inquinamenta et sordes). In the Catholic doctrine of merit Protestantism sees a belittling of grace and of the merits of Christ (cf. D 843), a favouring of external sanctification through works, base self-interest, and pharasaical self-righteousness.

(For the concept of merit see Doctrine of Redemption, Par. 11, 1.)

2. Teaching of the Church

By his good works the justified man really acquires a claim to supernatural reward from God. (*De fide.*)

The Second Council of Orange declared with St. Prosper of Aquitania and St. Augustine: "The reward given for good works is not won by reason of actions which precede grace, but grace, which is unmerited, precedes actions in order that they may be accomplished meritoriously (Nullis meritis gratiam praevenientibus debetur merces bonis operibus, si fiant; sed gratia, quae non debetur, praecedit ut fiant)" (D 191). The Council of Trent teaches that for the justified eternal life is both a gift or grace promised by God and a reward for his own good works and merits (D 809). As God's grace is the presupposition and foundation of (supernatural) good works, by which man merits eternal life, so salutary works are, at the same time gifts of God and meritorious acts of man: cuius (sc. Dei) tanta est erga omnes homines bonitas, ut eorum velit esse merita, quae sunt ipsius dona. D. 810; cf. 141. The Council is speaking here of "true" merit (vere mereri: D 842), that is, of meritum de condigno. Cf. 835 et seq.

3. The Doctrine in Scripture and Tradition

Scripture:

According to Holy Writ, eternal blessedness in heaven is the reward (merces, remuneratio, retributio, bravium) for good works performed on this earth, and rewards and merit are correlative concepts. Jesus promises rich rewards in Heaven to those, who for His sake are scorned and persecuted: "Be glad and rejoice, for your reward is very great in heaven" (Mt. 5, 12) The

Judge of the World decrees eternal reward for the just on the ground of their good works: "Come, ye blessed of my Father, possess you the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world. For I was hungry, and you gave me to eat (Mt. 25, 34 et seq.). In Christ's discourses the reward motive frequently recurs. Cf. Mt. 19, 29; 25, 21; Luke 6, 38. St. Paul, who stresses grace so much, also emphasises on the other hand, the meritorious nature of good works performed with grace, by teaching that the reward is in proportion to the works: "He will render to every man according to his works" (Rom. 2, 6). "Every man shall receive his own reward according to his own labour" (1 Cor. 3, 8). Cf. Col. 3, 24; Hebr. 10, 35; 11, 6. When he characterises the eternal reward as "the crown of justice which the Lord, the just judge, will render" (2 Tim. 4, 8), he thereby shows that the good works of the just establish a legal claim (meritum de condigno) to reward on God. Cf. Hebr. 6, 10.

Tradition:

From the times of the Apostolic Fathers, Tradition attests the meritoriousness of good works. St. Ignatius of Antioch thus writes to St. Polycarp: "Where there is great effort there is rich gain" (1, 3). "Give pleasure to your general from whom you indeed receive your pay (reward)! Let your laying-in be your works so that you may receive a corresponding reward" (6, 2). Cf. St. Justin, Apol. 1, 43. Tertullian introduced the term "merit," but without thereby making any material change in the traditional teaching. St. Augustine, in the struggle against the Pelagians, emphasised the part played by grace in the performance of good works more strongly than did the earlier Fathers, but alway staught the meritoriousness of good works performed with grace. Ep. 194, 5, 19: "What merit of man is there before grace by which he can achieve grace, as only grace works every one of our good merits in us, and as God, when He crowns our merits, crowns nothing else but His own gifts?"

Natural reason cannot prove the reality of supernatural merit since this rests on the free Divine promise of reward. The general conscience of men bears witness to the appropriateness of a supernatural reward for supernaturally good deeds freely performed. Cf. S. th. 1 II 114, 1.

§ 24. The Conditions of Supernatural Merit

1. The Meritorious Work itself

The meritorious work must be:

a) Morally good, that is, in accordance with the moral law in its object, intention and circumstances. Cf. Eph. 6, 8: "Knowing that whatsoever good things any man shall do, the same shall he receive from the Lord, whether he be bond or free." God, the Absolute Holiness, can reward good only.

b) Free from external coaction and internal necessity. Pope Innocent X rejected as heretical, (D 1094), the Jansenist teaching that in the condition of fallen nature freedom from external coaction alone and not from internal

necessity enables one to merit and demerit. Cf. Ecclus. 31, 10; Mt. 19, 17: "If thou wilt enter into life keep the Commandments." Mt. 19, 21: 1 Cor. 9, 17. St. Jerome says: "Where necessity is, there is no reward" (ubi necessitas nec corona est; Adv. Jov. II 3).

According to the testimony of the general human conscience only a free action merits rewards or punishment.

c) Supernatural, that is, excited and accompanied by actual grace, and proceeding from a supernatural motive. Even those in a state of grace require actual grace for the performance of salutary acts (Par. 8, 3). A supernatural motive is requisite, because the person performing the action is endowed with reason and freedom, and therefore ought to unite his will with that of God. Jesus promises reward for the works which are performed for His sake. Mk. 9, 40: "For whosoever shall give you to drink a cup of water in my name, because you belong to Christ: Amen, I say to you, he shall not lose his reward."

Cf. Mt. 10, 42; 19, 29; Luke 9, 48. St. Paul enjoins us to do everything in the name of the Lord Jesus, or for the honour of God. Col. 3, 17: "All whatsoever you do in word or in work, do all in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ!" 1 Cor. 10, 31: "Therefore, whether you eat or drink, or whatsoever else you do, do all to the glory of God." The most perfect motive is the perfect love of God (caritas), which, however, need not actually be brought to mind for each meritorious action. In the light of certain statements in S. Scripture some hold that less perfect motives, for example, obedience to the laws of God, hope of eternal bliss, may also be sufficient for meritorious action (thus Suarez, De Lugo, against the view of the majority of Thomists).

2. The Person Meriting

The meriting person must be:

a) Here on earth, i.e., in the wayfaring state. According to God's positive ordinance, the possibility of merit is limited to the period of earthly life. Cf. John 9, 4: "The night cometh when no man can work." Gal. 6, 10: "Therefore whilst we have time, let us work good to all men." According to 2 Cor. 5, 10, the reward is proportional to that which one has done "of the body," that is, during life on earth. Cf. Mt. 25, 34 et seq.; Luke 16, 26. The Fathers reject Origen's notion of the possibility of being converted and of acquiring merits in the other world. St. Fulgentius says: "God has given time to man to acquire eternal life in this life only" (De fide ad Petrum, 3, 36).

b) In the state of grace (in statu gratiae), as far as merit properly so-called (meritum de condigno) is concerned. The teaching of the Council of Trent on merit refer exclusively to the just. D 836, 842. The contradictory teaching of Baius was rejected. D 1013 et seq. Jesus demands permanent association with Him as a condition for the bringing forth of supernatural fruits: "As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, unless it abide in the vine, so neither can you unless you abide in me." For meritorious acting, St. Paul demands Charity, which is inseparably connected with the state of grace

(1 Cor. 13, 2 et seq.). St. Augustine teaches that only "the justified of faith can live rightly and act well" and by it acquire the everlasting life of bliss (Ad Simplicianum I 2, 21).

The necessity that a person meriting a supernatural reward be in a state of grace emerges if we consider that a supernatural reward is proportioned only to supernatural actions accomplished by a person who is in a state of friendship with God.

3. On the Side of the Rewarding God

Merit is dependent on the free ordinance of God to reward with everlasting bliss the good works performed by His grace. On account of the infinite distance between Creator and creature, man cannot of himself make God his debtor, if God does not do so by His own free ordinance. That God has made such an ordinance, is clear from His promise of eternal reward. Cf. Mt. 5, 3 et seq. (the Eight Beatitudes) ; 19, 29 (hundred-fold reward) 25, 34 et seq. (sentence of judgment pronounced by the Judge of the World). St. Paul speaks of the "hope of the life everlasting, which God, who lieth not, hath promised before the times of the world" (Tit. 1, 2). Cf. 1 Tim. 4, 8 ; James 1, 12. St. Augustine says : "The Lord has made Himself a debtor, not by receiving, but by promising. Man cannot say to Him 'Give back what thou hast received' but only, 'Give what thou hast promised'" (Enarr. in Ps. 83, 16). St. th. 1 II 114, 1 ad 3.

According to the view of the Scotists and the Nominalists, the reason for the meritoriousness of good works lies exclusively in God's free acceptance so that God could have accepted as merit and rewarded with everlasting life merely naturally good works. According to the better-founded Thomistic view, the ground of the meritoriousness lies also in the intrinsic value of good works performed in the state of grace. The state of grace effects an inner equivalence (meritum de condigno) between the good actions and the eternal reward.

Addendum. The conditions for meritum de congruo (congruous merit) are, with the exception of the state of grace and of the Divine promise of reward the same as for meritum de condigno (merit of right).

§ 25. The Object of Supernatural Merit

1. Object of Meritum de Condigno

A just man merits for himself through each good work an increase of sanctifying grace, eternal life (if he dies in a state of grace) and an increase of heavenly glory. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent declared : Si quis dixerit, ... iustificatum bonis operibus . . . non vere mereri augmentum gratiae, vitam aeternam et ipsius vitae aeternae (si tamen in gratia decesserit) consecutionem, atque etiam gloriae

augmentum, A.S. D 842. According to this declaration three objects of true and proper merit are to be distinguished:

a) The increase of sanctifying grace.

As grace is the preliminary stage of glory, and as glory is proportional to good works, the measure of grace must also increase with the good works.

As glory is the object of merit, so also is the increase of grace. Cf. D 803, 834.

According to the teaching of St. Thomas, sanctifying grace is not always increased immediately after the performance of a good work, but when the soul is duly disposed. S. th. 1 II 114, 8 ad 3.

b) Eternal life, more exactly the claim to eternal life and, if one is in the state of grace in the moment of death, the real achieving of eternal life.

According to the teaching of Holy Writ, eternal life is the reward for the good deeds performed in this world. Cf. Mt. 19, 29; 25, 46; Rom. 2, 6 et seq.; James 1, 12.

The loss by grievous sin of the grace by which we are justified implies the loss of all former merits as a consequence. The good works are to a certain extent killed (opera mortificata). However, according to the general teaching of theologians, former merits revive when we return to a state of grace (opera vivificata). (See Doctrine of Penance, Par. 16, 3.)

c) The increase of heavenly glory.

As the measure of the heavenly glory, according to the declaration of the General Council of Florence, is different in the various individuals who attain to the Beatific Vision according to the difference in their merits (D 693: Pro meritorum tamen diversitate), consequently the growth of the merit also results in an increase of the glory. St. Paul bears witness: "He that soweth sparingly shall also reap sparingly, and he that soweth in blessings (=abundantly) shall also reap blessings" (2 Cor. 9, 6). Cf. Mt. 16, 27; Rom. 2, 6; 1 Cor. 3, 8; Apoc. 22, 12.

Tertullian comments: "Why are there many dwellings in the Father's mansion (John 14, 2), if not on account of the variety of the merits?" (Scorp. 6). Jovinian's teaching of the equality of the heavenly glory for all the blessed was rejected by St. Jerome (Adv. Jov. II 32-34).

2. Object of Meritum de Congruo

There is no definite doctrinal decision in this matter. The concept meritum de congruo is not without ambiguity, inasmuch as the claim arising from it can be greater or less, hence the opinions of theologians are divided.

a) Meritum de congruo and the sinner.

A person in mortal sin can merit de congruo, by his free co-operation with actual grace, further actual graces in preparation for justification, and finally the grace of justification itself. (Sent. probabilis.) Cf. Ps. 50, 19: "A contrite and humble heart thou dost not despise." St. Augustine says of the Publican (Luke 18, 9-14) that he "on the ground of merit of faithful humility" (merito fidelis humilitatis) departed justified (Ep. 194, 3, 9).

b) Meritum de congruo and the justified.

α) The justified can merit de congruo the grace of final perseverance, inasmuch as it is appropriate that God should bestow on the just man, who faithfully co-operates with grace, the actual grace necessary for the persistence in the state of grace. (Sent. probabilis.)

However, the claim to the grace of perseverance, founded on the good works of the just man, is slight, and therefore it is uncertain. The success of humble and persevering prayer is more certain. Cf. Mt. 7, 7: "Ask and it shall be given you." John 16, 23: "If you ask the Father anything in my name He will give it to you." St. Augustine, De dono persev. 6, 10.

β) The justified can merit for himself, de congruo, the restoration of Sanctifying Grace after a fall through sin, in so far as it is appropriate that God by His mercy should restore grace to a sinner, who previously, in the state of grace, has done much good. (Sent. probabilis.)

When St. Thomas, in S. th. 1 II 114, 7, teaches that man can merit restoration after a fall through sin neither "merito condigni" nor "merito congrui," he takes the concept meritum in a narrow sense. In his commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews (cap. 6 lect. 3) he takes the concept in a wider sense and affirms the possibility of such a meritum congrui.

γ) The justified man can merit de congruo for others that which he can merit for himself, and in addition , the first actual grace. (Sent. probabilis.)

The possibility of meriting for others is based on the friendship of God for the just, and on the communion of the saints. More effective than such merit is prayer for others. Cf. James 5, 16: "Pray for one another, that you may be saved, for the continual prayer of a just man availeth much." 1 Tim. 2, 1-4. Only Christ as the Head of the Church, and as the Author of Salvation, can merit for others de condigno (Hebr. 2, 10). Cf. S. th. 1 II 114, 6.

Temporal goods are an object of supernatural merit only to the extent that they are means for the achieving of eternal salvation. (Sent. probabilis.) Cf. S. th. 1 II 114, 10.

PART 2

The Church

CHAPTER 1

The Divine Origin of the Church

§ 1. The Concept Church

1. Explanation of the Word

The English word "Church" is derived, through the German "Kirche", from the Greek word κυρικόν, a vulgar form of κυριακόν, which, like the corresponding Latin dominicum, has been current as a designation for the Christian cult-structure, at least since the beginning of the fourth century.

The Latin word "ecclesia" is the unchanged rendering of the Greek ἐκκλησία=assembly, community. Holy Writ uses the word (in the Septuagint as a rendering of the Hebrew kahal) in a profane and a religious significance. In the profane sense it designates the assembly of the people, the civil community, any kind of gathering of people, for example, Ps. 25, 5 (odivi ecclesiam malignantium) Ecclus. 23, 34; Acts 19; 32, 39, 40. In the religious sense it means the community of God, that is, in the Old Testament, the assembly or community of the Israelites (for example Ps. 21, 23, 26; 39, 10); in the New Testament, the assembly or community of the believers in Christ, and indeed, the individual assemblies, for example, the community in the house of Aquilas and of Prisca (Rom. 16, 5) or the community of Jerusalem (Acts 8, 1; 11, 22); of Antioch (Acts 13, 1; 14, 26); of Thessalonica (1 and 2 Thess. 1, 1); as also the totality of the believers in Christ (for example, Mt. 16, 18; Acts 9, 31; 20, 28; Gal. 1, 13; Eph. 1, 22; 5, 23 et seq.; Phil 3, 6; Col. 1, 18; 1 Tim. 3, 15). Synonymous designations are: Kingdom of Heaven (Mt.), Kingdom of God, House of God (1 Tim. 3, 15; Hebr. 10, 21; 1 Peter 4, 17), the faithful (Acts 2, 44).

The Roman Catechism (I 10, 2), supported by St. Augustine (Enarr. in Ps. 149, 3), gives the following definition of the concept: "The Church is the faithful of the whole world."

2. Material Explanation

The Church is the Mystical Body of Jesus Christ. (*Sent. certa.*)

In the Encyclical "Mystici Corporis" (1943), Pope Pius XII declared: "To describe this true Church of Christ—which is the Holy, Catholic, Apostolic, Roman Church—there is no name more noble, none more excellent, none more Divine, than the expression, 'the Mystical Body of Jesus Christ'."

St. Paul teaches that the Church, the community of the believers in Christ, is the body of Christ, and that Christ is the head of the Body. Under the image

of head and body he vividly depicts the inner spiritual connection between Christ and His Church restored by faith, charity and grace. Eph. 1, 22: "He hath subjected all things under His feet and hath made Him head over all the Church which is His Body." Col. 1, 18: "and He (Christ) is the head of the body, the Church." 1 Cor. 12, 27: "Now you are the body of Christ and members of member." Cf. Rom. 12, 4 et seq.; Col. 2, 19; Eph. 4, 15 et seq.; 5, 23.

The clear teaching of Scripture lives on in Tradition. Ps.-Clement (middle of the 2nd century) says: "It is not unknown to you that I believe that the living Church is the body of Christ" (2 Cor. 14, 2). St. Augustine answers the question: What is the Church? with the words: "The body of Christ. Add to this the Head (=Christ) and it becomes a man. The head and the body, a man" (Sermo 45, 5).

In the early Middle Ages (Paschasius Radbertus, Ratramnus) the expression "Corpus Christi mysticum" appeared as a designation for the Church in contradistinction to Corpus Christi verum, by which was understood the historical and sacramental body of Christ. In the period of early Scholasticism, the expression "Mystical Body of Christ" was, however, also employed of the Eucharist, in order to distinguish the sacramental body of Christ from the historical body. Only towards the end of the 12th century did the appellation, "Mystical Body of Christ," become general as a name for the Church. The word "mystical" (=full of mystery, i.e., hidden things) indicates the mysterious character of the communion of grace between Christ and the faithful.

3. Classification

a) In the wider sense the designation "Mystical Body of Christ" means the communion of all those made holy by the grace of Christ. These include: the faithful on earth; those in the place of purification who are not yet completely justified; and the perfectly justified in Heaven. Correspondingly, one distinguishes the militant, the suffering, and the triumphant Church.

b) In the narrower sense the Mystical Body of Christ means the visible Church of Christ on earth. The Fathers, for example, St. Augustine (Enarr. in Ps. 90, 2, 1), and St. Gregory the Great (Ep. V 18) and theologians often include in the Church on earth those who already before the coming of Christ were bound to Him in spirit by the faith in the coming Redeemer. According to the individual periods of salvation, one distinguishes the Church of the Mosaic Law (Synagogue) and the Church of the Evangelical Law or of the New Covenant instituted by Christ. It is with the latter that the treatise on the Church is chiefly concerned. In the concept of the Church of the New Covenant, one can, as in the concept of the Sacraments, distinguish between an external and an internal side; the external juridical organisation stemming from Christ, and the inner attachment by grace of man with Christ, operated by the Holy Ghost. Although both notions belong to the idea of the Church, they are basically separable from each other, as are the outward signs and the inward grace in the Sacraments. The outward legal side is emphasised in St. Robert Bellarmine's well-known definition: "The Church is a union of men who are united by the profession of the same Christian faith, and by participation in the same Sacraments under the direction of their lawful pastors, especially of the one representative of Christ on earth, the Pope of Rome" (De eccl. mil. 2). The inner saving task of the Church is stressed in J. A. Möhler's definition: "By the Church on earth Catholics understand the visible community of all the faithful, founded by Christ, in which are continued the activities developed by Him during His earthly life for the

remission of sin and for the salvation of mankind under the direction of His Spirit until the end of the world, by means of a continuous uninterrupted Apostolate ordained by Him, and by which, in the course of time, all peoples will be brought back to God. . . . Thus the visible Church is the Son of God in human form constantly appearing, constantly being renewed, eternally being rejuvenated, just as the faithful in Holy Writ are also called the Body of Christ" (Symbolism, Par. 36).

§ 2. The Foundation of the Church by Christ

1. Dogma and Heretical Counter-propositions

The Church was founded by the God-Man Jesus Christ. (*De fide.*)

The Vatican Council declared in the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church of Christ: "The eternal Shepherd and Bishop of our souls (1 Peter 2, 25) resolved, in order to give permanent duration to the saving work of the Redemption, to establish the Holy Church, in which all the faithful would be welded together as in the house of the Living God, by the bond of the one Faith and of the one Charity." D 1821. Pope Pius X declared in the Anti-modernist Oath (1910) that: "The Church was founded immediately and personally by the true and historical Christ during the time of His earthly life." D 2145. The establishment of the Church by Christ means that He Himself laid down the essential elements of her teaching, her liturgy and her constitution.

The Reformers taught that Christ founded an invisible Church, and that her juridical organisation is a purely human institution. The Greek Orthodox Church and the Anglican Church recognise the Divine establishment of a visible hierarchical Church, but deny the Divine establishment of the Primacy of the Bishop of Rome. According to modern liberal theology it was not Jesus' intention to cut off His followers from the Synagogue and to weld them together into an independent religious community; both these things, it is asserted, occurred by force of external conditions. According to Modernism, Jesus conceived the "Kingdom of Heaven," whose nearness He preached, purely eschatologically in the sense of the later Jewish Apocalyptics. Since He believed the end of the world to be imminent, it was far from His intention to institute a Church as a society which should exist on earth for hundreds of years. The Church, it is claimed, developed out of the collective consciousness of the faithful of the first century which urged them to a social coalescence. cf. D 2052, 2091.

2. The Church in Scripture and Tradition

a) The prophets of the Old Covenant foretold the institution, in the time of the Messias, of a new Kingdom of God, which was no longer to be limited to the people of Israel, but which should encompass all peoples (cf. Is. 2, 2–4; Mich. 4, 1–3; Is. 60). Jesus began His public activity with the sermon on "The Kingdom of Heaven" (thus St. Mt.), or the "Kingdom of God" (thus the other Evangelists): "Do penance for the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand" (Mt. 4, 17; cf. 10, 7). His miracles show that the Messianic empire of God had already come (Mt. 12, 28). As conditions for the entry into the Kingdom of God, Jesus demands justice (Mt. 5, 20), fulfilment of the will of His Father (Mt. 7, 21), a childlike disposition (Mt. 18, 3). He enjoins His

hearers to seek first the Kingdom of Heaven (Mt. 6, 33), threatens the Pharisees with exclusion from the Kingdom of God (Mt. 21, 43 ; 23, 13), and proclaims the transfer of the Kingdom of God from the Jews to the Pagans (Mt. 21, 43). Jesus does not understand the Kingdom of God purely eschatologically. It is a kingdom which will be founded and which will continue while the world lasts, and which will be completed in the future world. Many of the Parables spoken by Our Divine Lord, for example, of the sower of the seed, of the cockle in the wheat, of the net, of the leaven, of the mustard seed, depict the Kingdom of God in this world.

In contrast to the Old Testament community of Jahweh, Jesus established a new religious community. Mt. 16, 18 : "Thou art Peter and upon this rock I will build my Church." Here Jesus clearly expressed His intention of instituting a new religious community, which will be dissociated from the Synagogue. To this end He assembled His disciples (Mt. 4, 18 et seq.), and chose from them twelve, "that they should be with Him and that He might send them to preach, and He gave them power to heal sickness and to cast out devils" (Mk. 3, 14 et seq.). In view of their task He called them Apostles (Luke 6, 13) that is, ambassadors, agents, plenipotentiaries (ἀπόσταλος is the Greek rendering of the Hebrew schalach and schaluach and of the Aramaic schelucha = one sent). In long personal contact He instructed them for the preaching office (Mk. 4, 34 ; Mt. 13, 52), and transferred to them a whole series of powers—the power of binding and loosing (Mt. 18, 17 et seq.), that is, the legislative, juridical and punitive power ; the power of consummating the Eucharist (Luke 22, 19), the power of forgiving sins (John 20, 23), and the power of baptising (Mt. 28, 19). He sent them forth into all the world with the mandate to preach His Gospel and to baptise (Mt. 28, 19 et seq. ; Mk. 16, 15 et seq.). Before He returned to the Father He handed over His mission to the Apostles : "As the Father hath sent me so I send you" (John 20, 21). He appointed the Apostle Peter to be the head of the Apostles and the supreme guide of His Church (Mt. 16, 18 et seq. ; John 21, 15–17). The supranational character of the constitution which Christ established, and His developed teaching on faith and morals, which far exceeds that of the Old Testament, necessarily led to the secession of the primitive Christian communities from the Synagogue.

According to the teaching of St. Peter, Christ Himself is the "cornerstone," on which the spiritual temple, which the faithful conjointly form, is built, "the foundation which has been built" (Eph. 2, 20), and on which the messengers of the Faith must continue to build in their missionary work (1 Cor. 3, 11). Christ is the head of the Church (Eph. 5, 23 ; Col. 1, 18). The Church is His property, which He has acquired with His own blood (Acts 20, 28) ; His bride, whom He has loved, and for whom He has given Himself, in order to sanctify her, and to make Himself glorious (Eph. 5, 25–27). True to Christ's commission, the Apostles preached to Jews and Pagans the Gospel of Christ, and established Christian communities. These were bound to one another by the confession of the same faith, and by the celebration of the same liturgy under the direction of the Apostles. Cf. Acts and Epistles of the Apostles.

b) The Fathers see in the Church and in her institutions generally the work of Christ. St. Clement of Rome traces the whole order of the Church back to the Apostles, from the Apostles to Christ, from Christ to God. (Cor. 42.) In regard to Mt. 16, 18, St. Cyprian speaks of the building of the Church by Christ, and designates the Church the "Church of Christ" and the "Bride of Christ" (De unit. eccl. 4 and 6).

As regards the foundation of the Church by Christ, several stages must be distinguished; the preparation during the time of His public activity; the completion by His sacrificial death on the Cross; and the entry into the public sphere on the Feast of Pentecost after the sending of the Holy Ghost. Thus the first Christian Whit Sunday must be regarded as the birthday proper of the Church.

§ 3. The Purpose of the Church

1. Propagation of the Mission of Christ

Christ founded the Church in order to continue His work of redemption for all time. (*De fide.*)

The Vatican Council declares on the purpose of Christ's foundation: Christ "resolved to establish the Holy Church in order to give permanent duration to the work of the Redemption"; ut salutiferum redemptionis opus perenne redderet. D 1821. Leo XIII says in the Encyclical "Satis cognitum" (1896): "What did Christ the Lord achieve by the foundation of the Church; what did He wish? This: He wished to delegate to the Church the same office and the same mandate which He had Himself received from the Father in order to continue them." While Christ acquired the fruits of the Redemption by His own efficacy, the task of the Church consists in the application of the fruits of the Redemption to mankind. This is achieved by the exercise of the three-fold office delegated to the Church by Christ—the teaching office, the pastoral office and the sacerdotal office. Thus the Church is Christ continuing and perpetually working on earth.

Christ bequeathed His mission to the Apostles: "As thou hast sent me into the world, I also have sent them into the world" (John 17, 18). "As the Father hath sent me, I also send you" (John 20, 21). But the purpose of Christ's mission was the eternal salvation of man. "I am come that you may have life and have it abundantly" (John 10, 10). "The Son of Man is come to seek and to save that which was lost" (Luke 19, 10). For the fulfilment of her task, Christ has given the Church the mandate and the full power to preach His truth (teaching office), to inculcate His commandments (pastoral office), and to dispense His instruments of grace (sacerdotal office). Mt. 28, 19: "Going therefore, teach ye all nations: baptising them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost. 20. Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you. And behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world." Luke 10, 16: "He that heareth you heareth me: and he that despiseth you despiseth me: and he that despiseth me despiseth Him that sent me." Cf. Mt. 18, 18 (power of binding and loosing); Mt. 16, 15 (preaching and baptism); Luke 22, 19 (Eucharist); John 20, 23 (forgiveness of sins).

In compliance with Christ's mandate, the Apostles considered themselves to be servants and ambassadors of Christ and dispensers of the mysteries of God. Cf. 1 Cor. 4, 1 : " Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ and the dispensers of the mysteries of God." 2 Cor. 5, 20 : " For Christ therefore we are ambassadors, God as it were exhorting by us. For Christ, we beseech you, be reconciled to God."

The sanctification of men by the communication of the truth, of the Commandments and of the grace of Christ is the immediate purpose of the Church. The supreme and ultimate purpose is, as in all God's operations, the external glory of God.

2. Inferences

a) By reason of her purpose and the means she uses to effect it the Church is a supernatural spiritual society. (*Sent. certa.*)

Pope Leo XIII declared in the Encyclical " Immortale Dei " (1885) : " Although this society (the Church) consists of men, just as civil society does, yet by reason of the purpose set for it, and by reason of the means with which it seeks to achieve this purpose it is a supernatural and spiritual society ; and for this reason it is essentially different from civil society."

Christ said to Pilate : " My Kingdom is not of this world " (John 18, 36). St. Augustine comments on this : " Hear ye, therefore, Jews and pagans . . . hear all earthly kingdoms : I do not hinder your dominion in this world " (In Ioan. tr. 115, 2).

As the purpose of the Church is a purely religious one, she has in herself (per se) no political, economic, social and profane cultural tasks to perform. But as, on the other hand, nature and supernature are intrinsically interdependent, and complementary, the realisation of the religious purpose of the Church is assisted by the fulfilment of the secular tasks which have to be accomplished by civil society. The Church is not opposed to culture and progress, as her whole history demonstrates. D 1740, 1799 ; Encyclical of Leo XIII " Annum ingressi" (1902).

It does not necessarily follow from the religious nature of the Church's purpose that she may not acquire and possess earthly goods. As she must accomplish her spiritual, supernatural function by men living among the citizens of the earth, she can no more dispense with earthly means than could the Divine Founder of the Church Himself (John 12, 6 ; 13, 29). In the Syllabus (1864) Pius IX rejected the proposition : " The Church has no native and legitimate right of acquiring and possessing." D 1726. Temporal possessions, of course, are not an end in themselves, but merely a means to an end.

b) The Church is a perfect society. (*Sent. certa.*)

Pope Leo XIII declared in the Encyclical " Immortale Dei " : " The Church, according to her nature and her rights, is a perfect society, as she possesses in herself and by herself, by the will and the goodness of her Founder, everything that is necessary for her existence and her efficacy. As the aim which the Church pursues is the most sublime, so also her power is the most eminent.

and it cannot be considered as being less than the civil power or in any way subject to the civil power." On the relation of the Church to the civil power, Leo XIII teaches in the same Encyclical: "Each of them is in its nature supreme. Each has definite limits, within which it must remain, limits which are determined by its nature and its immediate purpose." D 1866. In the Syllabus (1864), Pius IX rejected the subordination of the Church power to the power of the State. D 1719 et seq.

According to the will of her Divine Founder, the Church has an independent purpose distinct from the purpose of the State, namely, the sanctification and the eternal salvation of men. Further, she possesses all the means necessary for this purpose, namely, the teaching power, the pastoral power, and the sacerdotal power. By virtue of God's ordinance the exercise of her powers, independent of all temporal power. Thus the Church rejects every intervention of State power in the domain of the Church such as State approval of the promulgation of Church laws and decrees (placet), the hindrance of the practice of the Church's juridical function by the invocation of a temporal power (Recursus ab abuso) the hindering of the free intercourse of the bishops and the faithful with the Pope, interventions in the organisation of the Church. D 1719 et seq., 1741, 1749, CIC 2333 et seq.

CHAPTER 2

The Constitution of the Church

§ 4. The Hierarchical Constitution of the Church

1. Divine Origin of the Hierarchy

Christ gave His Church an hierarchical constitution. (*De fide.*)

The hierarchical magisterial powers of the Church embrace the teaching power, the pastoral power (=legislative, juridical and punitive power), and the sacerdotal power. They correspond to the three-fold office laid on Christ as man for the purpose of the Redemption of mankind: the office of prophet or the teaching office, the pastoral or royal office and the priestly office. Christ transferred this three-fold office, with the corresponding powers, to His Apostles.

Against the Reformers, who rejected the special priesthood and with it the hierarchy and recognised the general priesthood only of all the faithful, the Council of Trent declared: There exists in the Catholic Church a hierarchy instituted by Divine ordinance: Si quis dixerit, in Ecclesia catholica non esse hierarchiam divina ordinatione institutam. A.S. D 966. Pius VI rejected as heretical the Gallican teaching of the pseudo-Synod of Pistoja, that the power of the Church was transferred immediately to the Church, that is, to the totality of the faithful, and from the Church to her pastors. D 1502. According to the teaching of the Church, Christ gave the spiritual power to the Apostles immediately. Pius X condemned the proposition of

the Modernists that the Church hierarchy is the result of a general historical development. D 2054.

Pius XII, in the Encyclical "Mystici Corporis" (1943), rejected the distinction between "a Church shaped by charity," and "a Church consisting of juridical elements," for such a distinction postulates that the Church founded by Christ was originally merely one kept together by the invisible bond of charity, a religious society endowed with charisma, which only gradually, under the influence of external conditions, developed into a legally organised society with an hierarchical constitution (juridical Church). The distinction rests on the thesis of R. Sohms, according to which the essence of the Church law contradicts the essence of the Church. In the last analysis, this thesis of R. Sohms harks back to the view of the Reformers that the Church is an invisible, that is, not a divinely-established community of believers in Christ. According to the teaching of the Church, there belongs to the Mystical Body of Christ an external, visible, juridical element (i.e., the legal organisation), and an inner, invisible, mystical element (i.e., the communication of grace), just as in Christ, the Head of the Church, there is the visible human nature, and the invisible Divine nature, and in the Sacraments, the outward signs and the inward grace.

Proof from Sacred Scripture :

Christ delegated to the Apostles the mission which He, as man, received from the Father (John 20, 21). Christ's mission embraces His three-fold office of Redeemer. He gave them the mandate to proclaim His Gospel through the whole world (Mt. 28, 19 ; Mk. 16, 15), endowed them with His authority (Luke 10, 16 ; Mt. 10, 40), promised them a wide power of binding and loosing (Mt. 18, 18), and transferred to them the sacerdotal powers of baptism (Mt. 28, 19), of celebrating the Eucharist (Luke 22, 19), of forgiving sins (John 20, 23). According to St. Paul's testimony, the Apostles considered themselves delegates of Christ "by whom we have received grace and apostleship for obedience to the faith in all nations, for His name" (Rom. 1, 5), as "ministers of Christ and dispensers of the mysteries of God" (1 Cor. 4, 1), as "ambassadors for Christ, God, as it were, exhorting for us" (2 Cor. 5, 20), as promulgators of the "word of reconciliation" and bearers "of the ministry of reconciliation" (2 Cor. 5, 18 et seq.). They made use of the powers transferred to them : "But they going forth preached everywhere" (Mk. 16, 20). They gave to the faithful laws and injunctions (Acts 15, 28 et seq. ; 1 Cor. 11, 34), held court and imposed punishments (1 Cor. 4, 21), celebrated the Eucharist (cf. Acts 2, 42. 46 ; 20, 7), and transferred Church offices by the imposition of hands (Acts 6, 6 ; 14, 22 ; 1 Tim. 4, 14 ; 2 Tim. 1, 6 ; Tit. 1, 5).

In the Ancient Church, side by side with the Apostles, there appear presbyters, who, according to their function, are also called "bishops" (ἐπίσκοποι=overseers) Cf. Acts 20, 17. 28 ; 1 Peter 5, 1–2 ; Tit. 1, 5–7), and deacons as incumbents of Church offices with hierarchical powers. Philip the Deacon preaches and baptises (Acts 8, 5. 38). The presbyters of Jerusalem decide conjointly with the Apostles the problems raised for the Christian Community by the obligations of the Old Testament Law (Acts 15, 22 et seq.). The presbyters of the community anoint the sick in the name of the Lord and guarantee forgiveness of sins (James 5, 14 et seq.). These co-operators with the Apostles were elected by the community, but received their office and their power, not from the community, but from the Apostles. Cf. Acts 6, 6 (installation of the first seven deacons ;)

14, 22 (installation of the presbyters). The charismatics, who played an essential rôle in the building-up of the Church in apostolic times (cf. 1 Cor. 12 and 14), but who were not incumbents of Church offices, did not belong to the hierarchy. St. Paul demands the subordination of the charismatics to the apostolic office (1 Cor. 14, 26 et seq.).

2. Perpetuation of the Hierarchy

The powers bestowed on the Apostles have descended to the bishops. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent teaches that: " the bishops who succeeded in the place of the Apostles belong by excellence to the hierarchical order, and are appointed by the Holy Ghost to rule the Church of God " (D 960). The Vatican Council teaches: Just as He (Christ) sent the Apostles whom He had elected for Himself from the world, as He Himself was sent by the Father (John 20, 21), so He wishes that there should be pastors and teachers in His Church to the end of time " (D 1821). These pastors and teachers are the bishops, the successors of the Apostles (D 1828; episcopi, qui positi a Spiritu Sancto in Apostolorum locum successerunt).

The perpetuation of the hierarchical powers follows necessarily on the indefectibility of the Church desired by Christ (see Par. 12). The promise of His aid given to the Apostles " even to the consummation of the world " (Mt. 28, 20) presupposes that the apostolic office is perpetuated in the successors of the Apostles. The Apostles, following the will of Christ, handed over their powers to others, for example, St. Paul to Timothy and Titus. Cf. 2 Tim. 4, 2–5; Tit. 2, 1 (teaching power); 1 Tim. 5, 19–21; Tit. 2, 15 (pastoral power); 1 Tim. 5, 22; Tit. 1, 5 (sacerdotal power). In the position of the two disciples of the Apostles, the monarchical episcopate, into which apostolic office finally evolves, appears clearly for the first time. The " angels " of the seven communities in Asia Minor (Apoc. 2–3) are, according to the traditional interpretation, which, however, has been contradicted, monarchic bishops.

The disciple of the Apostles, St. Clement of Rome, narrates concerning the perpetuation of the hierarchical powers by the Apostles: " In countries and towns they preached and appointed their neophytes after they have proved these in spirit, as bishops and deacons of the future faithful " (Cor. 42, 4). " Our Apostles through the Lord Jesus Christ, knew that disputes would arise about the episcopal office. For this reason, as they had received exact knowledge of this in advance, they appointed the above named, and subsequently gave directions that when these should fall asleep, other tried men should take over their duties " (Cor. 44, 1-2). At the beginning of the second century, St. Ignatius of Antioch attests that at the head of the Asia Minor communities, also even " in the farthest countries " (Eph. 3, 2), there stands in each a single (monarchic) bishop, in whose hand the whole religious and disciplinarian conduct of the community lies. " Nobody is supposed to do anything which concerns the Church without the Bishop. Only that Eucharist is regarded as valid and legal, that is consummated under the Bishop or by one authorised by him. There, where Jesus is, the Catholic Church is. It is not permitted to baptise without the Bishop, or to hold the agape. But whatever he finds good, that is also pleasing to God, so that everything that is done is certain and lawful. . . . He that honours the Bishop is

honoured by God ; he that does anything without consulting the Bishop, serves the devil" (Smyrn. 8, 1–2 ; 9, 1). In every community, side by side with and under the Bishop there are the presbyters and the deacons as further holders of office.

According to St. Justin the Martyr, the "overseer of the brethren," that is, the Bishop, celebrates the liturgy (Apol. I 65, 67). St. Irenaeus finds in the uninterrupted succession of the bishops from the Apostles down, the most certain guarantee for the assurance of the unfalsified handing-down of the Christian teaching : "We can enumerate the bishops installed by the Apostles and their successors from their times down to our own" (Adv. haer. III, 3, 1). However, as it would take him too far afield to enumerate the apostolic succession of all the Churches, he limits himself to "the greatest and oldest and best-known Church, which was founded and built at Rome by the two famous Apostles, Peter and Paul." He gives the oldest calendar of bishops of the Roman Church, beginning with the "blessed Apostles" down to St. Eleutherus, the twelfth successor of the Apostles (ibid. III 3, 3). Cf. St. Polycarp. St. Irenaeus narrates (ibid. III 3, 1) that he was appointed Bishop of Smyrna "by the Apostles"—according to Tertullian (De praesc. 32) by St. John. Tertullian, like St. Irenaeus, bases the truth of the Catholic teaching on the apostolic succession of the Bishops (De praesc. 32).

§ 5. The Primacy of St. Peter

Primacy means first in rank. A primacy may be one of honour, of control, of direction (primatus directionis), or of jurisdiction, that is, of government. A primacy of jurisdiction consists in the possession of full and supreme legislative, juridical and punitive power.

1. The Dogma and its opponents

Christ appointed the Apostle Peter to be the first of all the Apostles and to be the visible Head of the whole Church, by appointing him immediately and personally to the primacy of jurisdiction. (*De fide.*)

The Vatican Council defined : Si quis dixerit, beatum Petrum Apostolum non esse a Christo Domino constitutum Apostolorum omnium principem et totius Ecclesiae militantis visibile caput ; vel eundem honoris tantum, non autem verae propriaeque iurisdictionis primatum ab eodem Domino Nostro Jesu Christo directe et immediate accepisse. A.S. D 1823. If anyone says that the blessed apostle Peter was not constituted, by Christ Our Lord, Prince of all the Apostles and visible head of all the Church Militant ; or that he (Peter) directly and immediately received from Our Lord Jesus Christ a primacy of honour only and not one of true and proper jurisdiction, let him be anathema.

The invisible Head of the Church is the risen Christ. St. Peter represents the position of Christ in the external government of the militant Church, and is to this extent "the representative of Christ" on earth (Christi vicarius : D 694).

Opponents of this dogma are : the Greek Orthodox Church and the Oriental sects ; individual medieval opponents of the Papacy, Marsilius of Padua and John

of Jandun, Wycliffe and Huss ; the whole Protestant movement ; the Gallicans and Febronians ; the old Catholics and ; the Modernists. According to the Gallicans (E. Richer) and the Febronians (N. Hontheim) the fullness of Christ's spiritual power was transferred immediately to the whole Church and through this to St. Peter, so that he was the first servant of the Church, who was appointed by the Church (caput ministeriale). According to the Modernists, the primacy was not founded by Christ, but was developed to meet the needs of the Church in post-apostolic times. D 2055 et seq.

2. Biblical Foundation

From the very beginning Christ distinguished the Apostle Peter from the other Apostles. At the first meeting He announced the change of his name from Simon to Cephas=rock : " Thou art Simon the son of John " (Vulg. ; Jonas). (1, 42 ; cf. Mk. 3, 16.) The name Cephas indicates the office to which the Lord had appointed him (cf. Mt. 16, 18). In all the lists of the Apostles Peter is named in the first place. In St. Matthew he is expressly called the first. (Mt. 10, 2.) Since from the point of view of his time of calling, Andrew was before Peter, the constant placing of Peter's name at the head of the list of the Apostles indicates the dignity of his office. Peter together with James and John, was permitted to witness the awakening of the daughter of Jairus (Mk. 5, 37), the Transfiguration (Mt. 17, 1), and the Agony in the garden (Mt. 26, 37). The Lord taught from Peter's boat (Luke 5, 3), and paid the temple tax for Himself and Peter jointly (Mt. 17, 27), ordered him to strengthen the brethren after His own return (Luke 22, 32, appeared to him alone before appearing to the other Apostles (Luke 24, 34 ; 1 Cor. 15, 5).

The primacy was promised on the occasion of the solemn confession of the Messiahship in the house of Caesarea Philippi (Mt. 16, 17–19) : " Blessed art thou, Simon BarJona : because flesh and blood hath not revealed it to thee, but my Father who is in heaven. And I say to thee : That thou art Peter (=Cephas) ; and upon this rock I will build my Church. And the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. And I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of Heaven. And whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth, it shall be bound also in Heaven : and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven." These words are addressed solely and immediately to Peter. In them Christ promises to confer on him a threefold supreme power in the new religious community (ἐκκλησία) which He is to found. St. Peter is to guarantee to this Church a unity and unshakable strength similar to the rock foundation of a house (cf. Mt. 7, 24 et seq.). He is to be the holder of the keys, that is the steward of the Kingdom of God on earth (cf. Is. 22, 22 ; Apoc. 1, 18 ; 3, 7 ; the keys as a symbol of power and dominion). He is to bind and loose, that is, following Rabbinical language, impose the ban or loose from the ban, and also interpreting the law, pronounce a thing to be forbidden (bound) or permitted (loosed). In association with Mt. 18, 18, in which the power of binding and loosing, in the sense of the exclusion from or acceptance into the community, is bestowed on all the Apostles, and in view of the universal term (" whatever "), the plenary power promised to Peter is not limited to his teaching power, but it extends to the whole sphere of jurisdiction. God in Heaven will confirm whatever obligations Peter will impose or dispense from on earth.

In spite of all attempts to explain the passage, which appears in St. Matthew

only, as a partial or complete later interpolation, its genuineness is unassailable. This is proved, not only by the fact that the text is found in all manuscripts and translations, but also by the obvious Semitic colouring of the context. That these words were spoken by the Lord Himself there are no convincing reasons for disputing. It contains no contradiction of other teachings or facts in the Gospel.

The primacy was *conferred* when Christ, after His Resurrection, gave the mandate to Peter, after the latter's three-fold assurance of His love: "Feed my lambs! . . . Feed my lambs! . . . Feed my sheep!" (John 21, 15–17). Here, as in Mt. 16, 18 et seq., the words are directed solely and immediately to Peter. The "lambs" and the "sheep" designate Christ's whole flock, that is, the whole Church (cf. John 10). "Feed" in ancient and biblical language means, in its application to human beings, rule or govern (cf. Acts 20, 28). By Christ's thrice-repeated mandate, Peter obtained, not re-appointment to the Apostolic office—he did not lose this through his denial—but the supreme power of government over the Church.

After the Ascension of Our Lord, the Primacy devolved on Peter, and was exercised by him. From the very beginning he takes a leading position in the primitive community. He conducts the election of Matthias (Acts 1, 15 et seq.); he is the first to proclaim on the Feast of Pentecost the message of the crucified and risen Messiah (2, 14 et seq.); he attests the message of Christ before the High Council (4, 8 et seq.); he accepts the first pagan, the captain Cornelius, into the Church (10, 1 et seq.). He is the first to speak at the Council of the Apostles (15, 7 et seq.). Paul goes to Jerusalem "to see Peter" (Gal. 1, 18).

3. Testimony of the Fathers

Commenting on the promise of the Primacy, the Fathers assert that the Church was built on Peter, and recognise his pre-eminence over the other Apostles. Tertullian speaks of the Church: "which was built on him" (De monog. 8). St. Cyprian says with reference to Mt. 16, 18 et seq.: "He builds the Church on one person" (De monog. 8). St. Clement of Alexandria calls the Blessed Peter: "the chosen one, the selected one, the first among the Disciples, for whom alone, besides Himself, the Lord paid the tax" (Quis dives salvetur 21, 4). St. Cyril of Jerusalem calls him: "the head and the leader of the Apostles" (Cat. 2, 19). According to St. Leo the Great "only Peter was chosen out of the whole world to be the Head of all called peoples, of all the Apostles and of all the Fathers of the Church" (Sermo 4, 2). In the defensive struggle against Arianism many Fathers take the rock on which the Lord built the Church as meaning the faith of Peter in the Divinity of Christ, without, however, excluding the reference to Peter's person, which is clearly indicated in the text. Peter's faith was the reason why he was appointed by Christ as the support and foundation of His Church.

4. Peter and Paul

It follows from the dogma of the Primacy that Paul, like the other Apostles, was subordinate to Peter as the supreme head of the whole Church. Pope Innocent X rejected as heretical (1647) the teaching of the Jansenist Anton Arnauld, that Peter and Paul were joint heads of the Church. D 1091.

The Fathers, who frequently put Peter and Paul on an equal footing (principes apostolorum), have in mind either their apostolic efficacy or the contribution of

both Apostles to the building-up of the Church in Rome or the Church in general. St. Paul, according to his own confession, surpassed in efficacy all his co-Apostles (1 Cor. 15, 10). The Primacy of power belongs to Peter alone; to Paul belongs a leadership in the promulgation of the faith: Princeps clave Petrus, Primus quoque dogmate Paul (Venantius Fortunatus, Misc. IX 2, 35). The passage Gal. 2, 11: "I withstood him to the face," does not derogate from Peter's Primacy. Paul censured the inconsistent attitude of Peter, because, precisely on account of the latter's high authority in the Church, it endangered the freedom from the Old Law enjoyed by the Christians who were converted from Paganism. Peter well knew and recognised this freedom.

§ 6. The Primacy of Jurisdiction of the Pope

1. Perpetuation of the Primacy

According to Christ's ordinance, Peter is to have successors in his Primacy over the whole Church and for all time. (*De fide.*)

The Vatican Council defined: Si quis dixerit, non esse ex ipsius Christi Domini institutione seu iure divino, ut beatus Petrus in primatu super universam Ecclesiam habeat perpetuos successores, A.S. If anyone denies that in virtue of the decree of Our Lord Christ Himself (i.e., by divine institution), Blessed Peter has perpetual successors in his Primacy over the Universal Church, let him be anathema. D 1825. That the Primacy is to be perpetuated in the successors of Peter is, indeed, not expressly stated in the words of the promise and conferring of the Primacy by Our Lord, but it flows as an inference from the nature and purpose of the Primacy itself. As the function of the Primacy is to preserve the unity and solidarity of the Church; and as the Church, according to the will of her Divine Founder, is to continue substantially unchanged until the end of time for the perpetuation of the work of salvation, the Primacy also must be perpetuated. But Peter, like every other human being, was subject to death (John 21, 19), consequently his office must be transmitted to others. The structure of the Church cannot continue without the foundation which supports it (Mt. 16, 18): Christ's flock cannot exist without shepherds (John 21, 15-17).

Early on the Fathers expressed the thought that Peter lives on and works on in his successors. The Papal Legate Philippus, at the Council of Ephesus (431), declared: "This (Peter) lives and passes judgment up to the present day, and for ever, in his successors" (D 112, 1824). In a letter to Eutyches, St. Peter Chrysologus says of the Roman Pontiff: "The blessed Peter who on his Bishop's Chair lives on and leads the council, offers the true Faith to those that seek it" (With Leo, Ep. 25, 2). St. Leo the Great declared the Primacy to be a perpetual institution: "As that which Peter believed in Christ lives for ever, so also that which Christ instituted in Peter lives for ever" (Sermo 3, 2).

2. The Primacy and the See of Rome

The successors of Peter in the Primacy are the bishops of Rome. (*De fide.*)

Following the precedent of the General Council of Lyons (1274) and of Florence (1439), the Vatican Council defined: Si quis dixerit, . . . Romanum Pontificem non esse beati Petri in eodem primatu successorem, A.S. (If anyone

says that the Roman Pontiff is not the successor of Blessed Peter in the same Primacy anathema sit.) D 1825. Cf. D 466, 694.

The dogma merely states that the Pontiff of Rome at any time is, in fact, the holder of the Primacy. On what legal title the association of the Roman Pontiff's Chair with the Primacy rests, is not defined. The more usual theological viewpoint is that it rests not on the historical fact that Peter worked and died as Bishop of Rome, but on positive ordinance of Christ or that of the Holy Ghost—that it is, therefore, of Divine origin. If the connection of the Primacy with the See of Rome were of Church Law only, then a separation of the Primacy from the Roman Bishop's Chair by the Pope, or by the General Council would be possible: but since it is of Divine Law, a separation is impossible.

St. Peter's stay in Rome is indicated in 1 Peter 5, 13: "The Church that is in Babylon, elected together with you, saluteth you." (Babylon is a symbolic designation for Rome); in St. Clement of Rome, who mentions the Apostles Peter and Paul in connection with the sacrifices of Nero's persecution (Cor. 6, 1); in St. Ignatius of Antioch, who writes to the Christians of Rome: "Not as Peter and Paul do I command ye" (Rom. 4, 3).

The Roman activity of the Apostle St. Peter is expressly attested to by Bishop St. Dionysius of Corinth (about 170) (Eusebius H.e. II 25, 8); St. Irenaeus of Lyons (Adv. haer. III 1, 1; 3, 2 et seq.); the Roman writer Gaius under Pope St. Zephyrin (Eusebius, H.e. II 25, 6 et seq.); Tertullian (De praesc. 36; Adv. Marc. IV 5; Scorp. 15); St. Clement of Alexandria (Eusebius, H.e. VI 14, 6). St. Dionysius, Gaius and Tertullian mention also the martyrdom of St. Peter in Rome. Gaius is able to point out exactly the site of the graves of the Apostles: "I can point out the tokens of victory of the Apostles. If thou willst go to the Vatican or to the Ostia Road, thou wilt find the tokens of victory of the Apostles, who founded this Church" (loc. cit.). No other place but Rome has ever claimed to be in possession of the burial place of St. Peter.

The doctrine of the Primacy of the Roman Bishops, like other Church teachings and institutions, has gone through a development. Thus the establishment of the Primacy recorded in the Gospels has gradually been more clearly recognised and its implications developed. Clear indications of the consciousness of the Primacy of the Roman Bishops, and of the recognition of the Primacy by the other churches appear at the end of the 1st century. In the name of the Roman community St. Clement of Rome sends a letter which is pervaded by the consciousness of his responsibility for the whole Church, to the community of Corinth, in which he urgently exhorts the dissentients to submit to the presbyters and to penance (c. 57). However, the letter contains neither a formal statement of the Primacy, that is, an express invocation of the pre-eminence of the Roman Church, nor juridical measures. St. Ignatius elevated the Roman community over all other communities using in his epistle to it a solemn form of address. Twice he says of it, that it is the presiding community, which expresses a relationship of superiority and inferiority (cf. Magn. 6, 1): "which presides in the place of the district of the Romans" (ἥτις καὶ προκάθηται ἐν τόπῳ χωρίου Ῥωμαίων); the "overseer of love" (προκαθημένη τῆς ἀγάπης). St. Irenaeus designated "the Church founded by the two famous Apostles Peter and Paul at Rome" as "the greatest, most ancient and most generally known," and expressly ascribes to it pre-eminence over the other Churches. "If one wishes to know the true

Faith, then it suffices to ascertain the teaching of this one Church, as it is handed down through the succession of her bishops"; "For to this Church, on account of her more powerful principality (propter potentiorem princalitatem) every church must agree, that is, the faithful everywhere; in other words, in this community the apostolic tradition is always preserved by those who are from everywhere" (or: "from those who come from everywhere," that is, from heretics). Adv. Haer. III 3, 2.

About the middle of the second century, St. Polycarp, Bishop of Smyrna, came to Rome in order to negotiate with Pope St. Anicetus (154–165) concerning the date of celebration of the Easter Feast (Eusebius, H.e. IV 14, 1). Again Bishop Polycrates of Ephesus negotiated on the Easter Question with Pope St. Victor I (189–198), who threatened the Asia Minor communities with exclusion from the Church unity on account of their adhering to the Quartodecimanic practice (ibid. V 24, 1–9). Again Hegesippus came under Pope St. Anicetus to Rome in order to become acquainted with the true tradition of the faith (ibid. IV 22, 3).

Tertullian recognises the doctrinal authority of Rome. "If Italy is in thy neighbourhood then thou hast Rome, from whence for us (in Africa) the teaching authority already exists" (De praesc. 36). As a Montanist heretic, however, he declared the power of binding and loosing bestowed on Peter to be a purely personal gift to the Apostle. (De pud. 21.) St. Cyprian of Carthage attests the pre-eminence of the Roman Church, by designating her "the mother and the root of the Catholic Church" (ecclesiae catholicae matrix et radix: Ep. 48, 3); as "the place of Peter" (Locus Petri; Ep. 55, 8); as "the Chair of Peter" (cathedra Petri); and as "the principal Church, from which the episcopal unity emerged" (ecclesia principalis, unde unitas sacerdotalis exorta est; Ep. 59, 14). However, his attitude in the controversy regarding the re-baptism of heretics shows that he had not yet achieved a clear conception of the scope of the Primacy. Pope St. Stephen I, Cyprian's opponent in the controversy, maintained, according to the testimony of Bishop Firmilian of Caesarea, that he possesed "the succession of Peter, on which the foundations of the Church are erected" (With Cyprian, Ep. 75, 17); he threatened the Asia Minor Bishops with exclusion from the Church commonwealth (Eusebius, H.e. VII 5, 4).

St. Ambrose says: "Where Peter is there the Church is" (Enarr. in Ps. 40, 30). St. Jerome writes to Pope St. Damasus: "I know that the Church is built on this rock" (=Peter) (Ep. 15, 2). St. Augustine says of the Roman Church that the pre-eminence of the Apostolic See was always present in her (in qua semper apostolicae cathedrae viguit principatus: Ep. 43, 3, 7. Pope St. Leo I desired to have seen and honoured in his person: "him in whom the care of all shepherds is perpetuated with the guardianship of the sheep entrusted to him" (Sermo 3, 4). Before the Council of Ephesus (431) the Papal Legate Philippus makes a clear confession of the Primacy of the Pope as that of the perpetuated Peter (D 112). The Fathers of the Council of Chalcedon (451) received the Epistola dogmatica of St. Leo I with the cry: "Peter has spoken through Leo!" Scholasticism speculatively bases the Primacy of the Pope above all on the unity of the Church. St. Thomas, S.c.G. IV 76, develops the following arguments which are repeated in later ecclesiological treatises, for example, that of Jacob of Viterbo, John Quidort of Paris, John of Naples: a) In order that a Church exist there must be one person at the head of the whole Christian people, as in the one diocese one single bishop is the head of the people of that diocese. b) For the preservation of the unity of the Faith it is necessary that one single person stand at the head of the whole Church, who by his judgment, can decide questions of Faith that might arise. c) The aim of the government, namely, the

peace and unity of the subjects, is better achieved through one single ruler than through many; for a single ruler is a more suitable cause of unity than many. d) The Church Militant is a model of the Church Triumphant. As in the latter there is one single president, so in the the former also there must be one single person at the head of all the faithful.

§ 7. The Nature of the Papal Primacy

1. Dogma

The Pope possesses full and supreme power of jurisdiction over the whole Church, not merely in matters of faith and morals, but also in Church discipline and in the government of the Church. (*De fide.*)

Against the various forms of Episcopalism, which limited the jurisdictive power of the Pope in favour of the bishops (Conciliary Theory, Gallicanism, Febronianism), the Vatican Council declared: "If any one shall say that the Roman Pontiff has the office merely of inspection and direction and not a full and supreme power of jurisdiction over the universal Church, not only in things which belong to faith and morals, but also in those which relate to the discipline and government of the Church spread through the world; or assert that he possesses merely the principal part (potiores partes) and not all the fullness of this supreme power; or that this power which he enjoys is not ordinary and immediate, both over each and all the Churches, and over each and all the pastors and the faithful: let him be anathema" D 1831. Cf. D 1827, CIC 218.

In consonance with this declaration, the Primatial power is:

a) A true power of jurisdiction that is, a true governing power, not merely a warrant of supervision or direction, such as, for example, belongs to the president of a political party, or a society, or of a conference. As a governmental power, it embraces the full power of legislation, administration of justice (disputed and voluntary jurisdiction) and of its execution. Corresponding to it on the part of the subjects is the duty of subordination and of obedience.

b) A universal power, that is, it extends personally to the pastors (bishops) and to the faithful, totally and individually, of the whole Church. Materially it refers, not merely to matters of faith and morals (teaching office), but also to Church discipline and government (pastoral office).

c) Supreme power in the Church, that is, there is no jurisdiction possessing a greater or equally great power. The power of the Pope transcends both the power of each individual bishop and also of all the other bishops together. The bishops collectively (apart from the Pope), therefore, are not equal to or superior to the Pope.

d) A full power, that is, the Pope possesses of himself alone, the whole fullness of the Church power of jurisdiction and not merely a greater share than the other bishops taken individually or conjointly. Thus the Pope can rule independently on any matter which comes under the sphere of the Church's jurisdiction without the concurrence of the other bishops or of the rest of the Church.

e) An ordinary power, that is, it is connected with the office, by virtue of divine ordinance, and is not delegated from a higher possessor of jurisdiction. Thus it can be exercised at any time, i.e., not merely in exceptional cases, e.g., where the bishops neglect their pastoral duties in their territories (Febronius, Eybel). D 1500

f) A truly episcopal power, that is, the Pope is just as much a " universal bishop " of the whole Church, as he is bishop of his diocese of Rome (" Episcopus Urbis et Orbis " ; Jacob of Viterbo). Thus, the Papal power, like any other episcopal power, embraces the legislative, the juridical and the punitive power. Cf. CIC 218, Par. 2 and 335.

g) An immediate power, that is, the Pope can exercise his power, without the intervention of an intermediary, over the bishops and the faithful of the whole Church.

The biblical and patristic foundation is seen in the texts cited in Pars. 5 and 6 The doctrine therein has attained full development in the dogma promulgated by the Vatican Council.

2. Inferences

a) It follows from the supreme governing power of the Pope over the whole Church that he has the right, in the exercise of his office, of coming into free contact with all the bishops and faithful of the whole Church. For this reason the Church rejects all attempts by the State to subject official intercourse with the Apostolic See to state control, and to make the juridical obligation of Papal decrees dependent on the concurrence of the State authorities (placet). D 1829.

b) As the supreme lawgiver of the Church, the Pope is not legally bound by ecclesiastical decisions and usages, but by divine law alone. This demands that the Papal power, in consonance with its purpose, should be employed for the building-up of the Mystical Body of Christ, not for its destruction (2 Cor. 10, 8). The divine law, therefore, is an efficacious brake on arbitrariness. The third Gallican article, which demanded a far-reaching limitation of the exercise of the Papal power, was properly rejected. D 1324.

c) As the supreme judge of the Church, the Pope has the right of bringing every Church law-matter before his court, and to receive appeals in all Church disputes. He himself is judged by nobody (CIC 1556 ; Prima sedes a nemine iudicatur), because there is no higher judge on earth than he. For the same reason there is no appeal to a higher court against the judgment of the Pope. The Church rejects an appeal from the Pope to General Council as this would mean putting General Council above the Pope. D 1830 ; CIC 228, Par. 2. Cf. D 1323 (22nd Gallican Article).

§ 8. Papal Teaching Primacy or Papal Infallibility

1. Dogma

The Pope is infallible when he speaks ex cathedra. (*De fide.*)

The Union Council of Constantinople (869–70), of Lyons (1274), and of Florence (1438–45) having already proclaimed the teaching Primacy of the Pope, which, in its essence, involved infallibility, the Vatican Council defined : " The Roman Pontiff, when he speaks ex cathedra—that is, when in discharge of the office of Pastor and Doctor of all Christians, by virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, he defines a doctrine regarding Faith or Morals to be held by the Universal Church—by the Divine assistance promised to him in Blessed Peter, is possessed of that infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer willed that His Church should be endowed in defining doctrine regarding Faith or Morals ; and therefore such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are irreformable of themselves, and not in virtue of the consent of the Church." D 1839, cf. D 466, 694, 1833-35.

For the proper understanding of the dogma the following points must be noted :

a) The bearer of the Infallibility is every lawful Pope as successor of Peter, the Prince of the Apostles. But the Pope alone is infallible not others to whom he transfers a part of his teaching authority, for example, the Roman Congregations.

b) The object of his Infallibility is his teaching concerning Faith and Morals, above all revealed teaching, but also non-revealed teachings, which are closely associated with the teachings of Revelation.

c) The condition of the Infallibility is that the Pope speaks ex cathedra. For this is required : (α) That he speak as pastor and teacher of all the faithful with the full weight of his supreme apostolic authority ; If he speaks as a private theologian or as the bishop of his Diocese, he is not infallible ; β) That he have the intention of deciding finally a teaching of Faith or Morals, so that it is to be held by all the faithful. Without this intention, which must be made clear in the formulation, or by the circumstances, a decision ex cathedra is not complete. Most of the doctrinal expressions made by the Popes in their Encyclicals are not decisions ex cathedra.

d) The source of his Infallibility is the supernatural assistance of the Holy Ghost, Who protects the supreme teacher of the Church from error. This assistance must be distinguished from Revelation by which some truths or others are communicated by God to the bearer of the Revelation ; and from Inspiration, which is a positive influence effected by God over an author, of such a nature that God Himself is the principal author of the writing, and the ideas are consequently the Word of God. The Holy Ghost preserves the bearer of the supreme teaching office from a false decision (assistentia negativa), and leads him, where necessary, by external and internal grace to the right knowledge and correct statement of the truth (assistentia positiva). The Divine assistance does not relieve the bearer of the infallible doctrinal power of the obligation of taking pains to know the truth, especially by means of the study of the sources of Revelation. Cf. D 1836.

A consequence of the Infallibility is that the decisions, ex cathedra, of the Popes are " of themselves," that is, without the intervention of a further authority, immutable and not by reason of the assent of the whole Church, as the Gallicans taught. D 1325 (4th Gallican Article).

2. Proof from Scripture and Tradition

a) Christ made Peter the foundation of His Church, that is, the guarantor of her unity and unshakable strength, and promised her a duration that will not pass away (Mt. 16, 18). However, the unity and solidity of the Church is not possible without the right Faith. Peter is, therefore, also the supreme teacher of the Faith. As such he must be infallible in the official promulgation of Faith, in his own person and in his successors since by Christ's decree the Church is to continue for all time. Again, Christ bestowed on Peter (and on his successors) a comprehensive power of binding and loosing. As in Rabbinical speech one understood by binding and loosing also the authentic declaration of the law, so the power is also contained therein of authentically declaring the law of the New Covenant, the Gospel. God in Heaven will confirm the Pope's judgment. This supposes that, in his capacity of supreme Doctor of the Faith, he is preserved from error.

Christ installed Peter (and his successors) as supreme pastor over the whole flock (John 21, 15-17). The task of teaching Christian truth and of protecting

it from error is part of the function of the supreme pastor. But he could not fulfil this task if, in the exercise of his supreme teaching office, he himself were subject to error.

Christ prayed that Peter should be fortified in faith and commissioned him to fortify his brethren. Luke 22, 31 et seq.: "Simon, Simon, behold Satan hath desired to have you, that he may sift you as wheat. But I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not; and thou, being once converted, confirm thy brethren." The reason for Christ's praying for Peter especially was that Peter, after his own conversion, should confirm his brethren in their faith, which clearly indicates Peter's position as head of the Apostles. Peter's leading position in the primitive community shows that he fulfilled the Lord's mandate. Now, if these words are directed to Peter personally, then they must, in accordance with Mt. 16, 18, be also understood as referring to those in whom Peter is perpetuated as Head of the Church; for the endangering of faith, which exists at all times, makes the protection of the faith a pressing task of the Head of the Church in all times. In order to fulfil this task effectively, in matters of faith and morals infallibility is essential.

b) The Fathers did not expressly speak of the Infallibility of the Pope, but they attest the decisive teaching authority of the Roman Church and of its Pontiff. St. Ignatius of Antioch recognises of the Christians of Rome that they "are purified of every foreign colour," that is, are free from every false doctrine (Rom. Insc.). Probably having St. Clement's Letter in mind, he says: "You have taught others" (Rom. 3, 1). As distinct from all his other letters, in the Letter to the Romans, he desists from teaching them and warning them of error. St. Irenaeus of Lyons recognises the faith of the Roman Church as the norm for the whole Church: "With this Church on account of its special eminence, every other Church must agree . . . in her the apostolic tradition has always been kept pure" (Adv. haer. III 3, 2). The freedom of the Roman Church from error in faith presupposes the Infallibility of her episcopal teachers of faith. St. Cyprian characterises the Roman Church "as the teaching chair of Peter" (cathedra Petri), as "the starting point of the episcopal unity" and takes pride in the purity of her faith. He says of his adversaries who were exercised about the recognition of the Roman Church: "You do not bear in mind that it is the Romans, whose faith was praised by the commendatory testimony of the Apostles (Rom. 1, 8) and to which false teaching can gain no admittance" (Ep. 59, 14). St. Jerome, in the matter of a question which was disputed in the Eastern Church, requests Pope St. Damasus, the holder of the Cathedra Petri, to give a decision, on which occasion he remarks: "With you alone the heritage of the Fathers will remain unimpaired" (Ep. 15, 1). St. Augustine holds the judgment of Pope St. Innocent I in the Pelagian controversy to be decisive: "In this matter the resolutions of two councils were sent to the Apostolic Chair. Replies have arrived from thence. Thus the matter is ended (causa finita est). Would that the error were also ended!" (Sermo 131, 10, 10). St. Peter Chrysologus challenges Eutyches to submit himself to the judgment of the Pontiff of Rome: "For the Holy Peter who lives on in his episcopal chair and is its director, offers the true belief to them that seek it" (With Leo I, Ep. 25, 2).

The teaching Primacy of the Pope from the earliest times was expressed in practice in the condemnation of heretical opinions. Thus Pope St. Victor I or Pope St. Zephyrinus condemned Montanism: Pope St. Callistus I excluded

Sabellius from the Church Community. Pope St. Stephen I rejected the re-baptism of heretics; Pope St. Dionysius inveighed against the subordination conception of Bishop Dionysius of Alexandria; Pope St. Cornelius condemned Novatianism, St. Innocent I, Pelagianism, St. Celestine I, Nestorianism; St. Leo I, Monophysitism, St. Agatho, Monotheletism. Further testimonies of the doctrinal Primacy of the Popes are the formularies of faith which many Popes demanded of heretics and schismatics returning to the fold. The formula of Pope St. Hormisdas (519), which appealing to Mt. 16, 18 et seq. contains an explicit recognition of the infallible teaching authority of the Pope, must specially be stressed: " At the Apostolic Chair the Catholic religion was always preserved unspotted" (D 171). Cf. D 343, 357, 570 q.

The theologians of the peak period of Scholasticism are unanimous in teaching the Papal Infallibility. According to St. Thomas Aquinas, it appertains to the official power of the Papal Office " finally to decide questions of faith, so that they may be held with unshakable faith by all." He establishes this doctrine positively on Luke 22, 31 et seq., speculatively on the thought that according to 1 Cor. 1, 10, there must be one single faith in the whole Church. But unity of faith could not be preserved, if he who was at the head of the whole Church could not finally decide a problem of faith. S. th. 2 II 1, 10. Cf. S. th. 2 II, 2 ad 3; S.c.G. IV 76.

Conciliarism: In the 14th century, in consequence of the confusion in ecclesiastical and political affairs, the status of the Papacy sank considerably. This was fatefully reflected in its effects on the teaching of the Papal Primacy. William of Ockham, in his battle against Pope John XXII, tried to undermine the divine institution of the Primacy. Marsilius of Padua and John of Jandun directly denied it, and declared the Primacy to be a mere honorary Primacy, and ascribed the supreme juridical power and doctrinal power to the General Council. At the time of the great Western Schism (1378–1417) many reputable theologians, such as Henry of Langenstein, Conrad of Gelnhausen, Peter of Ailly, John Gerson, saw in the doctrine of the superiority of the General Council over the Pope (conciliary theory) the sole means of re-uniting the Church. The viewpoint appeared that the general Church was indeed free from error, but that the Roman Church could err, and fall into heresy and schism. The Council of Constance (Fourth and Fifth Sessions) and of Basle (Second Session) declared for the superiority of the Council over the Pope. However, the resolutions referring to this did not receive the Papal ratification and were consequently legally invalid (D 657 Anm. 2). In Gallicanism the theory of the superiority of a General Council lived on for hundreds of years (D 1323 and 1325; Second and Fourth Gallican Articles).

Objections: The historical facts adduced by the opponents of the dogma of Infallibility do not touch the dogma, as in not a single case was a real ex cathedra decision in question. On the Honorius question see Christology, Par. 13.

§ 9. The Bishops

1. Nature of the Episcopal Power

By virtue of Divine right the bishops possess an ordinary power of government over their dioceses. (*De fide.*)

In regard to the relation between the Papal and Episcopal powers the Vatican Council declared: " This power of the Pope is no way derogates from the ordinary and immediate power of episcopal jurisdiction by which bishops

'who have been set by the Holy Ghost' to succeed and hold the place of the Apostles feed and govern each his own flock as true pastors; but rather, this authority is asserted, strengthened and vindicated by the Supreme and Universal Pastor." D 1828. Cf. the Encyclical "Satis cognitum" of Leo XIII (1896); CIC 329 Par. 1.

According to this declaration the episcopal power is:

a) An ordinary power, that is, it is associated with the episcopal office.

b) An immediate power, that is, it is not practised at the order of a superior, but in the Bishop's own name. Thus bishops are not delegates (agents) and not vicars (representatives) of the Pope, but independent pastors of the flocks entrusted to them, even though they are subordinate to the Pope.

c) A power appointed by God; for the Apostles, on the ground of Divine ordinance, whether in the immediate commission of Christ, or on the direction of the Holy Ghost (Acts 20, 28) have passed on their pastoral office to the bishops. The bishops are the successors of the Apostles, not in such a manner that an individual bishop is a successor of an individual Apostle, but that the bishops in their totality are successors of the College of Apostles.

d) A true pastoral power, as it embraces all the ecclesiastical powers appertaining to the exercise of the pastoral office, the power to legislate, to judge and to punish (CIC 335, Par. 1).

e) A power which is limited locally and materially, since it extends only to a definite segment of the Church, and is circumscribed by the Papal power which is superior to it. In addition the so-called causae maiores, that is, matters of more than usual importance, touching the welfare of the whole Church, are reserved to the Pope (CIC 220).

2. Manner of Conferring

The individual bishop receives his pastoral power immediately from the Pope. (*Sent. probabilior.*)

In the Encyclical "Mystici Corporis" (1943) Pope Pius XII says of the Bishops: "Each of them is also, as far as his own diocese is concerned, a true Pastor, who tends and rules in the name of Christ the flock committed to his care. In discharging this function, however, they are not completely independent, but are subject to the proper authority of the Roman Pontiff, although they enjoy ordinary power of jurisdiction received directly from the Sovereign Pontiff himself" (quamvis ordinaria jurisdictionis potestate fruantur, immediate sibi ab eodem Pontifice Summo impertita). D 2287. Cf. D 1500.

The opinion cited (Papal Theory) corresponds best to the monarchical constitution of the Church. When the Pope unites in himself the whole fullness of the pastoral power of the Church, then it corresponds to this that all incumbents of the offices subordinate to him should receive their power immediately from him, the representative of Christ on earth. This conception is favoured by the current practice, according to which the Pope authorises the bishop nominated or ratified by him to guide a diocese, and requires the clergy and laity to obey him.

A second opinion (Episcopal Theory) assumes that each individual bishop receives his pastoral power direct from God, as does the Pope. The activity of the

Pope in the nomination or ratification of a bishop is claimed to consist simply in that he allocates to the bishop a definite territory in which he is to exercise the power received immediately from God. In order to establish this theory it is argued that the bishops, as successors of the Apostles, receive their power just as immediately from Christ, as the Apostles received their power immediately from Christ, not through the intermediation of Peter. In favour of the second view the historical fact is also urged that in Christian antiquity and in the early Middle Ages, the choice of bishop by clergy and people, or the nomination of a bishop by princes was not always and everywhere ratified by the Pope. It is asserted that a tacit ratification and conferring of the episcopal jurisdiction, such as is assumed by the exponents of the former view, is not demonstrable and is improbable.

The former opinion, which was already approved by Pius VI (D 1500), received a new authoritative confirmation by the Encyclical "Mystici Corporis," but the question still remains without final decision.

Addendum: Position of the parish priest.

Only Popes and Bishops possess ecclesiastical jurisdictional power by Divine right. All other Church offices are of Church institution. The view put forward by Gallican theologians, who taught that the office of parish priest was inaugurated in the seventy-two Disciples of Christ, in order to derive therefrom a claim to participation in the government of the Church (Parochianism) is without any biblical or historical foundation. Pope Pius VI rejected the doctrine and claim of the pseudo-Synod of Pistoja (1786). D 1509 et seq.

CHAPTER 3

The Internal Constitution of the Church

§ 10. Christ and the Church

Christ is, as Pius XII says in the Encyclical "Mystici Corporis", the Founder, the Head, the Conservator and the Redeemer of His Mystical Body, the Church. We follow the exposition of the Encyclical.

1. Founder of the Church

Christ founded the Church. (*De fide.*)

Pius XII comments: "The Divine Redeemer began to build the mystical body of His Church when He was preaching and giving His commandments; He completed it when He hung in glory on the Cross; He manifested and promulgated it by the visible mission of the Paraclete, the Holy Spirit, upon His disciples." Cf. D 1821, 2145.

a) During the period of His public teaching activity, Christ laid the foundations of the Church by selecting and sending forth the Apostles as He Himself was sent by the Father, by appointing Peter to be their Supreme Head and His representative on earth; and by giving over to them His Revelation and His means of grace. See § 2 and § 5.

b) On the Cross, Christ consummated the building of the Church. The Old Covenant ceased and the New Covenant sealed with the blood of Christ began. The Fathers and theologians see in the flowing forth of the blood and water from the opened side of Jesus a symbol of the emergence of the Church. As Eve, the mother of the living, proceeded from the side of the sleeping Adam, so the Church, the second Eve, the mother of those living by grace, proceeded from the side of the Second Adam, sleeping on the Cross. Water and blood are symbols of the two chief sacraments, Baptism and the Eucharist, which represent two essential elements of the Church and therefore the Church herself. This symbolism, which already goes back to St. Augustine, received an authoritative confirmation by the Council of Vienne, D 480. Cf. St. Augustine, In Ioan. tr. 9, 10; tr. 120. 2; Enarr. in Ps. 40, 10. S. th. I 92, 3; III 64, 2 ad 3.

c) On the Feast of Pentecost the Risen Christ strengthened the Church with the supernatural power of the Holy Ghost who descended upon the Church and led her into the beginning of her public activity just as He Himself at the beginning of His teaching activity was publicly attested to and inducted into His Messianic Office by the descent in visible form of the Holy Ghost upon Him.

2. The Head of the Church

Christ is the Head of the Church. (*De fide.*)

In the Bull "Unam sanctam" (1302) Pope Boniface VIII declared: "The Church represents one single Mystical Body whose head is Christ." D 468. The Council of Trent teaches: "Christ Jesus continually infuses strength into the justified as the head to the limbs and the vine to the grapes." D 809.

St. Paul attests: "He (Christ) is the Head of the Body, the Church" (Col. 1, 18; cf. Eph. 5, 23). "He (Christ) is the head from whom the whole body being compacted and fitly joined together" (Eph. 4, 15 et seq.; Col. 2, 19). According to these texts, the position of Christ in relation to His Disciples is similar to the position of the head to the other members of the body.

Pope Pius XII following the thought of St. Thomas (S. th. III 8, 1; De verit. 29, 4), established the principality of Christ from His pre-eminence, from His government of the Church, from His similarity of nature with man, from His fullness of grace, from His grace-bestowing activity:

a) As the head occupies the supreme position in the human body, so Christ as God-Man assumes a unique pre-eminence within humanity. He is, as God, the first-born of all creation (Col. 1, 15), as man, the first-born of the dead (Col. 1, 18), as God-Man the sole mediator between God and man (1 Tim. 2, 5) The final and most fundamental ground for His pre-eminence is the Hypostatic Union.

b) As the head, being that member which is pre-eminently endowed with capabilities, guides the other members of the body, so Christ guides, controls and governs the whole Christian commonwealth, in an invisible and extraordinary manner, by Himself intervening in the spirit and heart of man, especially of the superiors of the Church. He enlightens and strengthens her in a visible and ordinary manner, i.e., mediately through the Church hierarchy appointed by Him.

c) As the head possesses the same nature as the other members of the body, so Christ in the Incarnation, assumed human nature as we possess it, with the same

frailty, passions and mortality, and thus became our blood-kinsman. The Son of God became man, in order to make us his brothers according to the flesh and participators in the Divine nature (2 Peter 1, 4).

d) As the head is the seat of all the senses, while the other members possess the sense of touch only, so Christ (as man), on the ground of the Hypostatic Union, possesses the fullness of all supernatural gifts. John 1, 14: "Full of grace and truth." In Him the Holy Ghost dwells with such a fullness of grace that it cannot be conceived greater (John 3, 34). He has received the power over all flesh (John 17, 2). In Him are all treasures of wisdom and knowledge (Col. 2, 3), including the knowledge of the Beatific Vision of God.

e) As the nerves are distributed from the head to the individual members of the body, and communicate feeling and movement to them, so from Christ, the Head, grace continually streams to the limbs of His Mystical Body, by means of which He supernaturally enlightens and sanctifies them. As God, He is the chief cause (causa principalis), as man, the instrumental cause (causa instrumentalis) of grace. John 1, 16: "Of His fullness we have all received: and grace for grace." He determines for each person the measure of grace (Eph. 4, 7). He infuses the light of Faith, "author and finisher of faith": Heb. 12, 2); gives to pastors and teachers especially, the gifts of knowledge, insight and wisdom, and guides and enlightens councils. He bestows supernatural power for the performance of salutary acts (John 15, 5: "Without me you can do nothing"), bestows, especially on the most prominent members of the Mystical Body, the gifts of counsel, strength, fear of the Lord and piety, produces as primary dispenser the effects of the Sacraments in souls, nourishes the redeemed with His Flesh and Blood (John 6, 56), increases grace and gives glory to body and soul (John 6, 55).

3. Conservator of the Church

"Our Redeemer Himself conserves with divine power the society founded by Him, the Church." (*Pius XII.*)

The association of Christ with the Church is so intimate and constant that Christ and the Church conjointly form one single Mystical Person (quasi una persona mystica; S. th. III 48, 2 ad 1). Christ formally identifies Himself with the Church and her members when He, as the Judge of the world, declares: "I was hungry and you gave me to eat; I was thirsty and you gave me to drink" (Mt. 25, 35), or when He speaks from Heaven to Saul: "Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me?" (Acts 9, 4). Following this mode of speech, St. Paul calls the Church united with Christ simply Christ. 1 Cor. 12, 12: "But as the body is one and hath many members; and all the members of the body, whereas they are many, yet are one body: so also is Christ."

St. Augustine says: "Christ (=the Church) preaches Christ, the body preaches its Head and the Head protects His Body" (Sermo 354, 1). The baptised person, is, according to St. Augustine, not only a Christian, but has become Christ: "Let us congratulate ourselves, and give thanks, that we are not only become Christians but Christ . . . be astonished, rejoice, we are become Christ; for when He is the Head, we the members, then the whole Man is He and we" (In Ioan. tr. 21, 8). The body and the head compose "the whole Christ" (In ep. I Ioan. tr. 1, 2: De unit. eccl. 4, 7).

The intrinsic reason for the intimate unification of Christ with the Church into one sole mystical person lies: on the one hand, in that Christ entrusted His mission to the Apostles and to their successors, from which follows that it is He who through them baptises, teaches and guides, looses and binds, offers and sacrifices; on the other hand, in that Christ permits the Church to participate in His supernatural life by pervading the whole body of the Church with His Divine power, and by nourishing and conserving the individual members according to the rank which they take in the body, just as the vine nourishes and makes fruitful the grapes connected with it (John 15, 1–8).

4. Redeemer of the Church

"Christ is the Divine Redeemer of His Body, the Church." (*Pius XII.*)

St. Paul teaches: "Christ is the Head of the Church, He is the Redeemer of His Body" (Eph. 5, 23). Although He is "the Redeemer of the World" (John 4, 42), the "Saviour of all men" (1 Tim. 4, 10), He is still "especially" the "Saviour of the faithful" (1 Tim. 4, 10), who compose the Church, which He "hath purchased with His own blood" (Acts 20, 28). For He has not merely objectively redeemed her by making vicarious atonement for her on the Cross and by meriting grace, but also subjectively by freeing her from sin, sanctifying her by the application of the redemptive grace acquired on the Cross. That which He once began on the Cross He continues by ceaseless intercession in His heavenly glory. Cf. Rom. 8, 34; Hebr. 7, 25; 9, 24.

§ 11. The Holy Ghost and the Church

1. The Soul of the Church

The Holy Ghost is the Soul of the Church. (*Sent. communis.*)

In the Encyclical "Divinum illud" (1897), Leo XIII declared: "Let the one proposition suffice: Christ is the Head of the Church, the Holy Ghost her soul." In the Encyclical "Mystici Corporis" (D 2288) Pius XII confirmed this doctrine. In its content it asserts that like the soul in the body, the Holy Ghost is the principle of being and life in the Church. It is the Holy Ghost who welds together the members of the Church among themselves and with Christ the Head, as the Holy Ghost is entirely in the head and entirely in the members of the Mystical Body. It is He who by His assistance upholds the hierarchy in the exercise of the teaching office, of the pastoral office and of the sacerdotal office. It is He who with His grace excites and fosters every salutary activity in the members of the Mystical Body. All life and growth of the Mystical Body proceeds from the Divine life-principle indwelling in it.

This teaching is manifested in the numerous assertions of Holy Scripture on the inner, hidden operation of the Holy Ghost in the Church: He remains with the disciples of Jesus for all time, in His place (John 14, 16). He lives in them as in a temple (1 Cor. 3, 16; 6, 19). He binds them all together into one body (1 Cor. 12, 13); He teaches them all and reminds them of all that Jesus said to them (John 14, 26; 1 John 2, 27); He gives testimony of Jesus (John 15, 26); He leads them to all truth (John 16, 13);

He speaks in them when they are brought before the Court (Mt. 10, 20); He works in them when they confess Jesus as the Lord (1 Cor. 12, 3); He helps to preserve the deposit of faith entrusted to them (2 Tim. 1, 14); He bestows the extraordinary gifts of grace, and allocates to each as He will (1 Cor. 12, 11); He moulds the Christian to a dwelling of God (Eph. 2, 22); He effects the forgiveness of sins (John 20, 22 et seq.), the rebirth (John 3, 5), the spiritual renewal (Tit. 3, 5); He bestows the spirit of adoption of sons (Rom. 8, 15); He pours out love into the hearts of the faithful (Rom. 5, 5); He brings forth all the Christian virtues (Gal. 5, 22); He inducts the superiors of the Church (Acts 20, 28); He directs them in their official activity (Acts 15, 28); He takes pity on our weakness and pleads with us before the Father (Rom. 8, 26); supported by Him we cry to God: "Abba, Father" (Rom. 8, 15; Gal. 4, 6).

The Fathers attest the intimate connection of the Holy Ghost with the Church. St. Irenaeus says: "Where the Church is, there is also the Spirit of God; and where the Spirit of God is, there is the Church and all grace" (Adv. haer. III 24, 1). St. Augustine compares the working of the Holy Ghost in the Church to the working of the soul in the body: "What the soul is for the body of man that the Holy Ghost is for the body of Christ, that is, the Church. The Holy Ghost operates in the whole Church that which the soul operates in the members of the one body." As the soul quickens every member of the body and bestows a definite function on each, so the Holy Ghost, by His grace, quickens every member of the Church, and allocates to each a definite activity in the service of the whole. Through one He works miracles, through others He proclaims the truth; in one He preserves virginity, in another marital chastity; in one He effects this, in another that. As the soul does not follow the member that is cut off from the body, so also the Holy Ghost does not dwell in the member who separates itself from the body of the Church (Sermo 267, 4, 4). Scholasticism adopted the thought of St. Augustine, for example, St. Thomas in his Commentary on the Apostles' Creed (a. 9). In another metaphor St. Thomas calls the Holy Ghost the Heart of the Church (cor Ecclesiae), based on the Aristotelian thought that the heart is the central organ, out of which all life-powers stream to the body. In analogous manner the Holy Ghost is the universal principle, from which all supernatural life-powers, that is, all graces, overflow to the Church, the Head (Christ as to His humanity) and the members. As the heart with its universal efficacy is invisible to the eye, so also the Holy Ghost and His universal quickening and uniting efficacy in the Church is invisible. Thus the Holy Ghost is very appropriately compared to the heart, while Christ, as to His sensory human nature, is very appropriately compared to the head (S. th. III 8, 1 ad 3). Prescinding from picturesque language, St. Thomas says of the relationship of the Holy Ghost to the Church: The Holy Ghost unites, quickens, teaches, sanctifies the Church, indwells in her, communicates the riches of the one to the others. Cf. S. th. 2 II 1, 9 ad 5: III 8, 1 ad 3; III 68, 9 ad 2; In 1 Cor. c. 12 lect. 2.

2. Body and Soul of the Church

While the Holy Ghost is the soul of the Church, the lawfully organised visible commonwealth of the faithful is the body of the Church. Both conjointly form a coherent whole as do the soul and the body in man. 1 Cor. 12, 13: "In one spirit were we all baptised to one body." It follows from this that he who culpably persists in remaining outside the body of the Church cannot

participate in the Holy Ghost, and in the life of grace effected by Him. St. Augustine says: "Only the body of Christ lives from the spirit of Christ. . . . Willst thou then live of the Spirit of Christ? Then be in the body of Christ!" (In Ioan. tr. 26, 13.) "The Spirit does not pursue a separated member" (Sermo 267, 4, 4). On the other hand, it must be inferred from the generality and sincerity of the Divine desire of salvation, that he also, who entangled in invincible error, does not know the true Church of Christ, can receive the supernatural life given by the Holy Ghost outside the body of the Church. Such a person, however, must have at least an implicit desire to belong to the Church of Christ. In the same way a person who cannot actually receive the Sacrament of Baptism, but at least implicitly desires to receive the Sacrament can attain to the grace of Baptism. Cf. D 1647, 1677. See Par. 20.

CHAPTER 4

The Properties or Essential Attributes of the Church

§ 12. The Indefectibility of the Church

In saying that the Church is indefectible we assert both her imperishableness, that is, her constant duration to the end of the world, and the essential immutability of her teaching, her constitution and her liturgy. This does not exclude the decay of individual "churches" (i.e., parts of the Church) and accidental changes.

The Church is indefectible, that is, she remains and will remain the Institution of Salvation, founded by Christ, until the end of the world. (*Sent. certa.*)

The Vatican Council says of the Church that she is "an unconquered stability" (invicta stabilitas: D 1794) and that she "built on a rock, will continue to stand until the end of time" (ad finem saeculorum usque firma stabit). D 1824. Leo XIII says in the Encyclical "Satis cognitum": "The Church of Christ is one and everlasting" (unica et perpetua). D 1955.

The indefectibility of the Church was contested: by the spiritualistic sects of antiquity (Montanists) and of the Middle Ages (Joachim of Fiore, the Franciscan spiritualists) who promised a new age of the Holy Ghost, in which a more perfect Church of the Spirit would dissolve the secularised Church of the flesh; by the Reformers, who maintained that under the Papacy the Church had degenerated and departed from the teaching of Christ; by Jansenists (P. Quesnel, Synod of Pistoja), who accused the Church of obscuring individual truths of Faith; by the Modernists, who maintained a substantial development in the teaching and the constitution of the Church. D 1445, 1501, 2053 et seq.

The Messianic prophecies of the Old Testament envisage an eternal bond between God and His people (Is. 55, 3; 61, 8; Jer. 32, 40) and an eternal indestructible Kingdom (Is. 9, 7; Dn. 2, 44; 7, 14). David's throne is to exist for all time like the sun and the moon (Ps. 88, 37 et seq.). These prophecies refer to Christ and to His Kingdom, the Church. On His entry into

the world, the Angel Gabriel proclaimed: "He shall reign in the House of Jacob for ever" (Luke 1, 32 et seq.).

Christ built His Church on a rock in order to give her a safe foundation in all storms (cf. Mt. 7, 24 et seq.), and promised her "the gates of Hell shall not prevail" (Mt. 16, 18). In this the imperishableness and indestructibility of the Church is clearly expressed, whether one understands by the gates of Hell the power of death or the power of the Evil One. For the era subsequent to His going home to the Father, Jesus promised His disciples another Paraclete, who is to remain with them for ever, the Spirit of Truth (John 14, 16). Sending out His Apostles into the world, He assured them: "Behold I am with you all days even to the consummation of the world" (Mt. 28, 20). According to the Parable of the Cockle (Mt. 13, 24-30, 36-43); and of the draught of fishes (Mt. 13, 47-50), the Kingdom of God on earth will continue until the end of the world. St. Paul attests that the Eucharist is celebrated in memory of the death of the Lord "until He come again" (1 Cor. 11, 26).

St. Ignatius of Antioch sees the indefectibility of the Church symbolised in the anointing of the Lord. Ep. 17, 1. St. Irenaeus, in opposition to the Gnostic error, affirms that the preaching of the Church, thanks to the efficacy of the Holy Ghost, "is immutable and always remaining the same" (Adv. haer. III, 24, 1). St. Augustine says: "The Church will totter when her foundation totters. But how shall Christ totter? . . . as long as Christ does not totter, neither shall the Church totter in eternity" (Enarr. in Ps. 103, 2, 5). Cf. Enarr. in Ps. 47, 7; 60, 6.

The intrinsic reason for the indefectibility of the Church of Christ lies in her inner relation with Christ, who is the Foundation of the Church (1 Cor. 3, 11) and with the Holy Ghost, who indwells in her as essence and life-principle. In opposition to Joachim of Fiore, St. Thomas teaches that no more perfect state is to be expected, in which the Grace of the Holy Ghost will be more richly given, than it was heretofore given. S. th. 1 II 106, 4. In the past the Church built on the foundation of Christ, and of the Apostles, has verified the truth of her invincibility, by her resistance to destruction, when threatened by errors and by the assaults of the devil. Epos. symb. a. 9.

§ 13. The Infallibility of the Church

Infallibility is the impossibility of falling into error. One may distinguish an active and a passive infallibility. The former belongs to the pastors of the Church in the exercise of their teaching office (infallibilitas in docendo), the latter to the faithful as a whole in its assent to the message of faith (infallibilitas in credendo). Active and passive are related as cause and effect. We are concerned here chiefly with active infallibility.

1. Reality of the Infallibility

In the final decision on doctrines concerning faith and morals the Church is infallible. (*De fide.*)

In the definition of Papal Infallibility the Vatican Council implied the infallibility of the Church by declaring: "The Roman Pontiff when he

speaks ex cathedra . . . is possessed of that infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer willed that His Church should be endowed for defining doctrine regarding Faith or Morals." D 1839.

Opponents of the dogma are the Reformers, who in rejecting the hierarchy also rejected the authoritative teaching-function of the Church; and the Modernists, who deny the Divine institution of the Church and therefore also set aside her infallibility.

Christ promised His Apostles the assistance of the Holy Ghost for the fulfilment of their teaching task. John 14, 16 et seq. : " I will ask the Father : and He shall give you another Paraclete, that He may abide with you forever : the Spirit of Truth." Mt. 28, 20 : " Behold I am with you all days even unto the consummation of the world." Cf. John 14, 26 ; 16, 13. Acts 1, 8. The perpetual assistance of Christ and of the Holy Ghost guarantees the purity and the integrity of the promulgation of the faith of the Apostles and of their successors. Christ demands unconditional " obedience to the faith " (Rom. 1, 5), promulgated by His Apostles and of their successors, and makes eternal salvation dependent on this : " He that believeth and is baptised shall be saved, but he that believeth not shall be condemned " (Mk. 16, 16). He positively identifies Himself with them : " He that heareth you heareth me : and he that despiseth you despiseth me " (Luke 10, 16 ; cf. Mt. 10, 40 ; John 13, 20). This presupposes that the Apostles and their successors in their promulgation of faith are removed from the danger of error. St. Paul sees in the Church " the pillar and the ground of the truth " (1 Tim. 3, 15). The infallibility of the promulgation of faith is a presupposition of the unity and of the indestructibility of the Church.

In the battle against false teaching, the Fathers emphasise that the Church always preserved unfalsified the truth handed down by the Apostles, and will preserve it for all time. St. Irenaeus stresses as against the Gnostic error, that the promulgation of the Church is always the same, because she possesses the Spirit of the Holy Ghost, the Spirit of Truth : " Where the Church is, there is also the Spirit of God, and where the Spirit of God is, there is the Church and all grace ; but the Spirit is truth " (Adv. haer. III 24, 1). The Church is " the house of the truth," from which false teaching is excluded (III 24, 2). The unfalsified tradition of the apostolic teaching is guaranteed by the uninterrupted succession of the Bishops from the Apostles downwards. " They (the Bishops) have received the certain charisma of the truth according to the pleasure of the Father, with the succession in the office of Bishop." (IV 26, 2.) Cf. Tertullian, De praesc. 28 ; St. Cyprian, Ep. 59, 7.

The intrinsic basis of the Infallibility of the Church lies in the assistance of the Holy Ghost, which was promised to her especially for the exercise of the teaching office. Cf. S. th. 2 II 1, 9 ; Quodl. 9, 16.

2. The Object of the Infallibility

a) The primary object of the Infallibility is the formally revealed truths of Christian Doctrine concerning faith and morals. (*De fide.*) D 1839.

The Church can determine and propose the sense of the teaching of Revelation, not merely positively by authentic declaration of Holy Scripture and the tes-

timonies of Tradition, and by setting forth formulas of belief (Creeds, etc.), but also by the determination and rejection of such errors as are opposed to the teaching of Revelation. Otherwise she could not fully discharge her task of "guardian and teacher of the revealed word of God" (D 1793); D 1798

b) The secondary object of the Infallibility is truths of the Christian teaching on faith and morals, which are not formally revealed, but which are closely connected with the teaching of Revelation. (*Sent. certa.*)

This doctrine is a necessary consequence of the doctrine of Infallibility which has the purpose "of preserving and of truly interpreting the deposit of Holy Faith" (D 1836). The Church could not achieve this purpose if she could not infallibly decide regarding doctrines and acts which are intimately linked with Revelation. She may exercise her power in these matters either positively by the determination of the truth or negatively by the rejection of the error opposed to the truth.

To the secondary object of Infallibility belong: *a*) Theological conclusions derived from a formally revealed truth by aid of a natural truth of reason. *β*) Historical facts on the determination of which the certainty of a truth of Revelation depends (facta dogmatica). *γ*) Natural truths of reason which are intimately connected with truths of Revelation. For further details see Introduction, Par. 6. *δ*) The canonisation of saints, that is, the final judgment that a member of the Church has been assumed into eternal bliss and may be the object of general veneration. The veneration shown to the saints is, as St. Thomas teaches, "to a certain extent a confession of the faith, in which we believe in the glory of the saints" (Quodl. 9, 16). If the Church could err in her opinion, consequences would arise which would be incompatible with the sanctity of the Church.

3. Possessors of the Infallibility

Possessors of the Infallibility are the Pope and the whole Episcopate, that is, the totality of the Bishops, including the Pope, the Head of the Episcopate.

a) The Pope

The Pope is infallible when he speaks ex cathedra. (*De fide.*) (See Par. 8.)

b) The whole Episcopate

The totality of the Bishops is infallible, when they, either assembled in general council or scattered over the earth, propose a teaching of faith or morals as one to be held by all the faithful. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent teaches that the Bishops are the successors of the Apostles (D 960); and so does the Vatican Council (D 1828). As successors of the Apostles they are the pastors and teachers of the faithful (D 1821). As official teachers of the faith, they are endowed with the active infallibility assured to the incumbents of the Church teaching office.

Two forms of the activity of the teaching office of the whole Episcopate are distinguished—an extraordinary form and an ordinary one.

α) The Bishops exercise their infallible teaching power in extraordinary manner at a general or ecumenical council. It is in the decisions of the General Councils that the teaching activity of the whole teaching body instituted by Christ is most decisively exercised.

It has been the constant teaching of the Church from the earliest times that the resolutions of the General Councils are infallible. St. Athanasius says of the Decree on faith of the Nicene Council: "The words of the Lord which were spoken by the General Council of Nicaea, remain in eternity" (Ep. ad Afros 2). St. Gregory the Great recognises and honours the first four General Councils as much as the Four Gospels; he makes the fifth equal to them (Ep. I 25).

In order that a Council should be a general one it is necessary: $\alpha\alpha$) That all the ruling Bishops in the world be invited; $\beta\beta$) That in point of fact so many Bishops from the various countries come, that they may be regarded as being representative of the whole Episcopate; $\gamma\gamma$) That the Pope summon the Council, or at least invest the assembly with his authority and preside personally or by his representative at the meeting, and ratify the resolutions. From the Papal ratifications, which can be explicit or implicit, the resolutions derive general legal binding power. CIC 227.

The first eight General Councils were summoned by the Emperor, who also, as a rule, assumed a presidency of honour or outer protection. The Second and the Fifth General Councils were held without the co-operation of the Pope or of his representative. According to the manner in which they were convened, their composition and their direction, they were plenary councils of the Orient, but achieved ecumenical validity by the subsequent supplementary recognition of their docttinal decrees by the whole Church.

β) The Bishops exercise their infallible teaching power in an ordinary manner when they, in their dioceses, in moral unity with the Pope, unanimously promulgate the same teachings on faith and morals. The Vatican Council expressly declared that also the truths of Revelation proposed as such by the ordinary and general teaching office of the Church are to be firmly held with "divine and catholic faith" (D 1792). But the incumbents of the ordinary and general teaching office of the Church are the members of the whole episcopate scattered over the whole earth. The agreement of the Bishops in doctrine may be determined from the catechisms issued by them, from their pastoral letters, from the prayer books approved by them, and from the resolutions of particular synods. A morally general agreement suffices, but in this the express or tacit assent of the Pope, as the supreme head of the Episcopate, is essential.

An individual Bishop, when he makes a promulgation of faith, is not infallible. The history of the Church shows that individual members of the Episcopate, for example, Photinus, Nestorius, have fallen into error and heresy. In order to preserve the teaching of faith handed down by Tradition, in its purity, the collegiate infallibility of the whole Episcopate suffices. However, the individual Bishop, in what concerns his own diocese is, by virtue of his office, the authentic, that is the authoritative, teacher of faith, as long as he continues in communion with the Apostolic See, and as long as he adheres to the general teaching of the Church.

§ 14. The Visibility of the Church

Visibility is that quality of the Church on the ground of which she appears externally and perceptibly to the senses. A distinction is made between material and formal visibility. The former consists in the sensory appearance of her members, the latter in definite properties, by which the members of the Church externally and visibly belong to a religious communion. The material visibility of the Church is not disputed; but the formal visibility is questioned. The formal visibility presupposes and is based on the knowability of the Church.

1. The External Visible Side of the Church

The Church founded by Christ is an external visible commonwealth. (*Sent. certa.*)

According to the teaching of the Council of Trent there is in the Church "a visible sacrifice" and an "visible and external priesthood" (D 957). The Vatican Council teaches that Christ appointed the Apostle Peter to be the "visible foundation" (D 1821) of the unity of the Church. Leo XIII, in the Encyclical "Satis cognitum" (1896), teaches: "When one visualises the ultimate purpose of the Church and the proximate causes effecting sanctity, she is, in fact, spiritual. But when one considers the members of the Church and the means which lead to the spiritual gifts, then she is externally and necessarily visible." A threefold sensible bond binds the members of the Church to one another, and makes them known as such: the profession of the same Faith, the use of the same means of grace, and the subordination to the same authority.

Pius XII, in the Encyclical "Mystici Corporis," confirmed the teaching of Leo XIII, and expressly rejected the view that the Church is "a mere spiritual entity, joining together by an invisible link a number of communities of Christians, in spite of their difference in Faith."

The visibility of the Church was denied by the Spiritualistic Sects of the Middle Ages, by Huss and the Reformers. According to Huss, the Church consists of the communion of the predestinated (D 627). Calvin held the same view. Luther taught that the Church is "the assembly of the saints (=the faithful), in which the Gospel is properly taught and the Sacraments are properly administered" (Conf. Aug. Art. 7). But without an authoritative teaching office there is no certain norm for the purity of doctrine or for the administration of the Sacraments. The rejection of the hierarchy inevitably led to the doctrine of the invisible Church.

The biblical proof of the visibility of the Church springs from the Divine institution of the hierarchy (Par. 4). The teaching office demands from its incumbents the duty of obedience to the faith (Rom. 1, 5) and the confession of faith (Mt. 10, 32 et seq.; Rom. 10, 10). To the sacerdotal office corresponds, on the part of the faithful, the duty of using the means of grace dispensed by it (John 3, 5; 6, 54). To the pastoral office corresponds, on the part of those shepherded, the duty of being subject to the Church Authority (Mt. 18, 17 et seq.; Luke 10, 16).

The Prophets of the Old Covenant depict the Messianic Kingdom symbolically by the simile of a high mountain visible from afar off, which overtowers all other mountains, and to which all people converge (Is. 2, 2 et seq.; Mich. 4, 1 et seq.). According to the parables of Jesus, the Church is like an earthly kingdom, a flock, a building, a vine, a city on a mountain. St. Paul compares the Church to the human body.

The Fathers teach that the Church of Christ is easily recognised and distinguished as such from heretical communions. St. Irenaeus holds against the Gnostics that the adherents of the Church throughout the whole world confess the same faith, observe the same commandments and preserve the same form of Church constitution. He compares the Church, which preaches the same truth everywhere, to a seven-branched candlestick, which, visible to all, bears the light of Christ (Adv. haer. V 20, 1). St. Augustine compares the Church to a city on a mountain (Mt. 5, 14): "The Church stands clear and visible before all men; for she is the city on the mountain which cannot be hidden" (Contra Cresconium, II, 36, 45). Cf. In Ep. I Ioan. tr. 1, 13. "The final reason for the visibility of the Church lies in the Incarnation of the Divine Word" (Möhler, Symbolik, Par. 36).

2. The Inner, Invisible Side of the Church

Side by side with the outward visible side, the Church, like her Divine-human Founder, has also an inner, invisible side. The purpose of the Church—the inner sanctification of mankind—is invisible. The gifts of Salvation, which the Church communicates, truth and grace, are invisible. The inner life-principle of the Church, the Holy Ghost, and the operation of His grace, are invisible. While the outward social side is an object perceptible to the senses, the inner mystical side is an object of faith. The visible appearance of the Church, therefore, in no wise excludes faith in the Church as the salutary institution founded by God.

The objections raised against the visibility rest mostly on a one-sided emphasis on the inner spiritual side. The words of Jesus, Luke 17, 21: "The Kingdom of God is within you" (intra vos), as they were addressed to the Pharisees, do not assert: the Kingdom of God is in your hearts, but: the Kingdom of God is in your midst. But even in the former interpretation it does not exclude the visibility.

§ 15. The Unity of the Church

By unity is to be understood not merely numerical unity or unicity, but above all the inner unity or unicity in the sense of being undivided.

The Church founded by Christ is unique and one. (*De fide.*)

In the Nicene Creed the Church confesses: Credo in . . . unam . . . Ecclesiam. D 86. The Vatican Council teaches: "In order that the whole host of the faithful may remain in unity of faith and communion (in fidei et communionis unitate) He placed St. Peter over the other Apostles and instituted in him both a perpetual principle of unity and a visible foundation" D 1821. In the Encyclical "Satis cognitum," which ex professo treats of the unity of the Church, Leo XIII comments: "As her Divine Founder willed

that the Church should be one in faith, in government and in communion, He appointed Peter and his successors to be the foundation and, as it were, the centre of its unity." D 1960.

One may, with the Vatican Council, distinguish a two-fold unity of the Church:

1. Unity of Faith

This consists in the fact that all members of the Church inwardly believe the truths of faith proposed by the teaching office of the Church, at least implicitly, and outwardly confess them. Cf. Rom. 10, 10: "For with the heart, we believe unto justice: but with the mouth, confession is made unto Salvation" (unity of the confession of faith or symbolical unity). Unity of Faith leaves room for various opinions in those controversial questions which the Church has not finally decided.

Incompatible with the Catholic conception of the unity of Faith is the Protestant theory of the Fundamental Articles, which demand agreement in the basic truths of faith only, so that within the framework of the one Christian Church varying confessions of faith can exist side by side. Cf. D 1685.

2. Unity of Communion

This consists, on the one hand, in the subjection of the members of the Church to the authority of the bishops and of the Pope (unity of government or hierarchical unity); on the other hand, in the binding of the members among themselves to a social unity by participation in the same cult and in the same means of grace (unity of cult or liturgical unity).

The unity both of faith and of communion is guaranteed by the Primacy of the Pope, the Supreme Teacher and Pastor of the Church (centrum unitatis: D 1960). One is cut off from the unity of Faith by heresy and from the unity of communion by schism.

Proof: Christ and the Apostles see in Unity an essential property of the Church. Christ gives the Apostles the mandate to promulgate His teaching to all peoples, and demands unconditional assent to its promulgation (Mt. 28, 19 et seq.; Mk. 16, 15 et seq.). In the prayer of the High Priest He insistently asks the Father for the unity of the Apostles and of the future faithful: "Not for these only do I pray, but for them also who through their words shall believe in Me: that they may be one, as thou, Father, in me, and I in Thee: that they also may be one in Us: that the world may believe that thou hast sent Me" (John 17, 20 et seq.). Accordingly, unity must be a characteristic of the Church of Christ.

St. Paul symbolically represents the unity of the Church by picturing it as a house (1 Tim. 3, 15) and again as a human body (Rom. 12, 4 et seq.; et passim). He expressly enjoins internal and outward unity: "I beseech you . . . in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ . . . that you be careful to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace: one body and one Spirit; as you are called in one hope of your calling: one Lord, one Faith, one Baptism, one God and Father of all" (Eph. 4, 3–6). He warns insistently against schism

and heresy: "I beseech you, brethren, by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that you all speak the same thing and that there be no schisms among you: but that you be perfect in the same mind and in the same judgment" (1 Cor. 1, 10). "A man that is a heretic after the first or second correction avoid" (Tit. 3, 10). Cf. Gal. 1, 8 et seq.

In the struggle against heresy the Fathers very strongly stress the unity of faith; in the struggle against schism they very strongly stress the unity of communion. St. Irenaeus effectively contrasts the variety of Gnostic views with the unity of the Christian teaching of faith throughout the whole world: "Just as the sun is one and the same in the whole world, so the message of truth penetrates everywhere and enlightens all men, who wish to come to the knowledge of the truth" (Adv. haer. I 10, 2; cf. V 20, 1). For the purpose of the public confession of faith on the occasion of the reception of Baptism, the most important truths of faith were synthesised into rules of faith and symbols of faith. Cf. the rules of faith of St. Irenaeus (Adv. haer. I 10, 1; III 4, 2); of Tertullian (De praesc. 13; de virg. vel. 1; Adv. Prax. 2) and of Origen (De princ. I praef. 4). St. Cyprian, impelled by the secessions from the Church in Carthage and in Rome, wrote the first monograph on the unity of the Catholic Church. In this he denies salvation to all those who secede from the Church (De eccl. cath. unit. 6). Unity is preserved by the bond of the Bishops who are closely linked one with the other (Ep. 66, 8). The significance of the Primacy for the preservation of Church unity was stressed by St. Cyprian (De unit. 4); St. Optatus of Milevis (De schism. Donat. II 2 et seq.); St. Jerome (Adv. Jov. I 26).

St. Thomas declares that the unity of the Church is founded on three elements:— The common faith of all members of the Church, the common Hope of eternal life, and the common Love of God and of one another in mutual service Fidelity to the unity of the Church is a condition for the attaining of eternal salvation. Expos. symb. a. 9.

§ 16. The Sanctity of the Church

Sanctity in a creature means attachment to God. A distinction is made between subjective or personal, and objective or material sanctity. Subjective sanctity consists, as to the negative side, in freedom from sin; as to the positive side, in the supernatural attachment to God through grace and charity. Objective sanctity belongs to persons and things that are permanently devoted to the service of God or that operate the sanctification of men.

1. Sanctity as an Essential Attribute of the Church

The Church founded by Christ is holy. (*De fide.*)

In the Apostles' Creed the Church confesses: Credo in . . . sanctam Ecclesiam (D 2). The Vatican Council imputes to the Church: "a pre-eminent sanctity and an inexhaustible fruitfulness in all good things" (D 1794). Pius XII comments in the Encyclical "Mystici Corporis": "Certainly our holy Mother shows herself without stain in the Sacraments with which she begets and nurtures her children; in the faith which she preserves ever inviolate; in the holy laws which she imposes on all and in the evangelical counsels by which she admonishes; and, finally, in the heavenly gifts and

miraculous powers by which out of her inexhaustible fecundity she begets countless hosts of martyrs, virgins, and confessors."

The Church is holy in her origin, her purpose, her means and her fruits.

She is holy in her Founder and Invisible Head of the Church, Christ the Lord; in her inner life-principle, the Holy Ghost; in her purpose which is the glory of God and the sanctification of men, in the means by which she attains her purpose, in the teaching of Christ with its propositions of faith, commandments and counsels concerning morals, in her liturgy especially the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass, in her laws, in her institutions, such as the Orders and Congregations, the institutes of education and of charity, in the sacraments, the sacramentals and the liturgical prayers, the gifts of grace and charisma given by the Holy Ghost. Many members of the Church are holy in the ordinary sense of holiness (= possession of the state of grace). The Church has never lacked examples of heroic holiness and marvellous manifestations of holiness. Of the kinds of holiness named, however, only the last two, holiness of the means and heroic holiness of the members, are perceptible to the senses, and only these may be regarded as notes of the Church of Christ.

Proof: Jesus compared the Church to the leaven (Mt. 13, 33) in order to set forth her remoulding and sanctifying power and task. In the same sense He designates His disciples: "the salt of the earth" (Mt. 5, 13), and: "the light of the world" (Mt. 5, 14). St. Paul addresses the Christians as "saints": "Those who are sanctified in Christ Jesus, called to be saints" (1 Cor. 1, 2). He calls individual communities as well as the whole Church: "Church of God" (1 Cor. 1, 2; 1 Tim. 3, 15). As the purpose of the establishment of the Church, he names the sanctification of her members, both negative and positive: "Christ also loved the Church and delivered Himself up for it: that He might sanctify it, cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life; that He might present it to Himself, a glorious Church, not having spot or wrinkle or any such thing; but that it should be holy and without blemish" (Eph. 5, 25-27). Cf. Tit. 2, 14. The hierarchy and the extraordinary gifts of grace serve "the perfecting of the saints" according to the model of Christ (Eph. 4, 11-13). The most profound source of holiness of the Church and the power of holiness indwelling in her lies in her intimate relation with Christ and with the Holy Ghost; she is the Body of Christ which is permeated and animated by His Spirit (1 Cor. 12, 12 et seq.).

In the defensive struggle against paganism, the early Christian Apologists proudly point to the sublimity of the Christian teaching on faith and morals, and emphasise the moral reformation which the Christian religion effected. Cf. Aristides, Apol. 15–17; St. Justin, Apol. I 14–17, 23–29. Athenagoras, Suppl. 31–36; Ep. ad Diogn. 5. et seq. According to Origen, "the communities of God to which Christ has become teacher and educator are, in comparison with the communities of the pagan peoples, among which they live as strangers, like heavenly lights in the world" (C. Cels. III 29; cf. I 26. Cf. St. Augustine, Sermo 214, 11).

St. Thomas establishes the sanctity of the Church on the sanctity of her members, who have been washed with the Blood of Christ, anointed with the grace of the Holy Ghost, consecrated by the indwelling of the most Holy Trinity to be the Temple of God, and sanctified by the invocation of God. Expos. symb. a. 9.

2. The Church and Sin

Not only those members who are holy but the sinners also belong to the Church. (*Sent. certa.*)

It does not follow from the holiness of the Church that mortal sinners thereby cease to be members of the Church, as in early Christian times the Novatianists and the Donatists and in modern times Luther and Quesnel maintained. Clement XI and Pius VI reject this view. D 1422–28. 1515. Pius XII rejected it anew in the Encyclical "Mystici Corporis" and commented: "Schism, heresy, or apostasy are such of their very nature that they sever a man from the Body of the Church; but not every sin, even the most grievous, is of such a kind."

In the Parables of the cockle among the wheat Mt. 13, 24–30), of the net, which enmeshes good and bad fish (Mt. 13, 47–50), and of the wise and the foolish virgins (Mt. 25, 1–13), Jesus teaches that good and bad live side by side in the Church, and that the separation will be made only at the end of the world, at the General Judgment. He gives exact indications for the correction of erring brethren. Only when all attempts at improving them remain unsuccessful, are they to be cast out of the Church (Mt. 18, 15–17). From the apostolic writings it is plain that even in the Primitive Church grave sins occurred, which were not punished always by exclusion from the Christian communion (cf. 1 Cor. 11, 18 et seq.; 2 Cor. 12, 20 et seq.).

St. Augustine defended the traditional Church teaching against the Donatists by appealing to the parables of Jesus. Cf. In Ioan. tr. 6, 12; Enarr. in Ps. 128, 8; Ep. 93, 9, 34. The doctrine that every mortal sinner ceases to be a member of the Church leads to denial of the visibility of the Church, as the presence or absence of the state of grace is not knowable from without. A mortal sinner remains within the Church as long as he remains bound at least by Christian faith and Christian hope, with Christ, the Head of the Mystical Body. Cf. S. th. III 8, 3 ad 2.

§ 17. The Catholicity of the Church

Catholic means Universal (καθ' ὅλον). The Church is called Catholic especially on account of her spatial extent, that is, on account of her extension over the whole earth. We may distinguish Virtual Catholicity, that is, the intention to extend over the whole earth together with the capacity to achieve that purpose, and Actual Catholicity, that is the actual extension of the Church over the whole earth. Virtual Catholicity existed from the beginning; Actual Catholicity, by its nature, could only be achieved after a fairly long historical development. Actual Catholicity is said to be physical if it embraces all peoples of the earth, even if not all individual men, and moral if it includes only the greater part of them. Catholicity, of course, presupposes unity.

The Church founded by Christ is catholic. (*De fide.*)

In the Apostles' Creed the Church confesses: Credo in . . . sanctam Ecclesiam catholicam (D 6). Cf. D 86, 1686.

Moral Catholicity suffices for the concept of Catholicity. Nevertheless it is Christ's will that the Church constantly endeavour to extend. The ideal towards which

the Church strives is physical Catholicity. According to the established view of the majority of theologians, moral Catholicity demands that the Church extend over the whole earth simultaneously. Thus after a certain time of development this moral Catholicity will be realised and from that time on be perpetuated. The wide extension and the great number of the faithful do not indeed of themselves constitute a proof of the truth of a teaching—error also can achieve wide extension; nevertheless Catholicity is a quality which, according to the will of her Founder, shall not be lacking in the teaching of Christ, and it is therefore a characteristic of the true Church of Christ.

Proof: In the Messianic prophecies of the Old Covenant, Catholicity is mentioned as a characteristic of the Messianic Kingdom. While the Old Testament Kingdom of God was limited to the People of Israel, the coming Messianic Kingdom was to embrace " all peoples of the earth." Cf. Gn. 12, 3; 18, 18; 26, 4; 28, 14; Ps. 2, 8; 21, 28; 71, 8–11. 17; 85, 9; Is. 2, 2; 11, 40; 45, 22; 49, 6; 55, 4–5; 56, 3–8; 66, 19–21; Ez. 17, 22–24; Dn. 2, 35; Mal. 1, 11. Christ willed that His Church should be one Church spanning the world and encompassing all nations. In place of the narrow Jewish particularism He instituted a world-wide Christian universalism: " And this Gospel of the Kingdom shall be preached in the whole world, for a testimony to all nations; and then shall the consummation come" (Mt. 24, 14; cf. Luke 24, 47). " Going therefore teach ye all nations" (Mt. 28, 19; cf. Mk. 16, 15). " Ye shall be witnesses unto me in Jerusalem and in all Judaea and Samaria and even to the uttermost ends of the earth" (Acts 1, 8).

The Apostles fulfilled the mandate of Christ. The primitive community in Jerusalem became the embryo of the mission in Judaea and Samaria: the first Pagan-Christian community in Antioch became the starting point of the missions to the pagans. St. Paul travelled almost the whole ancient civilised world in order " to guide all pagan peoples to the obedience of faith" to Christ (Rom. 1, 5). He already sees fulfilled the words of the Psalms: " Their sound hath gone forth into all the earth: and their words unto the ends of the whole world" (Rom. 10, 18). When the number of the pagans predetermined by God shall have entered the Church, then also Israel, which was the first to reject the offer of Salvation made by Him to it before all others, shall be converted and saved (Rom. 11, 25 et seq.).

The title " Catholic Church " was first used by St. Ignatius of Antioch: "Where Jesus Christ is, there is the Catholic Church" (Smyrn. 8, 2). In the Martyrium Polycarpi it is found four times, three times in the sense of the " universal Church" through the whole world (inscr. 8, 1; 19, 2); once in the meaning of the " Orthodox Church" (16, 2). Since the end of the 2nd century the expression is frequently found in both meanings, which factually coincide (Canon Muratori, Tertullian, St. Cyprian). The attribute " Catholic" (in connection with Church) first appears in the Creeds in the Eastern Church (St. Cyril of Jerusalem, St. Epiphanius, Nicaeno-Constantinopolitanum: D 9, 14, 86). St. Cyril of Jerusalem refers the catholicity of the Church not merely to spatial extension, but also to the teaching given by her; to the generality of the classes of society, which she brings to the veneration of God; to the generality of the forgiveness of sins, which she guarantees; and to the generality of the virtues which she possesses (Cat. 18, 23). By all these characteristics the true Church of Christ is distinguished from the congregations of heretics. Thus

for St. Cyril, the name Catholic Church " is the proper characteristic name of this Holy Church, the mother of us all, who is the Bride of Our Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God." (Cat. 18, 26.) St. Augustine understands the appellation " Catholic " pre-eminently of universal spatial extension (Ep. 93, 7, 23). From the writings of the Old and New Testaments he adduces the proof, that this is an essential trait and characteristic mark of the true Church of Christ. Cf. Ep. 185, 1, 5 ; Sermo 46, 14, 33 et seq.

St. Thomas bases the Catholicity of the Church on her universal extension over the whole world ; on the universality of the classes represented in her ; and on her universal duration from the time of Abel to the end of the world. Expos. symb. a. 9.

§ 18. The Apostolicity of the Church

Apostolic signifies derived from the Apostles. We distinguish a threefold apostolicity : of origin (apostolicitas originis), of teaching (ap. doctrinae), and of succession in office (ap. successionis.)

The Church founded by Christ is apostolic. (*De fide.*)

The Nicene Creed confesses : Credo in . . . apostolicam Ecclesiam (D 86). Cf. D 14, 1686.

The dogma asserts : In its origin the Church goes back to the Apostles. She has always adhered to the teaching which she received from the Apostles. The Pastors of the Church, the Pope and the Bishops are connected with the Apostles by the succession of office. The apostolicity of the succession guarantees the unfalsified transmission of doctrine and makes manifest the organic connection between the Church of the present day and the Church of the Apostles.

Proof : Christ founded His Church on the Apostles, by transferring to them His threefold office, teaching, pastoral and sacerdotal ; and by appointing Peter the supreme pastor and the teacher of the Church (see supra Pars. 4 and 5). Christ willed that these offices, and the powers corresponding to them, should be transmitted to their successors, since the purpose of the Church makes it necessary that these be perpetuated. In the unbroken succession of the Bishops from the Apostles the apostolic character of the Church most clearly appears. It is sufficient to point to the apostolic succession of the Roman Church, because the Roman bishop is the head of the whole Church and vehicle of the infallible doctrinal power. Consequently the apostolic Church and the unfalsified apostolic teaching are where Peter or his successor is.

Among the Fathers, St. Irenaeus and Tertullian especially, stressed and verified the basic principle of Apostolicity against the Gnostic error. They appealed to the fact that the Catholic Church received her teaching from the Apostles, and by the uninterrupted succession of the bishops preserved it in its purity. The heresies, on the other hand are post-apostolic, or in individual cases where errors may be traced back to apostolic times, of extra-apostolic origin. St. Irenaeus offers the oldest list of Roman bishops (Adv. haer. III 3, 3 ; cf. IV 26, 2). Cf. Tertullian. De praescr. 20–21 ; 32 ; 36–37 ; Adv. Marc. IV 5 ; St. Cyprian,

Ep. 69, 3; St. Augustine, Contra ep. Manichaei, 4, 5; Ep. 53, 1, 2 (List of Roman Bishops).

St. Thomas teaches that the Apostles and their teachings are the secondary foundation of the Church, the primary foundation being Christ Himself. Expos. symb. a. 9.

Characteristics of the Church

The four properties of Unity, Sanctity, Catholicity and Apostolicity, since they appear externally and are easily recognisable, are not merely properties of being, but at the same time, outer marks of the true Church of Christ. The Holy Office, under Pius IX (1864), declared: "The true Church of Christ, by virtue of Divine authority, is constituted and is knowable by the four characteristics, which we confess in the Creed as an object of the Faith" (D 1686; cf. 1793). In Apologetics we show that of all the Christian confessions the Roman Catholic Church alone possesses at least pre-eminently these four characteristics.

CHAPTER 5

The Necessity of the Church

§ 19. Membership of the Church

1. Teaching of the Church

The members of the Church are those who have validly received the Sacrament of Baptism and who are not separated from the unity of the confession of the Faith, and from the unity of the lawful communion of the Church. (*Sent. certa.*)

In the Encyclical "Mystici Corporis," Pius XII declared: "Only those are to be accounted really members of the Church who have been regenerated in the waters of Baptism and profess the true faith, and have not cut themselves off from the structure of the Body by their own unhappy act or been severed therefrom, for very grave crimes, by the legitimate authority (D 2286).

According to this declaration three conditions are to be demanded for membership of the Church: a) The valid reception of the Sacrament of Baptism. b) The profession of the true Faith. c) Participation in the Communion of the Church. By the fulfilment of these three conditions one subjects oneself to the threefold office of the Church, the sacerdotal office (Baptism), the teaching office (Confession of Faith), and the pastoral office (obedience to the Church authority).

As the three powers perpetuated in these offices, the power of consecration, the power of teaching and the power of government, constitute the unity and the visibility of the Church, subjection to each and all of these powers is

a condition for membership of the Church. On reception of Baptism, the seal of Jesus Christ, the Character of Baptism, is imprinted. This effects the incorporation in the Body of Christ, and confers the capacity and right to participate in the Christian cult. Baptism is, therefore, the real cause of our incorporation into the Church. The Confession of the true Faith and the adherence to the communion of the Church are for adults subjective conditions for the achievement and the unhindered perpetuation of their membership of the Church which is initiated by Baptism. Those children validly baptised outside the Church are members of the Church unless and until after reaching the use of reason, they voluntarily separate themselves from the Confession of the Faith or from the communion of the Church.

The Decretum pro Armenis of Eugene IV (1439), says of Baptism : "Through it we are made members of Christ and compacted into the body of the Church" (per ipsum membra Christi ac de corpore efficimur Ecclesiae). D 696. The Council of Trent declared : "The Church exercises jurisdiction over nobody who has not previously entered the Church through the gates of Baptism" (D 895). Cf. D 324, 869 ; CIC 87.

2. Proof

According to the teaching of Christ, the reception of Baptism is an indispensable condition for entry into the Kingdom of God (John 3, 5), and for the attaining of eternal salvation (Mk. 16, 16). St. Peter demands penance and Baptism from all who accept the message of Christ. Thus, from the very beginning, Baptism was the gate through which men entered the Church. Acts 2, 41 : "They therefore that received His word were baptised : and there were added in that day about three thousand souls." Cf. Acts 8, 12 et seq. 38 ; 9, 18 ; 10, 48 ; 16, 15. 33 ; 18, 8 ; 19, 5. According to the teaching of the Apostle St. Paul, all Jews and pagans, freemen and slaves, are bound together in one body, namely the Body of Christ. 1 Cor. 12, 13 ; Gal. 3, 27 et seq. In the case of an adult, the acceptance of the message of Faith must precede the reception of Baptism. Mk. 16, 16 : "He that believeth and is baptised shall be saved." The mandate of Baptism, Mt. 28, 19, indirectly demands subjection to the threefold apostolic office.

That those who dissociate themselves from the Faith and from the communion of the Church, cease to be members of the Church, is the general conviction of Tradition. Already St. Paul commands that "a heretic," after being corrected once or twice is to be avoided. (Tit. 3, 10). Tertullian comments : "The heretics have no share in our doctrine and the withdrawal from the communion testifies that in any case they are without" (De bapt. 15.) In his opinion they are no longer even Christians, as they have not received from Christ the teachings to which they at their own choice adhered (De praecsr. 37). According to St. Cyprian, only those remaining in the House of God form the Church, while heretics and schismatics are outside the Church (Ep. 59, 7). The controversy on the Baptism of heretics revolved itself into the question whether the heretics, as being outside the Church, could validly administer Baptism. St. Augustine compares the heretic to a limb "which has been cut off from the body" (Sermo 267, 4, 4). In the interpretation of the Creed, he says : "Neither heretics nor schismatics belong to the Catholic Church" (De fide et symbolo, 10, 21).

3. Inference

Among the members of the Church are not to be counted:

a) The unbaptised. Cf. 1 Cor. 5, 12: "What have I to do to judge them that are without (qui foris sunt)?" The so-called Baptism by blood and Baptism of desire, it is true, replace Sacramental Baptism in so far as the communication of grace is concerned, but do not effect incorporation into the Church, as they do not bestow the sacramental character by which a person becomes attached formally to the Church.

In spite of the opinion of Suarez, catechumens are not to be counted among the members of the Church. Even if they have the desire (votum) to belong to the Church, they are not really (actu) accepted into it. The Church claims no jurisdiction over them (D 895). The Fathers draw a sharp line of separation between catechumens and "the faithful." Cf. Tertullian, De praescr. 41; St. Augustine, In Ioan. tr. 44, 2.

b) Open apostates and heretics. Public heretics, even those who err in good faith (material heretics), do not belong to the body of the Church, that is to the legal commonwealth of the Church. However, this does not prevent them from belonging spiritually to the Church by their desire to belong to the Church (votum Ecclesiae) and through this, achieving justification and salvation.

According to the more probable opinion, represented by St. Bellarmine and most modern theologians (Palmieri, Billot, Straub, Pesch) against Suarez, Franzelin, and others, secret apostates and heretics remain members of the Church, because the loss of membership of the Church, just as much as its acquisition, on account of the visibility of the Church, can only result from external legally ascertainable facts.

c) Schismatics, as well as those who, in good faith, fundamentally reject the Church authority, or who dissociate themselves from the commonwealth of the faithful subject to her. Schismatics in good faith (material) like heretics in good faith, can, by a desire to belong to the Church (votum Ecclesiae), belong spiritually to the Church, and through this achieve justification and salvation.

d) Excommunicati vitandi (CIC 2258). Excommunicati tolerati, according to the opinion almost generally held today, which is confirmed by CIC 2266, remain members of the Church, even after the promulgation of the juridical judgment and even if they are deprived of many spiritual benefits. The view adopted by individual theologians (Suarez, Dieckmann) that excommunicati vitandi also remain members of the Church, is not compatible with the teaching of the Encyclical "Mystici Corporis," for the latter speaks expressly of such who, for very grave crimes, have been severed by the legitimate authority from the body of the Church. By these, in consonance with the almost universal teaching of the theologians, excommunicati vitandi, and only these, are to be understood.

Although public apostates and heretics, schismatics and excommunicati vitandi are outside the legal organisation of the Church, still their relationship to the Church is essentially different from that of the unbaptised.

As the baptismal character which effects incorporation in the Church is indestructible, the baptised person, in spite of his ceasing to be a member of the Church, cannot cut himself off so completely from the Church, that every bond with the Church is dissolved. The obligations arising from the reception of Baptism remain, even when the use of the rights connected with it are withdrawn by way of punishment. Thus the Church claims jurisdiction over baptised persons who are separated from her.

§ 20. The Necessity for Membership of the Church

Membership of the Church is necessary for all men for salvation. (*De fide.*)

In the Caput Firmiter, the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) declared: "The universal Church of the faithful is one outside of which none is saved" (extra quam nullus omnino salvatur). D 430. This was the teaching also of the Union Council of Florence (D 714), and of Popes Innocent III (D 423) and Boniface VIII in the Bull "Unam sanctam" (D 468), Clement VI (D 570 b), Benedict XIV (D 1473), Pius IX (D 1647, 1677), Leo XIII (D 1955), Pius XII in the Encyclical "Mystici Corporis" (D 2286, 2288). As against modern religious indifferentism, Pius IX declared: "By Faith it is to be firmly held that outside the Apostolic Roman Church none can achieve salvation. This is the only ark of salvation. He who does not enter into it, will perish in the flood. Nevertheless equally certainly it is to be held that those who suffer from invincible ignorance of the true religion, are not for this reason guilty in the eyes of the Lord" (D 1647). The last proposition holds out the possibility that people who in point of fact (actu) do not belong to the Church can achieve salvation. Cf. D 1677; 796 (votum baptismi).

The necessity for belonging to the Church is not merely a necessity of precept (necessitas praecepti), but also a necessity of means (nec. medii), as the comparison with the Ark, the means of salvation from the biblical flood, plainly shows. The necessity of means is, however, not an absolute necessity, but a hypothetical one. In special circumstances, namely, in the case of invincible ignorance or of incapability, actual membership of the Church can be replaced by the desire (votum) for the same. This need not be expressly (explicite) present, but can also be included in the moral readiness faithfully to fulfil the will of God (votum implicitum). In this manner also those who are in fact outside the Catholic Church can achieve salvation.

Christ ordained affiliation to the Church by founding the Church as an institution unto salvation for all men. He endowed the Apostles with His authority, gave them a universal mandate to teach and baptise and made eternal salvation dependent on the acceptance of His teaching and the reception of Baptism. Luke 10, 16; Mt. 10, 40; 18, 17; 29, 19; Mk. 16, 15 et seq. That those who, in innocent ignorance, do not know the true Church of Christ, but who are nevertheless ready to bow to the demands of the Divine Will, will not be cast out, springs from the Divine Justice, and from the doctrine of God's general will of salvation, which is clearly proved in the Scriptures. (1 Tim. 2, 4). The Apostles teach the necessity of the Church for salvation by promulgating Faith in Christ and His Gospel as a condition for salvation. Peter confesses before the High Council: "Neither is there salvation in any other" (Acts 4, 12). Cf. Gal. 1, 8; Tit. 3, 10 et seq.; 2 John 10 et seq.

It is the unanimous conviction of the Fathers that salvation cannot be achieved outside the Church. This principle was extended not only to pagans but to

heretics and schismatics as well. St. Irenaeus teaches that: "in the efficacy of the spirit all those have no part, who do not hasten to the Church; rather they, by their evil teaching and their evil deeds, rob themselves of life. For where the Church is, there is also the spirit of God, and where the spirit of God is, there is the Church and all grace" (Adv. haer. III 24, 1). Origen formally declares: "Outside the Church nobody will be saved" (extra ecclesiam nemo salvatur; In Jesu Nave hom. 3, 5); similarly St. Cyprian: "Outside the Church there is no salvation" (salus extra ecclesiam non est; Ep. 73, 21). The Fathers, for example, St. Cyprian, St. Jerome, St. Augustine, St. Fulgentius, regard, as types of the necessity of the Church for salvation, the saving Ark of Noah and the House of Rahab (Jos. 2, 18 et seq.). In the Primitive Church the conviction of her necessity for salvation found practical expression in her missionary zeal, in the readiness of her children to suffer martyrdom and in her battle against heresy.

In view of the stress laid upon the necessity of membership of the Church for salvation it is understandable that the possibility of salvation for those outside the Church is mentioned only hesitantly. St. Ambrose and St. Augustine admit that catechumens who depart this life before the reception of Baptism can win salvation on the ground of their faith, their desire for Baptism, and their internal conversion (St. Ambrose, De obitu Val. 51; St. Augustine, De bapt. IV 22, 29). On the other hand, Gennadius of Marseilles denies them this possibility, except in the case of martyrdom (De eccl. dogm. 74). St. Augustine distinguishes also, not indeed using the terminology, between material and formal heretics. Thus he does regard material heretics as heretics properly so-called (Ep. 43, 1, 1). He seems to estimate their possibility of salvation otherwise than he does that of heretics proper.

St. Thomas, agreeing with Tradition, teaches the general necessity of the Church for salvation. Expos. symb. a. 9. On the other hand, he concedes that a person may be saved extrasacramentally by baptism of desire and therefore the possibility of salvation without actual membership of the Church by reason of a desire to be a member of the Church. S. th. III 68, 2.

As against the reproach of intolerance a distinction must be made between dogmatic and civil tolerance. The Church rejects the dogmatic tolerance which would concede the same power of justification and the same value to all religions, or to all Christian confessions (Indifferentism); for there is only one truth. But the Church recognises the propriety of civil tolerance, by preaching the commandment of neighbourly charity towards all men, even those in error. Cf. the prayers of the Liturgy on Good Friday.

CHAPTER 6

The Communion of Saints

§ 21. Concept and Reality of the Communion of Saints

In the following exposition the concept Church is taken in the wider sense to designate all those redeemed and sanctified by the grace of Christ whether on earth, in Purgatory or in Heaven. The Church in this wider sense is usually called the Communion of Saints.

The members of the Kingdom of God on earth and in the other world sanctified by the redeeming grace of Christ are united in a common supernatural life with the Head of the Church and with one another. (*Sent. certa.*)

The Apostles' Creed, in its later version (fifth century), extends the profession of belief in the Holy Catholic Church to the : "communion of saints." In the context the words refer to the Church here below. It asserts that the faithful on earth, in so far as the obstacle of grievous sin does not stand in the way, are connected with Christ, the Head and with one another in a supernatural life-communion.

In their original significance the words "communio sanctorum" express the common possession of sacred goods (sanctorum=genitive of sancta). Niceta of Remesiana in his explanation of the Creed comments : "Believe, therefore, that thou in this Church wilt achieve a co-possession of all sacred goods" (communio sanctorum) ! In the same sense St. Augustine speaks of the communio sacramentorum (Sermo 214, 11). At the present day we think of the human community that is sanctified by the grace of Christ, i.e., that possesses the saving goods acquired by Christ.

According to the Roman Catechism, the Communion of Saints becomes effective through the common possession by the faithful of the means of grace deposited in the Church and of the extraordinary gifts of grace bestowed upon the Church ; and again through the common participation in the fruits of the prayers and of the good works of all the members of the Church : "The unity of God, by which she (the Church) is guided, causes all that is deposited in her to be common to all" (I 10, 22). "Not merely those gifts are common, which make men pleasing and just, but also the extraordinary gifts of grace" (I 10, 25). "Whatever good things and holy things are undertaken by an individual benefit all, and that these things are profitable to you, is caused by love, which does not seek its own advantage" (I 10, 23). Pius XII also, in the Encyclical "Mystici Corporis," similarly comments : "There can be no good and virtuous deed performed by individual members of the Mystical Body of Christ which does not, through the Communion of Saints, redound also to the welfare of all." Thus there is among the members of the Mystical Body a spiritual commonwealth of riches, which embraces all the wealth of graces acquired by Christ, and all the good works performed with the grace of Christ.

Christ willed that those who believe in Him should form an inner moral unity with one another, whose model is His Own Unity with the Father (John 17, 21). He looks upon Himself as a vine, His disciples as the grapes, which by the power of the vine are brought forth as fruits (John 15, 1–8). He guides His disciples, and not merely themselves, but the whole communion of the faithful in Christ, to beg of the common Father in Heaven supernatural and natural gifts (Mt. 6, 9 ; cf. the Our Father). St. Paul developed Christ's teaching still further. He sees in Christ the Head of the Mystical Body, the Church, and in the faithful the members of this one Body. The activity of the individual member is profitable to all members. 1 Cor. 12, 25–27 : " that there might be no schism in the body ; but the members might be mutually careful one for another. And if one member suffer anything, all the members suffer with it : or if one member glory, all the members rejoice with it. 27. Now you are the Body of Christ and members of member." Rom. 12, 4 : "For as in one body we have many members, but all the members have not the same office, so we, being many, are one body in Christ ; and every one members, one of another." A practical inference from this teaching is the intercessory prayer, which the Apostle instituted for the community founded by Him, and which he requests for himself and for all the saints (for example, Rom. 1, 9 et seq. ; 15, 30 et seq. ; Eph. 6, 18 et seq.).

In Tradition, faith in the communion of saints from the very beginning found practical expression in the intercessory prayer which was offered in the Liturgy for the living and for the dead. The Fathers, in frequent warnings, exhort the faithful to pray for themselves and for others. The idea of the Communion of Saints became the object of theoretical discussions, especially by St. Augustine in his numerous expositions on the Body of Christ. As members of this body he reckons not merely the members of the Church living on earth, but also the deceased members—in fact all the just from the beginning of the world. They all have Christ for their Head. The unifying bond, which binds the members with one another and with the Head, is charity, which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, Who vivifies the Body of Christ. Cf. De civ. Dei XX 9, 2 : Enarr. In Ps. 36, 3, 4 ; in Ps. 137, 4 ; Sermo, 137, 1, 1. The expression " Communio Sanctorum " appears in connection with the Creed, of which it was probably already a constituent part, first in the explanation of the Roman baptismal symbol by Niceta of Remesiana (after 380). The existence of the term in Gaul since the middle of the 5th century has also been demonstrated (Faustus of Riez).

St. Thomas draws two inferences from the doctrine of the Communion of Saints: a) The merit of the redemption of Christ, the Head, is communicated in the sacraments to the members of the Mystical Body. b) Each member participates in the good works of the other. Expos. symb. a. 9–10.

§ 22. The Communion of the Faithful Living on Earth

1. Intercessory Prayer

By intercessory prayer the Faithful on earth can procure gifts from God for one another. (*Sent. certa.*)

Pius XII comments in the Encyclical " Mystici Corporis " : " The salvation of many souls depends upon the prayers and voluntary mortifications offered

for that intention by the members of the Mystical Body of Christ." In consonance with the consistent practice of the Church, he exhorts the faithful to mutual intercessory prayer: "Let our common pleading rise daily to Heaven for all the members of the Mystical Body of Jesus Christ."

The belief in the power of intercessory prayer is of immense antiquity, and is known also outside Israel (cf. Ex. 8, 4; 10, 17). The great figures of Israel such as Abraham (Gn. 18, 23 et seq.), Moses (Ex. 32, 11 et seq.; 32, 30 et seq.), Samuel (1 Sm. 7, 5; 12, 19 et seq.); Jeremias (Jer. 18, 20), intercede with the Lord for their peoples or for individual persons. The Prophets are appealed to by the King and by the people for their intercession with God (3 Kings 13, 6; 4 Kings 19, 4; Jer. 37, 3; 42, 2). Jesus requires His disciples to pray for their persecutors (Mt. 5, 44). St. Paul assures the community to which he writes, of his intercessory prayer (Rom. 1, 9 passim) and himself prays for the community's prayers for himself (Rom. 15, 30 passim) and for all the saints (Eph. 6, 18). He exhorts: "I desire therefore, first of all, that supplications, prayers, intercessions and thanksgivings be made for all men: for kings and for all that are in high station" (1 Tim. 2, 1 et seq.); St. James enjoins the Christians to: "Pray for one another that you may be saved. For the continual prayer of a just man availeth much" (James 5, 16).

Ancient Christian literature is very rich in exhortations and appeals to the faithful to think of one another in prayer. St. Clement of Rome exhorts the Corinthians to pray for sinners that meekness and humility should be granted them (Cor. 56,1). He transmitted a community prayer in which the faithful over all the world, and all those needing help are commemorated (Cor. 59). St. Ignatius of Antioch asks in his letters for prayers for himself, so that he might be made a partaker of martyrdom, for the orphaned Church of Syria, for heretics so that they might be converted, and for all men. (Cf. Rom. 4, 2; 8, 3; 9, 1; Eph. 10, 1–2; 11, 2; 21, 1–2.) Cf. St. Polycarp, Phil. 12, 3; Didache, 10, 5; St. Justin, Apol. 1, 61, 2; 65, 1; 67, 5. Tertullian, De poenit. 10, 6.

2. Merits for Others

By good works performed in the state of grace the Faithful on earth can merit de congruo gifts from God. (*Sent. probabilis.*)

According to the declaration of Pius XII, cited above (n. 1), the salvation of many depends on the voluntary penitential exercises of the members of the Mystical Body of Christ. These, in the manner of a meritum de congruo, effect the bestowal of the outward and inward graces necessary for salvation. See Doctrine of Grace, Par. 25, 2 b.

In Christian Tradition from the earliest times we find the conviction that one can procure from God for one's Christian brethren, benefits, especially of a spiritual nature, not merely by intercessory prayer, but also by works of piety. St. Clement of Rome presents Esther "who by her fasts and her humility stormed the all-seeing Lord" (Cor. 55, 6), as a model to the Christians of Corinth. St. Justin testified to the ancient Christian practice whereby the faithful and the catechumens pray and fast together, in order to gain from God forgiveness for their past sins (Apol. I 61, 2).

3. Vicarious Atonement

The Faithful on earth can, by their good works performed in the state of grace, render atonement for one another. (*Sent. cert.*)

The effect of the atonement is the remission of temporal punishment for sin. The possibility of vicarious atonement is founded in the unity of the Mystical Body. As Christ, the Head, in His expiatory sufferings, took the place of the members, so also one member can take the place of another. The doctrine of indulgences is based on the possibility and reality of vicarious atonement.

Pope Clement VI declared in the Jubilee Bull "Unigenitus Dei filius" (1343), in which for the first time the doctrine of the "Treasury of the Church" (thesaurus Ecclesiae) is officially mentioned, that also the merits (=atonements) of Mary, the Mother of God, and of all the chosen, from the greatest to the least of the just, contribute to the increase of the treasure from which the Church draws in order to secure remission of temporal punishment. D 552; cf. 740 a. Pius XI in the Encyclicals "Miserentissimus Redemptor" (1928) and "Caritate Christi" (1932) exhorts the faithful to make atonement to the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus, not merely for their own transgressions, but also for the sins of others.

Even in the Old Testament the idea of vicarious atonement by innocent persons for guilty is known. The innocent person takes on himself responsibility for the displeasure of God which the guilty person has merited, in order by sacrifice to win again the Divine favour for the latter. Moses offers himself to God as a sacrifice for the people who sinned (Ex. 32, 32). Job brings God a burnt offering, in order to expiate the sins of his children (Job. 1, 5). Isaias prophesies the vicarious suffering of atonement of Christ as a ransom, as an offering in atonement for the sins of mankind (See Doctrine of Redemption, Pars. 9 and 10). The Apostle St. Paul teaches that also the faithful can rend expiation for one another. Col. 1, 24: "Who now rejoice in my suffering for you and fill up those things that are wanting of the sufferings of Christ in my flesh for His body, which is the Church." 2 Cor. 12, 15: "But I most gladly will spend and be spent myself for your souls." 2 Tim. 4, 6: "I am even now ready to be sacrificed" (that is, to suffer a martyr's death).

Even in the writings of the earliest Fathers the view is found that the death of the martyrs is a means of expiation for others as well as themselves. St. Ignatius of Antioch writes to the Ephesians that he is consecrating himself for them, that is, that he will offer himself as an expiation offering (8, 1). In the letter to St. Polycarp he designates himself and his claims as "ransom money" for him (2, 3). Appealing to 2 Cor. 12, 15, 2 Tim. 4, 6 and Apoc. 6, 9, Origen teaches that the Apostles and Martyrs by their death remove the sins of the faithful (In Num. hom. 10, 2). The customs attested by Tertullian (Ad mart. I), and by St. Cyprian (Ep. 15–23), of accepting penitents back into the Church communion on the letter of recommendation of a martyr, rest on the idea of vicarious atonement. (Letter of peace.) St. Cyprian says expressly that sinners can be supported with the Lord by the help of the martyrs (Ep. 19, 2; 18, 1). Cf. St. Ambrose, De virg. I 7, 32; De poenit. I 15 81.

St. Thomas establishes from Holy Writ the possibility of vicarious atonement

from Gal. 6, 2 (" Bear ye one another's burdens"). He justifies it rationally by pointing to the penetrating power of caritas: " In so far as two men are one by charity, one can render atonement for the other." (S. th. III 48, 2 ad 1. Cf. Suppl. 13, 2; S.c.G. III 158: Expos. in ep. ad Gal. (6, 2); Expos. symb. a. 10.)

§ 23. The Communion between the Faithful on Earth and the Saints in Heaven

1. Veneration and Invocation of the Saints

It is permissible and profitable to venerate the Saints in Heaven, and to invoke their intercession. (*De fide.*)

The veneration of the saints is called " Absolute Dulia." The Council of Trent declared in connection with the veneration of images, that " through images we honour the saints which they represent." D 986. As regards the invocation of the saints the Council declared: " It is good and profitable to appeal to them for help." D 984. Cf. 998. The Church's faith finds practical expression in the celebration of the feasts of the Saints.

The declaration of the Council of Trent is directed against the Reformers, who rejected the invocation of the saints as unbiblical and as incompatible with the one mediatorship of Christ. Cf. Conf. Aug., and Apologia Conf. Art. 21. Art. Smalcald. P. II. Art. 2 25–28. Amongst the ancient Christian Fathers the Gallic priest Vigilantius is remarkable by reason of his opposition to the veneration and invocation of the saints.

Holy Writ does not explicitly refer to the veneration and invocation of saints, but it asserts the principle out of which Church teaching and practice developed. Our right to venerate the saints can be deduced from the veneration offered to the angels as attested by Holy Writ. (Cf. Jos. 5, 14; Dn. 8, 17, Tob. 12, 16.) The ground for the veneration of the angels is their supernatural dignity, which is rooted in their immediate union with God (Mt. 18, 10). Since the saints also are immediately joined to God (1 Cor. 13, 12; 1 John 3, 2), it follows that they too are worthy of veneration.

2 Mac. 15, 11–16 attests the faith of the Jewish people in the intercession of the saints: Judas the Maccabean sees in a " credible " vision how two deceased just men, the High Priest Onias and the Prophet Jeremias, intercede with God for the Jewish people and for the Holy City. Cf. Jer. 15, 1. According to Tob. 12, 12; Apoc. 5, 8; and 8, 3, the angels and the saints lay the prayers of the holy on earth at the feet of God, that is, they support them with their intercession as also might be expected from the permanency of charity (1 Cor. 13, 8). The propriety of invoking them logically follows from the fact of their intercession.

Historically the veneration of the saints appears first in the form of the veneration of the martyrs. The oldest testimony is afforded by the Martyrium Polycarpi (about 156). The author makes a sharp distinction between the veneration of Christ and the veneration of the martyrs: " This (Christ) we adore, because He is the Son of God. To the martyrs, on the other hand, we offer the love which is due to disciples and imitators of the Lord, on account of their unsur-

passable devotion to their King and Teacher" (17, 3). He also testifies for the first time to the custom of celebrating the birthday of the martyrdom, that is, "the date of the death" (18, 3). Tertullian (De corona mil. 3) and Cyprian (Ep. 39, 3) mention the offering of the Eucharistic Sacrifice on the anniversary of the death of the martyrs. St. Jerome defends the veneration and the intercession of the saints against Vigilantius (Ep. 109, 1; Contra Vigil. 6). St. Augustine defends the veneration of the martyrs against the reproach that it is an adoration of men. As the purpose of this veneration he mentions imitation of their example, utilisation of their merits, and the grace we receive from God through their intercession (Contra Faustum XX 21). The invocation of the saints is first attested by St. Hippolytus of Rome, who turns to the three companions of Daniel with the prayer: "Think of me, I beseech you, so that I may achieve with you the same fate of martyrdom." (In Dan. 11, 30). Origen teaches that "with him who properly prays not only the High Priest (Jesus Christ), but also the angels and the souls of the pious who sleep pray." The biblical proof of the doctrine of the intercession of the saints is derived from 2 Mach. 15, 14; the proof from reason derives from the continuation and completion of neighbourly charity (De orat. 11; cf. Exhort. ad Mart. 30 and 38; In lib. Iesu Nave hom. 16, 5; In Num. hom. 26, 6). Cf. St. Cyprian, Ep. 60, 5. In ancient Christian tomb inscriptions, not only martyrs, but also other deceased who were believed to be in eternal blessedness, are frequently invoked for their intercession on behalf of the living and the dead. The objection made by the Reformers that the intercession of the saints belittles the mediatorship of Christ is not cogent, as the intercession of the saints is a secondary one and is subordinate to the one mediatorship of Christ, while its efficacy rests on His redemptive merits. The invocation and veneration of the saints redound therefore to the glorification of Christ, who as God dispenses grace and who as man merited grace, and co-operates in its conferring. "We show veneration to the servants so that it might radiate back from them to the Lord" (St. Jerome Ep. 109, 1). Cf. Roman Catechism. III 2, 14.

2. Veneration of the Relics of the Saints

It is permissible and profitable to venerate the relics of the Saints. (*De fide.*)

The honour shown to the relics of the saints is called "Relative Dulia." The Council of Trent declared: "Also the holy bodies of the holy martyrs and of the others who dwell with Christ . . . are to be honoured by the faithful." D 985. Cf. D 998, 440, 304. The reason for the veneration of relics lies in this, that the bodies of the saints were living members of Christ and Temples of the Holy Ghost; that they will again be awakened and glorified and that through them God bestows many benefits on mankind (D 985). As well as the bodies and their parts, objects which came into physical contact with the saints are also venerated as relics.

The declaration of the Council is directed against the Reformers, who rejected as unbiblical both the veneration of the saints and the veneration of relics (cf. Luther, Art. Smalcald. P. II Art. 2 n. 22). In Christian antiquity Vigilantius inveighed against the veneration of relics which even then was greatly developed.

Holy Writ does not mention the veneration of relics, but it affords precedents, upon which the Christian veneration of relics is founded. On their departure from Egypt the Israelites took with them the bones of Joseph (Ex. 13, 19). A

dead person was awakened to life by contact with the bones of Eliseus (4 Kings 13, 21). Eliseus worked a miracle with the mantle of Elias (4 Kings 2, 13 et seq). The Christians of Ephesus laid the handkerchiefs and aprons of the Apostle Paul on the sick persons and thereby achieved cure of sicknesses and freedom from evil spirits (Acts 19, 12).

The high esteem in which martyrdom was held led very early to the veneration of the relics of the martyrs. The Martyrium Polycarpi narrates that the Christians of Symrna collected the bones of the martyr bishop, "more valuable than precious stones and to be more treasured than gold," and interred them in a suitable place (18, 2). "There," says the author, "we shall as much as possible, congregate in joy and jubilation, and the Lord will approve, that we celebrate the feast day of his martyrdom" (18, 3). St. Jerome examines in detail and rejects the reproach made by Vigilantius that the veneration of relics amounted to adoration of idols. He distinguished latria and dulia, and pointed out that the veneration of relics is a relative veneration, i.e., refers really to the person of the martyr (Ep. 109, 1 ; C. Vigil. 4 et seq.). Cf. Theodoret of Cyrus, Graec. affect. curatio 8 ; St. John Damascene, De fide orth. IV 15 ; S. th. III 25, 6.

3. Veneration of Images of the Saints

It is permissible and profitable to venerate images of the Saints. (*De fide.*)

The veneration shown to images of the saints is "Relative Dulia." The Seventh General Council at Nicaea (787), appealing to Tradition, declared against the Iconoclasts of the Greek Church, that it is permissible to set up "the venerable and holy images" of Christ, of the Mother of God, of the angels and of all the saints, and to show them a reverent homage (τιμητικὴν προσκύνησιν), but not adoration in the true and proper sense (ἀληθινὴν λατρείαν) which is due to God alone ; for the veneration of the image refers to the prototype (Basilius, De Spiritu S. 18, 45). D 302. The Council of Trent renewed these decisions against the Reformers, who rejected the veneration of images, as well as that of saints and relics ; and in so doing stressed again its relative character : "The honour which is shown to the images refers to the prototypes which these represent." D 986 ; cf. 998.

The Old Testament prohibition of the making and veneration of images (Ex. 20, 4 et seq.), on which the opponents of the veneration of images rely, was intended to prevent the Israelites from relapsing into the idolatry of their pagan milieu. The prohibition is valid for Christianity only in so far as it prohibits the idolatrous veneration of images. Further, even the Old Testament knew exceptions from the prohibition of the making of images : Ex. 25, 18 (two cherubims of gold on the ark). Numbers 21, 8 (the brazen serpent).

Owing to the influence of the Old Testament prohibition of images, Christian veneration of images developed only after the victory of the Church over paganism. The Synod of Elvira (about 306) still prohibited figurative representations in the houses of God (Can. 36). The original purpose of the images was that of instruction. The veneration of images (by kissing, bowing down before them, burning of candles, incensing) chiefly developed in the Greek Church

from the fifth to the seventh centuries. The Iconoclasts of the eighth and the ninth centuries saw in the veneration of images a relapse into paganism. Against them St. John Damascene († 749), the Patriarchs Germanus († 733) and Nicephorus († 829) of Constantinople and the Abbot Theodor of Studium († 826) defended the Church practice. They stressed above all the relative character of the veneration and also pointed out the educational value of the images Cf. D 1569.

§ 24. The Communion of the Faithful on earth and the Saints in Heaven with the Poor Souls in Purgatory

1. Possibility of Suffrages

The living Faithful can come to the assistance of the Souls in Purgatory by their intercessions (suffrages). (*De fide.*)

By suffrages are understood not only intercessory prayers, but also indulgences, alms and other pious works, above all the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass.

The Second General Council of Lyons (1274) and the Council of Florence (Decretum pro Graecis 1439) agree in declaring: "For the alleviation of the punishments these are profitable to the poor souls, namely: The Sacrifice of the Mass, prayers and alms and other works of piety, which the Faithful are accustomed to perform for one another according to the institutions of the Church." D 464, 693.

The Council of Trent declared against the Reformers, who rejected the Fires of Purgatory, that there is a cleansing fire, and that the souls held fast in it receive help through the intercessory prayers of the Faithful, above all by the Sacrifice of the Altar, which is pleasing to God; animasque ibi detentas fidelium suffragiis, potissimum vero acceptabili altaris sacrificio iuvari. D 983. Cf. D 427, 456, 998.

According to 2 Mach. 12, 42–46 there existed in late Judaism the conviction that those who had died in sin could be helped by prayer and sacrifice of atonement. Purification from sin was ascribed to prayer and sacrifice. The early Christians took over from Judaism belief in the efficacy of intercessory prayer. Paul desired God's mercy on the day of judgment for his loyal helper Onesiphorus, who, apparently, was no longer among the living at the time of the composition of the Second Epistle to Timothy: "The Lord grant (grace) unto him to find mercy of the Lord in that day" (2 Tim. 1, 18).

Tradition abounds in testimonies in favour of the doctrine. Among the literary monuments of antiquity, the apocryphal Acts of Paul and of Thecla (end of the second century) first attest the Christian custom of praying for the dead. The deceased Falconilla beseeches the prayer of Thecla "so that she might be translated to the place of the just." Thecla prays: "Thou God of the Heavens, Son of the All-Highest grant to her (to the Mother Tryphaena), according to her wish, that her daughter Falconilla may live in eternity" (Acta Pauli et Theklae 28, et seq.). Tertullian bears witness not only to prayer for the dead, but also to the celebration of the Eucharist on the anniversary of their death (De monogamia 10; De cor. mil. 3; De exhort cast. 11; cf. St. Cyprian, Ep. 1, 2). St. Cyril of Jerusalem, in his description of the Mass, mentions, after

the Consecration, the intercessory prayer for all the dead. He ascribes to it the power of reconciling the dead with God (Cat. myst. 5. 9 et seq.). That the dead may be helped through almsgiving also, is attested by St. John Chrysostom (In Phil.; hom. 3, 4), and St. Augustine (Enchir. 110; Sermo 172, 2, 2). However, St. Augustine stresses that suffrages do not avail all the dead, but only those who have so lived, that they can benefit them after their death. Cf. De cura pro mortuis gerenda, 1, 3; Conf. IX 11–13. Ancient Christian tomb inscriptions from the second and third centuries frequently contain an appeal for prayers for the dead, or a blessing in which animation, life in God or in Christ is besought for the dead. Cf. the grave inscription of Abercius of Hieropolis (before 216); "He who understands this, let every co-religionist utter a prayer for Abercius" (V 19).

2. Efficacy of Suffrages

Suffrages operate in such a manner that the satisfactory value of the good works is offered to God in substitution for the temporal punishments for sins, which the poor souls still have to render. It operates by way of remission of temporal punishments due to sins. In prayer impetratory value is added. While atonement establishes a formal claim against the Divine justice, prayer takes the form of an appeal to the Mercy of God. The possibility of vicarious atonement is founded on the unity of the Mystical Body of Christ effected by grace and charity.

According to the manner and degree in which suffrages effect satisfaction one distinguishes: a) those which work ex opere operato; the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass as the offering of Christ by Himself; b) those which work quasi ex opere operato; the suffrages performed in the name of the Church, for example, the Obsequies; c) those which work ex opere operantis; personal good works of the faithful, for example, alms-giving. A pre-condition for these last is a state of grace in the person performing the good work. The most efficacious of all suffrages is the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass.

3. Intercession of the Saints for the Souls in Purgatory

The Saints in Heaven also can come to the help of the Souls in Purgatory by their intercession. (*Sent. communis.*)

In the Liturgy of the Dead the Church prays God to vouchsafe that the dead attain participation in eternal bliss: "through the intercession of the Blessed Mary Ever Virgin and of all the saints" (Oratio pro defunctis fratribus, etc.). However, the intercession of the saints has an impetratory value only, as the possibility of atonement and of merit is limited to the term of earthly life.

In many ancient Christian grave inscriptions the departed souls are recommended to the martyrs. In order to secure the advocacy of the martyr the faithful often insisted on being buried in the vicinity of the resting place of a martyr. To the inquiry of Bishop Paulinus of Nola St. Augustine replies: To be in the vicinity of a martyr's grave is of itself of no avail to the dead; but through this those who remain behind are encouraged to invoke in their prayers the intercession of the martyr for the departed souls (De cura pro mortuis gerenda 4, 6).

4. Intercession and Invocation of the Poor Souls

The Souls in Purgatory can intercede for other members of the Mystical Body. (*Sent. probabilis.*)

As the poor souls are members of the Mystical Body of Christ, the question whether they can intercede for other suffering souls or for the Faithful on earth must be answered in the affirmative. Consequently one must agree with Suarez and St. Bellarmine that it is possible and permissible to appeal to the poor souls for their intercession.

The Provincial Synods of Vienna (1858) and of Utrecht (1865) teach that the poor souls can help us by their intercession (Coll. Lac V 191, 869). Leo XIII, in 1889, ratified an indulgenced prayer in which the poor souls are appealed to in dangers to body and soul. (The prayer is not included in the authentic collections of 1937 and 1950.)

Against the intercession and invocation of the poor souls St. Thomas makes the point that they have no knowledge of the prayers of the faithful on earth, and, that in consequence of their status of those undergoing punishment, the acceptance of their intercession is prohibited ; secundum hoc (sc. quantum ad poenas) non sunt in statu orandi, sed magis ut oretur pro eis (S. th. 2 II 83, 11 ad 3 ; cf. 2 II 83, 4 ad 3). However, as the Church has never frowned on the invocation of the poor souls—a practice which is widespread among the Faithful, and which has been advocated by many theologians—the abrogation of the above-mentioned indulgenced prayer must not be regarded as a reprobation—the possibility and permissibility of such invocation is not to be doubted. It is possible that the poor souls may acquire knowledge of the invocations of the Faithful by Divine Revelation.

The veneration of dulia may not be offered to the suffering souls.

Appendix :

Suffrages for the Damned ?

Suffrages are of no profit to the damned in Hell as they do not belong to the Mystical Body of Christ. (*Sent. communis.*)

St. Augustine thought it possible that suffrages for the dead might also bring about an alleviation of the punishments of the damned, in so far as these are not entirely evil (non valde mali) : " To whom these offerings (of the Altar and of alms-giving) profit, they profit in such a fashion that the pardon is complete, and that even the condemnation becomes more tolerable " (aut certe ut tolerabilior fiat ipsa damnatio ; Enchir. 110). The words of Psalm 76, 10, according to which God, even in His anger, does not restrain His mercy, can, according to St. Augustine, be understood as meaning, " that in truth He puts no limit to eternal punishment pains, but that He certainly alleviates or interrupts the torments from time to time (non aeterno supplicio finem dando, sed levamen adhibendo vel interponendo cruciatibus ; Enchir. 112). According to St. Gregory the Great, prayer for the damned is " in the eyes of the Just Judge worthless " (Dial. IV 44 ; Moralia XXXIV 19, 38). The theologians of

early Scholasticism mostly follow St. Augustine. In liturgical books of the early Middle Ages we even find a missa pro defuncto, de cuius anima dubitatur or desperatur. In the prayers said during the Mass according to these liturgical books an alleviation of the pains of Hell was besought, in case the person in question, on account of the grievousness of his sins, cannot attain to glory. St. Thomas, following St. Gregory, teaches that suffrages for the damned are of no avail to them, and that it is not the intention of the Church to pray for them. Suppl. 71, 5.

PART 3

The Sacraments

SECTION 1

The Doctrine of the Sacraments in General

CHAPTER I

The Nature of the Sacraments

§ 1. The Concept of Sacrament

1. Explanation of the Word

According to its etymology the word "sacramentum" means a sacred or holy thing (res sacrans or res sacra). In Roman profane literature the oath of loyalty taken by the soldier and the oath in general were called sacramentum. In Roman legal language the word sacramentum means a pledge deposited in the Temple by disputing parties.

In the Vulgate, sacramentum is the rendering of the Greek *μυστήριον*. The word means something hidden, secret (mysterium) (cf. Tob. 12, 7; Dn. 2, 18; 4, 6); in the sphere of religion it signifies the Secrets of God (Wis. 2, 22; 6, 24): and in particular the mystery of the Redemption by Jesus Christ (Ep. 1, 9; Col. 1, 26 et seq.). It has the further meanings of: sign, symbol, type of a sacred mystery (Eph. 5, 32; Marriage is a symbol of the mysterious bond of Christ with His Church. Cf: Apoc. 1, 20; 17, 7).

In agreement with the usage of Holy Writ, the Fathers apply the word sacramentum both to the Christian religion viewed as a whole, i.e., as a congeries of doctrines and institutions, and to individual doctrines or liturgical institutions or ceremonies of Christianity. Tertullian uses the word sacrament in its classical meaning "military oath" when speaking of the vow of Christian Baptism. St. Augustine, proceeding from the specific concept "token," gives the following definition: Sacramentum, id est sacrum signum (De civ. Dei X 5). This was altered by the Scholastics to: "signum rei sacrae." Further definitions may be derived from texts of St. Augustine; signum ad res divinas pertinens (cf. Ep. 138, 1, 7); invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma (cf. Ep. 105, 3, 12).

The theologians of early Scholasticism (Hugo of St. Victor, † 1141, Petrus Lombardus, † 1160) perfected the Augustinian definition of the concept by defining a Sacrament not merely as a sign but also as a cause of grace. The

following definitions of Sacrament are of considerable interest: St. Isidore of Seville (Etymol. VI 19, 40): Quae (sc. baptismus et chrisma, corpus et sanguis Domini) ob id sacramenta dicuntur, quia sub tegumento corporalium rerum virtus divina secretius salutem eorundem sacramentorum operatur, unde et a secretis virtutibus vel a sacris sacramenta dicuntur. Hugo of St. Victor (De sacr. christ. fidei I 9, 2): Sacramentum est corporale vel materiale elementum foris sensibiliter propositum ex similitudine repraesentans et ex institutione significans et ex sanctificatione continens aliquam invisibilem et spiritalem gratiam. Petrus Lombardus, Sent. IV 1, 4: Sacramentum proprie dicitur, quod ita signum est gratiae Dei et invisibilis gratiae forma, up ipsius imaginem gerat et causa existat.

2. Explanation of the Doctrine

The Sacraments of the New Covenant are effective signs of grace instituted by Christ.

The Roman Catechism (II 1, 8) defines a Sacrament as "a thing perceptible to the senses, which on the ground of Divine institution possesses the power both of effecting and signifying sanctity and righteousness (=sanctifying grace)": docendum erit rem esse sensibus subiectam, quae ex Dei institutione sanctitatis et iustitiae tum significandae tum efficandae vim habet. Thus there are three elements in the concept of sacrament: a) the external, that is a sensibly perceptible sign of sanctifying grace: b) the conferring of sanctifying grace: c) the institution by God or, more accurately, by the God-Man Jesus Christ.

The Council of Trent mentions only the incomplete definition which goes back to St. Augustine: Symbolum rei sacrae et invisibilis gratiae forma visibilis. A Sacrament falls into the genus sign. S. th. III 60, 1: sacramentum ponitur in genere signi. An essential part of a sign is that it leads to the knowledge of another thing: Signum est enim res praeter speciem, quam ingerit sensibus, aliud aliquid ex se faciens in cogitationem venire (St. Augustine, De doctr. christ. II 1, 1). The Sacraments are neither purely natural signs, as a natural action can designate a supernatural effect only on the ground of the positive ordinance of God, nor purely artificial or conventional signs, as according to their inner composition, they are appropriate for vividly depicting inward grace. They are not merely speculative or theoretical signs, but efficacious or practical signs, as they not only indicate the inner sanctification, but also effect it. They point to the past, present and future, commemorating the Passion of Christ, signifying the grace they confer and indicated the glory to come (which is merited by that grace) (signa rememorative passionis Christi, signa demonstrativa praesentis gratiae, signa prognostica futurae gloriae). Cf. S th. III 60, 3.

3. The Protestant Concept of Sacrament

The Reformers, by reason of their doctrine of justification, see in the sacraments pledges of the Divine promise of the forgiveness of sins by means of the awakening and strengthening of fiducial faith, which alone justifies. Thus, the sacraments are not means whereby grace is conferred, but means whereby faith and its consequences are stirred into action. Cf. Confessio Aug. Art. 13: De usu sacramentorum docent, quod sacramenta instituta sint, non modo ut sint notae professionis inter homines, sed magis ut sint signa et testimonia voluntatis Dei erga nos, ad excitandam et confirmandam fidem in his, qui,

utuntur, proposita. Calvin, Inst. IV 14, 12: quorum (sc. sacramentorum) unicum officium est, eius (sc. Dei) promissionis oculis nostris spectandas subicere imo nobis earum esse pignora. Thus the Sacraments have only a psychological and symbolic significance. The Council of Trent rejected this teaching as a heresy. D 848 et seq.

Modern liberal Theology regards the Sacraments as mere imitations of pagan mystery-cults.

Modernism denies the immediate institution of the sacraments by Christ, and regards them as mere symbols, which stand in the same relation to religious feeling as words do to ideas. Cf. D 2039–41, 2089.

§ 2. The Constituent Parts of the Sacramental Sign

1. Matter and Form

The outward sign of the sacraments is composed of two essential parts, namely, thing and word (res et verbum or elementum et verbum). (*Sent. fidei proxima.*)

The thing is either a physical substance (water, oil) or an action perceptible to the senses (penance, marriage). The word is, as a rule, the spoken word.

Since the first half of the 12th century the words and the baptismal formula are frequently called form in the sense of formula (forma verborum). Less frequently, beginning at the middle of the 12th century (Petrus Lombardus), the corporal thing was called matter. A short time later both expressions appear together (Eckbert of Schonau, Pseudo-Poitiers-Glossary, Alanus of Lille, Petrus Cantor). In the hylomorphistic sense of Aristotelian philosophy the two expressions are first used by Hugo of St. Cher (about 1230) who was the first to distinguish between matter and form in respect of each of the Seven Sacraments. The Church has officially adopted this terminology. The Decretum pro Armenis of the Union-Council of Florence (1439) declared: Haec omnia sacramenta tribus perficiuntur, videlicet rebus tamquam materia, verbis tanquam forma, et persona ministri conferentis sacramentum cum intentione faciendi, quod facit Ecclesia; quorum si aliquid desit, non perficitur sacramentum. All these Sacraments are perfected by three (elements) namely: by things (which are) as it were the matter; by words (which are) as it were the form, and; by the person of the minister who confers the Sacrament with the intention of doing that which the Church does. If any of these (elements) is lacking, the Sacrament is not effected. D 695; cf. 895. The matter is distinguished as: "materia remota," that is, the physical substance as such, for example, water, oil; and "materia proxima" that is, the use of the physical substance in the sacrament, for example, the ablution and the unction.

Holy Writ, at least in respect of individual sacraments, clearly stresses the two essential parts of the outward sign, for example, Eph. 5, 26 for Baptism: "That He might sanctify it (the Church) cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life." Cf. Mt. 28, 19; Acts 8, 15 et seq.; Mt. 26, 26 et seq.; James 5, 14; Acts 6, 6.

Tradition bears witness to the fact that the sacraments were invariably administered by an action perceptible to the senses, accompanied by words (prayer). In respect of Baptism St. Augustine says: "Take away the words, what then is the water but water. The words are added to the element, and the Sacrament emerges" (In Ioan. tr. 80, 3; cf. tr. 15, 4; Sermo Denis 6, 3). Cf. S. th. III 60, 6.

2. Moral Unity of Both

The expressions matter and form in the Aristotelian sense are only analogously applied to the parts of the sacramental sign in so far as " the thing " by itself is something undefined, and " the words " define it. The parts do not conjointly make up a physical unit like the parts of a corporeal being, but are joined by a moral unity only. Thus it is not necessary that they coincide absolutely in point of time ; a moral coincidence suffices, that is, they must be connected with each other in such a fashion, that according to general estimation, they compose a unitary sign. The Sacraments of Penance and Matrimony, on account of their special nature, permit even a long separation between matter and form.

3. Sacramentum—res sacramenti

Scholastic theology calls the outward sign sacramentum or sacramentum tantum (significat et non significatur), the inner operation of grace res sacramenti (significatur et non significat). It distinguishes from these two as an intermediary element res et sacramentum (significatur et significat) ; that is, in the Sacraments of Baptism, Confirmation and Consecration the sacramental character, in the Eucharist the true body and the true blood of Christ, in Penance the inner penitence of the penitent, in Extreme Unction (according to Suarez) " the inner anointing," that is, the recuperation of the soul, in Matrimony the indissoluble bond of marriage. Cf. S. th. III 66, 1 ; 73, 6 ; 84, 1 ad 3. The beginnings of the distinction mentioned, which was at first applied in a somewhat different sense to Baptism, then to the Eucharist and finally to all the Sacraments, go back to the first half of the 12th century (Sententiae divinae paginae of the School of Anselm of Laon, Summa sententiarum V 5, VI 3). Cf. FS 10 (1950) 244–252.

4. It is appropriate that there be signs of grace perceptible to the senses.

The appropriateness of the institution of signs of grace perceptible to the senses may be shown by considering that man is composed both of body and soul. Cf. Hugo, of St. Victor De sacr. christ. fidei 1 9, 3 : Triplici ex causa sacramenta instituta esse noscuntur ; propter humiliationem, propter eruditionem, propter exercitationem. (The sacraments were instituted for three reasons ; for our humiliation, for our instruction, for our exercise.) Cf. S. th. III 61, 1 ; Cat. Rom. II 1, 9.

CHAPTER 2

The Efficacy and the Effects of the Sacraments

§ 3. The Objective Efficacy of the Sacraments

1. Sacraments and Grace

The Sacraments of the New Covenant contain the grace which they signify, and bestow it on those who do not hinder it. (*De fide.*)

While the Reformers recognised only a subjective psychological efficacy in the Sacraments (regarding them as they excite and confirm fiducial faith in the recipient), the Catholic Church teaches that the Sacraments have an

objective efficacy, that is, an efficacy independent of the subjective disposition of the recipient or of the minister. The Council of Trent declared against the Reformers : Si quis dixerit, sacramenta novae Legis non continere gratiam, quam significant, aut gratiam ipsam, non ponentibus obicem, non conferre. . . . (If anybody says that the sacraments of the New Law do not contain the grace which they signify or that they do not confer that grace upon those who do not place an obstacle to its reception) A.S. D 849 ; similarly D 695. Cf. also D 850 : Si quis dixerit, non dari gratiam per huiusmodi sacramenta semper et omnibus, quantum est ex parte Dei, . . . (If anybody says that grace is not given always and to everybody when they are rightly received but only sometimes and to some A.S.) It follows from this that the Sacraments confer grace immediately, that is, without the mediation of fiducial faith. It is true that, in the adult recipient, faith is an indispensable pre-condition (conditio sine qua non) or a disposing cause, but it is not an efficient cause of grace. On the other hand the Sacraments are efficient causes of grace, even if only instrumental causes. Cf. D 799 : " The Sacrament of Baptism is a ' causa instrumentalis ' of justification."

The expression used by the Schoolmen (since the time of Hugo of St. Victor) and by the Council of Trent, " The Sacraments contain grace," asserts that grace is contained in the Sacraments in the same manner as the effect is contained in the instrumental cause, that is not formaliter (as is liquid in a vessel) but virtualiter. Cf. S. th. III 62, 3.

As regards Grace, Holy Scripture ascribes a true (instrumental) causality to the Sacraments. This may be seen, in particular, by the use of the prepositions " out of " (ἐκ, ἐξ ; ex) and " through " (διά ; per) and (in Latin) by the use of the ablative of instrumentality and of the dative. John 3, 5 : " Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost (ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ πνεύματος) he cannot enter into the Kingdom of God." Tit. 3, 5 : " He saved us by the laver of regeneration and renovation of the Holy Ghost " (διὰ λουτροῦ παλιγγενεσίας). Eph. 5, 26 : " Cleansing it (the Church) by the laver of water in the word of life " (τῷ λουτρῷ τοῦ ὕδατος). Cf. Acts 8, 18 ; 2 Tim. 1, 6 ; 1 Peter 3, 21.

The Fathers ascribe the sanctification of the soul immediately to the sacramental sign. They particularly stress the power of the water in baptism to bring about inner sanctity. They compare the efficacy of the baptismal water which effects the regeneration, to the fecundity of the womb, especially of the virginal womb of Mary (St. John Chrysostom, In Ioan. hom. 26, 1 ; St. Leo the Great, Sermo 24, 3 ; 25, 5 ; cf. the prayer at the blessing of the baptismal water). The practice of child Baptism "for the forgiveness of sins," which goes back to primitive Christianity, is a definite proof that the efficacy of Baptism was regarded as being independent of the personal activity of the person baptised.

2. Efficacy ex opere operato

The Sacraments work ex opere operato. (*De fide.*)

In order to designate the objective efficacy Scholastic Theology coined the formula : Sacramenta operantur ex opere operato, that is, the Sacraments operate by the power of the completed sacramental rite. The Council of

Trent sanctioned this expression which was vigorously combated by the Reformers: Si quis dixerit, per ipsa novae Legis sacramenta ex opere operato non conferri gratia, . . . A.S. (If anybody says that grace is not conferred ex opere operato by the Sacraments of the New Law A.S.) D 851.

The beginnings of Scholastic terminology in this matter go back to the second half of the 12th century. A distinction was made, principally in the School of Gilbert of Poitiers firstly in the doctrine of merit and in the question of the moral evaluation of Christ's Crucifixion between the opus operans, that is, the subjective doing, and the opus operatum, that is, the objective deed. The distinction was adapted to the doctrine of the Sacraments and was thus applied to the efficacy of the Sacraments (Pseudo-Poitiers-Gloss. Peter of Poitiers, Summa of the Cod. Bamberg. Patr. 136).

By opus operatum is understood the valid completion of the sacramental rite in contradistinction to the opus operantis, that is, the subjective disposition of the recipient. The formula "ex opere operato" asserts, negatively, that the sacramental grace is not conferred by reason of the subjective activity of the recipient, and positively, that the sacramental grace is caused by the validly operated sacramental sign. Möhler's interpretation: ex opere operato = ex opere a Christo operato (Symbolik, Par. 28) is historically false; for the scholastic term does not purport to indicate the source (causa meritoria) of the sacramental grace, but the nature and manner of the sacramental operation of grace.

Against frequent distortions and reproaches (cf. Melanchthon's Apologia Confessionis, Art. 13) it must be stressed that the Catholic teaching of the efficacy of the Sacraments ex opere operato must in no wise be interpreted in the sense of a mechanical or magical efficacy. The opus operantis is not excluded. On the contrary, in the case of the adult recipient it is expressly demanded (cf. "non ponentibus obicem" D 849). Nevertheless the subjective disposition of the recipient is not the cause of grace; it is merely an indispensable pre-condition of the communication of grace (causa dispositiva, not causa efficiens). The measure of the grace effected ex opere operato even depends on the grade of the subjective disposition. D 799: secundum propriam cuiusque dispositionem et cooperationem. [(we receive grace according to the measure given by the Holy Spirit as He wills and) according to each one's own disposition and co-operation.]

§ 4. The Mode of Operation of the Sacraments

All Catholic theologians teach that the Sacraments are not merely conditions or occasions of the communication of grace, but true causes (causae instrumentales) of grace. However, in the more exact explanation as to how the Sacraments cause grace ex opere operato, they diverge. The Thomists conceive the causality of the Sacraments as a physical, the Scotists and many theologians of the Society of Jesus, as a moral one. To these two theories, the Jesuit L. Billot († 1931) has added the theory of the intentional mode of operation. It is to be noted that the Council of Trent did not decide on the nature and manner of the sacramental causality of grace.

1. Meaning of Physical Mode of Operation

The Sacraments operate physically if, through a power received from God, indwelling in them, they cause the grace which they signify. God, as causa principalis of grace, makes use of the sacramental sign as a physical instrument, in order to produce through it the sacramental grace in the soul of the recipient. God confers the grace mediately through the Sacrament.

2. Meaning of Moral Mode of Operation

The Sacraments operate morally if, by reason of their institution by Christ, they move God to bestow the grace by their objective value. As soon as the sacramental sign is validly accomplished God bestows the grace, because He has bound Himself as by a treaty to do so by the institution of the Sacraments (thus the older Scotists), or because the sacramental signs possess an impetratory power similar to the intercession of Christ, since in a certain sense, they are the actions of Christ. In this theory God gives grace immediately on account of the moral pressure exercised on Him by the Sacrament.

3. Intentional Mode of Operation

Billot's theory has its roots in the opinion of older Schoolmen (Alexander of Hales, St. Albert the Great, St. Thomas in the Commentary on the Sentences), according to which the Sacraments do not effect grace " modo perfective," but only " modo dispositive," i.e., by bringing forth immediately not the grace itself but only a real disposition to grace, i.e., the sacramental character or the so-called "soul-ornamentation" (ornatus animae). But while these older theologians attributed to the Sacraments a physical causality in respect of the disposition mentioned, Billot ascribed to them an intentional causality, that is, they have the power of designating and communicating a spiritual conception. According to Billot, the Sacraments cause grace "intentionaliter dispositive," i.e., by bestowing on the soul of the recipient what he calls a titulus exigitivus gratiae that is, a claim to grace. This claim to grace effected by the Sacrament infallibly results in the immediate infusion of grace by God, if no obstacle stands in the way, or as soon as the obstacle is removed.

Criticism:

Billot's theory contradicts the principle: The Sacraments operate that which they signify, namely, grace. According to the teaching of the Church (D 849 et seq.), grace itself is the real thing effected by the Sacrament.

The teaching which best corresponds to the teaching of the Church, of Holy Scripture and of the Fathers, is that expounded by St. Thomas Aquinas, i.e., the physical mode of operation (S. th. III 62).

Objections:

a) Spatial distance between the minister and the receiver.

The physical mode of operation is not to be understood in such a manner that the sacramental sign must come into physical contact with the recipient in order to be able to cause the sacramental grace. A physical contact is necessary only when the particular sacramental sign demands such, as for example, the ablution and the anointing. Sacramental absolution and the declaration of consent of matrimony do not demand any physical operation of the spoken word on the recipient.

b) Temporal sequence of the sacramental rite.

The operation of grace occurs as soon as the activity proper to the sacramental sign, which consists in the signifying of grace, is completed. In this moment the instrumental power communicated by God to the Sacrament which produces grace in the soul of the recipient, becomes effective. Thus it is true that the causing of grace is associated with the last moment of the sacramental action; but the preceding part is not on this account meaningless, since the entire action, which is a moral unity, is requisite for the function of signifying. The activity proper to the signifying and the instrumental activity of the dispensing of grace coalesce in one unitary sacramental action. Cf. S. th. III 62, 1 ad 2.

c) Revival.

The revival of a validly but unworthily received Sacrament occurs in the case of Baptism, Confirmation and Holy Orders. In these cases the sacramental character is regarded as the physical bearer of the grace-effecting power bestowed by God. In the Sacraments of Extreme Unction and Matrimony the character of Baptism takes over this task. Many theologians, however, in the exceptional case of revival accept the theory of the moral mode of operation, at least in respect of the Sacraments which do not confer a character.

§ 5. The Effects of the Sacraments

1. Sacramental Grace

a) Sanctifying Grace

All the Sacraments of the New Covenant confer sanctifying grace on the receivers. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent teaches : per quae (sc. sacramenta Ecclesiae) omnis vera iustitia (=gratia sanctificans) vel incipit vel coepta augetur vel amissa reparatur. [By these (sacraments of the Church) all true justice (i.e., sanctifying grace) begins or is increased or is restored if it has been lost.] D 843a, cf. 849-851.

Holy Writ indicates grace as the effect of the Sacraments partly directly, partly indirectly. According to 2 Tim, 1, 6, the effect of the Apostles' imposition of hands is "the grace of God." Other passages call the effect of sacramental rites regeneration (John 3, 5 ; Tit. 3, 5), purification (Eph. 5, 26), forgiveness of sins (John 20, 23 ; James 5, 15), communication of the Holy Ghost (Acts 8, 17), conferring of eternal life (John 6, 55). All these effects are inseparable from the bestowal of sanctifying grace.

Those Sacraments, which, per se, that is, corresponding to the determination of their purpose, confer sanctifying grace for the first time, or restore lost sanctifying grace (gratia prima), are called Sacraments of the Dead (Sacramenta mortuorum *i.e.* Baptism, Penance). Those Sacraments which, per se, increase sanctifying grace, already present, are called Sacraments of the Living (sacramenta vivorum).

It is theologically certain that the Sacraments of the Dead confer gratia secunda per accidens, that is in certain circumstances, namely, when the receiver is already in the state of grace. In view of the Tridentine dogma that the Sacraments confer grace on all, who do not oppose any obstacle to them (D 849 et seq.), it is very probable that the Sacraments of the Living bestow gratia prima per accidens, namely, if a mortal sinner in good faith believes that he is free from sin and receives the Sacrament with imperfect contrition. Cf. S. th. III 72, 7 ad 2 ; III 79, 3. With sanctifying grace the theological and moral virtues and the gifts of the Holy Ghost are also invariably conferred. Par. 21.

b) Specific sacramental grace

Each individual sacrament confers a specific sacramental grace. (*Sent. communis.*)

As there are various Sacraments having various aims (cf. D 846, 695), and as the differences in the sacramental signs also point to a difference in the effecting of grace, it must be assumed that each individual Sacrament, corres-

ponding to its special purpose, confers a special or specific sacramental grace (gratia sacramentalis in the narrower sense).

Sacramental grace and extra-sacramental or ordinary grace are not to be distinguished merely mentally, i.e., by reason of the purpose for which they are conferred. Neither are they to be regarded as two distinct habits of the soul (Capreolus) since the notion of a special sacramental endowment of grace side by side with extra-sacramental grace is not found in Revelation. According to the teaching of St. Thomas, sacramental grace is in its nature the same grace as extra-sacramental, but it brings with it in addition "a certain Divine help" for the achievement of the particular purpose of the Sacrament; gratia sacramentalis addit super gratiam communiter dictam et super virtutes et dona quoddam divinum auxilium ad consequendum sacramenti finem (S. th. III 62, 2). Cajetan, Suarez and others understand by this Divine help an actual help of grace, or the claim to actual grace. Other Thomists like John a St. Thoma, understand the expression of St. Thomas, more correctly indeed, as referring to a habitual Divine assistance which they more closely determine as an inner modus, by which the sanctifying grace is more perfectly directed to the special purpose of the Sacrament.

Modern theologians generally teach that, according to the time and the circumstances, the claim to the actual graces requisite for the achievement of the purpose of the Sacrament is associated with the sacramental grace. Pius XI declared in respect of the Sacrament of Matrimony: "It confers on them (on those contracting Matrimony) finally the claim to the actual assistance of grace, which they will receive as often as they require it for the fulfilment of the duties of their state." D 2237.

c) Measure of the sacramental grace

Although God is absolutely free in the dispensing of grace, theologians almost generally assume that each individual Sacrament has the power of itself to bestow the same measure of grace on all recipients. However, the subjective dispositions of the recipient in the case of adults means that de facto a varying measure of grace ex opere operato is received. D 799. Thus the Church always lays great emphasis on the necessity of preparation for the reception of the Sacraments. Cf. the Old Christian catechumenical practice. S. th. III 69, 8.

2. The Sacramental Character

a) Reality of the sacramental character

Three Sacraments, Baptism, Confirmation and Holy Orders, imprint a character, that is, an indelible spiritual mark, and for this reason cannot be repeated. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent declared against the Reformers, who, following the precedent of Wycliffe, denied the sacramental character: Si quis dixerit, in tribus sacramentis, baptismo scilicet, confirmatione et ordine, non imprimi characterem in anima, hoc est signum quoddam spirituale et indelibile, unde ea iterari non possunt A.S. (If anybody denies that, in three sacraments, namely Baptism, Confirmation and Orders, a character that is a spiritual and indelible sign, is imprinted on the soul, whence these sacraments cannot be repeated A.S.) (D 852; cf. D 411, 695.)

Holy Writ does not explicitly refer to the sacramental character, but it speaks of a seal that God impresses on the faithful or of a being sealed by the Holy Ghost. 2 Cor. 1, 21 et seq.: "Now He that confirmeth us with you in

Christ and that hath anointed us, is God who also hath sealed us and given the pledge of the Spirit in our hearts." Eph. 1, 13: "In whom you also after you had heard the word of truth (the gospel of your salvation), in whom also believing, you were signed with the holy Spirit of promise." Eph. 4, 30: "Grieve not the Holy Spirit of God whereby you are sealed unto the day of Redemption!" The sealing by the Holy Ghost, which is an effect of baptism, is in these texts not yet distinguished from the endowment with Grace.

The Fathers teach that in Baptism a Divine seal is impressed and thus call Baptism itself a seal or sealing (σφραγίς, sigillum signaculum obsignatio). St. Cyril of Jerusalem calls Baptism "a holy inviolable seal" (σφραγὶς ἁγία ἀκατάλυτος; Procat. 16). St. Augustine, who was the first to use the term character (Ep. 98, 5 De bapt. VI 1, 1 and passim), establishes against the Donatists that Baptism and Holy Orders cannot be repeated, from the character which is conferred independently from grace and which is not lost even by mortal sin. In the writings of St. Augustine all the essential characteristics of the sacramental character appear: a) Its differentiation and the separability from grace ("consecratio" in contra-distinction to "sanctification" or "vitae aeternae participatio"; Ep. 98, 5; De bapt. V 24, 34); b) The impossibility of losing it (C. ep. Parm. II 13, 29; C. litt. Petil. II 104, 239); c) As a consequence of the foregoing the impossibility of repeating the Sacrament (C. ep. Parm. II 13, 28).

It was only at the close of the 12th and the beginning of the 13th centuries that the doctrine of the sacramental character was scientifically developed by scholastic theologians. Petrus Cantor († 1197) first related the non-repeatable nature of the Sacrament of Baptism, Confirmation and Holy Orders to the character. The older Franciscan School (Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure), as well as St. Albert the Great and especially St. Thomas Aquinas, played an essential part in the development of the doctrine. Scotus criticised the proofs from Scripture and Tradition, but out of consideration for the authority of the Church, admitted the existence of the character. Pope Innocent III embodied the teaching concerning the sacramental character for the first time in papal documents (D 411).

b) The nature of the Sacramental Character

The Sacramental Character is a spiritual mark imprinted on the soul. (*De fide.*)

On the ground of this explanation of the Council of Trent, the character is to be defined as a real accidental being attaching to the soul, more exactly, as a supernatural quality entatively inhering in the soul. St. Thomas classes it as a species of potency, while the Summa Alexandri, St. Bonaventure and St. Albert the Great define it as a habitus. S. th. III 63, 2: Character importat quandam potentiam spiritualem ordinatam ad eo, quae sunt divini cultus. St. Thomas regards not the substance of the soul but the faculty of intellect as the subject or bearer of the character (similarly St. Bellarmine, Suarez). The reason is that the acts of religion which are made possible by the character are manifestatians of faith which appertain to the faculty of Intellect. S. th. III 63, 4.

Durandus († 1334) taught that the sacramental character is not something entative but a mere relatio rationis, by which, on the ground of Divine ordinance, a person is purely externally equipped and empowered to achieve certain religious actions, just as an official might receive power of a plenipotentiary nature to do certain official actions. This theory is incompatible with the teaching of the Council of Trent.

c) Determination of the purpose of the Sacramental Character

The Sacramental Character confers the full power for the performance of acts of Christian Worship. (*Sent. communis.*)

Associating himself with the Augustinian concept of the sacramental character as a consecratio, which is supported by Ps.-Dionysius, St. Thomas sees the purpose of the sacramental character in the " deputatio ad cultum divinum," that is, in deputing the faithful to receive, or bestow on others, things pertaining to the worship of God. This deputing can be either passive or active, according as it entitles one to receive or administer Sacrament. S. th. III 63, 3 : Deputatur quisque fidelis ad recipiendum vel trandendum aliis, ea, quae pertinent ad cultum Dei, et ad hoc proprie deputatur character sacramentalis. As all Christian worship flows from Christ's priesthood, the character is a participation in the priesthood of Christ and an assimilation to the High Priest, Jesus Christ. S. th. III 63, 3 : totus ritus christianae religionis derivatur a sacerdotio Christi, et ideo manifestum est, quod character sacramentalis specialiter est character Christi, cuius sacerdotio configurantur fideles secundum sacramentales characteres, qui nihil aliud sunt quam quaedam participationes sacerdotii Christi ab ipso Christo derivatae. The whole rite of the Christian religion is derived from Christ's priesthood. Consequently, it is clear that the sacramental character is specially the character of Christ, to whose character the faithful are likened by reason of the sacramental characters, which are simply certain participations of Christ's priesthood, flowing from Christ Himself.

The sacramental character is a signum configurativum in so far as it assimilates one to the High Priest Jesus Christ. From this primary function other secondary functions flow. The character is a signum distinctivum in so far as it distinguishes the baptised from the non-baptised, the confirmed from the non-confirmed, the consecrated from the non-consecrated ; it is a signum dispositivum in so far as it empowers the faithful in relation to certain acts of worship and indirectly disposes them for the reception of sanctifying and actual grace ; it is a signum obligativum in so far as it entails obligations to carry out Christian worship, and demands the possession of sanctifying grace for its worthy performance.

The fact that only the sacraments of Baptism, Confirmation and Holy Orders imprint a character is established from reason on the ground that only these three Sacraments bestow a full power to perform Christian acts of worship. S. th. III 63, 6.

d) Duration of the Sacramental Character

The Sacramental Character continues at least until the death of its bearer. (*De fide.*)

D 852 : signum indelibile (an indelible sign).

According to the general opinion of the Fathers and the theologians, the character endures beyond death for eternity. St. Cyril of Jerusalem speaks of a " seal of the Holy Ghost which cannot be erased in all eternity " (Procat. 17). Speculatively, the eternal duration of the character may be established by considering the eternal duration of Christ's priesthood and the immortality of the soul. S. th. III 63, 5.

CHAPTER 3

The Institution and the Seven-fold Nature of the Sacraments

§ 6. The Institution of the Sacraments by Christ

Since a Sacrament is an efficacious sign of grace it follows that only God, the Originator of all grace, can institute a Sacrament as causa principalis. A creature could institute a Sacrament as causa instrumentalis (ministerialis) only. God's power in regard to the Sacraments is called potestas auctoritatis, the creature's power is called potestas ministerii. Christ as God possesses potestas auctoritatis, as man potestas ministerii. The latter, on account of the Hypostatic Union of Christ's human nature with the Divine Person of the Logos, is called potestas ministerii principalis or potestas excellentiae. Cf. S. th. III 64, 3 and 4.

1. Institution by Christ

All Sacraments of the New Covenant were instituted by Jesus Christ. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent declared against the Reformers, who insisted that most of the Sacraments were human inventions : Si quis dixerit sacramenta novae legis non fuisse omnia a Jesu Christe Domino nostro instituta, (If anyone says that the sacraments of the New Law were not all instituted by Jesus Christ Our Lord) A.S. D 844.

Opposed to the Catholic Dogma is also the opinion of the Modernists, according to which the Sacraments were not founded by the historical Christ, but were introduced by the Apostles and their successors to satisfy the desire for external forms of worship. By them they were related to certain facts in the life of Jesus. D 2039 et seq.

The attempt made by modern writers on the history of religion to explain the Sacraments as imitations of pagan mystery rites, is unfounded. A borrowing of the essential rites from such mystery-cults cannot be demonstrated. In non-essential ceremonies a certain limited influence of the pagan milieu on the young Christian movement may be admitted. Many similarities in the religious ideas and the forms of expression may be explained by the common religious disposition of human nature and by psychological accommodation to the circumstances obtaining in the Early Church.

2. Immediate Institution

Christ instituted all the Sacraments immediately and personally. (*Sent. certa.*)

Immediate institution by Christ signifies that He determined the specific sacramental operation of grace and ordained a corresponding outward sign for the distinguishing and production of this operation of grace. Christ would have instituted the Sacraments mediately only if He had left the determination of the sacramental operation of grace and of the corresponding

outward sign to the Apostles and to their successors. Individual Scholastic theologians (Hugo of St. Victor, Petrus Lombardus, Magister Roland, St. Bonaventure) held the view that the Sacraments of Confirmation and of Extreme Unction were instituted by the Apostles under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. St. Albert the Great, St. Thomas Aquinas (S. th. III 64, 2), and Scotus teach the doctrine of the immediate institution of all the Sacraments by Christ.

Holy Scripture attests that Christ immediately instituted the Sacraments of Baptism, Eucharist, Penance and Consecration. The other Sacraments, according to the testimony of Holy Writ, were in existence in apostolic times. However, the Apostles assume to themselves no right of institution, but regard themselves merely as "ministers of Christ and dispensers of the mysteries of God" (1 Cor. 4, 1). Cf. 1 Cor. 3, 5.

The idea of the institution of the Sacraments by the Apostles or by the Church was unknown to the Fathers. St. Ambrose says in regard to the Eucharist: "Who is the Originator of the Sacred Mysteries (Sacraments) if not the Lord Jesus? These Sacred Mysteries come from Heaven" (De sacr. IV 4, 13). Cf. St. Augustine, In Ioan. tr. 5, 7.

The immediate institution of the Sacraments by Christ may be speculatively proved by the consideration that the Sacraments, like the truths of Faith, belong to the foundations of the religion founded by Christ. Just as Christ in His Own Person promulgated the truths of Faith which are in substance immutable, and which He entrusted to the Church for preservation, so it is reasonable that He personally also instituted the Sacraments and confided to the Church their administration. The doctrine of the immediate institution of the Sacraments by Christ is of special value in defending the unity of the Church. Cf. S. th. III 64, 2 ad 3; 64, 4 ad 1.

3. Substance of the Sacraments

Christ fixed the substance of the Sacraments. The Church has no power to alter them. (*Sent. certa.*)

It follows from the immediate institution of the Sacraments by Christ that their substance is immutably fixed for all time. The institution of a new Sacrament would involve a substantial change. The Council of Trent teaches that the Church has had always the power to make changes in the administration of the Sacraments: "preserving unimpaired their substance" (salva illorum substantia). The power to make alterations in the substance of the Sacraments is not claimed by the Church for herself. D 931. Cf. D 570 m, 2147 a, 3001 n. 1.

Whether Christ ordained the matter and form of the Sacraments specifically (in specie) or in general (in genere) is a matter of controversy, that is, whether He laid down the specific nature of the Sacrament or whether He merely gave the idea of the Sacrament in general and left the closer determination of the matter and form to the Church. The latter form of institution implies a far-reaching co-operation of the Church, and therefore approaches the notion of mediate institution. The declaration of the Council of Trent (D 931) cited above, on the other hand, seems to favour specific institution, as the expression "Sacraments," according to the proximate sense, designates the concrete substance, that is, matter and form, without however excluding the generic institution. For

Baptism and the Eucharist the specific institution is definitely proved in Holy Writ, but not for the other Sacraments. The fixing of the sacramental sign by Christ in individual cases (in individuo), that is, according to all details of the rite (for example, immersion or infusion in Baptism, wording of the form) must be excluded. The sacramental form was ordained by Christ not according to the wording, but according to the sense.

4. Accidental Rites

To be distinguished from the essential rites of the Sacraments based on Divine ordinance are the accidental rites, ceremonies and prayers, which, in the course of time, became current by custom or by the positive prescription of the Church, and which have the purpose of symbolically representing the sacramental operation of grace, of expressing the dignity and sublimity of the Sacraments, of satisfying man's need for external forms of worship and of preparing him for the reception of grace. Cf. D 856, 931, 943, 946.

§ 7. The Seven Sacraments

There are seven Sacraments of the New Law. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent declared against the Reformers who, after long vacillation, finally retained only two Sacraments—Baptism and Communion, that there are no more and no fewer than seven Sacraments, namely, Baptism, Confirmation, Eucharist, Penance, Extreme Unction, Holy Order and Matrimony : Si quis dixerit, sacramenta novae Legis . . . esse plura vel pauciora quam septem, A.S. D 844.

Holy Writ incidentally mentions all seven Sacraments, but does not summarise them in the figure seven. Again, no formal enumeration of the seven Sacraments is found in the Fathers. The formal numeral seven presupposes a well-developed concept of a Sacrament. This emerged only around the middle of the 12th century. The earliest names in this connection are Magister Simon, the Sententiae divinitatis of the School of Gilbert of Poitiers, Petrus Lombardus, Magister Roland (Alexander III).

For the existence of seven Sacraments a seven-fold proof can be adduced :

1. Theological Proof

The existence of the seven Sacraments has been regarded as a truth of Faith since the middle of the 12th century. Expressed first as a scientific conviction of theologians, it was confirmed by the official teaching of the Church from the 13th century on. The Union Councils of Lyons (1274) and of Florence (1438–1445), expressly teach the doctrine. D 465, 695. (Cf. D 424, 665 et seq.) As Christ lives on in the Church (Mt. 28, 20) and the Holy Ghost directs the Church in her teaching activity (John 14, 26), the whole Church cannot err in her teaching. Therefore the belief of the whole Church is, for the faithful, a proof that a doctrine has been revealed.

2. Proof from Prescription

It cannot be shown that any one of the seven Sacraments was at any particular time instituted by a Council, a Pope, a Bishop or a Community. The doctrinal decisions of the Church, the Fathers and the theologians presuppose the existence of the individual Sacraments as something handed down from antiquity. From

this one may infer that the seven Sacraments existed in the Church from the very beginning. Cf. St. Augustine, De baptismo IV 24, 31 : "That which the whole Church holds and which was not introduced by councils, but has always been firmly held, of this one can with complete justice believe that it was transmitted by none other than Apostolic authority."

3. Historical Proof

The Greek-Orthodox Church, which in the 9th century under Photius temporarily and in the 11th century (1054) under Michael Cerularius finally separated itself from the Catholic Church, agrees that there are seven Sacraments. This is shown in its liturgical books, in its declarations at the Union Council of Lyons (D 465) and Florence (D 695), in its answers to the attempts at union made by the Protestants in the 16th century, and in its official confessional writings. The figure seven was taken over from the Catholic Church of the Orient without hesitation by the Greek Church in the 13th century because it corresponded to the latter's own consciousness of the Faith.

The Patriarch Jeremiah II of Constantinople answered the Tübingen Professors, Martin Crusius and Jacob Andreä, who sent him the Confessio Augustana in a Greek translation, as the basis for the unity negotiations, in his first rejoinder (1576) in association with Simeon of Thessalonica (De sacramentis 33) : "The mysteries of Sacraments in the same Catholic Church of the Orthodox Christians are seven, namely Baptism, Unction with Divine Myron, Holy Communion, Ordination, Matrimony, Penance and the Holy Oil ; that is, the grace-gifts of the Divine Spirit are seven, as Isaias says, and seven also are the mysteries of the Church, which are efficacious by the Spirit" (c. 7). With reference to this explanation, the Confessio Orthodoxa (I 98), of the Metropolitan Petrus Mogilas of Kiev (1642), enumerates the same seven Sacraments. The confession of the Patriarch Dositheos of Jerusalem (1672) holds against the confession of the calvinistically-minded Patriarch Cyrillus Lucaris of Constantinople, who recognised only two Sacraments, Baptism and Communion, expressly and firmly to the number seven : "A lesser or greater number of Sacraments we have not in the Church ; for any number departing from the number seven of the Sacraments is a monstrosity of heretical mania" (Decr. 15).

The sectaries of the Nestorians and Monophysites who fell away from the Church in the 5th century, similarly held firmly to the sevenfold number of the Sacraments. While the Nestorians, in the enumeration of the seven Sacraments partly departed from the Catholic Church, the Monophysites agreed with the Catholic doctrine. The Nestorian theologian Ebedjesu († 1319) enumerates the following seven Sacraments : Priesthood, Baptism, Oil of Unction, Eucharist, Forgiveness of Sin, Holy Fermentum (=leaven for the preparation of the bread of the Host), and the Sign of the Cross. The Catechism of the Monophysitic Syrian Bishop Severius Barsaum (1930) teaches : "The Sacraments of the Church are these : Baptism, Myron, Eucharist, Penance, Consecration of Priests, Unction of the Sick, and Matrimony."

5. Speculative Foundation

The appropriateness of the number seven of the Sacraments flows from the analogy to the supernatural life of the soul with the natural life of the body. The supernatural life is generated by Baptism ; brought to growth by Confirmation ; nourished by the Eucharist ; cured from the diseases of sins and from the weakness arising from these by Penance and Extreme Unction. By the two social Sacraments of Holy Order and Matrimony the congregation of the Church is guided, and spiritually and corporeally preserved and increased. Cf. S. th. III 65, 1 ; St. Bonaventure, Breviloquium VI 3. D 695.

§ 8. The Necessity of the Sacraments

Necessity is what cannot not be (S. th. I 82, 1: Necesse est quod non potest non esse), whether on the ground of an inner principle (for example the Existence of God), or on the ground of an external principle. The latter can be a final or an efficient cause. The necessity imposed by the final cause (necessitas finis) consists in this that unless one uses a defined means one cannot achieve a certain purpose (for example, nourishment is necessary (necessitate finis) for the preservation of human life) or at least one cannot achieve it easily (for example, a vehicle is necessary for the easy performance of a long journey). The necessity imposed by an efficient cause is the necessity of coaction (necessitas coactionis) A high grade of appropriateness is called necessity of congruity (necessitas convenientiae or congruentiae). S. th. I 82, 1.

1. On the Part of God

God can communicate grace even without the Sacraments. (*Sent. certa.*)

God, in His omnipotence and freedom, can communicate grace in a purely spiritual manner also. Therefore for Him the institution of Sacraments was not indispensably necessary. S. th. III 72, 6 ad 1; virtus divina non est alligata sacramentis. However, in view of the fact that man is composed of body and soul the institution was highly appropriate (necessitas convenientiae or congruentiae). Again, the nature of the Church as a visible religious community demands visible religious signs (notae quaedam et symbola quidus fideles internoscerentur; Cat. Rom. II 1, 9, 4). The Sacraments are also valuable in promoting the Christian life of virtue: humility, on account of man's dependence for his spiritual life on material elements; faith and confidence, on account of the manifest signs of grace; neighbourly love, on account of the co-membership of one Mystical Body implied by the Sacraments. Cf. S. th. III 61, 1; S.c.G. IV 56; Cat. Rom. II 1, 9.

2. On the Part of Man

The Sacraments of the New Covenant are necessary for the salvation of mankind. (*De fide.*)

As Christ instituted the Sacraments and bound them up with the communication of grace they are necessary to us for the achievement of salvation (necessitate medii), even if not all are necessary for each individual. The efficacious reception of a Sacrament can, in case of necessity, be replaced by the desire for the Sacrament (votum sacramenti) (hypothetical necessity).

The Council of Trent declared against the Reformers who, on the ground of their "sola fides" doctrine, contested the necessity of the Sacraments for salvation: Si quis dixerit sacramenta novae Legis non esse ad salutem necessaria, sed superflua, et sine eis aut eorum voto per solam fidem homines a Deo gratiam iustificationis adipisci, licet omnia singulis necessaria non sint. A.S. D. 847. In the Middle Ages the necessity of the Sacraments was controverted by the Cathari.

The Sacraments are the means appointed by God for the attainment of eternal salvation. Three of them are in the ordinary way of salvation so necessary,

that without their use salvation cannot be attained. Thus, for the individual person, Baptism is necessary in this way and after the commission of a grievous sin, Penance is equally necessary, while for the Church in general, the Sacrament of Holy Orders is necessary. The other Sacraments are necessary in so far as salvation cannot be so easily gained without them. Thus Confirmation is the completion of Baptism, and Extreme Unction is the completion of Penance, while Matrimony is the basis for the preservation of the Church commonwealth, and the Eucharist is the end (finis) of all the Sacraments. Cf. S. th. III 65, 3 and 4.

CHAPTER 4

The Minister and the Recipient of the Sacraments

§ 9. The Minister of the Sacraments

1. The Person of the Minister

a) Primary and secondary minister

a) The primary minister of the Sacraments is the God-Man Jesus Christ. (*Sent. certa.*)

In the Encyclical "Mystici Corporis" (1943), Pius XII teaches: "And when the Church administers the Sacraments with external rite, it is He who produces their effect in the soul." "In virtue of the juridical mission by which the Divine Redeemer sent forth His Apostles into the world as He Himself had been sent by the Father" (cf. John 17, 18; 20, 21) it is indeed He who baptises through the Church, He who teaches, governs, absolves, binds, offers and makes sacrifice."

St. Paul says of Christ Himself that He purifies the persons being baptised by the laver of water (Eph. 5, 26). The human minister is only the servant and representative of Christ. 1 Cor. 4, 1: "Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ and the dispensers of the mysteries of God!" 2 Cor. 5, 20: "We are ambassadors for Christ."

St. Augustine comments on John 1, 33 ("He it is that baptises in the Holy Ghost"): "Peter may baptise, it is This (=Christ) who baptises; Paul may baptise, it is He who baptises; Judas may baptise, it is He who baptises" (In Ioan. tr. 6, 7).

b) The secondary minister of the Sacraments is man in the wayfaring state. (*Sent. communis*).

Except for Baptism and Matrimony, a special priestly or episcopal power, conferred by Holy Orders, is necessary for the valid ministration of the Sacraments. The Council of Trent declared against the Reformers' teaching of the general priesthood of all the faithful: Si quis dixerit, Christianos omnes in verbo et omnibus sacramentis administrandis habere potestatem (If anybody says that all Christians have power to administer all the sacraments) A.S. D 853.

As the human minister acts as the representative of Christ (in persona Christi: 2 Cor. 2, 10), he requires for this purpose a special investment with full powers by Christ, or by the Church of Christ.

Except in the case of the Holy Eucharist, the minister of the Sacrament must be distinct from the receiver. Innocent III declared self-Baptism invalid, though he regarded it as a lively expression of faith in the Sacrament and of the desire for the same (votum sacramenti). D 413.

b) The Minister's orthodoxy and state of grace

The validity and efficacy of the Sacrament is independent of the minister's orthodoxy and state of grace.

As far as the state of grace is concerned this doctrine is de fide; as far as orthodoxy is concerned it is de fide in respect of Baptism (D 860); it is a sententia fidei proxima as regards the other Sacraments. Cf. CIC 2372.

As against the teaching of the Donatists, Waldenses, Fraticelli, Wycliffians and Hussites, the Council of Trent declared: Si quis dixerit ministrum in peccato mortali existentem, modo omni essentialia, quae ad sacramentum conficiendum aut conferendum pertinent, servaverit, non conficere aut conferre sacramentum, A.S. (If anyone says that a minister who, though he be in a state of mortal sin, does everything that is essential for the perfection and administration of a sacrament, does not perfect or administer the sacrament A.S.) D 855. Cf. D 424, 488, 584, 672.

In the controversy about the baptism of heretics, Pope St. Stephen I (256) decided, on appeal to tradition, against Bishop St. Cyprian of Carthage and Bishop Firmilian of Caesarea, that Baptism administered by heretics is valid. D 46: "Thus if any one shall come to you from any heresy, then nothing new should be undertaken, but that which is traditional, namely, that the hands be imposed unto penitence" (nihil innovetur, nisi quod traditum est, ut manus illis imponatur in poenitentiam). The error of the Donatists, who demanded not merely orthodoxy, but also the being free from all grievous sin, for the valid administration of the Sacraments, was rejected by St. Optatus of Milevis and especially by St. Augustine, on the ground that the primary minister of the Sacraments is Christ.

The intrinsic theological foundation derives from the doctrine of the efficacy of the Sacraments ex opere operato, as also from the instrumental relation of the human minister to Christ the Primary Minister. As an instrument is effective in virtue of its principal cause, so the efficiency of the Sacrament is independent of the subjective constitution of the minister. Dependence on this would be a source of constant uncertainty and uneasiness. Cf. S. th. III 64 5.

c) Worthiness of the minister

As the servant and representative of Christ, the minister is in conscience bound to minister the Sacraments in a worthy manner, that is, in the state of grace. Cf. Ex. 19, 22; Lv. 19, 2; 21, 6. The administration of a Sacrament in the state of grievous sin is a sacrilege. An exception is the administration of Baptism in case of danger of death, because the minister of the Baptism of necessity does not function as an official servant of the Church, but comes to the help of a person in an emergency. The Roman Catechism (II 1, 20, 2) enjoins: "One must always insist that the Holy must be treated in a holy and reverent manner." Cf. S. th. III 64, 6.

2. Activity of the Minister

a) For the valid dispensing of the Sacraments it is necessary that the minister accomplish the Sacramental Sign in the proper manner. (*De fide.*)

This involves the obligation of using the essential matter and the essential form and of unifying them in a unitary sacramental sign. D 695.

b) The minister must further have the intention at least of doing what the Church does. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent declared against the Reformers, who denied the necessity of the intention of the minister, as they recognised in the Sacrament a subjective, psychological efficacy only: Si quis dixerit, in ministris, dum sacramenta conficiunt et conferunt, non requiri intentionem saltem faciendi quod facit Ecclesia, A.S. D 854. Cf. D 424, 672, 695, 752.

The expression "intendere facere quod facit Ecclesia" (to do what the Church does) has been current since the beginning of the 13th century. (Praepositinus, Gilbert of Poitiers, William of Auxerre, Philipp the Chancellor.)

α) Necessity of the intention

The Fathers did not discuss the necessity of the intention. They see the proper intention included in the proper consummation of the sacramental rite. Pope Cornelius (251–253) declared the bishop's consecration of Novatian as "an apparent and nugatory imposition of hands," that is, as invalid, obviously on account of the lack of the necessary intention on the part of the minister (Eusebius, H.e. VI 43, 9). Regarding the validity of Baptism conferred in play or in joke there was uncertainty in Patristic times. St. Augustine ventured no decision (De bapt. VII 53, 102). It was only in the period of early Scholasticism that the question was cleared up, notably by Hugo of St. Victor (De sacr. II 6, 13).

The necessity of the intention is based on the following arguments. As the human minister is a servant and representative of Christ (1 Cor. 4, 1; 2 Cor. 5, 20), he is in duty bound to subordinate and adapt his will to the will of Christ Who gives him his mandate. Christ continues perpetually to live and work in the Church. Therefore it suffices to have the intention of doing what the Church does.

The human minister is a creature endowed with reason and freedom. The act involved in the execution of the administration of the Sacrament must therefore be an actus humanus, that is, an activity which proceeds from understanding and free will. Hugo of St. Victor, who was the first to lay strong emphasis on the intention, teaches: rationale esse oportet opus ministeriorum Dei (the work of the ministers of God ought to be rational) (De sacr. II 6, 13).

The sacramental sign of itself is undetermined and may be used variously. By the intention of the minister it is unambiguously determined, and adapted to the sacramental operation. Cf. S. th. III 64, 8.

β) Nature of the Intention required in the Administration of the Sacraments. Subjectively regarded, an actual intention is that disposition of the will which is present before and during the whole action, but such a disposition is not indispensable. A virtual intention, that is, that disposition of the will, which is

conceived before the action and which continues virtually during the action (called by St. Thomas intentio habitualis. S. th. III 64, 8 ad 3), also suffices. An habitual intention, that is, that disposition of the will which was conceived before the action and which was not withdrawn, but which during the action is neither actually nor virtually present, and thus does not affect the action, is not sufficient.

Objectively considered, the intention of doing what the Church does suffices. The minister, therefore, does not need to intend what the Church intends, namely, to produce the effects of the Sacraments, for example, the forgiveness of sins; neither does he need to intend to execute a specific Catholic rite. It suffices if he have the intention of performing the religious action as it is current among Christians.

γ) Inadequacy of an intentio "mere externa"

According to the almost general opinion of modern theologians, an inner intention (intentio interna) is necessary for the valid administration of the Sacraments. By intentio interna is meant an intention which is directed, not merely to the external execution of the sacramental rite, but also to its inner signification. The mere external intention (intentio mere externa) which was regarded by many theologians of early Scholasticism (for example Robertus Pullus, Roland), later by Ambrosius Catharinus, O.P. († 1553) and many theologians of the 17th and 18th centuries, as adequate, and which is directed towards merely performing the external action with earnestness and in the proper circumstances, while the inner religious significance is not taken into consideration, is insufficient. The mere external intention is not compatible with the concept of doing what the Church intends, or with the status of the minister as a servant of Christ, or with the religious determination of the sacramental sign, which is of itself capable of many interpretations, or with the declarations of the Church. Cf. D 424; fidelis intentio. Pope Alexander VIII, in 1690, rejected the following proposition: Valet Baptismus collatus a ministro, qui omnem ritum externum formamque baptizandi observat, intus vero in corde suo apud se resolvit: non intendo, quod facit Ecclesia. (A Baptism is valid which is conferred by a minister who observes all the external rite and the form of baptising but who says in his heart "I do not intend to do what the Church does") D 1318. Cf. D 672, 695, 902.

The necessary inner intention can be an intentio specialis et reflexa or an intentio generalis et directa, according to whether the inner religious significance of the sacramental action is intended in particular or only in general, whether with or without reflexion on the purpose and effects of the Sacrament.

§ 10. The Recipient of the Sacraments

1. The Person of the Recipient

Only a person in the wayfaring state can validly receive a Sacrament. (*Sent. communis.*)

As a Sacrament communicates spiritual grace through the senses, only a being composed of body and soul, i.e. a man, is an appropriate subject for the reception of the Sacraments. The dead cannot receive Sacraments. The Synods of Hippo (393) and of Carthage (397) prohibit the Baptism of the dead and the Communion of the dead.

2. Conditions of the Valid Reception

a) Excepting the Sacrament of Penance, neither orthodox belief nor moral worthiness is necessary for the validity of the Sacrament, on the part of the recipient. (*Sent. communis.*)

The Sacrament of Penance is an exception because the moral acts of the penitent (according to the usual opinion) are, as quasi matter, an essential part of the sacramental sign.

In the Donatist controversy the defenders of the Church doctrine maintained that the validity of the Sacraments is independent of the orthodoxy and moral worthiness, not merely of the minister, but also of the recipient. St. Augustine teaches: "The purity of Baptism is wholly and entirely independent of the purity or impurity of the conscience both of the minister and of the recipient" (Contra litt. Petiliani II 35, 82).

The intrinsic ground is this that the Sacraments receive their grace of conferring power neither from the recipient nor from the minister of the Sacrament, but from God, the Originator of grace. Cf. S. th. III 68, 8.

b) For the validity of the Sacraments in the case of adult recipients the intention of receiving the Sacrament is necessary. (*Sent. certa.*)

According to the teaching of the Council of Trent, justification follows, in the case of an adult endowed with reason and freedom, a voluntary acceptance of grace (per voluntariam susceptionem gratiae et donorum; D 799). A Sacrament received without a proper intention or which is conferred on a person against his will is invalid. Pope Innocent III declared forced Baptism to be invalid. D 411.

The necessity of intention on the part of the recipient is not, as is that of the minister, founded in the nature of the sacramental sign, but on a person's right to freedom. God in His Wisdom honours man's freedom and makes each man's sanctification dependent on each man's free decision. A young child, however, receives sacramental grace without his consent. Pope Innocent III declared (1201) in regard to the Baptism of children: "Original sin, which is contracted without consent, is by the power of the Sacrament, remitted without consent." D 410.

Constitution of the intention

As the role of the recipient is receptive, a subjective habitual intention normally suffices and even in case of necessity, an interpretative intention, whereby a person, who is suddenly rendered incapable of an actual or habitual intention (unconsciousness, mental disturbance), had a wish at least implicit before the emergency to receive the Sacrament. In Matrimony a virtual intention at least is necessary because those contracting Matrimony are not merely recipients but also ministers of the Sacrament. The same applies to Holy Orders, on account of the obligations arising therefrom. The intention to receive that which the Church gives is sufficient.

3. Conditions for the Worthy Reception of the Sacraments

In the case of adult recipients moral worthiness is necessary for the worthy or fruitful reception of the Sacraments. (*De fide.*)

Moral worthiness in this context consists in the removal of any obstacles to grace. D 849 : non ponentibus obicem. In the Sacraments of the Dead the obstacles to grace are lack of faith and unreadiness for penance, the requisite dispositions being faith and, at least, attrition (attritio) ; in the Sacraments of the Living the obstacle to grace is a consciousness of grievous sin, the necessary disposition is the state of grace. In particular for the worthy reception of the Eucharist, the Church demands in the case of a grievous sin, the previous reception of the Sacrament of Penance. D 880, 893. CIC 807, 856.

4. Revival of the Sacraments

A validly conferred but unworthily received Sacrament communicates the Sacramentum tantum—Baptism and Consecration confer also the character (res et sacramentum)—but not the res (or virtus) sacramenti, that is, the grace (a Sacrament thus unworthily received is called : sacramentum informe).

The Sacraments of Baptism, Confirmation and Consecration, when they are received validly but unworthily, revive after the removal of the moral indisposition, that is, the sacramental grace is conferred subsequently. (*Sent. communis.*)

The ground for the revival lies, on the one hand, in God's mercy, on the other hand, in the absolute impossibility of repeating these Sacraments.

Many Theologians, in view of God's mercy, assume a revival of Extreme Unction and of the Sacrament of Matrimony also, as both these Sacraments are relatively unrepeatable. The Sacrament of Penance cannot revive, because an unworthy reception of it involves invalidity of the Sacrament. In the case of the Eucharist, revival is improbable, because this Sacrament can very easily be received again.

The revival of Baptism was taught even by St. Augustine. Cf. De baptismo, I 12, 18 : "That which is already given (Baptism) begins then to be efficacious to salvation when the former unreadiness for Penance is replaced by true Penance." Cf. S. th. III 69, 10.

CHAPTER 5

The Pre-Christian Sacraments and the Sacramentals

§ 11. The Pre-Christian Sacraments

1. Existence of Pre-Christian Sacraments

a) Primitive Era

Most theologians agree, with St. Thomas, that before the Fall there were in Paradise no instruments of grace perceptible to the senses and instituted by God (Sacraments in the wider sense). As man in the primitive condition was free from sin, he had no need for these means of salvation. Also since the higher powers of man dominated the lower, it was not appropriate that the spiritual soul should be perfected by corporeal elements. Some theologians, on the other hand, invoking St. Augustine, consider the tree of life (Gn. 2, 9) and marriage in the garden of Paradise (Gn. 2, 23 et seq.) to be Sacraments. According to St. Thomas, this marriage was not a means of grace, but a natural institution (officium naturae). Cf. S. th. III 61, 2.

b) Era of the Natural Law

On the ground of God's general will of salvation theologians generally postulate, with St. Augustine (C. Jul. V 11, 45) and St. Thomas (S. th. III 70, 4 ad 2), that during the period from the Fall to Abraham and for the pagan world up to the promulgation of the Gospel, there was a so-called sacramentum naturae, by which young children were liberated from original sin. This "nature-Sacrament" consisted in an act of faith in God and (at least implicitly) in the future Redeemer, which was made in the name of the children by the elders, and which was probably outwardly manifested by the use of an appropriate outward sign (prayer, blessing).

During the period from Abraham to Moses, circumcision (Gn. 17, 10 et seq.) was for the male Israelites the ordinary means of purification from original sin. Innocent III, concurring with Scholastic theology, teaches: "Original sin was remitted by the mystery of circumcision, and thus the danger of damnation was avoided." D 410. Scholastic theology follows St. Augustine (De nuptiis et concup. II 11, 24), and St. Gregory the Great (Moralia IV praef. 3) in this matter. The older Fathers (St. Justin, St. Irenaeus, Tertullian) saw in circumcision only a Sign of the Covenant and a model of Baptism, not a means for the attaining of salvation. Cf. S. th. III 61 3; III 70, 4.

c) Era of the Mosaic Law

During the era of the Mosaic Law there were, according to the general teaching of the Fathers and of the theologians, side by side with circumcision as the model of Baptism (Col. 2, 11) other Sacraments, for example, the Paschal Lamb and the Offering of Food as models of the Eucharist, purifications and ablutions as models of the Sacrament of Penance, consecration rites as models of the Sacrament of Holy Orders. Cf. S. th. 1 II 102, 5.

2. Efficacy of the Pre-Christian Sacraments

a) The Old Testament Sacraments wrought, ex opere operato, not grace, but merely an external lawful purity. (*Sent. certa.*)

The Decretum pro Armenis (1439) teaches in accordance with the teaching of St. Thomas: Illa (sc. sacramenta antiquae Legis) non causabant gratiam, sed eam solum per passionem Christi dandam esse figurabant. D 695, cf. D 845. St. Paul calls the cult-institutions of the Old Covenant "weak and deficient elements" (infirma et egena elementa; Gal. 4, 9), and teaches that they were not able to bestow inner purity of conscience, but could communicate an outer legal purity only. Hebr. 9, 9: "According to which (the First Tabernacle = the Old Covenant) gifts and sacrifices are offered, which cannot, as to the conscience, make him perfect that serveth, only in meats and in drinks." 9, 13: "For if the blood of goats and of oxen and the ashes of an heifer being sprinkled, sanctify such as are defiled, as to the cleansing of the flesh."

b) As the entire Old Covenant "was our pedagogue in Christ" (Gal. 3, 24), so the Old Testament Sacraments as types pointed to the future riches of the Messianic era Hebr. 10, 1: Umbram habens lex futurorum bonorum) and were thus a confession of faith in the coming Redeemer. By awakening the consciousness of sinfulness and faith in the coming Redeemer, with the co-operation of actual grace in the recipient, they created a disposition favourable for the reception of sanctifying grace which God then conferred and thus these Sacraments brought about inner sanctification ex opere operantis.

c) Circumcision performed on young infants effected the inner sanctification neither ex opere operato as in Baptism, nor merely ex opere operantis, i.e., not merely by reason of the faith of the representative of the recipient, but quasi ex opere operato. As an objective confession of faith in the coming Redeemer, it was for God the occasion of regularly bestowing the grace of sanctification. Cf. S. th. III 70, 4: "In circumcision grace was bestowed not in the power of the circumcision, but in the power of faith in the Passion of Christ, Whose sign circumcision was."

§ 12. The Sacramentals

1. Concept of Sacramentals

"Sacramentals are things or actions which the Church uses in a certain imitation of the Sacraments, in order, in virtue of her prayers, to achieve effects, above all of a spiritual nature." CIC 1144.

Hugo of St. Victor distinguishes the sacramentals as "lesser Sacraments" (sacramenta minora) from the chief Sacraments (sacramenta in quibus principaliter salus constat). De sacr. I 9, 7: II 9, 1 et seq. The expression "sacramentalia" is first used by Petrus Lombardus (Sent. IV 6, 7).

To the Sacramentals belong: a) The ceremonies customarily associated with the Sacraments. b) Independent religious actions; exorcisms (exorcismi),

blessings (benedictiones) and consecrations (consecrationes). c) The religious use of blessed and consecrated objects, and d) The blessed and consecrated objects themselves (sacramentalia permanentia).

2. Difference between Sacramentals and Sacraments

a) Institution

Sacramentals are, as a rule, not instituted by Christ, but by the Church. The power of the Church to institute sacramentals is shown by recalling the example of Christ and of the Apostles (cf. 1 Cor. 11, 34); and the Church's task of worthily administering the treasures of grace bequeathed by Christ to her (cf. 1 Cor. 4, 1), and of promoting the salvation of the souls of the faithful. D 856, 943, 931. CIC 1145.

b) Efficacy

The sacramentals do not work ex opere operato. However, their efficacy rests, not merely on the subjective disposition of the person using the sacramentals, but principally on the intercessory prayer of the Church, to which there belongs a particularly effective power, because she is the holy and immaculate bride of Christ (Eph. 5, 25 et seq.). In view of the opus operantis of the Church, one can say that the sacramentals are operative quasi ex opere operato. The constitutive blessings, which permanently consecrate a person or a thing to the service of God, infallibly produce their effect, but in the other sacramentals the impetratory influence of the Church is not infallible.

c) Effects

The sacramentals do not confer sanctifying grace immediately, but merely dispose to its reception. In details the effects of the sacramentals are different according to their special purpose. The constitutive benedictions confer an objective sanctification on the persons or things consecrated to God. The invocative benedictions confer temporal benefits, actual graces, and by excitation to acts of sorrow and love of God, the remission of venial sins and of temporal punishments for sin. (S. th. III 87, 3). Exorcisms guarantee protection from the assaults of the evil one. Cf. S. th. III 65, 1 ad 6.

SECTION 2

The Seven Sacraments

I. The Sacrament of Baptism

§ 1. Concept of Baptism and Its Sacramental Nature

1. Concept

Baptism is that Sacrament in which man being washed with water in the name of the Three Divine Persons is spiritually re-born. The Roman Catechism, supported by John 3, 5, Tit. 3, 5 and Eph. 5, 26, gives the following definition: Baptismum esse sacramentum regenerationis per aquam in verbo (II 2, 5).

2. The Sacramental Nature of Baptism

Baptism is a true Sacrament instituted by Jesus Christ. (*De fide.*) D 844.

The institution of Baptism by Christ is disputed by modern Rationalism. According to Harnack, the Christian forgiveness of sins developed out of the penitential baptism of St. John. R. Reitzenstein attempted to prove that Christian Baptism is an imitation of the baptism of the Menanderians, an old Gnostic baptismal sect. On the contrary, however, what is more probable is that this heretical baptism was influenced by the Christian Baptism. Pope Pius X rejected the teaching of the Modernists that the Christian community had introduced the necessity of Baptism by adopting from Judaism the rite of baptism as an outward sign of acceptance into the Christian communion, and associating therewith the obligation to lead a Christian life. D 2042.

Proof

a) Baptism was already prefigured in the Old Covenant. Archetypes of Baptism are, according to the teaching of the Apostles and of the Fathers, the hovering of the Spirit of God over the primitive waters (cf. the baptismal consecration of water); the Flood (1 Peter 3, 20 et seq.); circumcision (Col. 2, 11 et seq.); the march through the Red Sea (1 Cor. 10, 2) and through the Jordan (Jos. 3, 14). A formal prophecy of Baptism is found in Ez. 36, 25: "I will pour upon you clean water and you shall be cleansed from all your filthiness: and I will cleanse you from all your idols." Cf. Is. 1, 16 et seq.: 4, 4; Zach. 13, 1.

An immediate preparation for the Baptism of Christ was the Johannine baptism (Mt. 3, 11) which excited the recipients to penance and thus (ex opere operantis) was to effect the forgiveness of sins. The Council of Trent expressly declared, against the Reformers, that the Johannine baptism had not the same

effective power as the Baptism of Christ. D 857. Cf. S. th. III 38, 3 : Baptismus Ioannis gratiam non conferebat, sed solum ad gratiam praeparabat.

b) Christ had Himself baptised by John in the Jordan (Mt. 3, 13 et seq.) and gave His disciples the mandate to administer Baptism (John 4, 2). He explained to Nicodemus the nature and the necessity of Baptism (John 3, 3. 5), and before the Ascension gave His Apostles a universal mandate to baptise (Mt. 28, 19). John 3, 5 : " Unless a man be born (Vulg. : re-born) of water and the Spirit (Vulg. : Holy Ghost), he cannot enter the Kingdom of God." (Mt. 28, 18 : " All power is given to me in Heaven and in earth. 19. Going therefore, teach ye all nations : baptising them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost" (βαπτίζοντες αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος). Cf. Mk. 16, 15 : " Go ye into the whole world and the preach Gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptised shall be saved : but he that believeth not shall be condemned."

The genuineness of Mt. 28, 19 is guaranteed by all the manuscripts and all the old versions. In the Didache c. 7., the passage is cited twice.

From the classical passages adduced in the context John 3, 5 and Mt. 28, 19 all the elements of the New Testament concept of Sacrament can be derived, Baptism appears as an outward sign of grace, consisting of ablution with water and the invocation of the Three Divine Persons ; it effects inward grace, namely re-birth, and is ordained for all time by Christ.

c) In the Primitive Church, the Apostles fulfilled the mandate to baptise (Acts 2, 38, 41 ; 8, 12 et seq. ; 8, 36 et seq. ; 9, 18 ; 10, 47 et seq. ; 16, 15. 33 ; 18, 8 ; 19, 5 ; 1 Cor. 1, 14 et seq.). The oldest Church documents, such as the Didache (c. 7), the Letter to Barnabas (11, 11), Pastor Hermae (Sim. IX 16), St. Justin Martyr (Apol. 1, 61) attest the perpetuation of the apostolic tradition. The oldest monograph on Baptism was composed by Tertullian (about 200).

3. The Actual Time of the Institution of Baptism

The exact time of the institution of Baptism cannot be established from Holy Writ. Theologians are divided in their opinions. Some assign as the time of institution the Baptism of Jesus in the Jordan (Petrus Lombardus, Sent. IV 3, 5 ; St. Thomas, S. th. III 66, 2 ; Cat. Rom. II 2, 20) ; others the conversation with Nicodemus (Peter Abelard ; cf. St. Bernard of Clairvaux ; Ep. 77), others the promulgation of the mandate of Baptism before the Ascension (Hugo of St. Victor, De sacr. II, 6, 4 ; Mag. Roland). The first two views are based on the improbable assumption, that the baptism of the Disciples was Christian sacramental Baptism. Against the first opinion we may note above all the silence of Holy Writ ; against the second, the external circumstances, in which the words of Jesus on the necessity of Baptism for salvation were spoken. The probabilities are in favour of the occasion in Mt. 28, 19 ; still the mandate of Baptism does not exclude an earlier institution.

St. Bonaventure (Com. in Ioan. c. 3. n. 19) seeks to unify the various opinions in the following fashion. According to the matter (materialiter) Baptism was instituted when Christ was baptised ; according to the form (formaliter)

when He rose from the dead and gave the form (Mt. 28, 19); according to the effect (effective), when He suffered, for it received its power from the Passion; according to the purpose (finaliter), when He foretold its necessity and its benefit (John 3, 5).

§ 2. The Outward Sign of Baptism

1. Matter

a) Materia remota

The materia remota of the Sacrament of Baptism is true and natural water. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent declared against Luther who held that any fluid suitable for ablution was permissible in case of emergency: Si quis dixerit aquam veram et naturalem non esse de necessitate baptismi, . . . A.S. D 858. Cf. D 696, 412, 477: CIC 737 Par. 1.

A decision apparently attributed to Pope Stephen II (754), according to which a Baptism in an emergency administered with wine would be valid, is of doubtful genuineness; in any case the decision is wrong and did not give or purport to give any final doctrinal decision on the question.

The only matter of Baptism known to Holy Writ and Tradition is water. John 3, 5: "Born again of water." Acts 8, 36: "See, here is water! What doth hinder me from being baptised?" Cf. Acts 10, 47; Eph. 5, 26; Hebr. 10, 22.

One of the oldest proofs from Tradition is that offered by the Didache c. 7: "Baptise in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost in living (=flowing) water. 2. But if thou hast no living water, then baptise in another water; if thou canst not do it in cold, do it in warm. 3. If thou hast neither (in sufficient quantity), then pour water on the head three times, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." Cf. Ep. Barnabae 11, 11; St. Justin, Apol. 1, 61; Tertullian, De bapt. 1; S. th. III 66, 3.

In present usage the use of consecrated water is strictly prescribed for the lawful administration of *solemn* Baptism (CIC 757). The consecration of the baptismal water is early referred to by St. Cyprian (Ep. 70, 1).

b) Materia proxima

The materia proxima of the Sacrament of Baptism is the ablution, by physical contact, of the body with water. (*Sent. certa.*)

The washing can occur by dipping (immersio), pouring-on (infusio) or sprinkling (aspersio). Against the Greek Orthodox Church, which formerly did not recognise the validity of Baptism by infusion and which still partly adheres to the practice of re-baptising those who go over to it if they have been baptised by infusion, the Council of Trent declares: Si quis dixerit, in Ecclesia Romana . . . non esse veram de baptismi sacramento doctrinam (If anyone says that the Roman Church does not teach the true doctrine concerning the sacrament of Baptism) A.S. D 859. Cf. D 435; CIC 758.

In Christian antiquity and in mediaeval times up to the 13th century, Baptism was usually administered in the form of immersion, and indeed, by a threefold

immersion (Tertullian, De cor. mil. 3). That Baptism by infusion was also recognised as valid, is attested by the Didache, c. 7, and the practice of clinical Baptism approved of by St. Cyprian (Ep. 69, 12) (=Baptism of the sick). Cf. S. th. III 66, 7.

The threefold immersion is interpreted by the Fathers as a symbol of the Three Divine Persons (Tertullian, Adv. Prax. 26 ; D 229) and of Christ's three days in the grave (St. Cyril of Jer., Cat. myst. 2, 4). In the Spanish Church, with the consent of Pope Gregory the Great (Ep. I 43), a single immersion was used, in order to symbolise against the Arians the unity of Substance of the Three Divine Persons.

2. **Form**

The form of Baptism consists in the words of the minister which accompany it and more closely determine it.

For the validity of the form, the invocation of the Three Divine Persons, and, according to the teaching of most Theologians, also the designation of the actual baptismal action is requisite. The Decretum pro Armenis teaches : Si exprimitur actus, qui per ipsum exercetur ministrum, cum Sanctae Trinitatis invocatione, perficitur sacramentum (If the act which the minister effects is expressed (in words) together with the invocation of the Holy Trinity, the sacrament is perfected) D 696. The Latin Church baptises with the formula : N. Ego te baptiso in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti (N I Baptise thee in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost). The baptismal formula of the Greek Church is : *Βαπτίζεται ὁ δοῦλος τοῦ θεοῦ (ὁ δεῖνα) εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος.* (The servant of God (N) is Baptised in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost).

a) Invocation of the Trinity

The Trinitarian form of Baptism is biblically founded in Mt. 28, 19. In the oldest Patristic literature this is attested by the Didache, St. Justin (Apol. I 61), St. Irenaeus (Adv. haer. III 17, 1 ; Epideixis 3 and 7), Tertullian (De bapt. 13).

The Baptism mentioned in Holy Writ " in the name of Jesus Christ " (Acts 22, 38 ; 8, 12 [Vulg.] ; 10, 48) or " in the name of the Lord Jesus " Acts 8, 16 ; 19, 5) or " in Christ Jesus " (Rom. 6, 3) or " in Christ " (Gal. 3, 27) is, contrary to the conception of Scholastic theology, not to be understood in the sense that Baptism was administered in the name of Jesus instead of in the name of the Trinity. Very probably it means that Christian Baptism was administered by the mandate and through the power of Christ as distinct from the Johannine baptism or from the Jewish proselytic baptism. That no permanent formula of Baptism is available is suggested by the change in current language. According to the Didache 9, 5, Baptism " in the name of the Lord " in view of the preceding Baptism instruction in c. 7, designates the Trinitarian Baptism instituted by Our Lord. Acts 19, 2–5 also suggest that in the Baptism " in the name of the Lord Jesus " the Holy Ghost was named. The Church has pronounced no final decision on the question. Pope Nicholas I affirmed (866), appealing to St. Ambrose (De Spiritu S. I 3, 42) the validity of Baptism administered " in the name of Christ," that is, under invocation of Christ. D 335 ; cf. D 229. St. Thomas puts forward the opinion that the Apostles, on the ground of special

revelation by Christ, baptised in the name of Christ (not in the name of Jesus.) For the post-apostolic era he holds as invalid, on the ground of Christ's ordinance in Mt. 28, 19, Baptism administered in the name of Christ, unless a special privilege of God grants an exception. S. th. III 66, 6.

b) Designation of the act of Baptism

By a decision of Alexander III (1159–81), rejecting a proposition of the Belgian theologian F. Farvacques, by a decision of Alexander VIII (1690), and by the declaration of the Decretum pro Armenis (1439), the designation of the actual act of Baptism by the words: (Ego) te baptizo, D 398, 1317, 696, is also required for the validity of Baptism.

However, many theologians of the period of early scholasticism (for example, Hugo of St. Victor, Stephen of Tournai) affirmed the validity of Baptism administered with the omission of the words named. St. Thomas and most of the theologians of the peak period of scholasticism, pointing to the Decretal of Alexander III, declare such a Baptism invalid. Cf. S. th. III 66, 5 ad 2. But a serious difficulty in regard to this view is the historical fact that in ancient Christian times, according to the testimony of Tertullian (De cor. mil. 3; Adv. Prax. 26; De bapt. 2, 1), St. Hippolytus of Rome (Traditio Apost.), St. Ambrose (De sacr. II 7, 20), of the Sacramentarium Gelasianum and others, Baptism was administered in such a manner that the person baptising, in association with the apostolic confession of faith, proposed the threefold question of faith to the person being baptised, and immersed him on each confession. In this no designation of the baptismal act was made by the person baptising; the intention of the minister sufficed. In view of this the express designation of the baptismal act can hardly be considered an essential part of the sacramental form. It seems more proper to see in it a condition strictly imposed by the Church for the valid administration of the Sacrament.

§ 3. The Effects of Baptism

1. Justification

Baptism confers the grace of justification. (*De fide.*)

As justification consists, negatively, in the remission of sin, positively, in the sanctification and renewal of the inner man (D 799), so Baptism, provided that the proper dispositions (Faith and sorrow for sin) are present, effects: a) the eradication of sins, both original sin and, in the case of adults, also all personal, mortal or venial sins; b) inner sanctification by the infusion of sanctifying grace, with which the infused theological and moral virtues and the gifts of the Holy Ghost are always joined. Together with sanctifying grace the justified person also receives a claim to those actual graces which are necessary for the fulfilment of the obligations assumed in Baptism.

In the Decree on Original Sin, the Council of Trent declared: "If any one denies that by the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ which is conferred in Baptism, the guilt of original sin is remitted; or even asserts that the whole of that which has the true and proper nature of sin is not taken away . . . let him be anathema." D 792, cf. 696, 742, 895

According to the testimony of Holy Writ, Baptism has the power both of eradicating sin and of effecting inner sanctification. Acts 2, 38 : " Do penance : and be baptised every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of your sins. And you shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost." 1 Cor. 6, 11 : " But you are washed : but you are sanctified : but you are justified : in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ and the Spirit of our God." Acts, cf. 22, 16 ; Rom. 6, 3 et seq. ; Tit. 3, 5 ; John 3, 5 ; 1 John 3, 9 ; 5, 18.

From the very beginning Tradition ascribes to Baptism the same effects. The author of the Barnabas Letter says : " We descend into the water full of sins and filth and we arise from it bearing fruit as we have in our hearts the fear of God, and in our spirit hope in Jesus " (11, 11). Cf. Pastor Hermae. Sim. IX 16 ; St. Justin, Apol. I 61 ; Tertullian, De bapt. 1, 1 ; St. Cyprian, Ad donatum 4.

2. Remission of the Punishments of Sin

Baptism effects the remission of all punishments of sin, both the eternal and the temporal. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent teaches that in the spiritually reborn nothing remains behind that is hateful to God, and that keeps them from entering Heaven ; in renatis nihil odit Deus, . . . ita ut nihil prorsus eos ab ingressu coeli remoretur. D 792. Cf. D 696. It is presupposed that the recipient of Baptism innerly renounces all sins, including venial sins. The remission of all punishment of sin is indicated in the Pauline teaching that in Baptism the old man dies and is buried and a new man arises (Rom. 6, 3 et seq.).

The same doctrine is taught by the Fathers generally. Tertullian says : " When the guilt is taken away the punishment is also taken away " (De bapt. 5). St. Augustine teaches that the baptised person who dies immediately after Baptism goes direct to Heaven (De peccatorum meritis et remissione II 28, 46).

The evils remaining after Baptism, such as concupiscence, suffering and death (poenalitates), have for the baptised person no longer the character of punishment, but are a means of testing and proving him (D 792 : ad agonem) and of assimilation with Christ. In the Resurrection they will be removed from the just by the power of the Sacrament of Baptism (cf. S. th. III 69, 3).

3. Baptismal Character

Even if it be unworthily received, valid Baptism imprints on the soul of the recipient an indelible spiritual mark, the Baptismal Character, and for this reason, the Sacrament cannot be repeated. (*De fide.*) D 852, 867.

As the sacramental character is an assimilation to the High Priest Jesus Christ, and a participation in His priesthood (signum configurativum), so the baptised person is incorporated, by the baptismal character, into the Mystical Body of Christ. From the unity of the Mystical Body, it follows that every validly baptised person, even one baptised outside the Catholic Church, becomes a member of the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church founded by

Christ if he does not voluntarily and at the same time declare himself a member of a heretic or schismatic community. Every baptised person is subject to the jurisdiction of the Church.

The baptismal character distinguishes the baptised from the unbaptised, invisibly indeed to the bodily eye, but not to the spiritual (signum distinctivum). By the baptismal character the baptised person is empowered and entitled to passive participation in the priesthood of Christ, that is, to receive the other Sacraments (sacramentorum ianua ac fundamentum ; CIC 737, Par. 1), and to receive all treasures of grace and truth, which Christ has transmitted to His Church (signum dispositivum). The baptismal character is a consecration of the baptised to Christ, and therefore imposes the obligation on the recipient to live a Christian mode of life (signum obligativum). This can never be remitted.

§ 4. The Necessity of Baptism

1. Necessity of Baptism for Salvation

Baptism by water (Baptismus fluminis) is, since the promulgation of the Gospel, necessary for all men without exception, for salvation. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent declared against the Reformers, whose idea of justification led them to deny it, the necessity of Baptism for salvation : Si quis dixerit, baptismum liberum esse, hoc est non necessarium ad salutem, A.S. D 861. Cf. D 791. As to the moment of the beginning of the baptismal obligation, the Council of Trent declared that after the promulgation of the Gospel (post Evangelium promulgatum) there could be no justification without Baptism or the desire for the same. D 796. The necessity of Baptism for salvation is, according to John 3, 5 and Mk. 16, 16, a necessity of means (necessitas medii), and, according to Mt. 28, 19, also a necessity of precept (necessitas praecepti). The necessity of means does not derive from the intrinsic nature of the Sacrament itself, but from the designation of Baptism as an indispensable means of salvation by a positive ordinance of God. In special circumstances the actual use of the prescribed means can be dispensed with (hypothetical necessity).

Tradition, in view of John 3, 5, strongly stresses the necessity of Baptism for salvation. Tertullian, invoking these words, observes: "It is determined by law that nobody can be saved without baptism" (De bapt. 12, 1). Cf. Pastor Hermae, Sim. IX 16.

2. Substitutes for Sacramental Baptism

In case of emergency Baptism by water can be replaced by Baptism of desire or Baptism by blood. (*Sent. fidei prox.*)

a) Baptism of desire (Baptismus flaminis sive Spiritus Sancti)

Baptism of desire is the explicit or implicit desire for sacramental baptism (votum baptismi) associated with perfect contrition (contrition based on charity).

The Council of Trent teaches that justification from original sin is not

possible "without the washing unto regeneration or the desire for the same" (sine lavacro regenerationis aut eius voto). D 796. Cf. D 847, 388, 413.

According to the teaching of Holy Writ, perfect love possesses justifying power. Luke 7, 47: "Many sins are forgiven her because she hath loved much." John 14, 21: "He that loveth me shall be loved of my Father: and I will love him and will manifest myself to him." Luke 23, 43: "This day thou shalt be with me in Paradise."

The chief witnesses from Tradition are St. Ambrose and St. Augustine. In the funeral oration on the Emperor Valentine II, who died without Baptism, St. Ambrose says: "Should he not acquire the grace for which he longed? Certainly: As he desired it, he has attained it . . . His pious desire has absolved him" (De obitu Valent. 51, 53). St. Augustine declared: "I find that not only suffering for the sake of Christ can replace that which is lacking in Baptism, but also faith and conversion of the heart (fidem conversionemque cordis), if perhaps the shortness of the time does not permit the celebration of the mystery of Baptism" (De bapt. IV 22, 29). In the period of early Scholasticism St. Bernard of Clairvaux (Ep. 77 c. 2 n. 6–9), Hugo of St. Victor (De sacr. II 6, 7) and the Summa Sententiarum (V 5) defended the possibility of Baptism of desire against Peter Abelard. Cf. S. th. III 68, 2.

Baptism of desire works ex opere operantis. It bestows Sanctifying Grace, which remits original sin, all actual sins, and the eternal punishments for sin. Venial sins and temporal punishments for sin are remitted according to the intensity of the subjective disposition. The baptismal character is not imprinted. nor is it the gateway to the other sacraments.

b) Baptism of blood (baptismus sanguinis)

Baptism of blood signifies martyrdom of an unbaptised person, that is, the patient bearing of a violent death or of an assault which of its nature leads to death, by reason of one's confession of the Christian faith, or one's practice of Christian virtue.

Jesus Himself attests the justifying power of martyrdom. Mt. 10, 32: "Every one therefore that shall confess me before men, I will also confess him before my Father who is in Heaven." Mt. 10, 39 (16, 25): "He that findeth his life shall lose it: and he that shall lose his life for me shall find it." John 12, 25: "He that hateth his life in this world keepeth it unto life eternal."

From the beginning the Fathers regarded martyrdom as a substitute for Baptism. Tertullian calls it "blood Baptism" (lavacrum sanguinis) and ascribes to it the effect of "taking the place of the baptismal bath if it was not received, and restoring that which was lost" (De bapt. 16). According to St. Cyprian, the catechumens who suffer martyrdom receive "the glorious and most sublime blood-Baptism" (Ep. 73, 22). Cf. Augustine, De civ. Dei XIII 7.

As, according to the testimony of Tradition and of the Church Liturgy (cf. Feast of the Innocents), young children can also receive blood-Baptism, blood-Baptism operates not merely ex opere operantis as does Baptism of desire, but since it is an objective confession of Faith it operates also quasi ex opere operato. It confers the grace of justification, and when proper dispositions are present, also the remission of all venial sins and temporal punishments. St. Augustine says: "It is an affront to a martyr to pray for him; we should rather recommend ourselves to his prayers" (Sermo 159, 1). Baptism by blood does not confer the baptismal character. Cf. S. th. III 66, 11 and 12.

§ 5. The Minister of Baptism

1. Person of the Minister

Baptism can be validly administered by anyone. (*De fide.*)

The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) teaches that Baptism is available unto salvation no matter by whom it is administered provided that it is correctly administered according to the form laid down by the Church : " Sacramentum baptismi . . . in forma Ecclesiae a quocumque rite collatum proficit ad salutem." D 430. The Decretum pro Armenis (1439) explains this in more detail : " The minister of this Sacrament is the priest (sacerdos = bishop and presbyter) whose official function it is to baptise. In case of necessity, however, not merely the priest or the deacon, but also a layman, even a woman, yea even a pagan or a heretic can baptise, provided he adheres to the form of the Church, and has the intention of doing what the Church does." D 696. The mandate to baptise in Mt. 28, 19 is addressed to the Apostles and to their successors, the bishops. According to the testimony of Holy Writ, however, already the Apostles transferred the full power to baptise to others. Cf. Acts 10, 48 : " He (Peter) commanded them to be baptised in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ." 1 Cor. 1, 17 : " Christ sent me not to baptise, but to preach the gospel." According to Acts 8, 38 (cf. 8, 12), Philip the Deacon administered Baptism.

In the early Church the administration of Baptism was regarded as a privilege of the bishop. St. Ignatius of Antioch says : " Without the bishop it is not allowed to baptise or to celebrate the agape " (Symyrn. 8, 2). Tertullian names side by side with the bishop and in subordination to him, also the priests and the deacons as regular ministers of Baptism. In case of necessity he also admits that the (baptised) laity, but only men, can administer Baptism. He prohibits women from baptising. (De bapt. 17.) Later witnesses for the permissibility of lay-Baptism in case of emergency are the Synods of Elvira (can. 38 ; D 52 d), St. Jerome (Dial. c. Lucif. 9), St. Augustine (Contra ep. Parm. II 13, 29). Express testimonies for the permissibility of Baptism by women are first found only in the Middle Ages. (Urban II, Ep. 271.)

The validity of Baptism by heretics was taught by Pope St. Stephen I. He appealed to Tradition, against Bishop St. Cyprian of Carthage (D 46 ; nihil innovetur, nisi quod traditum est). It was defended also by St. Augustine against the Donatists. The Council of Trent declared it as a dogma. D 860.

The admission of the validity of Baptism administered by an unbaptised person was made only in the decline of the Patristic era. St. Augustine did not venture any decision on it (Contra ep. Parm. II 13, 30). A Synod at Compiègne in the year 757, and Pope Nicholas I (866) admitted the validity of Baptism administered by an unbaptised person. D 335.

The intrinsic reason for the validity of Baptism administered by anybody lies in the fact that Baptism is necessary for salvation. Cf. S. th. III 67, 3–5.

2. Rite of Administration

The administration of solemn Baptism is reserved to the members of the hierarchy. The regular ministers of solemn Baptism are bishops and parish priests. An extraordinary minister is the deacon (with permission of the Ordinary or of the Parish Priest). CIC 738, Par. 1, 741. Laymen administering Baptism may perform only those sacramental rites which are necessary for validity. CIC 759.

§ 6. The Recipient of Baptism

Baptism can be received by any person in the wayfaring state who is not already baptised. (*De fide.*)

The Baptism "for the dead" in 1 Cor. 15, 29 ("Otherwise, what shall they do who are baptised for the dead if the dead rise not again at all? Why are they then baptised for them?") was not a Baptism administered to the dead, but either a representative Baptism (vicarious Baptism) for unbaptised deceased for whom it was sought to acquire baptismal grace subsequently or a Baptism or a Baptism-like ablution ceremony, by which it was believed that one could be of avail to the dead by making intercession for them, on the analogy of the Jewish prayer of intercession for the dead (2 Mach. 12, 42 et seq.). In virtue of this passage from St. Paul's epistle, various Old-Christian sects, such as the Cerinthians and the Marcionites, undertook representative Baptism for the dead. Baptisms were also solemnised in which the dead were baptised. The Synods of Hippo (393) and Carthage (397) opposed such Baptisms.

1. Adults

In the case of adults, an habitual desire, at least, to receive Baptism is requisite for the valid reception of Baptism. D 411. The worthy reception of the Sacrament demands an inner disposition, which must comprehend at least faith and sorrow for sins committed. (D 798.) Holy Writ expressly demands faith as preparation for Baptism (Mk. 16, 16: "He that believeth and is baptised shall be saved"; Mt. 28, 19; Acts 2, 41; 8, 12 et seq.; 8, 37) and sorrow for sins committed (Acts 2, 38; "Do penance and be baptised every one of you"; 3, 19). The Early Christian preparation for Baptism consisted principally in instruction in Christian doctrine and in penitential practices.

2. Young Children

The Baptism of young children is valid and licit. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent, against the Rebaptisers (Anabaptists), rejected the custom of repeating Baptism after the attaining of the use of reason, and approved of the Baptism of infants: Si quis dixerit, parvulos . . . esse rebaptisandos aut praestare omitti eorum baptisma, quam eos non actu proprio credentes baptizari in sola fide Ecclesiae, A.S. D 869, cf. D 791.

The Reformers, influenced by Christian tradition, retained the Baptism of children although it is not compatible with their notion of a Sacrament. Luther sought to remove the difficulty with the assumption that infants were, in the moment of Baptism, endowed with the ability to make an act of justifying, fiducial faith in a miraculous manner. According to Catholic teaching, faith, as it is not the effective cause of justification, but merely an act of disposition, need not be present. The faith which the infants lack is, according to the teaching of St. Augustine and the Schoolmen, replaced by the faith of the Church. S. th. III 68, 9 ad 2.

In recent times K. Barth has raised exegetic and material objections to the practice of child-Baptism and demanded that the present practice of child-Baptism should be replaced by a Baptism involving responsibility on the part of the person being baptised.

The validity of child-Baptism cannot be proved with absolute certainty from Holy Writ, but it can be indicated with a high degree of probability. When St. Paul (1 Cor. 1, 16) and the Acts of the Apostles (16, 15. 33 ; 18, 8 ; cf. 11, 14) repeatedly speak of the Baptism of a whole "household," then any children present in the family are included, all the more so because circumcision, which was replaced by Christian Baptism (Col. 2, 11 : "circumcision of Christ"), and the late Jewish Baptism of proselytes were performed on children. According to Acts 2, 38 et seq., the promise of the communication of the Spirit, which is effected through Baptism, is meant not merely for the adherents of Peter, but also for their children. The word children may also indeed be understood to include posterity in a wider sense. The possibility of the Baptism of children flows from the objective efficacy of the Sacraments, from God's general wish for salvation (1 Tim. 2, 4), in which also infants are included (Mt. 19, 14), and from the necessity for salvation of Baptism (John 3, 5).

1 Cor. 7, 14 is not an argument against the Baptism of children.

The fact that St. Paul called the children of Christian families "holy" no more proves that they did not require Baptism, than the "sanctification" of a non-Christian marriage partner by a Christian proves that the former on his conversion to Christianity need not be baptised. Christian tradition knows nothing of unbaptised members of the Church. The concept "holy" must be understood in the wider sense of external purity.

From the Martyrium Polycarpi (9, 3 : "86 years I have served Him") it follows that Polycarp was baptised about the year 70 while a child. It is apparent from the First Apologia of St. Justin (15, 6) that the men and women of 60 and 70 years of age mentioned therein, "who were disciples of Christ from childhood" were baptised between the years 85 and 95, as children. Child-Baptism as a Church practice is directly attested to by St. Irenaeus (Adv. haer. II, 22, 4), Tertullian (De bapt. 18), St. Hippolitus of Rome (Traditio apostolica) ; Origen (In Lev. hom. 8, 3 ; Comm. in Rom. 5, 9) ; St. Cyprian (Ep. 64, 2) and old Christian grave inscriptions from the 3rd century. Origen establishes the validity of the practice of child-Baptism by reason of the presence of original sin, and traces it back to the Apostles. A Carthaginian Synod under St. Cyprian (251 or 253) disapproved the postponement of Baptism of the newly-born to the eighth year after birth, on the ground that "God's mercy and grace should be refused to no born man." After the 4th century an abuse arose, notably in the East, of postponing Baptism to maturity or even to the end of life. St. Gregory Nazienzus recommends, as a rule, an age of about three years (Or. 40, 28). Through the clear knowledge of the nature of original sin gained in the Pelagian dispute, and of the necessity of Baptism for salvation, the practice of the Baptism of children was strongly promoted.

It follows from the validity of child-Baptism that baptised infants are full members of the Church, and that, after attaining the use of reason, they are obliged to fulfil the baptismal vows taken on their behalf by their godparents. The teaching of Erasmus of Rotterdam, that children after the attaining of the use of reason should freely decide whether they wish to recognise the baptismal obligations or not, was rejected by the Council of Trent. D 870. According to God's positive ordinance, every human being, for the attaining of his supernatural destination, is directed to become a member of the Church of Christ by Baptism. For the sake of his eternal salvation he must assume the obligations of Christian belief and Christian morality which flow from Baptism.

II. The Sacrament of Confirmation

§ 1. Concept of Confirmation and Its Sacramental Nature

1. Concept

Confirmation is that Sacrament in which, by the imposition of hands, unction and prayer, a baptised person is filled with the Holy Ghost for the inner strengthening of the supernatural life and for the courageous outward confession of Faith: St. Thomas defines it as a Sacrament of the fullness of grace and as "that Sacrament in which strength is conferred on the regenerate": sacramentum, quo spirituale robur regenerato confertur. S. th. III 72, 1 ad 2. S.c.G. IV 60.

2. The Sacramental Nature of Confirmation

Confirmation is a true Sacrament properly so-called. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent declared against the Reformers, who rejected Confirmation as unbiblical: Si quis dixerit, confirmationem baptizatorum otiosam caeremoniam esse et non potius verum et proprium sacramentum, (If anyone says that confirmation of baptised persons is an unnecessary ceremony and not a true and proper sacrament) A.S. D 871.

According to the Apologia Confessionis of Melanchton (Art. 13, 6), Confirmation is a rite composed by the Fathers, which is not necessary for salvation since it has not been commanded by God. According to the rationalists (e.g. Harnack), it developed out of the fact that symbolic actions, which originally accompanied the administration of Baptism, became separate and independent. Pius X rejected the assertion of the Modernists that Baptism and Confirmation were not two separate Sacraments in the Primitive Church. D 2044.

a) Scriptural proof

The institution of Confirmation by Christ can only be proved indirectly from Holy Writ. The Prophets of the Old Covenant having already foretold the outpouring of the Spirit of God over the whole of humanity as a characteristic of the Messianic era (cf. Joel 2, 28 et seq.; Is. 44, 3-5; Ez. 39, 29), Jesus promised His Apostles (John 14, 16 et seq.; 26; 16, 7 et seq.; Luke 24, 49; Acts 1, 5) and all the future faithful (John 7, 38 et seq.) the mission of the Holy Ghost. On the Feast of Pentecost He fulfilled His word to the Primitive Christian Community. Acts 2, 4: "And they were all filled with the Holy Ghost, and they began to speak with divers tongues according as the Holy Ghost gave them to speak."

Subsequently the Apostles communicated the Holy Ghost by the outward rite of the imposition of hands on the baptised. Acts 8, 14 et seq. narrate: "Now, when the Apostles, who were in Jerusalem, had heard that Samaria had received the word of God, they sent unto them Peter and

John 15. Who when they were come, prayed for them that they might receive the Holy Ghost. 16. For He was not as yet come upon any of them: but they were only baptised in the name of the Lord Jesus. 17. Then they laid their hands upon them: and they received the Holy Ghost." According to Acts 19, 6, St. Paul communicated the Holy Ghost to some twelve disciples in Ephesus after they had received Christian Baptism, by the same rites: "And when Paul had imposed his hands on them, the Holy Ghost came upon them, and they spoke with tongues and prophesied." According to Hebr. 6, 2, the imposition of hands, which effects the communication of the Holy Ghost (V. 4), belongs, side by side with Baptism, to the foundations of the Christian religion.

That Confirmation is a sacrament is evident from the passages cited, since: *a*) The Apostles performed a sacramental rite, consisting of the imposition of hands and prayer; *β*) The effect of this outward rite was the communication of the Holy Ghost, i.e., the Principle of inner sanctification. According to Acts 8, 18, a causal connection existed between the imposition of hands and the communication of the Spirit (per impositionem manus Apostolorum); *γ*) The Apostles acted in the mandate of Christ. As Christ promised the communication of the Spirit for all the faithful, it must be assumed, that He also gave detailed indications of the nature and manner of the communication of the Spirit. The matter-of-course manner in which the Apostles, who regarded themselves merely as the ministers of Christ and the dispensers of the mysteries of God (1 Cor. 4, 1), undertook the rite of the imposition of hands, presupposes its ordinance by Christ.

St. Thomas teaches that Christ instituted the Sacrament of Confirmation non exhibendo, sed promittendo, that is, in such a manner than He Himself did not administer it, but that He merely promised its administration for the future, because in this Sacrament the fullness of the Holy Ghost is conferred, which was not to be given before the Resurrection and Ascension of Christ (S. th. III 72, 1 ad 1). Individual scholastic theologians, for example, Magister Roland and St. Bonaventura, take the view that Confirmation was instituted by the Apostles, or by the Holy Ghost through the Apostles (mediate Divine institution). Alexander of Hales, or the Summa going under his name, favoured the opinion that the Sacrament of Confirmation was instituted by the Council of Meaux (in concilio Meldensi) under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, but in this he had in mind, merely the final determination of the Confirmation rite which was current in his time. He does not dispute that Christ established the rite of imposition of hands, for the conferring of the Holy Spirit.

b) Proof from Tradition

Although in the early Christian era Confirmation was most intimately associated with Baptism, still, according to the testimonies of early Christian Tradition, it a was a sacramental rite distinct from Baptism.

Tertullian sees in Baptism a preparation for the reception of the Holy Ghost: "Not that we attain the Holy Ghost in the water, but in the water . . . we are purified and prepared for the Holy Ghost" (De bapt. 6). After the Baptism an anointing of the whole body (baptismal unction), and then the imposition of the hands takes place: "Emerged from the bath of Baptism we are anointed with consecrated ointment" (c. 7). After that the hand is imposed, in the course

of which the Holy Ghost is invoked and invited by means of the blessing (dehinc manus imponitur per benedictionem advocans et invitans Spiritum Sanctum; c. 8). The effect of this rite is the communication of the Holy Ghost. In his work, De carnis resurrectione 8, Tertullian names the following initiation rites: Baptism, Unction, Signing (with the Cross), Imposition of Hands, Reception of the Eucharist.

St. Hippolytus of Rome (235) in his Church order (Ἀποστολικὴ παράδοσις) mentions the following rites of Confirmation: Imposition of hands by the Bishop and prayer, anointing with consecrated oil—this unction must be distinguished from the baptismal unction performed by the priest after Baptism—together with imposition of hands and the simultaneous pronouncement of a Trinitarian formula of blessing, signing of the forehead and the kiss of peace. Cf. in Dan. I 16. Pope St. Cornelius (251–253) makes the reproach to Novatian that after the Baptism which he received on a sick bed, by the effusion of the baptismal water, "the illness being gone he did not receive the other things, which, according to the rule of the Church one must receive, as also the sealing by the Bishop." It is his conviction that the latter has the communication of the Holy Ghost as a consequence. Hence the question: "How could he, if he has not received this, receive the Holy Ghost?" (Ep. ad Fabium Ant.: Eusebius H.e. VI 43, 15).

St. Cyprian († 258) says, with regard to Acts 8, 14 et seq.: "This still happens in our community. Those who are baptised in the Church are brought before the overseers of the Church (Bishops) and by our prayer and our imposition of hands receive the Holy Ghost, and by the zeal of the Lord they are perfected" (Ep. 73, 9). Cf. Ep. 74, 5 and 7.

According to the Spanish Synod of Elvira (about 306) a person, who, in serious sickness, has received emergency Baptism either from a layman or from a deacon, must be brought before the Bishop, "so that he may be perfected by the imposition of hands" (can. 38 and 77). D 52 d–e.

St. Cyril of Jerusalem († 386) (or his successor John), devoted to Confirmation the third mystagogic catechesis, which is entitled: "On Unction" (περὶ χρίσματος). Further testimonies are given by St. Ambrose (De sacr. III 2, 8–10; De myst. 7, 42), St. Jerome (Dial. c. Luciferianos 8 et seq.), Pope St. Innocent I (Ep. 25, 3) St. Augustine, (De trin. XV 26, 46; In ep. I Ioan. tr. 6, 10), St. Leo I (Sermo 24, 6), Ps.-Dionysius (De eccl. hier. 4, 3, 11). Scholasticism establishes the existence of the Sacrament of Confirmation speculatively on the analogy between the natural life of the body and the supernatural life of the soul. As a Sacrament of spiritual rebirth, Baptism corresponds to the bodily birth, so the Sacrament of strengthening and completion of the supernatural life, Confirmation, corresponds to bodily growth. S. th. III 72, 1.

§ 2. The Outward Sign of Confirmation

1. Matter

There is no official dogmatic decision regarding the essential matter of the Sacrament of Confirmation. Theologians are divided in their opinions.

a) Some, invoking the testimony of Holy Scripture (Acts 8, 17; 19, 6; Hebr. 6, 2) hold that the imposition of the hands alone is the essential matter (Petrus Aureoli, Dionysius Petavius). Cf. D 424.

b) Others, appealing to the Decretum pro Armenis (D 697), the teaching of the Council of Trent (D 872), the Roman Catechism (II 3, 7), the tradition of

the Greek Church and the teaching of St. Thomas (S. th. III 72, 2 ; De art fidei t sacr. Eccl.), declare that the anointing with chrism alone is the essential matter (St. Bellarmine, St. Gregory of Valentia, Wilhelm Estius).

The testimony of Holy Writ is decisively against this view. The Decretum pro Armenis is not an infallible doctrinal decision. The Council of Trent simply speaks of the anointing with chrism without thereby giving any decision on the essential matter. It is true that in the Greek Church the anointing is prominent ; but it appears that the anointing was accompanied by an imposition of the hands. Cf. Firmilian of Caesarea, who mentions only the imposition of the hands as the rite of the communication of the Spirit. (Ep. 75, 7 et seq., and 18 in St. Cyprian's collection of letters; St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Cat. 16, 26; Apost. Const. II 32, 3 ; III 15, 3.) In any case the imposition of the hands may be regarded as being included in the physical contact, which is requisite for the anointing. St. Thomas names in other passages also the imposition of hands as a constituent part of the rite of Confirmation and ascribes to it as the effect the communication of the Holy Ghost. Cf. S. th. III 84, 4 ; S.c.G. IV 60.

The majority of modern Theologians, concurring with Church practice, see the essential matter in the imposition of the hands together with the anointing with chrism on the forehead. This doctrine is favoured by the profession of faith of Michael Palaeologus (1274), which mentions both the imposition of the hands and the anointing with chrism as constituent parts of the rite of Confirmation : aliud est sacramentum confirmationis, quod per manuum impositionem episcopi conferunt chrismando renatos (D 465). Similarly CIC 780. However, this does not constitute a formal decision regarding the essential matter.

That the imposition of hands belongs to the sacramental sign is evident from the clear testimony of Holy Writ and Tradition (Tertullian, St. Hippolytus, St. Cyprian, Firmilian of Caesarea, St. Jerome, St. Augustine). The Roman rite knows two impositions of the hands, one general (stretching out of the hands) and one individual. As the former is not found in the Greek rite, and as the Confirmation of the Greek Church is recognised as valid by the Catholic Church, only the latter can be regarded as an essential constituent part of the sacramental sign. Historically the Confirmation anointing can be traced back to the beginning of the third century (Origen In Lev. hom. 8, 11 ; St. Hippolytus of Rome, Traditio Apost.). While in the West, where since the time of St. Hippolytus a double anointing after Baptism was known, the baptismal anointing and the Confirmation anointing, the Confirmation anointing achieved only a slow recognition (Popes SS. Silvester and Innocent I), in the East, where only one anointing after Baptism was known, it became a dominant part of the rite of the communication of the Spirit (Serapion of Thmuis, St. Cyril of Jerusalem).

That the Confirmation anointing was current in apostolic times cannot be demonstrated. The passages 2 Cor. 1, 21 ; 1 John 2, 20, 27 use the word anointing in the metaphorical sense. If one holds fast to the theory that the Sacraments were instituted by Christ in specie, then the anointing can only be regarded as an essential constituent part of the sacramental sign if Christ Himself ordained it. Of this, however, there is no proof. If, on the other hand, it is assumed that Christ laid down the sacramental sign of Confirmation in genere only, the possibility remains that the Church subsequently added to the original rite

of the imposition of hands the rite of anointing As the Tridentine declaration "salva illorum substantia" (D 931) favours specific institution by Christ it seems best to regard the anointing as a condition laid down by the Church for the valid administration of the Sacrament.

The materia remota of Confirmation is, according to the second and third views, the chrism which is prepared from olive oil and balsam and which is consecrated by the Bishop on Maundy Thursday. The addition of fragrant material is first attested by Ps.-Dionysius about 500 (De eccl. hier. IV 3 Par. 4). The consecration of the chrism, which is already early attested by the Fathers (Tertullian, St. Hippolytus; cf. the Consecration Prayer in the Enchologium of Serapion o Thmuis), is regarded by St. Thomas (S. th. III 72, 3) and by many modern Theologians as a condition for the validity of the Sacrament; on the other hand it is regarded by others merely as a condition for the liceity of the administration.

2. Form

The form of Confirmation consists in the words which the minister speaks when he imposes his hands on the recipient and anoints his forehead. (*Sent. communis.*)

Acts 8, 15 and many of the Fathers, for example, Tertullian, St. Cyprian, St. Ambrose, mention side by side with the imposition of the hands a prayer for the communication of the Holy Ghost. According to St. Hippolytus, the bishop, in association with the general imposition of the hands, first pronounces a prayer for the favour of God. On the subsequent anointing and individual imposition of the hands, he pronounces the indicative formula: Ungueo te sancto oleo in domino patre omnipotente et christo iesu et spiritu sancto (I anoint thee with holy oil in the Lord, the Father Omnipotent and in Christ Jesus and in the Holy Ghost).

The formula current to-day appears in the Latin Church since the end of the twelfth century (Sicard of Cremona, Huguccio): N. Signo te signo crucii et confirmo te chrismate salutis in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti (N. I sign thee with the sign of the Cross and I confirm thee with the Chrism of Salvation in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost).

The Greek Church, at least since the fifth century, uses the formula: *Σφραγὶς δωρεᾶς πνεύματος ἁγίου* = "the seal of the gift of the Holy Ghost." It is first attested as a constituent part of the reconciliation rite, in the spurious seventh canon of the First Council of Constantinople (381). It was first generally prescribed at the Trullan Synod (692), Canon. 95.

§ 3. The Effects of Confirmation

1. Confirmation Grace

a) As a Sacrament of the living, Confirmation effects (per se) an increase of Sanctifying Grace. (*Sent. certa.*)

The Decretum pro Armenis teaches: per confirmationem augemur in gratia et roboramur in fide. (By Confirmation we are increased in grace and strengthened in faith). D 695.

In Holy Writ and in ancient Christian tradition (see Par. 1) the chief effect of Confirmation is not, as a rule, called the communication of grace, but the communication of the Holy Ghost. However, the supernatural presence of the

Holy Ghost implies the conferring of sanctifying grace; for the Holy Ghost, who, with the Father and the Son, is already substantially present in the soul in a natural manner as the cause of its natural being, takes up His abode in the soul of the just man in a new and supernatural manner and thereby joins the soul to God in a close supernatural union, by means of sanctifying grace, so that it shares in an intimate way in the Divine Life itself. S. th. III 72, 7: Missio seu datio Spiritus Sancti non est nisi cum gratia gratum faciente. Associated with Sanctifying Grace are the infused virtues and the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Among the latter, the gift of strength best defines the purpose of Confirmation. By this gift the confirmed person is strengthened to do battle against the enemies of salvation, if necessary by suffering martyrdom.

With the grace of Confirmation the confirmed person receives also the claim to those actual graces, which enable him to achieve the special purpose of the Sacrament.

Assertions of the Fathers (for example, Tertullian, De Bapt. 6 and 8), ascribing to Baptism the effect of forgiveness of sins and to Confirmation the effect of the communication of the Holy Ghost, must not be understood in an exclusive sense. The forgiveness of sins is inseparable from the conferring of grace. For this reason the baptised person also receives sanctifying grace and with it, the Holy Ghost. Cf. St. Cyprian, Ep. 74, 5: "There cannot be Baptism without the (Holy) Ghost." But the supernatural effect of the Holy Ghost in Baptism is different from that in Confirmation. In the former the Holy Ghost effects the rebirth into supernatural life, in the latter the perfection of the supernatural life.

b) The specific operation of Confirmation is the perfection of Baptismal Grace. (*Sent. communis.*)

The Roman Catechism (II 3, 19) says: illud proprie confirmationi tribuitur, quod baptismi gratiam perficit.

Corresponding to its particular purpose of strengthening the recipient to give testimony to Christ (Acts 1, 8) the sanctifying grace conferred in Confirmation bestows a heightened power for the inward strengthening and the courageous outward confession of faith. The Decretum pro Armenis teaches with St. Thomas: Effectus huius sacramenti est, quia in eo datur Spiritus Sanctus ad robur, sicut datus est Apostolis in die Pentecostes, ut videlicet Christianus audacter confiteatur Christi nomen. D 697.

The Fathers ascribe to Confirmation the perfection of that supernatural life which derives from Baptism. St. Ambrose says of the sealing with the Holy Ghost (spiritale signaculum) which occurs at Baptism: "After the Baptism there still remains that it be perfected" (post fontem superest, ut perfectio fiat: De sacr. III 2, 8). Cf. St. Cyprian, Ep. 73, 9; Synod of Elvira, can. 38 and 77 (D 52 d–e); St. Cyril of Alexandria, In Joelem 32.

2. The Character Imposed in Confirmation

Confirmation imprints on the soul an indelible spiritual mark, and for this reason, cannot be repeated. (*De fide.*) D 852.

St. Cyril of Jerusalem says in regard to the communication of the Spirit in Confirmation: "May He (God) bestow on you the seal of the Holy Ghost which cannot be erased in all eternity" (Procat. 17). Some Fathers (Ps.-Ful-

gentius) (Sermo 45) and Synods (Toledo 653, Chalon-sur-Saône 813) prohibit the repetition of Confirmation just as they do the repetition of Baptism.

The Orthodox Church administers Confirmation a second time on "those who have denied Christ"—among these the Russians reckon those who have fallen-off to Judaism, Paganism and Islam, the Greeks those also who have gone over to Catholicism and to Protestantism (Confessio orthodoxa I 105) if they return. Thus the Orthodox Church denies the existence of the character in Confirmation. However, individual theologians declare that anointing with chrism of the returning ones is not a repetition of the Sacrament of Confirmation but a rite of reconciliation.

According to the teaching of St. Thomas, the Confirmation character gives the power and right to perform actions which are necessary in the spiritual battle against the enemies of the Faith. He asserts that the confirmed are made like to Christ, the Teacher of the Truth, the King of Justice and the High Priest (signum configurativum), he distinguishes the fighters of Christ (the confirmed) from the simple members of the Empire of Christ (the baptised) (signum distinctivum), he holds that Confirmation empowers and entitles those who receive it to an active, even if a limited participation in Christ's threefold office (signum dispositivum), and that it imposes the obligation of making public confession of the Faith (signum obligativum). The Confirmation character imposes an obligation to undertake the lay apostolate and it confers a capacity to carry out this obligation. Cf. S. th. III 72, 5.

As Confirmation is a Sacrament which is distinct from and independent of Baptism, and which has a special purpose of its own, the Confirmation character is really distinct from the baptismal character. Hence it is not merely a modal completion of the baptismal character, but a quality of the soul distinct from the baptismal character. The Confirmation character necessarily presupposes the baptismal character; the Confirmation of an unbaptised person is therefore invalid. S. th. III 72, 6.

§ 4. The Necessity of Confirmation

It follows from its institution by Christ that Confirmation is indispensable to the Church in her totality. It procures for her supernatural strength for the overcoming of the internal and external difficulties which the Divine Founder of the Church foretold for her (Mt. 10, 16 et seq.; John 15, 20).

2. For the Individual

A baptised person can achieve eternal salvation even without Confirmation. (*Sent. fidei proxima.*)

The Council of Trent declared that nothing keeps the regenerate from entering into Heaven. D 792. Tradition is unanimous in teaching that the baptised person who departs this life in a state of grace before the imposition of the bishop's hands is saved. Cf. Ps.-Cyprian, De rebapt. 4; Synod of Elvira, can. 77 (D 52 e); Ps.-Melchiades (Decretum Gratiani, c. 2 D. 5 de consecr.). Thus Confirmation, unlike Baptism, is not necessary for salvation with the necessity of an indispensable means (necessitate medii). It is necessary for salvation to this extent, that it contributes to the perfection of salvation. S. th. III 72, 1 ad 3; 72, 8 ad 4.

Even if there be no express Divine commandment to receive Confirmation, the Divine mandate to receive it may be deduced from its institution by Christ (praeceptum divinum implicitum). Church Law prescribes its reception by all the faithful if the occasion for its reception offers (CIC 787). The neglect of the Sacrament from contempt (ex contemptu) is a grievous sin. D 669. Christian charity towards oneself demands that such an important means of grace should not be left unused.

3. Confirmation of desire

Like Baptismal grace so also the grace of Confirmation (not the Confirmation character) can, in case of necessity, be received by the desire for the Sacrament (votum confirmationis, Confirmation of desire). As the grace of Confirmation presupposes the grace of Baptism, Baptism of desire at least must precede it, if not temporally at least conceptually. S. th. III 72, 6 ad 1 and 3.

§ 5. The Minister of Confirmation

1. The Ordinary Minister

The ordinary minister of Confirmation is the Bishop alone. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent declared in opposition to the antihierarchical tendencies of certain medieval sects (Waldenses, Wycliffians, Hussites), and to the practice and teaching of the Greek Orthodox Church which regards simple priests as its regular ministers: Si quis dixerit, sanctae confirmationis ordinarium ministrum non esse solum episcopum, sed quemvis simplicem sacerdotem, A.S D. 873. Cf. D 419, 424, 450, 465, 572, 608, 697; CIC 782 Par 1.

According to the testimony of the Acts of the Apostles (8, 14 et seq.; 19, 6), the rite of the communication of the Spirit was performed by the Apostles. Their successors are the bishops. In the West, the administration of Confirmation was always considered to be the privilege of the bishop. Witnesses for this are St. Hippolytus of Rome (Trad. Apost.), Pope St. Cornelius (Ep. ad Fabium), St. Cyprian (Ep. 73, 9), Ps.-Cyprian (De rebapt. 5), the Synod of Elvira (can. 38 and 77; D 52 d–e), St. Jerome (Dial. c. Lucif. 9), Pope St. Innocent I (Ep. 25, 3). Pope Innocent agrees with St. Hippolytus in distinguishing the Confirmation anointing on the forehead from the baptismal anointing performed by the priests, and emphasises that the former alone is the privilege of the bishops: "The priests are not allowed to mark the forehead with the same oil (with which they may anoint the baptised); this is the privilege of the bishops alone, when they communicate the Holy Ghost" (D 98). In the Orient also, the bishop was originally the regular minister of Confirmation as Bishop Firmilian of Caesarea (Ep. 75, 7 in St. Cyprian's Collection of Letters), The Didascalia (II 32, 3; III 12, 2), St. John Chrysostom (In Actus homil. 18, 3) attest.

Reason

As a Sacrament of perfection, Confirmation, as is appropriate, is administered by the possessors of the fullness of the sacerdotal power, the generals of the militia christiana, the bishops, who thereby impose on the recipients an obligation to wage spiritual warfare. S. th. III 72, 11; S. c. G. IV 60. The administration by the bishop strengthens the consciousness of the solidarity of the faithful with the bishop, and thus serves to preserve and reinforce the unity of the Church. Cf. St. Bonaventura (In Sent. IV d. 7 a. 1 q. 3.).

2. The Extraordinary Minister

The extraordinary minister of Confirmation is a priest on whom this full power is conferred by the common law or by a special apostolic indult. (*Sent. certa.*) CIC 782, Par. 2. Cf. D 697, 573.

By an indult of the Apostolic See special power was given, with effect from 1st January, 1947: a) To Parish Priests within their own territory; b) To permanent Vicars (can. 471) and to the administrator of a vacant parish (can 472); c) To priests to whom, in a definite territory with a definite church, the full spiritual care with all parochial rights and duties has been exclusively and permanently transferred. These are empowered personally to confer the Sacrament of Confirmation on those of the faithful who live in their territory if, a) these, in consequence of serious illness, are in actual danger of death, so that their death is to be reckoned with, and b) the Diocesan Bishop is not available or is lawfully prevented from being present, and another bishop who could represent the Diocesan Bishop is not to be had (emergency Confirmation). If anybody other than those named in the Indult are confirmed there results an invalidation of the Sacrament and the loss of the power to confirm (can. 2365). Decretum S. Congregationis de Disciplina Sacramentorum "Spiritus Sancti munera" of 14. 9. 1946 (AAS 38, 1946, 349 et seq.). Special directions were given for mission fields (AAS 40, 1948, 41).

Pope St. Gregory the Great granted the administration of Confirmation to priests in Sardinia, on the condition that a bishop was not available (Ep. IV 26). In numerous cases later Popes empowered simple priests to administer Confirmation.

In the Eastern Church the administration of Confirmation by simple priests has gradually become the general practice since the 4th century. The Apostolic Constitutions (end of the 4th century) grant the power to impose hands in Confirmation (χειροθεσία) not merely to bishops but also to presbyters (VIII 28, 3). This development was strongly promoted by the distinction made between the completion and the administration of the Sacrament on the analogy of the Holy Eucharist, that is, between the consecration of the myron reserved to the bishop, and the anointing with the consecrated myron performed by the priest. (Cf. St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Cat. myst. 3, 3.) The validity of the Greek Confirmation celebrated by priests, which has always been recognised by the Catholic Church is explained by a tacit privilege of the Apostolic See (thus Pope Benedict XIV. De synode dioec. VII 9, 3; cf. D 697; per Apostolicae Sedis dispensationem).

The extraordinary power to confirm possessed by simple priests is to be regarded as deriving from the papal jurisdictive power, not as a delegated extra-sacramental consecration-power, but as a constituent part of the power of consecration received by the priest in Holy Order. This power of consecration, however, is limited, and can be used only in virtue of the papal power of the Keys.

§ 6. The Recipient of Confirmation

a) Confirmation can be received by any baptised person who is not already confirmed. (*Sent. certa.*)

Even infants can validly receive Confirmation, as is proved by the practice current in the West up to the thirteenth century, and to-day in the Eastern Church. Corresponding to its purpose of equipping the baptised person to

be a soldier of Christ, Confirmation is more suitably administered only to those who have attained the use of reason, that is, those who have reached the seventh year of life or so. This is the time prescribed by the competent law (CIC 788) as a general rule. However, exceptions are admissible, especially in danger of death. Emergency Confirmation can and should be administered to young children also, as a higher state of grace has, as a consequence, a higher state of glory. S. th. III 72, 8 ad 4.

b) The repetition of Confirmation is invalid and grievously sinful.

The imposition of hands, which Pope St. Stephen I, invoking Tradition, ordered for those returning from heresy (D 46) is, in opposition to the view of St. Cyprian (Ep. 74, 5), not to be regarded as a repetition of Confirmation, but merely, as the addition "in poenitentiam" indicates, as a reconciliation ceremony. As the view prevailed in antiquity that Sacraments administered in heresy, in spite of their validity, did not confer the Holy Ghost until the person was received into the Church (cf. St. Augustine, De bapt. III 16, 21 ; III 17, 22), the reconciliation-rite was regarded as the occasion of the communication of the Holy Ghost. In consequence, in this rite, the imposition of hands was accompanied by a prayer to the Holy Ghost (cf. St. Leo I, Ep. 159, 7 ; 167, 18), so that the rite of reconciliation had a great similarity to Confirmation.

For the worthy reception of Confirmation the state of grace is necessary. The remote preparation involves instruction for Confirmation. Cf. Cat. Rom. II 3, 17 et seq.

III. The Sacrament of the Eucharist

§ 1. The Concept of the Eucharist

1. Definition

The Eucharist is that Sacrament, in which Christ, under the forms of bread and wine, is truly present, with His Body and Blood, in order to offer Himself in an unbloody manner to the Heavenly Father, and to give Himself to the faithful as nourishment for their souls.

2. Prototypes

Prefigures of the Eucharist are the Tree of Life in Paradise, the sacrifices of Abraham and Melchisedech, the manna in the desert, the Shew-bread in the Temple, and the various sacrifices of the Old Covenant, especially that of the Paschal Lamb.

3. Sublimity

The sublimity of the Eucharist over all other Sacraments is evident as is shown by St. Thomas : a) By reason of its content since the Holy Eucharist, unlike the other Sacraments, is not merely an instrument of Christ's grace, but contains within it substantially Christ, the Source of Grace Himself; b) By reason of the fact that all the other Sacraments are ordained to the Eucharist as to their final object ; c) By reason of the fact that the rites of the other Sacraments mostly are followed by the reception of the Eucharist by way of consummation. S. th. III 65, 3.

SECTION I

The Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist

CHAPTER I

The Fact of the Real Presence of Christ

§ 2. The Heretical Counter-theses

1. Antiquity
In Christian antiquity the Docetae and the Gnostic-manichaean sects, starting from the assumption that Christ had only an apparent body, denied the real presence of the Body and Blood of Christ in the Eucharist. Cf. St. Ignatius, Smyrn. 7, 1.

2. Middle Ages
On the ground of an observation by Hincmar of Rheims (De praedest. 31), which was referred without sufficient ground to John Scotus Eriugena († about 870), the latter is frequently named as one denying the Real Presence of Christ. That Scotus denied the Real Presence cannot, however, be demonstrated from his writings. It is certain nevertheless that he expressly stressed the symbolical character of the Eucharist.

"The Book of John Scotus" on the Eucharist, invoked by Berengarius of Tours in support of his error, and which was condemned by the Synod of Vercelli (1050) probably was written by the Monk Ratramnus of Corbie († after 868), De corpore et sanguine Domini. Ratramnus, it is true, did not deny the Real Presence, but in contrast to Paschasius Radbertus († about 860), who maintained the complete identity of the sacramental body with the historical body of Christ, strongly emphasised the different way in which the Body of Christ was manifested in the Eucharist, and applied to the Eucharist the expressions, similitudo, imago, pignus. Others who attacked the exaggerated realism of Paschasius Radbertus were Rabanus Maurus, in a lost letter to the Abbot Eigil of Prüm, and the Monk Gottschalk, in the Dicta cuiusdam sapientis de corpore et sanguine Domini adversus Ratbertum, which is erroneously ascribed to Rabanus Maurus.

Berengarius of Tours († 1088) denied the Transubstantiation of the bread and wine and the Real Presence of Christ. He saw in the Eucharist merely a figure (figura, similitudo) of the body and blood of Christ transfigured in Heaven. The words of Christ : "This is my body," are, according to him, to be taken in a metaphorical sense, just as is the phrase : "Christ is the

cornerstone."[*] Berengarius' teaching was controverted by many theologians, for example, Durandus of Troarn, Lanfranc, Guitmund of Aversa, Bernold of St. Blase, and it was condemned at many Synods, first at a Roman Synod under Pope St. Leo IX in the year 1050 and finally in the Roman Lenten Synod of the year 1079, under Pope Gregory VII. At the latter Synod Berengarius made a revocation, and accepted a confession of faith in which Transubstantiation and the Real Presence are clearly affirmed. D 355.

In the 12th and 13th centuries various spiritualistic sects, out of aversion to the visible organisation of the Church, and under the influence of Gnostic-manichaean views, denied the sacerdotal power of consecration and the Real Presence (Petrobrusians, Henricians, Cathari, Albigenses). In refutation of these errors, the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) officially proposed the doctrines of Transubstantiation, of the Real Presence; and of the exclusive consecration-power of the validly consecrated priest. D 430. Cf. D 367, 402.

In the 14th century John Wycliffe († 1384) disputed the doctrine of Transubstantiation and taught that the substances of the bread and the wine remain after the consecration (Remanance Theory). He reduced the presence of Christ in the Eucharist to a dynamic presence. He asserted that the faithful receive the Body and Blood of Christ in a spiritual manner only. He stated that the adoration of the Eucharist is idolatry, and that the Mass was not instituted by Christ. His teaching was rejected at a Synod at London (1382), and at the Council of Constance (1418). D 581 et seq.

3. Modern Times

The Reformers were unanimous in rejecting Transubstantiation and the sacrificial character of the Eucharist, but they were not agreed on the question of the Real Presence.

a) Luther, influenced by the words of Its institution, admitted the Real Presence, but only during the celebration of Holy Communion. In contrast to the Catholic doctrine of Transubstantiation, he assumed a co-existence of the true Body and Blood of Christ with the substance of the bread and wine (consubstantiation): verum corpus et sanguis Domini nostri Jesu Christi in et sub pane et vino per verbum Christi nobis christianis ad manducandum et bibendum institutum et mandatum (Cat. Maior V 8). He explained the possibility of the Real Presence of the body and blood of Christ by the aid of the untenable Ubiquity Doctrine, according to which the human nature of Christ by virtue of the Hypostatic Union, has a real share in the properties of the Deity, and thereby also in the omnipresence of God. Cf. Conf. Aug. and Apol. Conf. Art. 10; Art. Smalcald. III 6: Formula Concordiae I 8, 11–12; II 7.

b) Zwingli (similarly Karlstadt, Butzer and Oecolampadius) denied the Real Presence, and declared the bread and wine to be mere symbols of the Body and Blood of Christ. Holy Communion is, according to him, only a commemoration of our Redemption through the death of Christ, and a confession of Faith by the community.

c) Calvin, to whom Melanchthon finally approached (Cryptocalvinists), took a middle path. He rejected the substantial presence of the body and blood of Christ, but accepted a presence of power (secundum virtutem) (dynamic presence). Through the use of the bread and the wine, a power proceeding from the transfigured Body of Christ in Heaven, is conferred on the faithful, that is, according to Calvin, the predestined, and this power nourishes souls. The dogmatic decisions of the Thirteenth, Twenty-first and Twenty-second Sessions of the Council of Trent were directed against the errors of the Reformers.

Liberal Protestantism of the present day denies that Christ intended to institute the Eucharist, and maintains that Jesus' Last Supper was a mere parting meal. It asserts that the Holy Communion of the primitive Church developed out of the meetings of Jesus' disciples and that out of the simple parting meal St. Paul made an institution for the future: "Do this in commemoration of me," and associated the repetition of the Holy Communion with the commemoration of the death of Our Lord (1 Cor. 11, 26). Pope Pius X condemned the Modernistic proposition: "Not everything that St. Paul narrates of the institution of the Eucharist need be taken as historical." D 2045.

§ 3. Christ's Real Presence according to the Testimony of Holy Scripture

The Body and Blood of Jesus Christ are truly, really and substantially present in the Eucharist. (*De fide.*)

Against those who deny the Real Presence the Council of Trent defined: Si quis negaverit, in sanctissimae Eucharistiae sacramento continere vere, realiter et substantialiter corpus et sanguinem una cum anima et divinitate Domini nostri Jesu Christi ac proinde totum Christum, sed dixerit, tantummodo esse in eo ut in signo vel figura aut virtute. A.S. D 883.

The three expressions, vere, realiter, substantialiter are specially directed against the conceptions of Zwingli, Oecolampadius and Calvin, but exclude all forms of symbolical explanation of the words of institution.

1. Promise of the Eucharist (John 6, 22-71 [Vulgate 72])

After the preparatory miracles of the multiplication of the loaves and the walking on the water, Jesus exhorted the Jews, who desired a repetition of the miracle of the multiplication of the loaves: "Labour not for the meat which perisheth, but for that which endureth unto life everlasting which the Son of Man will give you" (27). In the ensuing Eucharistic speech Jesus: *a*) speaks first quite generally of the true heavenly bread which descends from Heaven and confers eternal life on the world (29–34); *b*) then designates Himself as this life-giving heavenly bread, and for its possession demands faith (35–51a); *c*) Finally more closely determines the true heavenly bread as His flesh and makes the eating of His flesh and the drinking of His blood necessary for the possession of eternal life (51b–58): "The bread

that I will give you is my flesh, for the life of the world. 52. Then the Jews disputed among themselves and said: How can this man give us his flesh to eat? 53. Then Jesus said to them: Amen, amen, I say unto you: except you eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink His blood, you shall not have life in you. 54. He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood hath everlasting life; and I will raise him up in the last day. 55. For my flesh is meat indeed: and my blood is drink indeed. 56. He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood abideth in me: and I in him."

The opponents of the Real Presence understand these words in the metaphorical sense of belief in the sacrificial death of Christ on the Cross. The necessity of accepting a literal interpretation in this case is however evident:

a) From the nature of the words used. One specially notes the realistic expressions ἀληθὴς βρῶσις=true, real food (V. 55); ἀληθὴς πόσις=true, real drink (V. 55); τρώγειν=to gnaw, to chew, to eat. (V. 54 et seq.)

b) From the difficulties created by the figurative interpretation. In the language of the Bible to eat a person's flesh and drink his blood in the metaphorical sense means to persecute him in a bloody fashion, to destroy him. Cf. Ps. 26, 2; Is. 9, 20; 49, 26; Mich. 3, 3.

c) From the reactions of the listeners, which Jesus does not correct, as He had done previously in the case of misunderstandings (cf. John 3, 3 et seq.; 4, 32 et seq.; Mt. 16, 6 et seq.). In this case, on the contrary He confirms their literal acceptance of His words at the risk that His Disciples and His Apostles might desert Him (V. 60 et seq.). In V. 63 ("It is the spirit that quickeneth: the flesh profiteth nothing") Christ does not reject the literal, but only the grossly sensual (Capharnaitic) interpretation.

d) From the interpretation of the Fathers, who ordinarily take the last section of the Promissory Discourse (51b-58) as referring to the Eucharist (for example, St. John Chrysostom, St. Cyril of Alexander, St. Augustine), and the interpretation of the Council of Trent (D 875, 930).

2. The Institution of the Eucharist Mt. 26, 26-28; Mk. 14, 22-34; Luke 22, 15-20; 1 Cor. 11, 23-25)

The principal biblical proof for the Eucharistic Real Presence lies in the words of institution, which the four narrators, Saints Matthew, Mark, Luke and Paul, record in a linguistically varying but substantially identical form.

a) The words spoken over the bread, in the so-called Petrine form recorded by Saints Matthew and Mark are: *τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ σῶμά μου*, Vulg.: Hoc est corpus meum; in the so-called Pauline form transmitted by Saints Luke and Paul are (according to St. Luke): *τοῦτο ἐστιν τὸ σῶμά μου τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν διδόμενον*, Vulg.: Hoc est corpus meum, quod pro vobis datur (in St. Paul's version the participle *διδόμενον*, Vulg.: tradetur, is missing). The sense of the words is: That which I am giving to you is my body which will be offered for you.

b) The words pronounced over the chalice are: In the Petrine form (according to St. Mark): *τοῦτο ἐστιν τὸ αἷμα μου τῆς διαθήκης τὸ ἐκχυννόμενον ὑπὲρ* (Mt. *περὶ*) *πολλῶν*, Vulg.: Hic est sanguis meus novi testamenti qui pro multis effundetur (St. Matthew adds to this: *εἰς ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν*, Vulg.: in remissionem peccatorum); in the Pauline form (according to St.

Luke): τοῦτο τὸ ποτήριον ἡ καινὴ διαθήκη ἐν τῷ αἵματί μου, τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἐκχυννόμενον (the addendum: τὸ—ἐκχυννόμενον is lacking in St. Paul's version), Vulg.: Hic est calix novum testamentum in sanguine meo, qui pro vobis fundetur. The meaning of these words is: This chalice contains my blood, by which the New Covenant is sealed (as previously also the Old Testament was sealed by blood according to Ex. 24, 8: "This is the blood of the covenant which the Lord hath made with you"), and this blood will be shed for you.

In contrast to modern rationalistic criticism, the Catholic Church has always affirmed the historical nature of the words of institution, and in contrast to those who deny the Real Presence, has always adhered firmly to their literal meaning. The Council of Trent rejected the figurative interpretation and thus indirectly declared the literal interpretation to be authentic (D 874).

The necessity of interpreting the words literally may be seen:

a) By the wording. There is nothing in the text to support a figurative interpretation; for bread and wine are neither of their nature nor, by current speech-usage, symbols of body and blood. The literal interpretation involves no intrinsic contradiction though it presupposes faith in the Divinity of Christ.

b) By the circumstances. Christ had to suit the mental comprehension of His Apostles, who understood His words as they were uttered. In order to avoid the danger of misleading humanity, in the institution of such a sublime Sacrament and act of worship at the very moment of His foundation of the New Covenant and in the composition of His Testament, He had to employ a form of speech which could not be mistaken.

c) By the practical inferences which St. Paul draws from the words of institution. In the unworthy reception of the Eucharist the Apostle sees a sinning against the body and blood of Our Lord; in the worthy reception a participation therein. 1 Cor. 11, 27 et seq.: "Therefore, whosoever shall eat this bread or drink the chalice of the Lord unworthily, shall be guilty of the body and the blood of the Lord. But let a man prove himself; and so let him eat of that bread and drink of the chalice. For he that eateth and drinketh unworthily eateth and drinketh judgment to himself, not discerning the body of the Lord." 1 Cor. 10, 16: "The chalice of benediction which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ? And the bread which we break, is it not the partaking of the body of the Lord?"

d) By the inadequacy of the arguments advanced against it. When the copula "Is" in many passages of Holy Writ has the meaning of "designates" or "symbolises," the figurative sense of these passages is apparent at once from the nature of the matter (for example Mt. 13, 38: "The field is the world") (cf. John 10, 7; 15, 1; 1 Cor. 10, 4) (for example in a Parable or an allegory) or from the current use of the language. This presupposition does not apply to the narrative of the Institution.

§ 4. The Real Presence according to the Testimony of Tradition

1. The pre-Nicene Fathers

The oldest clear traditional proof of the Real Presence derives from St. Ignatius of Antioch († about 107). He narrates of the Docetae: "They keep

away from the Eucharist and from the prayer, because they do not confess that the Eucharist is the flesh of our Redeemer Jesus Christ, who suffered for our sin, and whom the Father in His goodness raised from the dead" (Smyrn. 7, 1). Philad. 4: "Be ye resolved, to celebrate one Eucharist only; for there is only one flesh of our Lord Jesus Christ and only one chalice for unification with His blood."

St. Justin Martyr († about 165) gives in his First Apologia a description of the primitive Christian Eucharistic celebration (c. 65) and then says of the Eucharistic Banquet: "We receive this not as ordinary bread and ordinary drink; but as our Redeemer, Jesus Christ, was incarnated by the Word of God, and assumed flesh and blood for the sake of our salvation, so, as we have been taught, the food over which thanksgiving has been made (or which has been eucharistised) by the prayer of the Word which came from Him (by which (food) our blood and flesh are nourished by transmutation) is both flesh and blood of that same incarnate Jesus" (66, 2). St. Justin draws a parallel here between the Incarnation and the Eucharist. The effect of both the Incarnation and the Consecration is the flesh and blood of Jesus Christ. In establishing this thesis, St. Justin quotes the words of institution: "which the Apostles have handed down in those writings which are worthy of consideration, and which are called Gospels."

St. Irenaeus of Lyons († about 202) attests that "the bread over which thanksgiving is pronounced, is the body of the Lord and the chalice of His blood" (Adv. haer. IV 18, 4). Christ confessed, "the chalice deriving from the creation to be His own blood (αἷμα ἴδιον) with which He permeates our blood, and the bread deriving from the creation He declared to be His own body (ἴδιον σῶμα) with which He strengthens our bodies" (ib. V 2, 2). Our flesh is "nourished by the body and blood of the Lord, and becomes His member" and is thus enabled "to accept the gift of God, in which consists eternal life" (ib. V 2, 3). "How can they (the Gnostics) feel assured that bread over which thanksgiving has been made (i.e., the eucharistised bread) is the body of their Lord, and the chalice of His blood, if they do not declare Him the Son of the world's Creator?" (ib. IV 18, 5). Thus St. Irenaeus established the resurrection of the flesh on the real partaking of the Body and Blood of the Lord.

The Alexandrinians, St. Clement and Origen, attest the general belief of the Church that the Lord offers us the partaking of His Body and His Blood. However, due to their penchant for allegory, passages are also found in their writings, in which they use the words body and blood to signify the teaching of Christ, by which our spirits are nourished. Origen, Contra Celsum VIII 33: "But we, who render thanks to the Creator of the Universe, eat of the breads offered with thanksgiving and prayer over the gifts which, through prayer, have become a certain sacred body, which sanctifies him who partakes of it with an understanding mind." Cf. In Num. hom. 7, 2; In Ex. hom. 13, 3; In Matth. comment, ser. 85. As, according to the usage of the Alexandrinians, the same scriptural passage can be variously interpreted, an allegorical interpretation does not exclude the possibility of a more fundamental meaning.

Tertullian († about 220) expresses his faith in the Real Presence in the realistic words: "The flesh is refreshed with the body and blood of Christ so that the soul also may be nourished by God" (caro corpore et sanguine Christi vescitur, ut et anima de Deo saginetur: De carnis resurr. 8). Of those Christians who make idols, he says: "The Jews laid hands on Christ once only, these violate His body daily. Such hands should be cut off" (De idololatria 7). The parallelism with the crime of the Jews demands that the body of Christ, against whom such Christians sin in the reception of the Eucharist, be conceived as the Real Presence. When Tertullian in Adv. Marcionem IV 40, adds to the words of institution, "Hoc est corpus meum" the explanation: id est figura corporis mei, he does not understand the expression "figura" in the sense of image, symbol, since in the context against the Docetism of Marcion he expressly desires to demonstrate the reality of the body of Christ: figura autem non fuisset, nisi veritatis esset corpus. Figura means the outward form, the sacramental figure.

St. Cyprian († 258) relates the "asking for bread" in the Our Father to the Eucharist, and says that "Christ is our bread, we who touch His Body" (qui corpus eius contingimus) and that "those who touch His body and receive the Eucharist according to the law of the community," according to John 6, 51, have eternal life (De dominica orat. 18). Of the lapsed, who receive the Eucharist without previous penance and reconciliation, he says: "They do violence to His blood and body and they sin more now with hand and mouth against the Lord than they did when they denied Him" (De lapsis 16). The drinking of the Blood of Christ on the reception of the Eucharist is represented by him as parallel to the shedding of blood in martyrdom. The parallel demands that the former must be accepted as being as real as the latter. Cf. Ep. 58, 1; Ep. 63, 15.

2. The post-Nicene Fathers

Among the post-Nicene Fathers the outstanding witnesses for the Church belief in the Real Presence are St. Cyril of Jerusalem (4th and 5th mystag. Cat.), St. John Chrysostom, the Doctor Eucharistiae, St. Cyril of Alexandria and St. John of Damsacus (De fide orth. IV 13); among the Latin Fathers, St. Hilary of Poitiers (De Trin. VIII 14), and St. Ambrose (De sacr. IV 4–7; De Myst. 8 et seq.), who became the competent authority for the doctrine of the Eucharist in Scholasticism.

The Eucharistic doctrine expounded by St. Augustine is interpreted in a purely spiritual way by most Protestant writers on the history of dogmas. Despite his insistence on the symbolical explanation he does not exclude the Real Presence. In association with the words of institution he concurs with the older Church tradition in expressing belief in the Real Presence. Cf. Sermo 227: "The bread which you see on the altar is, sanctified by the word of God, the body of Christ; that chalice, or rather what is contained in the chalice, is, sanctified by the word of God, the blood of Christ." Enarr. in Ps. 33 Sermo 1, 10: "Christ bore Himself in His hands, when He offered His body saying: 'this is my body.'"

When in the Fathers' writings, especially in those of St. Augustine, side by side with the clear attestations of the Real Presence, many obscure symbolically-sounding utterances are found also, the following points must be noted for the proper understanding of such passages: (1) The Early Fathers were bound by the discipline of the secret, which referred above all to the Eucharist (cf. Origen, In Lev. hom. 9, 10); (2) The absence of any heretical counter-proposition often resulted in a certain carelessness of expression to which must be added the lack of a developed terminology to distinguish the sacramental mode of existence of Christ's body from its natural mode of existence once on earth; (3) The Fathers were concerned to resist a grossly sensual conception of the Eucharistic Banquet and to stress the necessity of the spiritual reception in Faith and in Charity (in contradistinction to the external, merely sacramental reception); passages often refer to the symbolical character of the Eucharist as "the sign of unity" (St. Augustine); this in no wise excludes the Real Presence.

The Fathers' testimony is reinforced by the testimony of the ancient Christian Liturgies, in which the so-called Epiclesis of the Logos is called down, "So that He might make the bread into the Body of Christ, and the wine into the blood of Christ" (St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Cat. Myst. 5, 7; Cf. the Euchologion of Serapion of Thmuis 13, 4; Apost. Const. VIII 12, 39).

The faith in the Real Presence is attested also by ancient Christian representations and inscriptions, especially by the Abercius-Inscription (before 216) from Hieropolis in Phrygia Minor and the Pectorius Inscription (end of the 4th century) from Augustodunum (Autun) in Gaul, both of which refer to the fish as a symbol of the Eucharist.

St. Thomas establishes the appropriateness of the Real Presence on: a) The perfection of the New Covenant and the consequent sublimity of its sacrifice over the sacrifices of the Old Covenant; b) Christ's love of men, which makes Him desire bodily association; c) The perfection of faith, which in the Eucharist extends not only to the Divinity, but also to the invisibly present Humanity of Christ. S. th. III 75, 1.

CHAPTER 2

The Effecting of Christ's Real Presence or Transubstantiation

§ 5. Dogma and Concept of Transubstantiation

1. Dogma

Christ becomes present in the Sacrament of the Altar by the transformation of the whole substance of the bread into His Body and of the whole substance of the wine into His Blood. (*De fide.*)

As against Luther's doctrine of consubstantiation, according to which the substances of bread and wine exist conjointly with the body and blood of Christ, and against the doctrine of impanation which, put forward by Guitmund of Aversa, suggested that Christ and the substance of the bread are united by a Hypostatic Union, the Council of Trent declared that the whole substance of the bread is transformed into the body of Christ and the whole substance of the wine is transformed into the blood of Christ. This transformation is called Transubstantiation: Si quis dixerit, in sacrosancto Eucharistiae sacramento remanere substantiam panis et vini una cum corpore et sanguine Domini nostri Jesu Christi, negaveritque mirabilem illam et singularem conversionem totius substantiae panis in corpus et totius substantiae vini in sanguinem, manentibus dumtaxat speciebus panis et vini, quam quidem conversionem catholica Ecclesia aptissime transubstantiationem appellat, A.S. D 884. Cf. D 335, 430, 465. Pope Pius VI adopted the doctrine of Transubstantiation against the Synod of Pistoja (1786), which wished to exclude this teaching from the instruction of the faithful as "a purely scholastic question." D 1529.

The expressions "Transsubstantiatio" and "Transsubstantiare" were coined by the theologians of the 12th century (Magister Roland [who later became Pope Alexander III] about 1150, Stephen of Tournai about 1160, Petrus Comestor 1160–70). The term Transubstantiation was first officially used in the Decretals of Innocent III, and later in the Caput Firmiter of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215).

Greek Orthodox theology took over the expressions from Latin theology after the Second General Council of Lyons, and translated it by μετουσίωσις, or μετουσιοῦσθαι, but it was only in the 17th century, in the defensive struggle against the Calvinistic Eucharistic doctrine of the Patriarch Cyrillus Lukaris, that its use became widespread in the Eastern Church. Cf. The Confessio Orthodoxa of Petrus Mogilas I 107 and the Confessio Dosithei 17. Modern Orthodox theology does not closely define the nature and manner of the Eucharistic presence of the body and blood of Christ. The significance of the term μετουσίωσις is substantially reduced, when it is not rejected altogether.

2. Concept

a) Transubstantiation signifies a conversion (μεταβολή, conversio). Conversion in the passive sense is the transition of one thing into another thing (transitus unius rei in aliam). In this we may distinguish the following elements:

α) A terminus a quo and a terminus ad quem, that is, a point of departure which ceases to be, and a point of destination, which commences to be. Both termini must be positive Being. Thus conversion is distinguished from creation (creatio) which has a negative terminus a quo and destruction (annihilatio), a negative terminus ad quem. If one considers the whole which is present, before as well as after the conversion, one speaks of a terminus totalis a quo (bread and wine), and a terminus totalis ad quem (the Body and Blood of Christ with the accidents of bread and wine). When one considers that which ceases to be, and that which commences to be, one speaks of a terminus formalis a quo (the substance of bread and wine), and a terminus formalis ad quem (the Body and Blood of Christ).

β) An inner connection between the ceasing of the terminus a quo and the beginning of the terminus ad quem. A mere temporal succession does not do justice to the concept of conversion. In the Eucharistic conversion the substances of the bread and the wine cease, because they are changed into the Body and Blood of Christ.

γ) A commune tertium, that is, a common remaining third, which after the conversion binds together the two extremes. In the Eucharistic conversion these are the appearances of the bread and wine. But a conversion is also conceivable in which nothing of the terminus a quo remains behind.

b) Transubstantiation is a marvellous and unique conversion (converso mirabilis et singularis: D 884), distinct from natural conversions. The latter are either accidental or substantial conversions. In the accidental conversion the substance remains unchanged; it merely assumes new accidental forms (conversio accidentalis or transaccidentatio, for example—a block of marble becomes a statue). In substantial conversion, the former substantial form ceases to exist; the matter which remains behind is a commune tertium, which takes on a new substantial form (conversio formalis or transformatio, for example, the assimilation of food by the organism). In the sphere of nature substantial transformation is always accompanied by accidental changes also. The Eucharistic conversion is a substantial conversion of a special kind, because the whole substance, matter and form, of the bread and wine is converted (conversio substantialis totalis), while the accidents remain unchanged. It has no analogue either in the natural or in the supernatural order and is thus justly designated by a special name: Transubstantiatio. The expression asserts that the whole substance, but also only the substance, is converted.

c) The conversion in the active sense, that is God's activity in the conversion, does not, according to the general teaching of theologians, consist of two independent actions, the annihilation of the substances of the bread and the wine, and the making present of the body and blood of Christ. It is one

and the same activity of God which effects that the terminus a quo (formalis) disappears and the terminus ad quem (formalis) appears.

The Scotists, St. Bellarmine, Chr. Pesch and others define the act of making-present the Body and Blood of Christ as the production or the introduction (adductio or introductio) of the body and blood of Christ under the appearances of bread and wine, with the exclusion, however, of any positional movement (Adduction Theory). According to this theory, the pre-existing Body of Christ is so adduced to the sacramental forms that it receives, in addition to its natural mode of being in Heaven, a new sacramental mode of being under the sacramental forms.

The Thomists, Suarez, Franzelin and others, define the act of Transubstantiation as the production or reproduction (productio or reproductio, replicatio) of the Body and Blood of Christ under the sacramental forms (Reproduction Theory). According to this teaching the same body which was initially produced from the Virgin Mary and which is now in heaven, is, by a new activity of God, produced from the substance of bread and wine. The mode of expression used by the Fathers and the Liturgies and also the concept of the conversion of the substance, the formal object of which is a new substance, seem to favour the reproduction theory. The process of Transubstantiation being a mystery, no definite solution is possible.

§ 6. Transubstantiation according to the Testimony of the Sources of Faith

1. Scriptural Proof

The conversion of the substance is implicitly (implicite) contained in the words of institution uttered by Christ. On the ground of His Divine Veracity and Omnipotence it may be inferred from His words that that which He offered was no longer bread and wine, but His Body and His Blood. Therefore a change had occurred. Personal observation shows that the accidents have not changed. It follows that the change affects the substance only.

The consubstantiation theory is incompatible with the words of institution. According to this theory they should read : " Here (in this bread) is my body." Cf. S.c.G. IV 63 ; S. th. III 75, 2.

2. Proof from Tradition

The Fathers of the first three centuries attest the Real Presence, without, however, going more closely into the question. For this reason, we find during this period, only indications of the conversion of the substance. Thus, for example, Tertullian says : " He took bread, offered it to His disciples and made it into His body by saying : 'This is my body' " (Adv. Marc. IV 40). Since the 4th century the Fathers expressly teach that a conversion occurs at the consecration. The principal witnesses for the doctrine of the conversion are St. Cyril of Jerusalem (Cat. Myst. 4, 2 ; 5, 7), St. Gregory of Nyssa (Or. cat. 37), St. John Chrysostom (De prodit. Judae hom. 1, 6 ; In Matth. hom. 82, 5), St. Cyril of Alexandria (In Matth. 26, 27) and St. John Damascene (De fide orth. IV 13), among the

Latin Fathers St. Ambrose (De sacr. IV 4, 14 et seq.; 5, 23; De Myst. 9, 52) and Ps.-Eusebius of Emesa, a preacher in Southern Gaul of the 5th and 6th centuries (PL 67, 1052–56). The Greek Fathers use the expressions μεταβάλλειν (St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Theodor of Mopsvestia), μεταποιεῖν (St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. Cyril of Alexandria, St. John of Damascus), μεταστοιχειοῦν (St. Gregory of Nyssa), μεταρρυθμίζειν (St. John Chrysostom), μετασκευάζειν (St. John Chrysostom); the Latin Fathers use the expressions convertere, mutare. St. Cyril of Jerusalem says: " Once at Cana in Galilee by a mere nod He changed water into wine, and is it now incredible that He changes wine into blood?" (Cat. Myst. 4, 2).

In order vividly to represent the mystery the Fathers employ analogies such as the change of nourishment into the substance of the body (St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. John Damascene), the change of water into wine at the Marriage of Cana (St. Cyril of Jerusalem), the change of the Staff of Moses into a serpent, the change of the waters of the Egyptian rivers into blood, the Creation and the Incarnation (St. Ambrose).

In the old Liturgies the Logos or the Holy Ghost is called down in a special prayer (Epiclesis) in order that He may " make " (ποιεῖν) the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ, or in order that the bread and wine might " become " (γίγνεσθαι) the body and blood of Christ. St. Cyril of Jerusalem says in his description of the Mass: " Having sanctified ourselves by these spiritual songs of praise, we invoke the Good God to send down the Holy Ghost on these gifts, so that He might make the bread into the body of Christ, and the wine into the blood of Christ. For that which the Holy Ghost has touched is completely sanctified and transmuted " (Cat. Myst. 5, 7).

Theodoret of Cyrus († about 460) teaches that the Eucharistic elements " do not emerge from their nature after consecration " but " remain in their former essence and in their appearance and in their shape." On the other hand, he attests that these are " something else before the invocation (Epiclesis) of the priest, after the invocation, however, they are changed and become something else" (Eranistes, dial. 2). As the change is clearly expressed here, many theologians take the first utterance to mean the continuance of the external appearance of the bread and wine after the mutation of the substance. In association with his Antiochian Christology, according to which the human nature exists independently side by side with the Divine nature, but participates in the name, the honour, and the adorability of the Divine nature, this conception tends towards the argument that in analogous manner the Eucharistic elements after the consecration continue unchanged, but participate in the name, the honour and the adorability of the celestial Christ, who has united Himself with them at the Epiclesis. Thus the mutation maintained by him is not to be understood as a mutation of the substance, but as a mysterious attachment of the unchanged elements to the body and blood of the Lord (moral mutation).

Similarly, Pope Gelasius I (492–496) observes: The Sacraments of the body and blood of Christ are " a Divine matter," on which account we are through them partakers of the Divine nature, " but still the substance or nature of the bread and wine does not cease to be." Bread and wine go over into the Divine substance through the efficacy of the Holy Ghost, " but nevertheless remain in the peculiarity of their nature " (De duabus naturis in Christo 14). Also Ps.-Chrysostom, an Antiochian, teaches that the bread after Consecration is called the body of the Lord, " even if the nature of bread remains in it." (Ep. ad Caesarium).

§ 7. The Sacramental Accidents

1. Continuance of the Accidents

The Accidents of bread and wine continue after the change of the substance. (*De. fide.*)

According to the explanation of the Council of Trent, the change extends only to the substances of the bread and the wine, while the appearances or accidents remain behind: manentibus dumtaxat speciebus panis et vini (D 884). By the appearances (species) is understood everything which is perceived by the senses, such as size, extent, weight, shape, colour, taste, smell.

2. Physical Reality of the Sacramental Accidents

The Sacramental Accidents retain their physical reality after the change of the substance. (*Sent. certa.*)

Many Cartesian Theologians of the 17th and 18th centuries, for example, Emmanuel Maignan O. Min. († 1676) and his pupil, John Saguens, denied the physical reality of the accidents, by applying to the doctrine of the Eucharist, the teaching of Descartes, that there are not absolute accidents, that is, really distinct and separable from the substance, but only modal accidents, that is, not really distinct from the substance and therefore also not separable from it. They declared the sacramental appearances to be subjective impressions of the senses effected in a miraculous manner by the omnipotence of God.

This opinion is incompatible: a) With the teaching of the Council of Trent, which says that all appearances "remain," that is, stay behind after the transformation of the terminus totalis a quo. b) With the whole teaching of Tradition, which has not the slightest doubt that an objective reality corresponds to the impressions of our senses. Cf. St. Augustine, Sermo 272: "Thus what you see is bread and a chalice; your own eyes tell you that. But what your faith must learn is this: the bread is the body of Christ, the chalice is the blood of Christ." S. th. III 75, 5: sensu apparet, facta consecratione omnia accidentia panis et vini remanere. c) With the concept of Sacrament, which demands an objective sign, if the Sacrament is not to become a merely apparent Sacrament.

3. No Subject of Inhesion

The Sacramental Accidents continue without a subject in which to inhere. (*Sent. certa.*)

It follows from the dogma of the Transubstantiation that the accidents after the change of the substances of the bread and wine exist without their own natural substance in which to inhere. The Council of Constance rejected Wycliffe's thesis: Accidentia panis non manent sine subiecto in eodem sacramento (D 582). The Body and the Blood of Christ cannot be bearers of the accidents of bread and wine; nor can any other substance (according to Abelard's School: the surrounding air). It follows from this that the accidents continue without any subject. The Roman Catechism (II 4, 43) calls this teaching: "the perpetual and constant teaching of the Catholic Church."

The continuance of the accidents without a subject is made possible by the Divine Omnipotence, which, as causa prima, takes the place of the missing causa secunda. Cf. S. th. III 77, 1. See Par. 12, 1.

CHAPTER 3

Nature and Manner of the Real Presence of Christ

§ 8. The Totality of the Presence

1. Total Presence of Christ

The Body and the Blood of Christ together with His Soul and His Divinity and therefore the Whole Christ are truly present in the Eucharist. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent defines the totality of the Real Presence together with the fact of the Real Presence: Si quis negaverit, in ss. Eucharistiae sacramento contineri vere, realiter et substantialiter corpus et sanguinem una cum anima et divinitate Domini nostri Jesu Christi ac proinde totum Christum, . . . A.S. D 883.

The body of Christ is present under the form of bread and the blood of Christ under the form of the wine ex vi verborum, that is, by the power of the words of consecration. Per concomitantiam (by concomitance), that is, on account of the real connection between the body and the blood of Christ, His blood and His soul are also present with the body of Christ under the form of bread, as He is a living body (Rom. 6, 9) (Concomitantia naturalis), and on the ground of the Hypostatic Union His Divinity is also present (concomitantia supernaturalis). Similarly, under the form of wine besides His blood Christ's body and soul and Divinity are also present by concomitance. Cf. D 876. S. th. III 76, 1.

In the Eucharistic promissory speech we find the words: "He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood" (John 6, 54, 56) parallel to the words: "He that eateth me" (V. 57), that is, the whole Person of Christ. Therefore the whole Christ is present with the flesh and blood of Christ. Cf. 1 Cor. 11, 27.

According to the teaching of the Fathers, the body of Christ present under the form of bread is immortal (St. Gregory of Nyssa, Or. cat. 37), life-giving (St. Cyril of Alexandria, Ep. 17; Adv. Nestorium 4, 5), adorable (St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps. 98, 9). These attributes presuppose the attachment of the body to the soul and to the Divinity. St. Ambrose teaches: "Christ is in this Sacrament, because It is the body of Christ" (De Myst. 9, 58).

It was only in the last decades of the 11th century that the question of the totality of the Presence became the object of theological discussion. Among those who first expressly taught that the whole Christ is received under both forms are John of Mantua, Manegold of Lautenbach, Anselm of Laon and his School.

2. The Total Presence under Each of the Two Species

The Whole Christ is present under each of the two Species. (*De fide.*)

In the dogma of the totality of the Real Presence it is implicitly stated that the Whole Christ is present under each of the two species individually. The Council of Constance raised this proposition to a dogma, in opposition to the Hussites (Utraquists), who demanded Communion under both forms. (D 626.) The Council of Trent declared against the Reformers, who made the same demand: Si quis negaverit, in venerabili sacramento Eucharistiae sub unaquaque specie . . . totum Christum contineri, A.S. D 885. Cf. D 698, 876.

This dogma is the legal basis of the usage of communion under one form. It is true that up to the 13th century Communion under the double form was the regular one, but Communion under one form was known even in antiquity, in the Communion of children, in Communion received at home, in Communion of the sick.

3. Total Presence in Every Part of the Two Species

When either consecrated species is divided the Whole Christ is present in each part of the species. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent declared: Si quis negaverit . . . sub singulis cuiusque speciei partibus, separatione facta, totum Christum contineri, A.S. D 885.

According to the narrative of the institution all the Apostles drank out of the one chalice. According to the old Liturgies the breaking of the bread for the administration of the Communion was done only after the Consecration, and all the communicants drank out of the same consecrated chalice. Although they received only a part of the consecrated bread and the consecrated wine, they still believed that they were receiving the whole body and the whole blood of Christ. Ps.-Eusebius of Emesa remarks: "When one takes of this bread the individual parts are not less than all the parts together. One receives the whole, two receive the whole, still more receive the whole without reduction" (PL 67, 1054).

From this dogma it flows as a conclusio theologica, that the whole Christ even before any separation is wholly present in every part of the species. Cf. D 876, in which the addendum "separatione facta" is missing. If Christ were not wholly present in every part of the species, the act of separation would be the cause of the Presence in the individual parts. According to Catholic teaching, however, the Consecration and the Transubstantiation operated by it are the sole cause of the Real Presence. But it does not follow from this teaching that there is a multifold actual Presence under one form. Just as the soul is wholly present in the whole body and wholly present in every part of the body, and still is only present once in the whole body, so also the body of Christ is only once actually present in the whole form. Potentially, however, Christ is capable of being present in a multifold manner. This multifold Presence occurs actually only after the separation of the previously united parts of the species.

For the understanding of this doctrine it must be borne in mind that the body of Christ which takes the place of the substance of the bread at the Transubstan-

tiation, is present according to the mode of a substance (per modum substantiae). Just as, before the consecration, the substance of the bread is wholly present in all parts of the non-consecrated host, so after the consecration, the body of Christ, and, per concomitantiam, the whole Christ, is present in all parts of the consecrated Host. Cf. S. th. III 76, 3.

§ 9. The Permanence of the Real Presence

1. Continuance of the Real Presence

After the Consecration has been completed the Body and Blood are permanently present in the Eucharist. (*De fide.*)

In contrast to the Lutheran doctrine of Holy Communion, which limited the Real Presence to the duration of the celebration of the Holy Communion, that is, to the time from the Consecration until the Communion, the Council of Trent declared that the Body and Blood of Christ are continually present after the Consecration: Si quis dixerit, peracta consecratione in admirabili Eucharistiae sacramento non esse corpus et sanguinem Domini nostri Jesu Christi, sed tantum in usu, dum sumitur, non autem ante vel post, et in hostiis seu particulis consecratis, quae post communionem reservantur vel supersunt, non remanere verum corpus Domini, A.S. D 886. Cf. 889.

The Lutheran "Confessio Augustana" (1530) does not profess belief in any limitation of the duration of the Real Presence. The omission of the procession of the Blessed Sacrament was not founded on the denial of the continuance of the Real Presence, but on the incompatibility of the "division of the Sacrament" (that is, the use of only one species) with the ordinance of Christ (Art. 22). In the year 1536, Luther concurred with M. Butzer in the Wittenberg Concord, which taught: extra usum, cum reponitur aut asservatur in pixide aut ostenditur in processionibus, ut fit apud papistas, sentiunt non adesse corpus Christi (They believe that, apart from its use, the Body of Christ is not present as (for example) when it is preserved in a pyx or carried in processions as is the custom of the Papists) (Formula Corcordiae II 7, 15). By "usus" the Old Lutheranism understood: "not only the partaking which is done with the mouth, but the whole outward, visible handling of the Communion instituted by Christ" (ib. 86), therefore not merely at the moment of reception, but during the whole time from the Consecration to the Communion, including any Communion of the sick which might follow the celebration of the Holy Communion. A biblical foundation for this teaching was sought in the words of Jesus: "Take ye and eat" (Mt. 26, 26). Obviously, however, it cannot be inferred from this that after the dispensing of the Communion the Real Presence ceases, since the particles which remain over and which are kept, are destined to be partaken of and to be administered to the faithful.

The belief of the Ancient Christian Church in the duration of the Real Presence is attested by the custom of bringing the Eucharist to the sick and to prisoners who were absent from the Celebration (St. Justin, Apol. I 65); of allowing the faithful to bring the Eucharist to their houses (Tertullian, De oratione 19, Ad uxorem, II 5; St. Cyprian, De lapsis 26; St. Basils, Ep. 93); of keeping the particles left over after the Communion (Const. Apost. VIII 13, 17); of celebrating the so-called missa praesanctificatorum, which goes back at least to the 7th century (Trullanum, can. 52). St. Cyril of Alexandria remarks: "I hear that it is said that the mystic Eulogy (= the Eucharist) is of no avail unto

sanctification, if a remnant of it is left over for the next day. But those who maintain this are foolish; for Christ does not alter, and His sacred body is not remoulded, but the power of blessing and the quickening grace is constantly in Him" (Ep. ad Calosyrium).

2. Cessation of the Real Presence

According to the general teaching of theologians, the Real Presence continues as long as the species, which constitute the sacramental signs ordained by Christ, remain. The ceasing of the Real Presence must be conceived neither as a destruction (annihilatio) properly so-called nor as a transformation of the body and blood of Christ into another substance, nor as a local movement, in which it returns to Heaven. When the species are corrupted, in place of the body and blood of Christ, those substances probably appear which correspond to the specific nature of the altered accidents.

§ 10. The Adoration due to the Eucharist

The Worship of Adoration (latria) must be given to Christ present in the Eucharist. (*De fide.*)

It follows from the wholeness and permanence of the Real Presence that the absolute worship of adoration (cultus latriae) is due to Christ present in the Eucharist. The total object of the adoration is Christ under the sacramental species. The latter are co-objects of the adoration, as they are connected with Christ in the unity of the Sacrament. The Council of Trent rejected the reproach of "adoration of bread" and of "idolatry" and declared: Si quis dixerit, in sancto Eucharistiae sacramento Christum unigenitum Dei Filium non esse cultu latriae etiam externa adorandum . . . A.S. D 888.

Opposed to this dogma are all those who deny the Real Presence. The Old Lutheran Theologians (for example, A. Musculus, M. Chemnitz, J. Gerhard), on the ground of their faith in the Real Presence of Christ only during the duration of the Holy Communion, that is, from the consecration to the Communion, also logically held that it is proper to adore the Eucharist and defended this position against the Cryptocalvinists ("Violators of the Sacrament").

That the worship of Latria is due to the Eucharist may be shown directly from Holy Writ in that, on the one hand, the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist, on the other, the right of Christ to adoration, are indicated (cf. Mt. 28, 9, 17; John 5, 23; 20, 28; Phil. 2, 10; Hebr. 1, 6). See Christology, Par. 19.

The post-Nicene Fathers attest that from the very beginning Divine worship was given to Christ present in the Eucharist before its reception. Cf. St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Cat. Myst. 5, 22: "Bow down and in adoration and veneration say Amen!" St. Ambrose, De Spiritu sancto III 11, 79: "By the footstool (Ps. 98, 5) is understood the earth, but by the earth the flesh of Christ, which we still adore today in the Mysteries." St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps. 98, 9: "Nobody eats this flesh without previously adoring it." While in the East the veneration of the Eucharist remained limited to the celebration of the Sacrifice, in the West there has developed since the Middle Ages, outside the celebration of the Mass, an extensive Eucharistic cult (theophoric processions, Feast of Corpus Christi 1264), Exposition of the Blessed Sacrament (since the 14th century).

CHAPTER 4

The Blessed Eucharist and Human Reason

§ 11. The Mysterious Character of the Eucharist

The Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist is a mystery of Faith. (*Sent. certa.*)

Human reason can neither know the existence of a divinely revealed truth beforehand nor positively demonstrate its intrinsic possibility afterwards. But reason enlightened by Faith is able to show the appropriateness of the doctrine of the Real Presence and its consonance with the body of supernatural truths, and to reject the objections from reason. The dogma of the Eucharist is suprarational, but not irrational.

The Eucharist cannot be estimated according to the laws of experience. Facts from the life of Jesus, as for example, the walking on the water, the emergence from the sealed tomb, the appearance of the Risen Christ coming through closed doors, attest that the ordinary, empirical mode of existence and action of the human body can be changed by a miraculous intervention of the Divine omnipotence, without its ceasing to be a true human body. Belief in the Eucharistic Real Presence certainly presupposes faith in a transcendental personal God and in the true Divinity of Christ.

§ 12. Apparent Contradictions between Reason and the Eucharistic Dogma

1. The Existence of the Accidents without a Subject

As there is a real distinction between the substance and the accidents of the body, God, who, as causa prima, can produce the operation proper to a causa secunda, can through His immediate activity preserve the accidents of the bread and the wine in their real being after the cessation of the substance of the bread and wine. God does not maintain them in being by allowing them inhere in Himself (causa materialis), but, as causa efficiens, He effects everything which the substances of bread and wine effected before the consecration. The accidents continuing without subject do not cease to be accidents since they receive from another Being (God) the inhaerentia aptitudinalis or exigentialis (S. th. III 77, 1 ad 2; aptitudo ad subiectum), that is, the disposition and need for a subject in which they may inhere. This implies that essential dependence, which belongs to the concept of accident. According to the teaching of St. Thomas, only the accident of dimensive quantity (quantitas dimensiva), that is extended quantity, is miraculously preserved in being immediately by God. The other accidents inhere in dimensive quantity as in their proximate subject. Cf. S. th. III 77, 1 and 2.

The relationship of the sacramental species to the sacramental substance is neither that of a physical inhering in the substance nor a merely outward condition of being side by side with it by reason of a positive Divine ordinance

(Scotists, Nominalists). It is an intrinsic, real connection so that the movement of the species results, without special Divine ordinance, in the movement of the body and blood of Christ.

2. The Spaceless, Spirit-form Mode of Existence of the Body of Christ

As, according to the Catholic teaching of Faith, the whole Christ is present in the Eucharist, so there are present, though Durandus († 1334) denies it, not only the Body of Christ but also the quantitas dimensiva, that is, the dimensive quantity and also the other accidents of the body of Christ. However, the Body of Christ in the Blessed Sacrament is, in fact, as the evidence of the eyes proves, not extended. In explanation of this fact, St. Thomas points out that by virtue of the Sacrament (ex vi Sacramenti) only the substance of the Body or of the Blood of Christ is present. This takes the place of the substance of bread or wine, while the extension and the other accidents are present concomitantly and as it were per accidens (concomitanter et quasi per accidens). Thus the accidents of Christ's Body are present in the Sacrament according to the mode of being of substance.

Consequently, the quantitas dimensiva of the body and blood of Christ is not present in the manner peculiar to it (secundum modum proprium), that is, not in three dimensional filling of space, but in the manner of substance (per modum substantiae), that is, without actual extension. Cf. S. th. III 76, 4. In order to make this mode of being present in the Blessed Sacrament more acceptable to human imagination, theologians distinguish two formal operations of quantity, the inner extension, that is, the ability of the Body to spread out in three dimensions, and the outer extension, that is, the filling of space in point of fact. The relationship between them is as of cause and effect. While the former belongs to the nature of the body, and for this reason is inseparable from the body, the latter can be abrogated by a miraculous intervention of God. In the Sacrament Christ's Body is present with the inner, but without the outer extension.

The mode of being of the Body of Christ in the Blessed Sacrament is the mode of being of a created spirit. For example, it is similar to that of the soul in the body. But while the created spirit is limited to a single space (definite presence), for example, the soul to one single body, Christ's Body is at one and the same time, present in many places. Thus He is in His natural mode of being in Heaven, and in His sacramental mode of existence in many places. Cf. S. th. III 76, 5 ad 1.

The following consequences flow from the spirit-form mode of existence of the Body of Christ in the Eucharist: The Body of Christ is: a) Inaccessible to the immediate influence of mechanical powers; b) Not an object of sensory perception; c) Without local movement per se, i.e., it is only moved per accidens with the species; d) Without natural sensory activity. Many theologians, for example, A. Cienfuegos (1739), and, in recent years, J. B. Franzelin and N. Gihr, assume, however, that the Divine Logos in a supernatural manner confers the use of the outward senses on Christ's body which is hypostatically united with Him even in its sacramental state.

3. Multilocation or Multipresence of the Body of Christ

The multilocation of the Body of Christ is not a circumscriptive one Christ's Body is present in its external extension (circumscriptive) in one place only, namely in Heaven. In its sacramental state however it has multipresence in so far as it is present in many places, in a sacramental manner, at one and the same time, without external extension. The multipresence is a mixed one, in so far as the Body is present with external extension in Heaven and without external extension in many places in the Sacrament. A circumscriptive multilocation is, according to St. Thomas (Quodl. 3, 2), metaphysically impossible. Scotus, Suarez, and others, on the other hand, affirm its possibility.

By multilocation the body as such is not multiplied since numerically the body remains one and the same. The multiplication is of the body's relation to space, that is, its presence. This resolves the objection that contradictions are asserted of the Body of Christ, for example, that it is simultaneously at rest and in movement or is near to and far from the same place, or is remote from itself. An intrinsic contradiction would only exist if in the same direction opposites were asserted. In point of fact, however, the opposites of the Body of Christ are in virtue of His different relations with space, namely that He is at the same time present in different modes, in several places.

SECTION 2

The Eucharist as a Sacrament

§ 13. The Sacramental Nature of the Eucharist

The Eucharist is a true Sacrament instituted by Christ. (*De fide.* D 844.)

The institution of the Blessed Eucharist by Christ is denied by modern Rationalism which holds the narrative of the Institution to be unhistorical. Cf. D 2045. Catholic teaching is that the Eucharist is a sacrament since there are present in it all the essential characteristics of a sacrament of the New Law, viz.:

1. The outward signs, i.e., the species of the bread and the wine (matter) and the words of consecration (form) which effect a permanent result.

2. The inner grace, which is indicated and operated by the outward sign, and which is, according to John 6, 27 et seq., eternal life.

3. Institution by Christ as may be seen from the words used by Him: "Do this in commemoration of Me" (Luke 22, 19; 1 Cor. 11, 24). The genuineness of this passage is guaranteed by the fact of the primitive Christian solemnisation of Holy Communion, which is not conceivable without a mandate from Christ. That Christ wished that the Eucharist should be a permanent institution is indicated also by the words of the narrative of the institution: "Blood of the Covenant" (Mt. 26, 28; Mk. 14, 24), "the New Covenant in my blood" (Luke 22, 20; 1 Cor. 11, 25). According to Christ's own words when He promised this great gift (John 6, 53 et seq.), the Eucharist is to be a source of life to all the faithful.

The sacramental species are the "sacramentum tantum," the Body and the Blood of Christ are the "res et sacramentum," the Sanctifying Grace or (according to St. Thomas), the union with the Mystical Body of Christ effected by grace, is "res or virtus sacramenti." Cf. S. th. III 73, 3 and 6. In contradistinction to the other Sacraments, the Eucharist is a permanent Sacrament (sacramentum permanens). Its beginning (in the consecration, i.e., sacramentum in fieri, consecratio, confectio), its being (sacramentum in esse), its reception (sacramentum in usu, communio) diverge in time.

§ 14. The Outward Signs of the Eucharist

1. Matter

The matter for the consummation of the Eucharist is bread and wine. (*De fide.*) D 877, 884.

a) According to the ancient custom of the Church, only wheaten bread is used for the consecration. The Decretum pro Armenis (1439) teaches with St. Thomas: cuius materia est panis triticeus. D 698; CIC 815 Par. I. Most theologians see in the use of wheaten bread a condition for validity, some, for example, G. Biel and Cajetan, only a condition for liceity.

The validity of the Sacrament is not affected by the fact that unleavened bread or, as in the Eastern Church, leavened bread is used. This was defined by the Union Council of Florence in the Decretum pro Graecis: Item (diffinimus), in azymo sive fermentato pane triticeo corpus Christi veraciter confici. D 692; CIC 816. The practice of the Latin Church seems better, since Christ in the Last Supper, according to the clear testimony of the Synopticists, used unleavened bread, probably wheaten bread. Cf. Mt. 26, 17; Mk. 14, 12; Luke 22, 7: "and the day of the unleavened bread came." In the Latin Church unleavened bread has been in use demonstrably since the 8th century. In Christian antiquity ordinary, that is leavened, bread was used also in the Eastern Church. (St. Ambrose, De sacr. IV 4, 14: panis usitatus.)

b) The second element of the Eucharist is natural grape wine (vinum de vite). D 698; CIC 815 Par. 2. At the Last Supper Christ used natural wine of grapes (Mt. 26, 29; Mk. 14, 25). The Church must follow His example, otherwise the consecration would be invalid.

Individual early heretical sects, such as the Ebionites and the Encratites, used water (Aquarii) instead of wine. The assertion that within the Catholic Church, in the 2nd century, water was used instead of wine (Harnack), contradicts the historical testimonies. Cf. St. Justin, Apol. I 65, 67; St. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. IV 18, 4; V 2, 3.

According to the custom of primitive Christianity, a certain amount of water (modicissima aqua; D 698; CIC 814) is mixed with the wine, but the validity of the Sacrament does not depend on this. The admixture of the water, which was a general practice among the Jews, as well as among the Greeks and the Romans (cf. Prov. 9, 5) and which is frequently attested to by the Fathers (St. Justin, Apol. I 65, 67; St. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. V 2, 3; Abercius-Inscription V. 16), is symbolically associated with the flowing out of the water from the open wound in Christ's side, the hypostatic unification of Christ's human nature with the Divine nature, and the mystical unification of the faithful with Christ. Cf. D 698, 945, 956. As regards the question whether the water is transmuted with the wine, Scholastic Theologians are divided in their opinion. The most probable opinion is that adopted by Innocent III, that the whole mixture is transmuted. D 416. S. th. III 74, 8.

2. Form

The form of the Eucharist consists in Christ's Words of institution, uttered at the Consecration. (*Sent. certa.*)

While the Greek-Orthodox Church wrongly placed the power of transmutation either in the Epiclesis alone, following the narrative of the institution, or in the connection of the words of institution with the Epiclesis (Confessio orth. I 107), the Catholic Church adheres firmly to the view that the priest consummates the transubstantiation solely by the uttering of the words of institution. The Decretum pro Armenis teaches with St. Thomas: "The words of the Saviour which He used when He made (confecit) this sacrament are the form of the sacrament: the priest then speaking (these words) in the person of Christ effects (conficit) this sacrament." D 698. The Council of Trent teaches that, according to the standing belief of the Church, "immediately

after the consecration," that is, after the uttering of the words of institution, the true body and the true blood of the Lord are present. D 876.

The words of institution demonstrate, at least with a high degree of probability, that at the Last Supper Jesus effected the transmutation by the words: "This is My Body," "This is My Blood," and not by a mere act of will, or by the blessing or thanksgiving, as many theologians, notably of the early period of Scholasticism, for example Innocent III (De sacro altaris mysterio IV 6), assumed. According to the mandate of Christ: "Do this in commemoration of Me," the Church must similarly complete the consecration, as did Christ, by the words of consecration.

The old Christian tradition teaches that Christ consecrated with the words of institution. Tertullian remarks: "He took bread ... and made it into His Body, by speaking: "This is my Body" (Adv. Marcionem IV 40). As far as the consecration effected by the Church is concerned, the Fathers ascribed this either to the whole prayer of thanksgiving, which is contained in the narrative of the institution, or expressly to the words of institution. According to St. Justin, the consecration occurred "by words of prayer stemming from Him (=Christ)" (Apol. I 66). According to St. Irenaeus, the bread assumes "the invocation of God" or "the Word of God" and thereby becomes the Eucharist (Adv. Haer. IV 18, 5: V 2, 3). According to Origen the bread, which is offered "with thanksgiving and prayer" becomes "through the prayer" the Body of Christ (C. Celsum VIII 33); the Eucharistic nourishment is sanctified "by God's words and prayer" (In Matth. comm. 11, 14). St. Ambrose, Ps.-Eusebius of Emesa, St. John Chrysostom expressly teach that the transmutation is effected by the words of institution of Christ. St. Ambrose explains: "The words of Christ complete therefore this Sacrament" (De sacr. IV 4, 14). St. John Chrysostom says: "The priest stands there and sets up the outward sign, while speaking these words; but the power and the grace are of God. 'This is my Body,' he says. These words transmute the gifts" (De proditione Judae hom. 1, 6). St. John of Damascus mentions both the words of institution and the Epiclesis (De fide orth. IV 13).

In agreement with Cardinal Bessarion, the words of the Epiclesis are to be taken as referring, not to the time at which they are spoken, but to the time to which they are related. That which happens in one single moment in the consecration, is liturgically developed and explained in the subsequent words of the Epiclesis. The Epiclesis has no consecratory, but only a declaratory significance. The view of H. Schell that the Greeks consecrated by the Epiclesis alone, and the Latins by the words of institution alone, must be rejected, since the substance of the Sacraments is not within the disposition of the Church. D 2147a.

To the objection that the words of institution in the Canon of the Mass refer to historical events, it is to be answered, that they acquire consecratory power by the intention of the priest. In the Roman Mass Canon the intention to change the elements is expressly uttered in the prayer, "Quam oblationem," which immediately precedes the narrative of the institution: ut nobis corpus et sanguis fiat dilectissimi Filii tui Domini nostri Jesu Christi ("the mutation Epiclesis of the Roman Mass"; Jungman).

Consecratio per contactum. In the 9th century an untenable opinion emerged that the mixing of a consecrated element with a nonconsecrated element would effect the transmutation of the latter. Amalar of Metz observed with reference to the Liturgy for Good Friday: Sanctificatur vinum non consecratum per

sanctificatum panem (the non-sanctified wine is sanctified by the sanctified bread) (De eccl. offic. I 15). This view was adopted in numerous liturgical and canonical works down well into the 12th century, and it was sought to justify it on the principle: sacrum trahit ad se non sacrum (a sacred thing assimilates a non-sacred thing to itself). It was rejected by theologians and canonists from the middle of the 12th century onwards on the ground that Transubstantiation is effected by the words of institution alone. Cf. S. th. III 83, 2 ad 2.

§ 15. The Effects of the Eucharist

1. Unification with Christ

a) The chief fruit of the Eucharist is an intrinsic union of the recipient with Christ. (*Sent. certa.*)

The Decretum pro Armenis teaches in concurrence with St. Thomas: Huius sacramenti effectus, quem in anima operatur digne sumentis, est adunatio hominis ad Christum. D 698. For the more exact determination of this union a distinction is made by the Schoolmen between the transient union (unio sacramentalis) which takes place in the sacramental partaking, and which ceases on the dissolution of the species, and the permanent spiritual union (unio spiritualis) in love and in grace. Christ is the vine, the recipient the grapes into which the supernatural life of grace flows.

Christ promised this inner communion of soul with Himself as a fruit of Holy Communion. The archetype of this union is the unity of the Son with the Father. John 6, 57: "He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood abideth in me and I in him."

The Greek Fathers, such as St. Cyril of Jerusalem, St. John Chrysostom, St. Cyril of Alexandria, speak very realistically of the union of the faithful with Christ in Holy Communion. St. Cyril of Jerusalem teaches, that by the reception of the Body and Blood of Christ the Christian becomes a "Christbearer" (χριστοφόρος) and "one body and one blood with him" (σύσσωμος και σύναιμος αὐτοῦ; Cat. Myst. 4, 3). St. Chrysostom speaks of a mixing of the Body of Christ with our body: "In order to show the great love that He has for us, He mixed Himself with us, and confused His Body with us, so that we might become one, like a head connected with the body" (In Ioan. hom. 46, 3). St. Cyril of Alexandria compares the coalescence of the communicants with Christ to the melting together of two candles into one (In Ioan. 10, 2 [15, 1]).

b) From the unity of the faithful with Christ the Head of the Mystical Body there flows the unity of the faithful as the members of the Mystical Body, with one another; homo Christo incorporatur et membris eius unitur (D 698). St. Paul based the unity of the faithful on the partaking of the same Eucharistic bread: "Because we being many are one bread, one body; all that partake of one bread." (1 Cor. 10, 17.)

In the preparation of the bread from many grains of corn and of the wine from many grapes the Fathers see a symbol of the union of the faithful in the one Mystical Body which is effected by the Holy Communion. Cf. Didache 9, 4; St. Cyprian, Ep. 63, 13; St. John Chrysostom, In ep. I. ad Cor. hom. 24, 2. St. Augustine who by preference stresses the incorporation in the Mystical

Body of Christ as a fruit of Holy Communion, glorifies the Eucharist as "a sign of unity" and as "a bond of charity": O sacramentum pietatis! O signum unitatis! O vinculum caritatis! (In Ioan. tr. 26, 13). St. Thomas also regards the Eucharist as the "Sacrament of Church unity" (S. th. III 82, 2 ad 3).

2. Preservation and Increase of Supernatural Life

The Eucharist, as food for the soul, preserves and increases the supernatural life of the soul. (*Sent. certa.*)

In agreement with St. Thomas (S. th. III 79, 1), the Decretum pro Armenis teaches: "Every effect which bodily food and bodily drink give to corporeal life, by preserving, increasing, restoring and refreshing it (sustentando, augendo, reparando et delectando) is produced by this Sacrament in the spiritual life." D 698.

a) The Eucharist preserves the supernatural life of the soul by conferring supernatural life and power on the recipient, by indirectly weakening evil concupiscence through the deepening of Charity, and by reinforcing the power of the will, so that it can withstand the temptations of sin. The Council of Trent designates the Eucharist as "an antidote by which we are preserved from grievous sins" (D 875). Cf. S. th. III 79, 6.

b) The Eucharist increases the life of grace already present by strengthening and confirming the supernatural habit of grace and with it the associated infused virtues and gifts of the Holy Ghost. The Council of Trent rejected the teaching of the Reformers that the remission of sins is the principal fruit of the Eucharist. D 887. Cf. S. th. III 79, 3.

c) The Eucharist cures the diseases of the soul by purging it of venial sins and the temporal punishments due to sin. The Council of Trent calls it "an antidote by which we are freed from our daily (=venial) sins" (D 875). The remission of venial sins and of the temporal punishment of sins takes place immediately by reason of the acts of perfect charity, which are awakened by the reception of the Sacrament, and it is proportioned to the intensity of these acts of Charity. Cf. S. th. III 79, 4 and 5.

d) The Eucharist engenders a spiritual joy, which effects in the recipient an impulse to a joyful defence of Christ, and to a joyful acceptance of the duties and sacrifices of the Christian life. Cf. S. th. III 79, 1 ad 2.

3. Pledge of Heavenly Bliss and of Future Resurrection

The Eucharist is a pledge of heavenly bliss and of the future resurrection of the body. (*Sent. certa.*)

The Council of Trent calls the Eucharist "a pledge of our future glory and perpetual bliss" (D 875). Jesus says in the promissory discourse: "He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my Blood hath everlasting life; and I will raise him up in the last day." (John 6, 55.)

Supported by the words of Holy Writ, the Fathers, in the struggle against the Gnostic denial of the Resurrection of the flesh, see in the partaking of the Eucharist a certain guarantee for the future resurrection of the body. St. Ignatius of Antioch calls the Eucharist "a means of help towards

immortality" and "an antidote by means of which one does not die, but lives forever in Jesus Christ" (Eph. 20, 2). St. Irenaeus argues against the Gnostics: "When our bodies partake of the Eucharist, they are no longer corruptible, as they have the hope of eternal Resurrection." (Adv. haer. IV 18, 5; cf. V 2, 2 et seq.)

The effects of Holy Communion achieved ex opere operato accrue to the recipient only. The effects gained ex opere operantis can, by reason of the communion of the saints, also redound by way of intercession to others, living and dead.

§ 16. The Necessity of the Eucharist

1. For Young Children

a) For children before the age of reason the reception of the Eucharist is not necessary for salvation. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent declared in opposition to the teaching of Calvinistic and of Greek-Orthodox theologians: Si quis dixerit, parvulis, antequam ad annos discretionis pervenerint, necessariam esse Eucharistiae communionem, A.S. D 937. Cf. D 933, 1922. No necessity, either of precept (necessita, praecepti) or of means (necessitas medii), exists.

According to the unanimous teaching of Holy Scripture and of Tradition Baptism alone is sufficient for the attaining of eternal bliss. Cf. Mk. 16, 16: "He that believeth and is baptised shall be saved." Rom. 8, 1: "There is therefore no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus." But already we are in Christ by reason of our Baptism. The justifying grace achieved by Baptism cannot be lost before the attaining of the use of reason, since young children are incapable of a personal sin. D 933.

St. Augustine (De peccat. meritis et remissione I 20, 27; 24, 34) refers even to young children the words of John 6, 53 (Vulg. 54): "Except you eat the flesh of the Son of man and drink His Blood, you shall not have life in you"; but he does not understand them exclusively of the sacramental, but also of the spiritual partaking of the flesh and blood of Christ, that is, of incorporation in the Body of Christ, which begins in Baptism and is completed in the Eucharist (ib. III 4, 8). Supported by St. Augustine, St. Thomas teaches that, according to the intention of the Church, baptised persons should desire the Eucharist, since Baptism is directed towards the Eucharist, which perfects the work of Baptism, i.e., incorporation into the Body of Christ. S. th. III 73, 3.

2. For Adults

For adults the reception of the Eucharist is necessary for salvation with the necessity of precept (necessitate praecepti). (*Sent. certa.*)

a) The divine precept, which finds expression in the words of institution, is expressly uttered in Christ's promise of the Eucharist, John 6, 53, in which the possession of Eternal Life is made dependent on the partaking of His body and blood. The Church more closely determined the divine precept

by commanding at the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) and at the Council of Trent, reception once a year, and at Easter, as a minimum duty. D 437, 891 : CIC 859. The obligation begins as soon as the faithful reach the years of discretion, that is, the use of reason, i.e., approximately in the seventh year. (D 2137.)

b) Reception of the Blessed Eucharist is not necessary by an absolute necessity of means (necessitas medii), but by a relative or moral necessity. A Christian who freely neglects for a long time the reception of the Blessed Eucharist, is morally unable to preserve himself in the state of grace for any long time. Cf. John 6, 53. It follows from the definition of the purpose of the Eucharist as nourishment for the soul, that without it supernatural life cannot be permanently maintained.

3. Validity of Communion under One Form

Communion under two forms is not necessary for any individual member of the Faithful, either by reason of Divine precept or as a means of salvation. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent, following the precedent of the Council of Constance, rejected the teaching of th Hussites and the Reformers, who maintained Communion under both forms to be necessary (Utraquists). It authorised the reception of Communion under one form: Si quis dixerit, ex Dei praecepto vel ex necessitate salutis omnes et singulos Christi fideles utramque speciem sanctissimi Eucharistiae sacramenti sumere debere. A.S. D 934. Cf. D 626. The reason is that Christ is whole and entire under each species.

The words spoken by Christ in His promise of the Eucharist (John 6, 52 et seq.) are not to be cited against this doctrine since Christ indeed demands the eating of His flesh and the drinking of His Blood, but gives no binding indication as to the manner in which they are to be partaken. Cf. D 930. In early Christian times, by way of exception Communion was received under one form, in Communion at home, in Communion of the sick and in the Communion of children. The abolition of the reception from the chalice in the Middle Ages (12th and 13th centuries) was enjoined for practical reasons, particularly danger of profanation of the Sacrament. S. th. III 80, 12.

§ 17. The Minister of the Eucharist

1. The Power of Consecration

The power of consecration resides in a validly consecrated priest only. (*De fide.*)

Against the Waldenses, who rejected the hierarchy and claimed equal powers for all the faithful, the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) declared: "This Sacrament can be consecrated by a legitimately ordained priest only." D 430. Cf. D 424. Against the Reformers' teaching of the general lay-priesthood, the Council of Trent defined the institution of a special priesthood, to which the power of consecration is reserved solely. D 961, 949.

Having regard to the hierarchical constitution of the Church it must be accepted that the mandate of Christ: "Do this in commemoration of Me"

(Luke 22, 19; 1 Cor. 11, 24), was addressed exclusively to the Apostles and to their successors. What is decisive in this matter is that Tradition always refers this mandate to the Apostles and to their successors in the priesthood (i.e., the bishops and the presbyters), and considered them only to be the perfecters of the Sacred Mysteries. According to St. Justin (Apol. I 65): "the overseer of the brethren," that is, the bishop, performs the Eucharist, while the deacons communicate the Eucharistic bread, wine and water to each of those present, and bring them to those who are absent. Cf. St. Cyprian, Ep. 63, 14; 76, 3. The Council of Nice (can. 18) grants to deacons the power of bringing Holy Communion, but expressly denies them the power of consecration.

From the passages Acts 13, 1 et seq., Did. 10, 7.13, 3; 15, 1, it may be inferred with a high degree of probability that the charismatically-gifted "Prophets" of the Primitive Church also celebrated the Eucharist. It does not contradict the Tridentine dogma to assume that they possessed the sacerdotal powers on the ground of an immediate Divine vocation just as the Apostles did (cf. Gal. 1, 1; S. th. III 64, 3).

2. Minister

The ordinary minister of the Eucharist is the priest; the extraordinary minister is the deacon (with permission of the local Ordinary or of the parish priest for some weighty reason). CIC 845.

St. Thomas bases the congruity of the priestly privilege on the connection between Communion and Consecration, on the position of the priest as mediator between God and the people, and on the reverence due to the Sacrament, which demands, that apart from a case of necessity, only the consecrated hand of the priest touch It. S. th. III 82, 3. During the period when the Communion was dispensed under both forms, the Bishop or the priest dispensed the Sacred Body, and the deacon dispensed the Sacred Blood. Cf. St. Cyprian, De lapsis 25.

§ 18. The Recipient of the Eucharist

The Council of Trent (D 881) distinguishes three types of reception: 1. The merely sacramental reception, that is, the sacramental reception in the state of grievous sin (unworthy Communion); 2. The merely spiritual reception, that is, the desire for the Sacrament deriving from living faith (spiritual Communion); 3. The sacramental-spiritual reception, that is, the sacramental reception in the state of grace (worthy Communion). To these must be added, 4. The purely material reception by an unsuitable subject, an unbaptised person or an animal.

1 Conditions for Valid Reception

The Sacrament of the Eucharist can be validly received by every baptised person in the wayfaring state, including young children. (*De fide.*) D 933.

In Christian antiquity young children also received the Eucharist. Cf. St. Cyprian, De lapsis 25; Const. Apost. VIII 13, 14.

2. Conditions for Worthy Reception

For the worthy reception of the Eucharist the state of grace as well as the proper and pious disposition are necessary. (*De fide* as regards the state of grace.)

The Council of Trent condemned the teaching of the Reformers that faith alone (fides informis) is a sufficient preparation for the reception of the Eucharist (D 893). At the same time it decreed that those in mortal sin must first receive the Sacrament of Penance, if an opportunity for receiving it offers itself. Only in a case of necessity may a person receiving be satisfied with a perfect contrition. D 880, 893. CIC 807, 856. On the other hand, the Church rejected the rigorous demands of the Jansenists, who demanded a condign expiation for sins committed and an entirely pure love of God as preparation for Holy Communion (D 1312 et seq.). In the Communion Decree (1905) Pius X declared that nobody may be turned away from the Sacred Table, who approaches it in the state of grace and who has the proper and pious disposition, that is, the desire to receive for a supernatural motive. D 1985.

Since the measure of the grace conferred ex operato is in proportion to the subjective disposition of the recipient, the reception of Holy Communion should be preceded by a good preparation, and an appropriate thanksgiving should follow it. D 1988.

The necessity for a state of grace is biblically founded in the earnest exhortation of St. Paul: 1 Cor. 11, 28: "So let a man prove himself, and so let him eat of that bread and drink of the chalice." The washing of the feet which preceded the Eucharist (John 13, 4 et seq.), is not merely a lesson in humility, but also a symbolical expression of the purity of conscience demanded for the Eucharist. (Cf. V. 10.)

From the beginning the Fathers demand Baptism and purity of conscience as a pre-condition for the fruitful reception of the Eucharist. Cf. Didache 9, 5; 10, 6; 14, 1; St. Justin, Apol. I 66. In the Oriental Liturgies the priest (bishop) before the dispensing of the Holy Communion calls to the faithful: "The Holy of Holies" (τὰ ἅγια τοῖς ἁγίοις). St. Augustine demands that the communicants approach the altar with pure consciences: Innocentiam ad altare apportate (In Ioan. tr. 26, 11).

An unworthy Communion is a sacrilege. Cf. 1 Cor. 11, 27: "Therefore, whosoever shall eat this bread, or drink the chalice of the Lord unworthily, shall be guilty of the body and of the blood of the Lord. 29. For he that eateth and drinketh unworthily eateth and drinketh judgment to himself, not discerning the body of the Lord." The direct sins against God (hatred of God, blasphemy of God) and against the humanity of Christ (Crucifixion, betrayal by Judas) are, however, objectively more grievous sins than the profanation of the Sacrament of the body and blood of Christ. Cf. S. th. III 80, 5.

Out of reverence for the Sacrament and in order to prevent abuse (cf. 1 Cor. 11, 21), the Church from ancient times demands a natural fast from midnight as bodily preparation for the worthy reception of the Eucharist. D 626; CIC 858. St. Augustine, speaking of the custom existing at his time "over the whole earth," and which was already attested by Tertullian (Ad uxorem II 5) and St. Hippolytus (Trad. Apost.), of receiving the Eucharist fasting (except on the

anniversary of its institution), refers it to the ordinance of the Holy Ghost. As a reason for this he gives "the honour due to so sublime a Sacrament." (Ep. 54, 6, 8.) Cf. the Apostolic Constitution "Christus Dominus" of Pius XII.

Notable changes in the law concerning the Eucharistic Fast have been introduced by the Apostolic Constitution of Pope Pius XII "Christus Dominus," Its provisions may be thus summarised:

1) Natural water (hot or cold) no longer breaks the Eucharistic Fast.

2) With the necessary permission of a confessor (which may be given intra or extra confession), a person who is ill, even if not confined to bed, may take non-alcoholic liquid or any non-alcoholic necessary medicine (liquid or solid), if without this concession the observance of the Eucharistic fast would cause grave inconvenience. This permission remains valid as long as the reason for it remains, unless the confessor has set a time-limit for its validity. It applies also to priests who are ill and who need the concession so that they may celebrate Mass. Priests may avail of this concession without recourse to a confessor.

3) Priests who have to celebrate Mass at a late hour, or after performing heavy and lengthy duties in the sacred ministry or after a long journey may take liquid non-alcoholic nourishment, even repeatedly, up to a period of one hour before saying Mass. A late hour is interpreted by the Holy Office as after 9 a.m. Priests may avail of this concession without recourse to a confessor.

4) Priests who celebrate two or three Masses on the same day—if there be an interval between the Masses—may take the ablutions prescribed by the Rubrics at the first Mass or Masses but they may use water only for these ablutions. If through inadvertence the priest takes wine at the ablutions he may, nevertheless, say his subsequent Masses.

5) With the necessary permission of a confessor, persons may take liquid food up to one hour before Holy Communion, if otherwise they could not receive Holy Communion without grave inconvenience by reason of: i) their fatiguing work, or, ii) the lateness of the hour at which they receive; or, iii) the length of the journey to the Church. The Instruction gives examples of fatiguing work: work at night-shifts in factories, transport services, docks, etc.; nurses and night-watchmen on night duty; pregnant women and also mothers who have to spend a long time at domestic duties before receiving. The list is not exhaustive. By way of example of a late hour, which excuses, the Instruction mentions the case of people in whose district the first Mass is at a late hour. As regards length of journey, the journey to the church must not be less than one mile and a quarter on foot. In the case of a bicycle it would probably be about four miles and for a car about twenty miles.

6) Ordinaries of places may permit evening Masses (after 4 p.m.) in circumstances demanded by the common good, e.g., to meet the needs of operatives of night-shift or on the occasion of religious and social reunions to which the faithful come from a long distance.

In non-missionary territories this permission may be granted only: i) on the days of precept mentioned in canon 1247; ii) on the suppressed holidays of

obligation listed in the Index published by the Congregation of the Council on December 28th, 1919 ; iii) on the First Friday of each month ; iv) on other feasts which are celebrated by large gatherings of the faithful ; v) on one other day of the week if this be necessary to meet the needs of particular classes of people.

In missionary territories it may be granted any day.

The priests who celebrate these evening Masses and the faithful who receive at them must be fasting from solid food for three hours previously. At the meal permitted up to three hours before the beginning of Mass or the reception of Holy Communion, the customary alcoholic beverages such as wine, beer, etc. may be taken in due moderation but spirits (whiskey, brandy, etc.) are forbidden. Non-alcoholic liquid nourishment may be taken up to an hour, for the priest, before the evening Mass, or, for the faithful, before Holy Communion.

The faithful who do not belong to the classes for whom the evening Mass is arranged may nevertheless receive Holy Communion immediately before, during or after these Masses provided they observe the special fasting rules laid down in this section.

SECTION 3

The Eucharist as a Sacrifice

CHAPTER I

The Reality of the Sacrifice of the Mass

§ 19. The Sacrificial Character of the Eucharist according to the Teaching of the Church

For the concept of Sacrifice see Doctrine of the Redemption. Par. 8, 1.

1. Teaching of the Church

The Holy Mass is a true and proper Sacrifice. (*De fide.*)

Against the attacks of the Reformers who rejected the sacrificial character of the Eucharist or accepted it only as a sacrifice in an imperfect sense, the Council of Trent declared that the Eucharist is a true and proper Sacrifice: Si quis dixerit, in Missa non offerri Deo verum et proprium sacrificium, aut quod offerri non sit aliud quam nobis Christum ad manducandum dari. (If anybody says that in the Mass a true and proper sacrifice is not offered or that the offering of Mass is not something other than that Christ is given to us that we may partake of Him). A.S. D 948. Prior to the Reformers, Wycliffe denied the institution by Christ of the sacrifice of the Mass. D 585.

The serious accusations of the Reformers proceed from the false presupposition that the sacrifice of the Mass according to Catholic teaching, is an independent sacrifice side by side with the Sacrifice of Christ on the Cross, and that in virtue of the sacrificial activity of the priest it confers ex opere operato forgiveness of personal sins and punishments of sins (Apologia Conf. Art. 24). Cf. Luther, Articuli Smalc. P. II Art. 2; Calvin, Inst. christ. rel. IV 18, 1–3; Heidelberg Catechism, Question 80 ("a cursed idolatry").

2. Difference between Sacrament and Sacrifice.

Although the Sacrament and the Sacrifice of the Eucharist are performed by the same consecration, still they are conceptually distinct. The Eucharist is a Sacrament in so far as in it Christ is partaken as nourishment for the soul; it is a sacrifice in so far as in it Christ is offered as a sacrificial gift to God: rationem sacrificii habet, inquantum offertur, rationem sacramenti autem, inquantum sumitur, et ideo effectum sacramenti habet in eo, qui sumit, effectum autem sacrificii in eo, qui offert vel in his, pro quibus offertur (it has the nature of a sacrifice in that it is offered up, and it has the nature of a sacrament in that it is received, and hence it has the effect of a sacrament in him who receives it and the effect of a sacrifice in him who offers or in those for whom it is offered). S. th. III 79, 5. The Sacrament is directed immediately to the sanctification of men, the sacrifice to the glorification of God. As a Sacrament, the Eucharist is a permanent reality (res permanens); as a sacrifice it is a transient action (actio transiens).

§ 20. The sacrificial character of the Eucharist according to the testimony of Holy Writ

1. Proof from the Old Testament

a) The sacrifice of Melchisedech as archetype of the Sacrifice of the Mass.

Gn. 14, 18 et seq. narrates: "But Melchisedech the king of Salem, bringing forth bread and wine, for he was the priest of the most high God, blessed him" (=Abraham). According to the traditional interpretation, Melchisedech brought out bread and wine (proferens, not offerens), in order to offer a sacrifice to God, as was customary in the celebrations of victory, and not for the refreshment of the weary warriors. This interpretation is affirmed by the express indication of Melchisedech's priesthood. The specific priestly activity is sacrifice. Christ, according to the Messianic prophecy of Psalm 109, 4, which the Epistle to the Hebrews (5, 6; 7, 1 et seq.) confirms, is a Priest according to the order of Melchisedech, that is, He is King and Priest at the same time, and according to the interpretation of Tradition, offers a sacrifice similar to that of Melchisedech. This Sacrifice can only refer to the proffering of His Body and Blood under the forms of bread and wine at the Last Supper and in the Holy Mass.

Both the Jewish (Philo) and the Christian tradition assume that Melchisedech offered sacrifice to God with bread and wine. In the sacrifice of Melchisedech the Fathers see the archetype of the Eucharistic sacrifice. St. Augustine says: "The sacrifice appeared for the first time there which is now offered to God by Christians throughout the whole world" (De civ. Dei XVI 22). Cf. St. Cyprian, Ep. 63, 4; St. Jerome, In Matth. IV 26, 26; Prayer of the Canon "Supra quae."

b) The prophecy of the Prophet Malachy.

In Mal. 1, 10 et seq. God speaks through the mouth of the Prophet to the Jewish priests: "I have no pleasure in you, saith the Lord of Hosts; and I will not receive a gift of your hand. 11. For from the rising of the sun even to the going down, my name is great among the Gentiles: and in every place there is sacrifice, and there is offered to my name a clean oblation. For my name is great among the Gentiles, saith the Lord of Hosts."

God is here proclaiming the abolition of the Jewish cult of sacrifice and forecasting a new, clean sacrifice. This is not the sacrifice of the heathens or of the proselytes or of the Diaspora Jews, for the former were not clean oblations on account of their desecration through the service of idols (cf. 1 Cor. 10, 20), and the latter were not proffered "in all parts." In addition, the sacrifices offered outside Jerusalem by the Diaspora Jews were deemed unlawful. The universality of the veneration of God and of the new sacrifice which is proclaimed in the prophecy points clearly to the Messianic era (cf. Ps. 21, 28 et seq.; Is. 49, 6). The Sacrifice of the Cross cannot be meant, as this was offered in one place only. The prophecy is fulfilled in the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass, which is offered "in all parts" (in the sense of a moral universality), and which, in view of the sacrificial gift and of the primary sacrificing priest, is a clean oblation. Cf. D 939.

The oldest tradition referred the Prophecy of Malachy to the Eucharist. Cf. Didache, 14, 3; St. Justin, Dial. 41; St. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. IV 17, 5; St. Augustine, Tract. adv. Jud. 9, 13.

c) Isaias proclaims a priesthood from among the Gentiles for the Messianic era : "And I will take of them to be priests and Levites saith the Lord" (66, 21). A special priestly status is, according to the Old Testament view, not conceivable without sacrifice.

2. Proof from the New Testament

a) Institution of the Sacrifice of the Mass.

Pointing to the sacrificial character of the Eucharist is the very fact that Christ made His Body and His Blood present under separate forms and thus in the form of a sacrifice. The separate forms symbolically represent the real separation of the Body and Blood of Christ which was made in the Sacrifice of the Cross.

The words of institution attest the sacrificial character of the Eucharist. Christ designates His Body a sacrificial Body and His blood, sacrificial blood, when He declares : "This is My Body which shall be given up for you": "This is My Blood, which shall be shed for you." The expressions "to give up the body," "to shed blood" are biblical sacrificial terms, which express the oblation of a true and proper sacrifice.

Again, Christ designates His Blood as the Blood of the Covenant.

As the Old Covenant of God with Israel was concluded by the proffering of bloody sacrifice (Ex. 24, 8 : "This is the blood of the Covenant which the Lord hath made with you"), the blood of the Covenant is synonymous, according to the biblical conception, with blood of sacrifice.

That the action of the Sacrifice is consummated in the present time is indicated by the present form of the participles διδόμενον (Lk.) and ἐκχυννόμενον (Mt., Mk., Luke), even if these do not exclude a reference to the proximate future. Especially to be noted is Luke 22, 20, where the pouring-out of the chalice is asserted (*τοῦτο τὸ ποτήριον · · · τὸ ὑπερ ὑμῶν ἐκχυννόμενον*) and thereby reference made to the present-day Eucharistic celebration. It follows from the mandate, : "Do this in commemoration of Me" (Luke 22, 19 ; cf. 1 Cor. 11, 24), that the Eucharistic Sacrifice is to be a permanent institution of the New Testament.

b) Indications of the sacrifice of the Mass.

Hebr. 13, 10 : "We have an altar whereof they have no power to eat who serve the Tabernacle." The "eating from the Altar" designates the partaking of the food of sacrifice, which is offered on the altar. The assertion must be taken as referring either in the literal sense to the partaking of the Eucharist, or in the metaphorical sense to the participation in the fruit of Christ's Sacrifice on the Cross. The context appears to favour the latter explanation (cf. V. 11 et seq.).

1 Cor. 10, 16–21 draws a parallel between the partaking of the Eucharist and the partaking of Jewish and pagan sacrificial foods : The participation in "the table of the Lord" and the participation in "the table of the demons" are mutually exclusive. V. 21 : "You cannot drink the chalice of the Lord and the chalice of the devils ; you cannot be partakers of the table of the Lord and of the table of the devils." The argument appears to presuppose that the Eucharist is a sacrificial food ; but sacrificial food implies a preceding sacrifice. Cf. D 939.

§ 21. The Sacrificial Character of the Eucharist according to the Testimony of Tradition

1. Pre-Nicene Witnesses

A. Harnack and F. Wieland maintained that the Church of the first two centuries knew only a subjective spiritual sacrifice of praise, of thanksgiving and of adoration. It was St. Irenaeus (according to Harnack, St. Cyprian) who first substituted an objective, tangible sacrifice for the subjective sacrifice, namely, the body and blood of Christ. But it is clear from the oldest witnesses of Tradition that the Church has always seen in the Eucharist an objective gift-sacrifice. The Didache (c. 14) gives the direction : " On the day of the Lord collect together, break bread and give thanks, after having first confessed your sins, so that your sacrifice (θυσία) may be a clean one. 2. Nobody who has a dispute with his neighbour should join the assembly, until they are reconciled, so that your sacrifice may not be desecrated. 3. For this (the sacrifice), is that of which the Lord saith : In this place and at that time a clean sacrifice shall be brought to me : 'for I am a great King, saith the Lord of Hosts, and my name is dreadful among the Gentiles' " (Mal. 1, 11. 14). The equiparation of the Eucharistic sacrifice with the sacrifice prophesied by Malachy, and the play upon the words in Mt. 5, 23 et seq. (" if therefore thou offer thy gift at the altar " etc.), vouch for the fact that the Eucharist is conceived as an outward sacrificial gift.

According to St. Clement of Rome (about 96), the function of the bishops consists in the presentation of the sacrificial gifts. 1 Cor. 44, 4 : " It will be no small sin for us if we crush out from the episcopate those who blamelessly and holily have offered the gifts." The expression " offered the gifts " (προσφέρειν τὰ δῶρα) suggests a tangible sacrificial gift.

St. Ignatius of Antioch († about 107) indicates the sacrificial character of the Eucharist by speaking in the same context of the Eucharist and of the altar ; but the altar is the place of sacrifice (θυσιαστήριον) Philad. 4 : " Be careful, therefore, to celebrate only one Eucharist ; for there is only one flesh of our Lord Jesus Christ and only one chalice of unification with His Blood, only one altar, as there is only one bishop with the presbyters and the deacons." Cf. Eph. 5, 2.

St. Justin Martyr († about 165) sees in the wheaten meal sacrifice offered by those cured of leprosy a prototype of the Eucharist. The clean sacrifice foretold by Malachy, which will be offered everywhere, is, according to him : " the bread of the Eucharist and the chalice of the Eucharist " (Dial. 41).

But the bread of the Eucharist is, according to Apol. I 66, the flesh of Christ, and the chalice of the Eucharist is His Blood. According to Dial. 117 St. Justin appears wrongly to place on a similar level the Eucharistic sacrifice and the prayers and thanksgivings made in the celebration of the Eucharist : " That prayers and thanksgivings offered by worthy persons are alone perfect and pleasing sacrifices to God, I also maintain. For only this has been handed down by Tradition to the Christians to do." The comment is directed against the material Jewish sacrifices. It does not exclude the possibility of the Body and

Blood of Christ, together with the prayers and thanksgivings, under which they are offered, being conceived as the sacrificial gifts of the Christians.

St. Irenaeus of Lyons († about 202) teaches that the flesh and blood of Christ : "are the new sacrifices of the New Covenant which have been handed down to the Church by the Apostles, and which She, throughout the whole world, offers to God." It is the fulfilment of the prophecy of Malachias (Adv. haer. IV 17, 5 ; cf. IV 18, 2 and 4).

Tertullian († after 220) designates the participation in the celebration of the Eucharist as a "standing at the altar of God" and the Holy Communion as "participation in the sacrifice" (participatio sacrificii ; De orat. 19).

St. Cyprian († 258) teaches that Christ as a Priest after the order of Melchisedech "offers a sacrifice to God the Father, and indeed, the same sacrifice as Melchisedech offered, that is, bread and wine, namely, His Body and His Blood" (Ep. 63, 4). "The priest who imitates that which Christ did, truly takes the place of Christ, and offers there in the Church a true and perfect sacrifice to God the Father, when he begins to sacrifice in the same manner, as he sees, that Christ sacrificed Himself" (Ep. 63, 14).

2. Post-Nicene Witnesses

The outstanding witnesses of the post-Nicene era are St. Cyril of Alexandria, St. John Chrysostom, St. Ambrose, and St. Augustine.

St. Cyril of Jerusalem († 386), in the fifth Mystagogical Catechesis, gives a description of the celebration of the Eucharistic ceremony customary at his time. He designates the consummation of the Eucharist as a spiritual sacrifice, as an unbloody Divine service, as a sacrifice of reconciliation (n. 8). The sacrificial gift is : "The Christ who was slain for our sins" (n. 10).

St. John Chrysostom († 407) establishes the sublime dignity of the Catholic priesthood especially in the sublimity of the Eucharistic sacrifice, whose sacrificial gift is Christ the Lord Himself (De sacerd. III 4). He exhorts : "Have therefore reverence, have reverence before this table, of which we all participate, before Christ, who was slain for us, before the sacrifice, which lies on the table" (In Rom. hom. 8, 8).

St. Ambrose († 397) teaches that in the sacrifice of the Mass, Christ is at one and the same time sacrificial gift and sacrificing priest : "Even if one does not now see that Christ is sacrificed, still He Himself is sacrificed on earth, whenever the body of Christ is sacrificed. Yea, it is obvious that He even offers Himself in us, for His Word sanctifies the sacrifice which is offered" (In Ps. 38, 25).

St. Augustine († 430) attests that : "the daily sacrifice of the Church" is the Sacrament, that is, the mysterious replica of the Sacrifice of Christ on the Cross which was made once and for all time, and in which Christ was the sacrificing Priest and the sacrificial Gift in one Person (De civ. Dei X 20 ; Ep. cf. 98, 9). The sacrifice offered by Christians is the universal sacrifice foretold by Malachy (Tract. adv. Jud. 9, 13).

Like the Fathers, the ancient Mass Liturgies attest the sacrificial character of the Eucharist. Cf. the sacrificial prayer (anaphora) of Serapion of Thmuis and the prayer subsequent to the consecration in the Roman Mass Canon.

Scholasticism reiterated the standpoint of the Fathers in all essentials. Cf. S. th. III 83, 1. The numerous explanations of the Mass current during the Middle Ages are directed rather to the liturgical than the dogmatic side of the Sacrifice of the Mass. A deeper foundation and speculative development of the doctrine of the Mass Sacrifice was reserved for theologians in modern times.

CHAPTER 2

The Nature of the Sacrifice of the Mass

§ 22. The Relation of the Sacrifice of the Mass to the Sacrifice of the Cross

1. Relative Character of the Sacrifice of the Mass

In the Sacrifice of the Mass, Christ's Sacrifice on the Cross is made present, its memory is celebrated, and its saving power is applied. (*De fide.*)

While the Sacrifice on the Cross is an absolute sacrifice, as it is neither the commemoration of a past sacrifice nor the archetype of a future sacrifice, the Sacrifice of the Mass is a relative sacrifice, as it is essentially linked to the Sacrifice on the Cross. The Council of Trent teaches : Christ left a visible Sacrifice to His Church : " in which that bloody sacrifice which was once offered on the Cross should be made present, its memory preserved to the end of the world, and its salvation-bringing power applied to the forgiveness of the sins which are daily committed by us." D 938.

On the ground of this explanation the relation of the Sacrifice of the Mass to the Sacrifice of the Cross may be more closely defined as a making-present (repraesentatio), a memorial (memoria), and an application (applicatio). The sacrifice of the Mass is the presenting again of the Sacrifice of the Cross, in so far as the sacrificial Body and the sacrificial Blood of Christ are made present under separate species, thus symbolically representing the real separation of the body and blood of Christ on the Cross. Again, the Sacrifice of the Mass is a commemoration of the Sacrifice of the Cross which continues until the end of time, as the anamnesis following the consecration specially indicates. But it is not a mere commemorative celebration (D 950) ; it is also a true and proper sacrifice. Finally, the sacrifice of the Mass is the means whereby the fruits of the Sacrifice of the Cross are applied to mankind in need of salvation. The Roman Catechism defines the relation of the Sacrifice of the Mass to the Sacrifice of the Cross as a renewal (instauratio : II 4, 68. 74).

It follows from the relativity of the Sacrifice of the Mass that it in no way detracts from the Sacrifice of the Cross. The Sacrifice of the Mass draws its whole power from the Sacrifice of the Cross, whose fruits it applies to individual men. Cf. D 951.

In the Holy Scriptures the relation of the Sacrifice of the Mass to the Sacrifice of the Cross is indicated in the words of institution (giving of the body, shedding of the blood), in the mandate of Christ: "Do this in commemoration of Me," and especially in the explanation which St. Paul adds to these words: "For as often as you shall eat this bread and drink the chalice, you shall show forth the death of the Lord, until He come" (1 Cor. 11, 26).

Among the Fathers, St. Justin mentions the commemoration of the Passion of the Lord in connection with the celebration of the Eucharist. (Dial. 117, 3.) Cf. St. Cyprian, Ep. 63, 9 and 17.

2. Essential Identity of the Sacrifice of the Mass with the Sacrifice of the Cross

In the Sacrifice of the Mass and in the Sacrifice of the Cross the Sacrificial Gift and the Primary Sacrificing Priest are identical; only the nature and mode of the offering are different. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent declared: Una eademque est hostia, idem nunc offerens sacerdotum ministerio, qui se ipsum tunc in cruce obtulit, sola offerendi ratione diversa (the Host is One and the Same; He is the Same Who now offers Himself through the ministry of His priests and Who then by Himself offered Himself on the Cross. The difference lies solely in the mode of offering). D 940. Cf. the Encyclical "Mediator Dei" of Pius XII (1947).

The sacrificial gift is the Body and Blood of Christ, and by concomitance, the whole God-Man Jesus Christ. The sacramental species confer a sensible presence on the sacrificial gift, but do not themselves belong to the sacrificial gift. The Primary Sacrificing Priest is Jesus Christ, who utilises the human priest as His servant and representative and fulfils the consecration through him. According to the Thomistic view, in every Mass Christ also performs an actual immediate sacrificial activity, which, however, must not be conceived as a totality of many successive acts but as one single uninterrupted sacrificial act of the Transfigured Christ.

The purpose of the Sacrifice is the same in the Sacrifice of the Mass as in the Sacrifice of the Cross; primarily the glorification of God, secondarily atonement, thanksgiving, and appeal.

While the sacrificial gift and the Primary Sacrificing Priest are numerically identical, the outward sacrificial action is numerically and specifically distinct. On the Cross the sacrificial gift was offered in a bloody manner by a real separation of the body and blood (immolatio realis), in the Holy Mass it is offered in an unbloody manner by a mystical separation of the body and blood (immolatio mystica).

§ 23. The Physical Nature of the Sacrifice of the Mass

The question at issue regarding the physical nature of the sacrifice of the Mass is: Which constituent part of the Holy Mass is the sacrificial action properly so called?

1. Negative Determination

a) The essential sacrificial action cannot lie in the Offertory; for the sacrificial gift properly so-called is not the bread and the wine but Christ's Body and Blood

(D 949 : ut . . . offerrent corpus et sanguinem suum). The offering of bread and wine serves only as a preparation for the sacrifices.

b) Again, the priest's Communion cannot be regarded as the essential sacrificial action. The sacrificial banquet does not appertain to the essence of the sacrifice ; for there are also true sacrifices without sacrificial food, for example, the sacrifice of Christ on the Cross. The partaking of the sacrificial nourishment presupposes the consummation of the sacrifice. Further, the Communion is not accomplished in the name of Christ, the primary sacrificial Priest ; it is not, as is the sacrifice, primarily directed to the honour of God, but to the profit of the recipient himself ; and it is not an appropriate representation of Christ's Sacrifice. Nor does the teaching of the Council of Trent favour the equiparation of the essential sacrificial action with the Communion, when it says : "If anyone says that the offering of Mass is not something other than that Christ is given to us that we may partake of Him," A.S. (D 948).

c) Again, the essential sacrificial action is not made up of the Communion of the priest in conjunction with the Consecration, as many maintain who favour the Destruction Theory. According to this theory the essence of the sacrifice is the destruction of the sacrificial gift (e.g., St. Bellarmine, J. De Lugo). Quite apart from the validity of the notions underlying the theory we note that, in fact, no destruction of the sacrificial gift, properly so-called, occurs in the Communion, but merely a destruction of the species. Further, the declaration of the Council of Trent cited above in (b) cannot be reconciled easily with this theory.

The priest's Communion is not a constitutive ingredient of the sacrifice of the Mass, nevertheless it is an integrating constituent part of it, since the Mass is as an offering of food, adapted to the partaking of the food of the Sacrifice. The Communion of the faithful is requisite neither for the validity nor for the liceity of the Sacrifice of the Mass, but it is highly desirable. D 955. Cf. D 944, 1528.

d) Again, the essential sacrificial action is not the offering-up prayer after the Transubstantiation (J. Eck) ; for the priest does not utter this prayer in the name of Christ, but in his own name and in the name of the community. Further this prayer was not instituted by Christ, and can be omitted in exceptional cases.

e) The breaking of the Host (M. Cano) and the mixing of the species do not appertain to the essential sacrificial action ; for both rites are not directed immediately to the sacrificial gifts, but to the species, and may be omitted in exceptional cases. Further, the rite of mixing the species is of Church origin.

2. Positive Determination

The essential Sacrificial Action consists in the Transubstantiation alone. (*Sent. communis.*)

The Transubstantiation instituted by Christ is effected by the priest in the name of Christ on the sacrificial gift, properly so-called, and is a representation of the Sacrifice of the Cross. For the completion of the sacrifice the double consecration is necessary, since Christ thus consummated the sacrifice at the Last Supper. Apart from Christ's example, the double consecration is necessary, in order to represent in a sacramental manner the real separation of the Body and Blood of Christ which took place in the sacrifice of the Cross.

According to St. Gregory Nazianzus, the priest, uttering the words of consecration, "sunders with unbloody cut the body and the blood of the Lord, using his voice as a sword" (Ep. 171). Supported by the terminology o the

Fathers, theologians speak of an unbloody or mystical immolation of Christ (immolatio incruenta, mactatio mystica) of the Divine sacrificial lamb. St. Thomas also places the Eucharistic sacrificial action in the consecration. S. th. III 82, 10. 2.

§ 24. The Metaphysical Nature of the Sacrifice of the Mass

The question at issue regarding the metaphysical nature of the Sacrifice of the Mass is : What makes the consecration (more exactly, the double-consecration) a sacrificial action ?

1. Probable Solution

In the act of offering, which forms the essence of the sacrificial action, a distinction must be made between external worship, and internal. The external sacrifice consists in the sacramental (mystica) separation of the Body and Blood of Christ, which is consummated vi verborum by the double consecration, and which is an objective representation (repraesentatio) of the historical real separation consummated on the Cross. To the external act of oblation, which Christ as the Primary Sacrificing Priest performs through the secondary sacrificing priest, there corresponds an inner act of oblation, in which Christ offers Himself in obedience and love to the Heavenly Father as a sacrificial gift just as He offered Himself in the voluntary giving of His body and His blood on the Cross. The outward and the inward oblations bear to each other a relation similar to that between matter and form.

2. Theories of the Sacrifice of the Mass

a) Destruction Theories

The Destruction or Mutation theories, which developed out of the reaction against the denial by the Reformers of the sacrificial character, proceed from the assumption that the essence of a sacrificial action lies in the destruction or mutation of the sacrificial gift. In the light of this the essence of the Mass-sacrifice is regarded as demanding a real destruction or mutation of the sacrificial gift. This, according to Suarez, consists in the destruction of the substances of the bread and of the wine effected by the Transubstantiation, and in the production of the Body and Blood of Christ ; according to J. De Lugo and J. B. Franzelin, in the placing of the Body and Blood of Christ under the appearances of food and drink in such a way that they are in a deathlike condition ; according to A. Cienfuegos, in the voluntary abrogation of the sensitive functions of the Sacramental Body of Christ from the moment of Consecration to the moment of the mixing of the sacramental forms ; according to St. Bellarmine, D. Soto and others, in the Communion. M. J. Scheeben, in association with a thought of Suarez, conceives the real change as a change for the better (immutatio perfectiva) in so far as by the changing of the substance of the bread and the wine the Body and the Blood of Christ are produced. All these attempts at clarification, apart from their very questionable point of departure, and other difficulties, collapse in view of the fact that a real change of the proper sacrificial gift, is excluded by the impassibility of the Transfigured Body of Christ ; any real change can occur only in the bread and wine or their species.

A special form of the Destruction Theory is the thesis that the essential sacrificial action lies in the mystical immolation of Christ effected by the double consecration, in so far as vi verborum under the form of bread, only the Body, and under the form of the wine, only the Blood of Christ is made present.

According to G. Vasquez, it suffices for the concept of the relative sacrifice that the previously consummated real change of the sacrificial gift be vividly represented (immutatio repraesentativa). According to L. Lessius, the consecration words per se intend a real separation of the Body and Blood of Christ, but in consequence of the impassibility of the Transfigured Body of Christ this is not achieved per accidens (immutatio virtualis). According to L. Billot, the designation of the inward sacrificial act appertains to the nature of the sacrificial action. For this, corresponding to the sacramental mode of existence of Christ, the sacramental separation of His Body and Blood suffices, which represents Him in a certain outward condition of death and of destruction (immolatio sacramentalis or mystica).

The Mystery Theory (O. Casel) put forward the idea that the Mass is numerically the same as the historical sacrifice on the Cross, i.e., the Sacrifice of the Cross in a mysterious way above all time and history is present at the Mass. The proofs from Scripture and Tradition, adduced in support of this mysterious real presence of the sacrifice of the Cross in the Mass, are not cogent. The theory was rejected in 1947 by Pope Pius XII in the Encycl. " Mediator Dei " (D.2297,2).

b) Oblation Theories

The Oblation Theories proceed from the assumption that the destruction of the sacrificial gift, even if it is factually present in most sacrifices, does not pertain to the essence of the sacrifice ; that the essential sacrificial action consists solely in the offering (oblation) of the sacrificial gift to God. The essence of the sacrifice of the Mass lies, therefore, in the offering which Christ personally (actually or virtually) consummates at the altar. The mystical separation of the Body and Blood by the double consecration is regarded merely as a condition of the oblation (many French theologians, in recent times : M. Lepin, M. de la Taille ; V. Thalhofer, G. Pell, M. ten Hompel).

V. Thalhofer assumes a true heavenly sacrifice of Christ, in which the Transfigured Christ perpetually offers Himself to the heavenly Father. In the consecration the celestial High Priest and with Him His sacrifice, enter earthly time and space. By the separate forms, the inward sacrificial act, which is identical with the sacrifice of the Cross, is made visible, represented ad extra. The point of departure of this explanation, the assumption of a true heavenly sacrifice of Christ, is very questionable, for a true sacrifice involves not merely an inward sacrificial act, but also an external sacrificial action.

M. de la Taille places the essential sacrificial act in the oblation, but maintains that the immolation also (sacrificial slaying) is requisite for the sacrifice of expiation. Christ's sacrifice consists in the ritual offering, consummated at the Last Supper, of the sacrificial gift to be later slain on the Cross, the sacrifice of the Mass in the ritual offering consummated by the Church of the sacrificial gift slain on the Cross. In the Mass Christ sacrifices virtually only, in so far as His sacrificial disposition endures for ever. Against this explanation there is the difficulty, that in this theory, Christ's sacrifice on the Cross would not be a sacrifice in itself but only in conjunction with the Last Supper, and that, in the sacrifice of the Mass, not the sacrifice of the Cross, but the oblation consummated at the Last Supper, is renewed.

c) Synthesis

The Oblation Theories correctly attribute the decisive significance to Christ's inward act of oblation. But as the cult of sacrifice involves an outward sacrificial act also, in which the inward sacrificial disposition is outwardly sensibly manifested, the essence of Christ's sacrifice on the Cross demands the real separation of His Body and Blood also, voluntarily permitted by Him ; and the essence of the sacrifice of the Mass demands the mystical separation of the Body

and Blood of Christ effected by the double consecration. This separation is not merely a condition of the oblation, but an essential constituent part of the sacrifice. Thus those theories of the sacrifice of the Mass are most probable which link together the sacramental mystical slaying by the double consecration and Christ's inward act of oblation (N. Gihr, L. Billot, Fr. Diekamp and others).

CHAPTER 3

The Effects and the Efficacy of the Sacrifice of the Mass

§ 25. The Effects of the Sacrifice of the Mass

The Sacrifice of the Mass is not merely a sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving, but also a sacrifice of expiation and impetration. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent defined: Si quis dixerit, Missae sacrificium tantum esse laudis et gratiarum actionis, . . . non autem propitiatorium . . . neque pro vivis et defunctis, pro peccatis, poenis, satisfactionibus et aliis necessitatibus offerri debere, A.S. D 950.

1. Sacrifice of Praise and Thanksgiving

The Sacrifice of the Mass, on account of the infinite value of the sacrificial gift and on account of the infinite dignity of the Primary Sacrificing Priest, is the most sublime and the most perfect sacrifice of praise (=adoration) and thanksgiving (sacrificium latreuticum et eucharisticum) and as such can be offered to God alone. When the Church celebrates Masses in commemoration of the Saints, she does not offer the sacrifice to the Saints, but to God alone. She commemorates the Saints with the intention of thanking God for the grace and glory conferred on the Saints, and of appealing for the intercession of the Saints. D 941, 952.

The custom of celebrating the Eucharist in honour of the Martyrs on the anniversary of their martyrdom, goes back already to the 2nd century. Cf. Martyrium Polycarpi 18, 3; St. Cyprian, Ep. 39, 3.

In the Liturgy the praise of God and the thanks for the gifts of creation and Redemption find expression chiefly in the Eucharistic prayer (Preface and Canon). St. Justin bears witness: "This one (the overseer of the brethren, that is, the Bishop) takes them (the sacrificial gifts) and offers up praise and honour to the Father of all by the name of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, and pronounces a long thanksgiving for our having been adjudged by Him to be worthy of these gifts" (Apol. I 65).

2. A Sacrifice of Expiation and Appeal

As a propitiatory sacrifice (sacrificium propitiatorium) the Sacrifice of the Mass effects the remission of sins and the punishment for sins; as a sacrifice of appeal (sacrificium impetratorium) it brings about the conferring of supernatural and natural gifts. The Eucharistic Sacrifice of propitiation can, as the Council of Trent expressly asserted, be offered, not merely for the living, but also for the

poor souls in Purgatory, according to the Apostolic tradition (D 940, 950). The biblical proof for the propitiatory character of the Sacrifice of the Mass is particularly supported by Mt. 26, 28: "This is My Blood of the New Testament, which shall be shed for many unto the remission of sins." According to Hebr. 5, 1 every priest is "ordained to offer up gifts and sacrifices for sins." The Acts of John (second half of the 2nd century) already know the "breaking of bread," that is, the celebration of the Eucharist, at the grave of a deceased person on the third day after his decease (n. 72). Tertullian attests the custom of celebrating the Eucharistic sacrifice for the deceased on the anniversary of their decease. De cor. mil. 3: "We offer the sacrifice for the deceased on the anniversary as on their birthday" (cf. De monog. 10; De exhort. castit. 11). St. Cyril of Jerusalem designates the sacrifice of the Mass as "a sacrifice of propitiation" (*θυσία ἱλασμοῦ*) and comments: "We offer the Christ slain for our sins. By this we propitiate the merciful God for those (the deceased) and for ourselves" (Cat. Myst. 5, 10). St. Cyril also attests that in the Holy Sacrifice those requiring help are thought of, and that God's help is invoked at various junctures: "In brief we all pray for all those needing help and offer this sacrifice for them" (ib. 5, 8). Cf. St. Augustine, De cura pro mortuis fier. 1, 3; 18, 22; Enchir. 110; Conf. IX 11 et seq.

§ 26. The Efficacy of the Sacrifice of the Mass

1. Efficacy of the Sacrifice of the Mass generally

The Holy Sacrifice of the Mass is the self-sacrifice of Christ, the Primary Sacrificing Priest; it is the Sacrifice of the Church to which the Eucharist was transmitted by Christ as a Sacrifice and as a Sacrament (D 938)—thus in the strict sense of the word there are no "private Masses" (D 944)and; it is the sacrifice of the celebrating priest and of the co-sacrificing faithful.

a) As the self-sacrifice of Christ, the sacrifice of the Mass works ex opere operato, that is, independently of the moral worthiness of the celebrating priest and of the co-sacrificing faithful. The Council of Trent declared: "This is that clean oblation (Mal. 1, 11), which no unworthiness or turpitude of those who offer it can stain." D 939.

b) As a sacrifice of the Church the sacrifice of the Mass works quasi ex opere operato, because the Church, as the Holy and immaculate Bride of Christ (Eph. 5, 25 et seq.), is always pleasing to God.

c) As a sacrifice of the celebrating priest and of the co-sacrificing faithful the sacrifice of the Mass, like every good work, works ex opere operantis corresponding to the intensity of their personal moral disposition. S. th III 82, 6.

2. Efficacy of the Propitiatory and Impetratory Sacrifice in Particular

According to the teaching of the Council of Trent, the Sacrifice of the Mass is offered: "for sins, for punishments for sins, and for expiations" (pro peccatis, poenis, satisfactionibus) and, as an impetratory sacrifice, "for other necessities" (pro aliis necessitatibus). D 950.

a) The Sacrifice of the Mass does not remit the guilt of sins immediately as do the Sacraments of Baptism and of Penance, but mediately by the conferring of the grace of repentance. The Council of Trent teaches: "Propitiated by the offering of this sacrifice, God, by granting the grace and the gift of penance remits trespasses and sins, however grievous they may be." D 940

b) The sacrifice of the Mass effects the remission of the temporal punishments for sin which still remain after the forgivment of the guilt of sins and of the eternal punishment, not merely mediately by the conferring of the grace of penance, but also immediately, because the atonement of Jesus Christ is offered as a substitute for our works of atonement and for the sufferings of the poor souls. The measurement of the punishments of sins remitted is proportional, in the case of the living, to the degree of perfection of their disposition. In the case of the suffering souls, the satisfactory operation of the Sacrifice of the Mass is applied by way of intercession (per modum suffragii). As they are in the state of grace and thus oppose no obstacle, theologians generally teach that at least a part of their punishments for sins is infallibly remitted. According to the teaching of the Council of Trent, the poor souls can: " be helped above all by the Sacrifice of the altar which is pleasing to God " (D 983).

c) The Sacrifice of the Mass infallibly effects the granting of benefits prayed for, in so far as it concerns the intercession of the primary sacrificial priest. However, as the requisite conditions for the granting of a petition are not always present either on the part of the person for whom the impetratory Sacrifice is offered or on the part of the person prayed for, the operation of the impetratory Sacrifice in regard to the specific petition is uncertain.

§ 27. The Value and the Fruits of the Sacrifice of the Mass

1. The Value of the Sacrifice of the Mass

a) Intrinsic value (secundum sufficientiam).

The intrinsic value of the Sacrifice of the Mass, that is, its peculiar dignity and efficacious power of itself (in actu primo), is infinite, on account of the infinite dignity of the Sacrificial Gift, and of the Primary Sacrificial Priest.

b) Extrinsic value (secundum efficaciam).

As a Sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving the sacrifice of the Mass is infinite as to its external value also, that is, as to its actual operation (in actu secundo) since the operations of adoration and of thanksgiving refer immediately to God, who as the Infinite Being can receive an infinite act.

c) As a propitiatory and impetratory Sacrifice, the Sacrifice of the Mass possesses a finite external value, since the operations of propitiation and impetration refer to human beings, who as creatures can receive a finite act only. This explains the practice of the Church of offering the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass frequently for the same intention.

While the external propitiatory and impetratory value of the Sacrifice of the Mass is intensively finite, that is, according to the ensuing operations, it is extensively infinite (indefinite) that is, as to the number of the possible participants, according to the more probable view (Cajetan and others). As all theologians agree, the fruit of the Sacrifice (fructus generalis) accruing to all the faithful, does not decrease when the number of the faithful increases. Similarly, the fruit of the Sacrifice accruing to the celebrating priest and to the co-sacrificing faithful (fructus specialissimus) is not lessened when several priests celebrate conjointly (consecration of priests, consecration of a bishop) and when a very large number of the faithful assists at the Sacrifice of the Mass. By way of analogy it may well be assumed that the fruit of the Sacrifice accruing to those for whom the

Sacrifice of the Mass is offered (fructus specialis) is not less when it is offered for several persons. As each participant receives a finite sacrificial fruit only, corresponding to his disposition, the infinite plenitude of blessings of Christ's Sacrifice cannot be exhausted.

In opposition to this, many theologians teach that a limited specific sacrificial fruit is laid down by positive Divine ordinance for each Holy Mass, so that it becomes less for each individual recipient when it is distributed among many.

The exponents of this view seek to establish the existence of a Divine Ordinance of this nature in the practice of the Church of offering the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass for individual persons and in individual necessities.

2. Fruits of the Sacrifice of the Mass

By the fruits of the Sacrifice of the Mass are understood the effects which the Mass produces ex opere operato as a propitiatory and impetratory Sacrifice: the propitiatory, satisfactory and impetratory effects. Since the time of Scotus a three-fold fruit of the Mass has been distinguished:

a) The general Mass-fruit (fructus generalis). This accrues to the benefit of the whole Church, independently of the intention of the celebrating priest, to the living faithful and to the poor souls in Purgatory, since every sacrifice of the Mass is a Sacrifice for the Church (D 944). Cf. the prayers of the Offertory.

b) The special fruit of the Mass (fructus specialis or ministerialis or medius). This accrues to the benefit of those persons for whom the Mass is, in a special manner, offered (applied), whether they be living or dead.

The offering of the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass for definite persons is already attested by Tertullian (De monog. 10), St. Cyprian (Ep. 1, 2), St. Augustine (Conf. IX 12 et seq.). Pius VI rejected the assertion of the pseudo-Synod of Pistoia (1786), which saw in the doctrine that the priest can apply the fruits of the Sacrifice to whom he wishes, an intrusion on the rights of God, and which characterised as false the opinion that the givers of stipends receive a special sacrificial fruit. D 1530; CIC 809. Cf. the Memento prayers.

c) The personal Mass-fruit (fructus specialissimus or personalis). This accrues to the celebrating priest as the servant and representative of the Primary Sacrificing Priest, Jesus Christ, and to the co-sacrificing faithful.

As the Sacrifice of the Mass does not work mechanically any more than the Sacraments, the receiving of the fruits of the Sacrifice demands certain due moral dispositions, and the measure of the fruits received is dependent on the quality of these dispositions (cf. D 799).

IV. The Sacrament of Penance

§ 1. The Concept of Penance

1. The Sacrament of Penance

The Sacrament of Penance (poenitentia, μετάνοια) is that Sacrament by which the sinner, who repents of his sins, acknowledges them sincerely and has the will to render atonement, has his sins, committed after his Baptism, remitted in the absolution pronounced by the priest. The word penance is also used to designate a particular part of the Sacrament of Penance, i.e., the satisfaction.

2. Virtue of Penance

The virtue of penance, which is insistently recommended in both the Old and New Testaments (cf. Ez. 18, 30 et seq.; 33, 11; Jer. 18, 11; 25, 5 et seq.; Joel 2, 12 et seq.; Ecclus. 2, 22; 17, 21 et seq.; Mt. 3, 2; 4, 17; Acts 2, 38), and which at all times was a necessary precondition for the forgiveness of sins (D 894), is that moral virtue, which inclines the will to turn away inwardly from sin, and to render atonement to God for it. It consists in sorrow of the soul for sins committed, in as much as sin is an insult God, together with a purpose of amendment: dolor de peccato commisso, in quantum est offensia Dei, cum emendationis propositio (S. th. III 85, 3). External manifestations of the virtue of penance are the confession of sins, the performance of penitential works of every kind, for example, prayer, fasting, almsgiving, mortifications, and the patient bearing of all trials sent by God.

Luther's teaching that penance is simply the amendment of our lives (optima poenitentia nova vita, i.e., "a new life") has been rejected as error by the Church. D 747, 923. Holy Writ exhorts the sinner to do penance for sins committed; it demands an internal penitential disposition as well as external works of penance. Cf. Ez. 18, 21 et seq.; Joel 2, 12 et seq.: "Be converted to Me with all your Heart, in fasting and in weeping and in mourning. And rend your hearts and not your garments, and turn to the Lord your God!" The "new life" is the end-term of penance, not the essence of penance. Cf. St. Augustine, Sermo 351, 5, 12.

In the order of grace in the New Covenant the Sacrament of Penance and the virtue of penance are intimately connected. Since the acts of sorrow, confession and atonement (or of the will to render atonement), which appertain to the nature of the Sacrament of Penance, are applications of the virtue of penance, the Sacrament of Penance in fact cannot be accomplished without the virtue of penance. On the other hand, in the present order of grace the acts of the virtue of penance of themselves alone cannot bring a baptised mortal sinner to justification, if they are not associated at least with a desire to receive the Sacrament of Penance.

SECTION 1

The Church's Power to Forgive Sins

CHAPTER I

The Existence of the Church's Power to Forgive Sins

§ 2. The Dogma and the Heretical Counter-propositions

1. Dogma

The Church has received from Christ the power of remitting sins committed after Baptism. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent declared against the Reformers, that Christ bestowed on the Apostles and on their legitimate successors the full power of remitting and retaining sins, in order to reconcile with God those of the faithful who lapsed after Baptism. The power to forgive sins involves not merely the power of preaching the Gospel of the forgiveness of sins, as the Reformers interpreted it, but also the full power of really remitting sins. D 894, 913.

1. Heretical counter-propositions

Many ancient and medieval Christian sects refused to accept the universal nature of the Church's power to forgive sins and many sects contended that the power to forgive sins appertained to the laity also. The Montanists (Tertullian) excluded from forgiveness the so-called three capital sins, denial of the Faith (idolatry), adultery and murder, and regarded the Perfect Members, the Spirituals, as bearers of the power of forgiving sins. The Novatianists denied to those lapsed from the Faith re-admittance to the Church ; and as the Church should embrace " the pure " only, they ended by excluding all mortal sinners from reconciliation. For the same reason the Donatists also denied to mortal sinners the possibility of penance and reconciliation. The Spiritualistic sects of the Wycliffites, Waldenses, Cathari, and the Hussites rejected the ecclesiastical hierarchy and consequently would concede the power of absolution to all good and pious Christians. Wycliffe declared also that the external confession of sins was superfluous and useless (D 587).

The power of the Church to forgive sins was totally denied by the Reformers. Even if initially they were prepared to recognise the validity of Penance or Absolution as a third Sacrament side by side with Baptism and Communion (Apol. Conf. Aug Art. 13), still the Protestant concept of justification necessarily led to the refusal to accept a real power to forgive sins. That is to say, if justification is not a true and real eradication of sins, but merely an external non-imputation or covering of sins on the ground of the fiducial Faith, then absolution is not a true release from sin, but simply a declaration (nuda declaratio) that sins are forgiven on the ground of fiducial Faith, that is that sins are not imputed for punishment.

In the Reformers' view, Penance is not a Sacrament, properly so-called, distinct from Baptism, but basically one and the same Sacrament. By the fact that the

sinner remembers the assurance of the forgiveness of sins given in Baptism, and renews the act of fiducial Faith made in Baptism, the sins he commits after Baptism are remitted. Thus, they claimed, Penance is only "a regression to Baptism" (regressus ad baptismum). According to the Conf. Aug. Art. 12, Penance consists of two essential constituent parts: of sorrow, which is conceived as being infused into the conscience by the consciousness of sin (terrores incussi conscientiae agnito peccato), and faith in the forgiveness of sins for Christ's sake. They asserted that no special confession of sins is necessary, as the person absolving exercises no judicial power over the penitent. The reproach is made against atonement that it is a belittling of the atonement made by Christ, and hence they rejected atonement by the Penitent.

Modernism (A. Loisy) teaches that the Primitive Church knew of no reconciliation of the baptised sinner by the authority of the Church. Even after Baptism had been recognised as an ecclesiastical institution, the Modernists claimed that it was not called a Sacrament. The words of John 20, 22 et seq., according to Modernism, assert, as to their content, the same thing as Luke 24, 47 (preaching of Penance for forgiveness of sins) and Mt. 28, 19 (mandate of Baptism), and for this reason must be understood as referring to the forgiveness of sins in Baptism. (D 2046 et seq.).

§ 3. The Testimony of Holy Writ

1. Promise of the Power of the Keys and of the Power of Binding and Loosing

a) In reward for the confession of Faith made by St. Peter at Caesarea Philippi, Jesus said to him: "I will give thee the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven" (Mt. 16, 19a). "The keys of the Kingdom of Heaven" mean supreme authority on earth over the Empire of God. The person who possesses the power of the keys has the full power of allowing a person to enter the Empire of God or to exclude him from it. But as it is precisely sin which hinders the entry into the empire of God in its perfection (cf. Eph. 5, 5; 1 Cor. 6, 9 et seq.; Gal. 5, 19 et seq.), the power to forgive sins must also be included in the power of the keys. Cf. Is. 22, 22; Apoc. 1, 18; 3, 7.

b) Immediately after the promise of the power of the keys, Jesus said to St. Peter: "And whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth, it shall be bound also in Heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, it shall be loosed also in Heaven" (Mt. 16, 19b). "Binding and loosing" is used in rabbinical speech in the sense of the authentic interpretation of the Law, and means according to this, the judgment as to the permissibility or otherwise of an action. Further, it means the exclusion from the community by the imposition of a ban, or the re-acceptance by the removal of a ban. As sin is the ground for the exclusion, the power to forgive sins is included in the power of binding and loosing. In Mt. 18, 18, the power of binding and loosing was promised in similar terms to all the Apostles. As this occurred in the context of the mode whereby a sinner should be admonished, there is obviously an immediate reference in it to the person of the sinner.

2. Transference of the Power to Forgive Sins (John 20, 21 et seq.)

On the evening of the day of the Resurrection Jesus appeared to the Apostles in the locked room, greeted them with the salutation of peace, showed them His hands and His side, and said to them: "'Peace be to you. As the Father

hath sent me, I also send you.' 22. When He had said this He breathed on them, saying: 'Receive ye the Holy Ghost. 23. Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them: and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained.'" With these words Jesus transferred to the Apostles the mission which He Himself had received from the Father, and which He had fulfilled upon earth. The mission consisted in: "to seek and to save that which was lost" (Luke 19, 10). As He Himself had forgiven sins on earth (Mt. 9, 2 et seq.; Mk. 2, 5 et seq.; Luke 5, 20 et seq.—curing of the man afflicted with the palsy; Luke 7, 47 et seq.—the woman who was a public sinner), He now invested the Apostles also with the power to forgive sins. The power communicated is twofold. It may be exercised by way of remission or retention of sins, and its effect is that before God the sins are remitted or retained.

The expression, remittere peccata (ἀφιέναι τὰς ἁμαρτίας), according to its natural meaning and according to numerous biblical parallels (cf. Ps. 50, 3; 1 Chr. 21, 8; Ps. 102, 12; 50, 4; 31, 1; 1 John 1, 9; Acts 3, 19) asserts a real eradication of sin, not a mere covering of the guilt of sin or a mere remission of punishment. The interpretation of these words as signifying the preaching of the forgiveness of sins (Luke 24, 47) or the forgiveness of sins in Baptism or the administration of external Church discipline does not correspond to the natural sense of the text. The Council of Trent authentically clarified the passage as against the forced interpretations of the Reformers, and took it as referring to the real forgiveness of sins in the Sacrament of Penance. D 913; cf. 2047.

The power to forgive sins was not conferred on the Apostles as a personal gift or charisma, but was transferred to the Church as a permanent institution. It was to pass on to their successors, just like the power to preach, to baptise, to celebrate the Eucharist, because the ground of its transference, the fact of sin, makes the continuance of this power necessary for all times. D 894: apostolis et eorum legitimis successoribus. Cf. D 379.

§ 4. The Testimony of Tradition

1. Testimony of the First Two Centuries

The oldest extra-biblical Christian writings refer only in a general way to the necessity of Penance, the confession of sins and the forgiveness of sins, without specifying that they refer specifically to the Sacrament of Penance administered by the Church.

The Didache exhorts to Penance and to the confession of sins before the celebration of the Eucharist, 14 1: "Assemble on the Lord's day, break bread and give thanks, having previously confessed your sins, so that your oblation may be a clean one." Cf. 10, 6. The confession of sins, therefore, should be made "in the assembly of the community," that is, publicly (4, 14). Apparently this refers to a general confession of sins, such as was customary in the Jewish divine service, similar to the modern "confiteor."

St. Clement of Rome (about 96) exhorts the agitators of Corinth "to be subject to the presbyters and to accept discipline to penance, bending the knee of the heart" (Cor. 57, 1). As the penance is imposed by the presbyters it appears that an ecclesiastical penance is meant.

St. Ignatius of Antioch († about 107) announces the forgiveness of sins through the Lord, to those who do penance: "The Lord forgives those who do penance

when they return to unity with God and to the communion with the bishop" (Philad. 8, 1; cf. 3, 2). The forgiveness of sins by the Lord presupposes the performance of the penance and the reconciliation with the Church.

St. Polycarp († 156) exhorts the presbyters: "to be gentle and merciful towards all, not strict in judgment, knowing that we are all debtors of sin" (Phil. 6, 1).

Pastor Hermae, an apocryphal apocalypse which emerged in Rome about the middle of the 2nd century, speaks of certain teachers who maintain that there is no other penance but baptism. Hermas approves of this standpoint as a Christian ideal, but stresses that there is still another penance after Baptism for those who have fallen into sin. This penance is general—even sinners against chastity are not excluded (Mand. IV 1), but only once: "If anyone after that great and sublime vocation (=Baptism), tempted by the devil, sin, he has penance once and for all (μίαν μετάνοιαν ἔχει); but if he keeps on sinning and doing penance, it avails such a person nothing; for he will hardly live," that is, the Church does not admit him to reconciliation a second time, and he will attain salvation with great difficulty only (Mand. IV 3, 6).

That the way to penance is open to all Christians who fall into sin was taught also by St. Justin (Dial. 141), St. Dionysius of Corinth (Eusebius, Hist. eccl. IV 23, 6), and St. Irenaeus. The last-mentioned reports many cases in which sinners against chastity and people lapsed from the Faith were re-accepted into the Church community after the public confession of their guilt and after the performance of penance (Adv. haer. I 6, 3; I 13, 5 and 7; IV 40, 1).

2. Testimony of the Third and Fourth Centuries

Eusebius (Hist. eccl. V 28, 8–12) relates that the Roman Confessor Natalis, who had lapsed to the Dynamistic Monarchists, and who had become their Bishop, mollified by severe penitential practices "the sympathetic Church of the merciful Christ," and was re-accepted into the Church community by Pope St. Zephyrinus (199–217).

Tertullian, in his work, De poenitentia, which was composed during the time he was a Catholic, speaks of a two-fold penance, a first penance as a preparation for Baptism (c. 1–6), and a second penance after Baptism (c. 7–12). With the Pastor Hermae he teaches that the second penance can be received only once. The penitents must submit themselves to the exhomologesis (c. 9), that is, to public confession and to severe penitential works, and after the performance of the penance are publicly absolved (palam absolvi: c. 10), and re-accepted into the Church community (restitui; c. 8). No sin, not even impurity and idolatry, is excluded from Penance.

Tertullian's second work on Penance, which was written after his lapse to Montanism, and which bore the title De pudicitia (On Propriety) contains a sharp polemic against the Penance practice of the Catholic Church. Its main object is to demonstrate the unforgivable nature of the sins of adultery and unchastity (fornicatio). In the beginning of his work Tertullian mentions the "edictum peremptorium" of a "Pontifex maximus, quod est episcopus episcoporum," in which the latter had declared: Ego et moechiae et fornicationis delicta poenitentia functis dimitto (the Pontifex maximus, the bishop of bishops . . . (who declared) "I dismiss by Penance the sins of adultery and

fornication") (1, 6), which, according to Tertullian's opinion, undermines all Christian chastity and morality. The authorship of this Edict was formerly almost generally ascribed to Pope St. Callistus I (217-222) or to his predecessor St. Zephyrinus (199–217). Modern research tends to attribute it to an African Bishop, probably Bishop Agrippinus of Carthage. Tertullian distinguishes between sins which can be forgiven and sins which cannot be forgiven, and speaks correspondingly of a double penance, one which can bring about forgiveness and one which cannot (c. 2). In the category of sins which cannot be forgiven he puts the three sins, grouped together here for the first time, the so-called capital sins: Idolatry, adultery and murder (c. 5). The Catholic Church, against which he directed his polemic, maintained, on the other hand, that every penance led to forgiveness (c. 3). The unnamed Bishop derived the Church's power to forgive sins from Mt. 16, 18 et seq. ab (c. 21).

In the same period the milder directive of Pope St. Callistus in the controversy about penance was combated by St. Hippolytus (Philosophumena IX 12). The polemic showed that in Rome all sinners who had done penance were re-accepted into the Church communion. St. Callistus declared that: "by him the sins of all were forgiven them."

For the Church of the East St. Clement of Alexandria and Origen bear witness that the power to forgive all sins was attributed to the Church. According to St. Clement: "the doors are open to everyone, who in truth of his whole heart returns to God, and God receives with heartfelt joy the son who truly does penance" (Quis dives salvetur 39, 2; cf. 42). Among the many ways of achieving forgiveness of sins, Origen names in the seventh place, "the hard and laborious forgiveness of sins by penance," which is attained by confession of sins before "the priest of the Lord" and by severe penitential practices (In Lev. hom. 2, 4). Cf. C. Celsum III 51.

When many Christians lapsed from the Faith during the Decian persecution (249–51), the problem of the treatment of the lapsed became pressing. St. Cyprian, in his work De lapsis and in his epistles, attests that the Church claimed the power of re-admitting those who had lapsed, just like all other sinners who had done penance, into the communion of the Church. Against a tendency to laxity in his clergy he stresses the necessity of penance as a pre-condition for the re-admission of the lapsed (De lapsis 16). Against the rigorism of Novatian he defends the power of the Church to forgive all sins, including apostasy (Ep. 55, 27).

In the following, centuries testimonies for the ecclesiastical forgiveness of sin multiply. Against the Novatianists the Church doctrine of penance was defended by St. Pacianus († 390), Bishop of Barcelona; by St. Ambrose in a special work entitled: De poenitentia; against the Donatists by St. Augustine. Cf. also St. John Chrysostom, De sacerd. III 5.

From the testimonies cited it is evident that Christian antiquity bears witness to the existence of an unlimited power to forgive sins conferred by Christ on His Church.

CHAPTER 2

The Properties of the Church's Power to Forgive Sins

§ 5. The Church's Power to Forgive sins as a True Power of Absolution

By the Church's Absolution sins are truly and immediately remitted. (*De fide.*)

According to the view of the Reformers, absolution is a mere declaration that sins are forgiven on the ground of fiducial Faith: nudum ministerium pronuntiandi et declarandi, remissa esse peccata confitenti, modo tantum credat se esse absolutum (D 919). As against this the Church firmly insists that the power of absolution is a true and real power of absolution, by which sins committed against God are immediately remitted.

The proof derives from John 20, 23. According to the words of Jesus, the act of the remission of sins, performed by the Apostles and by their successors, has the effect that sins are remitted by God. There is a causal connection between the active remitting and the passive being remitted.

The interpretation of the Reformers is exegetically untenable as they take the expression remittere to mean two things in the one sentence: "Those to whom you declare that sins are remitted to these they are remitted."

It is true that the scope of the Church's power to forgive sins was disputed in Christian antiquity, but the representatives of Montanistic and Novatianistic rigorism held, just as firmly as the representatives of the Church, to the fact that the Church truly and immediately forgives sins in addition to its power of canonical punishment by exclusion from the Church. The originator of the Edict on Penance transmitted by Tertullian declared: "I remit the sins of adultery . . . and of fornication" (D 43). St. Cyprian speaks of a forgiveness of sins accomplished by the priests (remissio facta per sacerdotes: De lapsis 29). St. John Chrysostom, in a contrast between the Old Testament and the New Testament priesthood, expressly rejects the declaration theory: "The Jewish priests had the power of cleansing from bodily leprosy, or rather in no wise to cleanse, but merely to declare the cleansed to be clean. . . . As against this, our priests received the power, not merely of declaring an unclean soul, instead of a leprous body, to be clean, but of entirely purifying it" (De sacerd. III 6).

§ 6. The Universality of the Church's Power to Forgive Sins

The Church's power to forgive sins extends to all sin without exception. (*De fide.*)

The attempts of the Montanists and the Novatianists to limit the scope of the Church's power to forgive sins, were rejected as heretical by the Church. According to the teaching of the Council of Trent, Penance was instituted as a reconciliation of the faithful with God "as often as they fall into sin after

Baptism" (quoties post baptismum in peccata labuntur). D 911; cf. 895, 430. It follows from this that Penance can be repeated at will, and that all sins without exception committed after Baptism can be remitted by the Church's power to forgive sins.

Christ promised to His Church and transmitted to His Church the power to forgive sins without limitation. The expressions quodcumque solveris (Mt. 16, 19), quaecumque solveritis (Mt. 18, 18), quorum remiseritis peccata (John 20, 23) show that the power in question is conceived to be as inclusive and as general as possible. In addition to this Christ transferred His mission, in which the unlimited power to forgive sins is contained, to the Church (John 20, 21). He Himself put this power into operation by the forgiveness of the most grievous sins. Cf. John 7, 53 to 8, 11; Luke 7, 36–50; Luke 23, 43; Mt. 26, 75.

In the time of the Apostles, St. Paul exercised the power of absolution, given to him by Christ, by the re-acceptance of a sinner at Corinth, who had given grave scandal, probably by the crime of incest (2 Cor. 2, 10; cf. 1 Cor. 5, 1 et seq.).

The passages cited by the opponents of this doctrine, Mt. 12, 31 et seq.; Mk. 3, 28 et seq.; Luke 12, 10 (sin against the Holy Ghost), and Hebr. 6, 4–6, refer to the sin of obduracy, which because of a lack of due dispositions, cannot be forgiven. 1 John 5, 16 does not treat of the power to forgive sins, but speaks of the exclusion of those lapsed from Christ from the intercessory prayer of the Church.

In Christian antiquity the generality of the Church's power to forgive sins is witnessed by the Pastor Hermae, St. Dionysius of Corinth, St. Irenaeus of Lyons, St. Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Tertullian in the work De poenitentia, St. Cyprian, St. Pacian, St. Ambrose and St. Augustine (cf. Par. 4). Invoking Holy Writ St. Pacian says: "He says whatsoever you shall loose; He excepts nothing whatsoever. He says whatsoever, be it great or little" (Ep. 3, 12). St. Ambrose expresses himself similarly: "God makes no distinction; He promised His mercy to all, and has conferred the power of forgiveness on all His priests without exception" (De poenit. I 3, 10).

In spite of the basic recognition of the universality of the power to forgive sin, the discipline of penance was very strict in the primitive Church. Public penance was granted once only, and absolution of very grievous sins was sometimes deferred to the end of the sinner's life, and in individual exceptional cases refused altogether. In order to meet an exaggerated rigorism, the Council of Nice (325), in can. 13, resolved that: "in regard to those in a dying condition, the ancient Church rule should be observed that nobody departing this life be deprived of the last and most necessary viaticum." D 57. Cf. D 95, 111, 147.

§ 7. The Judicial Character of the Church's Power to Forgive Sins

The exercise of the Church's power to forgive sins is a judicial act. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent defined, against the Declaration Theory of the Reformers, that the priestly absolution is a judicial act: Si quis dixerit

absolutionem sacramentalem sacerdotis non esse actum iudicialem, A.S. D 919. Christ, as the same Council declared, appointed priests : " as overseers and judges (tamquam praesides et iudices), who are given the competency by virtue of the power of the keys, to pronounce the forgiveness or the retention of sins." D 899.

A juridical process demands three essential elements : a) Judicial power (auctoritas iudicalis); b) Knowledge of the state of the facts (cognitio causae); and c) Judicial sentence (sententia iudicialis).

a) Christ transferred the power to forgive sins to the Apostles and to their legitimate successors. The incumbents of this power exercise it in His name and in His authority.

b) The power to forgive sins is twofold, since it includes the power to remit or to retain. The application of this powei must not be arbitrary, but must be related to the objective norm of the Divine law and to the state of conscience of the sinner. It follows from this that the possessor of the power must know and conscientiously examine the objective facts and the subjective state of the penitent.

c) In view of his investigation of the guilt and disposition of the sinner, the priest, in his capacity of God's representative, pronounces the judicial sentence, by virtue of which the sins are forgiven or retained. The retention, like the remission, is a positive judicial sentence (sententia retentionis : D 899), not merely a non-using of the power of absolution. The imposition of works of atonement is also an act of judicial power.

The conviction that the forgiveness of sins was a judicial act is clearly expressed in the practice of the Early Church. After the confession of sin and the imposition of penance the sinner was formally ejected from the communion of the faithful (excommunicated) and, when the penance had been performed, solemnly re-accepted. Tertullian designated the Court, which tried the sinner : " a supremely significant preliminary judgment of the future judgment " (summum futuri iudicii praeiudicium ; Apol. 39). St. John Chrysostom says in view of Mt. 18, 18 : " The judge sits on earth ; the Lord acts according to His servant, and whatever the latter judges on earth, that judgment is ratified in heaven " (Hom. 5, 1 in Is. 6).

SECTION 2

The Church's Forgiveness of Sins as a Sacrament

§ 8. The Sacramental Nature of the Church's Forgiveness of Sins

1. Reality of the Sacrament

The forgiveness of sins which takes place in the Tribunal of Penance is a true and proper Sacrament, which is distinct from the Sacrament of Baptism. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent defined against the Reformers: Si quis dixerit, in catholica Ecclesia poenitentiam non esse vere et proprie sacramentum. A.S. D 911; cf. 912.

In the act of the Church's forgiveness of sins the three elements requisite for a Sacrament are present: a) An outward sensible sign of grace; b) An inward invisible operation of grace; c) Institution by Christ.

2. The Physical Essence of the Sacrament

Since the Council of Trent, the ordinary doctrine of the Church accepts the Thomistic teaching that the physical essence of the Sacrament of Penance consists on the one hand in the acts of the penitent (sorrow, confession of sins, atonement, or desire for atonement), which form the quasi-matter (D 699, 896, 914) and on the other hand in the absolution of the priest, which is the form. The acts of the penitent are related to the absolution as matter is to form, and together they compose the sacramental sign which confers grace.

As against this the Scotists teach that the physical essence of the Sacrament of Penance lies in the absolution of the priest alone, and that the acts of the penitent are merely necessary pre-conditions of the worthy reception.

a) The following are the arguments in favour of the Thomistic view:

α) According to the teaching of the Council of Trent (D 896), the power of the Sacrament of Penance lies "pre-eminently" (praecipue) in the absolution, consequently not exclusively. But as the power of a Sacrament can only lie in that which appertains to the essence of the Sacrament, the three acts of the penitent, which are characterised as quasi materia sacramenti and as partes poenitentiae, together with the absolution, which is designated form, constitute the essence of the Sacrament.

β) The analogy with the other Sacraments (with the exception of Matrimony) makes it likely that the sacramental sign of the Sacrament of Penance is composed of two constituent parts which are really distinct from each other. The acts of the penitent are correctly considered as the matter, because they are subjected to the absolution and are informed as it were by this. On account of the lack of a material substance one speaks of a quasi-matter (cf. Cat. Rom. II 5, 13).

γ) As the forgiveness of sins is exercised in a juridical process, the essential constituent parts of the juridical process must also be essential parts of the Sacrament. But a juridical process involves not only a juridical sentence, but also the ascertaining and defining of the facts of the case. In the tribunal of penance this occurs through the self-accusation of the sinner. As the tribunal of penance aims at the forgiveness of sins, the confession of guilt must be accompanied by the disposition of sorrow and of the desire for atonement.

δ) St. Thomas regards the acts of the penitent as the matter of the Sacrament of Penance appertaining to the essence of the Sacrament. Cf. S. th. III 84, 2.

b) The Scotists make the point that the Council of Trent designates the acts of the Penitent as quasi materia, by which they understand matter not properly so-called. In this view the Council merely says that they are necessary for the completeness of the Sacrament (ad integritatem sacramenti), but not that they pertain to the essence of the Sacrament. They understand the expression partes poenitentiae in the sense of integrating parts. In addition, the Scotists submit the following reasons for their view : The acts of the penitent are not appropriate signs of the sacramental operation of grace, and for this reason not its cause ; the priest, as the sole dispenser of the Sacrament, must determine and make the whole sacramental sign ; the practice of the Church of giving the Sacrament to unconsciousness persons, presupposes that the sacramental sign of Penance consists exclusively in the activity of the priest.

CHAPTER I

The Outward Signs of the Sacrament of Penance

I. Contrition

§ 9. Contrition in General

1. Concept and Necessity

The Council of Trent defines contrition (contritio, compunctio) as : " Grief of the soul for and detestation of the sins committed, with the intention not to sin in future " : animi dolor ac detestatio de peccato commisso, cum proposito non peccandi de cetero. D 897. Thus the act of contrition is composed of three acts of the will which converge to one unity : grief of soul, detestation, intention. It is neither necessary nor always possible that the grief of sorrow, which is a free act of the will, be expressed in sensory feelings of sorrow. The intention of sinning no more is virtually included in true sorrow for sins committed.

Contrition, as is evident from the nature of justification, is the first and the most necessary constituent part of the Sacrament of Penance, and has been an indispensable precondition of the forgiveness of sins at all times (D 897). Subsequent to the institution of the Sacrament of Penance this contrition must also include the intention of confession and atonement. As contrition is an essential ingredient of the sacramental sign, it must be expressly awakened during the reception of the Sacrament of Penance (contritio formalis).

2. Properties of Contrition

Salutary contrition (contritio salutaris) must be inward, supernatural, general and as to estimation supreme.

a) Contrition is inward when it is an act of understanding and will. Joel 2, 13: "Rend your hearts, and not your garments!" But as a constituent part of the sacramental sign it must also appear externally (self-accusation).

b) It is supernatural when it occurs under the influence of actual grace and proceeds from a morally good motive directed towards reconciliation with God. A mere natural sorrow has no salutary value. D 813, 1207.

c) It is general, when it extends to all grievous sins committed. It is not possible that one grievous sin be remitted without the other.

d) It is, as to estimation, supreme (appretiative summa), when the sinner detests sin as the greatest evil, and is ready to suffer every other evil rather than offend God again by a grievous sin. But contrition does not need to be supreme above all according to intensity of feeling (intensive summa).

3. Kinds of Contrition

Contrition is divided into perfect contrition (contritio caritate perfecta or contritio in the narrower sense) and imperfect contrition (contritio imperfecta or attritio).

St. Thomas distinguishes two kinds of sorrow according to their relation to Sanctifying Grace: Contritio is the sorrow of the justified (poenitentia formata Sc. caritate), attritio the sorrow of the not yet justified (poenitentia informis Sc. caritate non formata). Cf. De verit. 28, 8 ad 3.

Since the Council of Trent, a distinction is made between the two kinds of contrition according to the motive: perfect contrition proceeds from the motive of perfect love of God, imperfect contrition from the motive of imperfect love of God or from other supernatural motivating grounds which may be traced back to it, for example, hope of eternal reward or the fear of eternal punishment. It follows from the variety of the motives that the two kinds of sorrow are different not merely in degree but in nature.

§ 10. Perfect Contrition

1. The Nature of Perfect Contrition

The motive of perfect contrition is the perfect love of God, i.e., Charity. It consists in this that God is loved for His Own sake above all (amor benevolentiae or amicitiae). Its formal object is God's goodness in itself (bonitas divina absoluta).

A preliminary stage of the perfect love of God is the love of thankfulness (amor gratitudinis); for true thankfulness has regard not so much for the good deed as for the disposition, from which the good deed proceeds. The formal object of love of thankfulness is the goodness of God which is evidenced in innumerable benefits, especially in the greatest benefit of the Redemption by Christ on the Cross (bonitas divina relaiva). Thus the love of thankfulness merges automatically into Charity.

The love of desire (amor concupiscentiae or spei), in which one loves God for one's own advantage, is primarily self-love, and therefore only secondarily and

imperfectly love of God. It is not a sufficient motive of perfect contrition. Perfect love however does not demand that one renounce one's own blessedness in God, but only that one's own interest be subordinated to God's interest. For this reason the Church rejected the teaching of Archbishop Fénelon of Cambrai († 1715), that Christian perfection consists in the condition of pure love of God to the exclusion of every other motive (amour désinteressé), D 1327 et seq.

A definite grade of intensity or a long duration is not requisite for the essence of perfect love and perfect sorrow. These are accidental perfections only.

2. Extra-Sacramental Justification through Perfect Contrition

a) Perfect contrition bestows the grace of justification on the mortal sinner even before the actual reception of the Sacrament of Penance. (*Sent. fidei proxima.*)

The Council of Trent declared: etsi contritionem hanc aliquando caritate perfectam esse contingat hominemque Deo reconciliare, priusquam hoc sacramentum actu suscipiatur, etc. D 898.

The teaching of Baius that charity can co-exist with grievous sin (D 1031, 1070), and that perfect sorrow effects extra-sacramental justification only in the case of necessity and martyrdom, was rejected (D 1071).

b) Extra-sacramental justification is effected by perfect sorrow only when it is associated with the desire for the Sacrament (votum sacramenti). (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent teaches: reconciliationem ipsi contritioni sine sacramenti voto, quod in illa includitur, non esse adscribendam. D 898. By the votum sacramenti the subjective and the objective factor of the forgiveness of sins, the act of sorrow of the penitent and the Church's power of the keys are brought into connection with each other. The desire for the Sacrament is virtually contained in perfect sorrow.

In the Old Covenant perfect sorrow was the only means of the forgiveness of sins for adults. Cf. Ez. 18, 21 et seq.; 33, 11 et seq.; Ps. 31, 5. In the New Testament also, the operation of the forgiveness of sins is attributed to the perfect love of God. Cf. John 14, 21 et seq.; Luke 7, 47 ("Many sins are forgiven her because she hath loved much"); 1 John 4, 7.

The Fathers frequently interpret the passage: 1 Peter 4, 8; caritas operit multitudinem peccatorum (Charity covereth a multitude of sins), which according to its context, must be understood of the mutual pardoning of men, as referring to the forgiveness of sins by God on the ground of sorrow deriving from love. Cf. St. Clement of Rome, Cor. 49, 5; Origen, In Lev. Hom. 2, 4; St. Peter Chrysologus, Sermo 94. Among the seven means of forgiveness of sins, Origen names in the sixth place: "overflowing love" (abundantia caritatis) and appeals for confirmation to Luke 7, 47 and 1 Peter 4, 8.

§ 11. Imperfect Contrition

1. Nature of Imperfect Contrition

Imperfect contrition (attritio) is true contrition, which however springs from less perfect motives than perfect contrition. It detests sin as an evil

for us, to the extent that it stains the soul with guilt (malum culpae) and involves a Divine punishment (malum poenae). Accordingly, the Council of Trent names as the principal motive of imperfect contrition : " the consideration of the turpitude of sin " (consideratio turpitudinis peccati) and " the fear of hell and (other) punishments " (metus gehennae et poenarum). D 898. The fear of punishment is no doubt the most frequent, but not the sole motive of imperfect contrition.

The fear which is the motive of imperfect contrition is not timor filialis, that is, filial fear, which co-exists with charity and in virtue of which one fears sin as an affront to the Supreme Good whom one loves with charity ; neither is it timor serviliter servilis, that is, slavish fear, which fears only punishment, and in which the will cleaves to sin ; it is, however, timor simpliciter servilis, that is, fear by which one fears, not the punishment only, but also God who punishes. This results in the aversion of the will from sin. Attritio, which is a due preparation for justification, must exclude the will to sin and be linked up with hope of pardon. D 898.

The word " attritio " has been current since the last quarter of the 12th century (Simon of Tournai ; before 1175). Its significance in Scholastic Theology is indeterminate. Some theologians understand by it a contrition, which lacks the will for confession, for satisfaction or the purpose of amendment of life. In this sense it is insufficient for the forgiveness of sins.

2. Moral and Supernatural Value of Imperfect Contrition

Contrition springing from the motive of fear is a morally good and supernatural act. (*De fide.*)

As against Luther's assertion that contrition springing from the fear of the punishment of hell makes a man a hypocrite and still more a sinner, the Council of Trent declared that this contrition " is a gift of God and a prompting of the Holy Ghost, by Whose help the penitent prepares the way to righteousness " (D 898), and that it " is a true and profitable sorrow " (D 915). Thus attritio is morally good and supernatural. Cf. D 818, 1305, 1411 et seq., 1525.

In many passages Holy Writ warns against sin by pointing to the Divine punishment. Mt. 10, 28 : " Fear rather him that can destroy both soul and body in hell." Cf. Ex. 20, 20 ; Ps. 118, 120 ; Mt. 5, 29 et seq. ; John 5, 14.

The Fathers also very frequently employ the fear motive. Tertullian exhorts sinners to accept public penance pointing out that thereby they avoid the punishment of hell (De poenit. 12). St. Augustine recommends fear of the divine punishment as a means of preparing the way to the love of righteousness (Enarr. in Ps. 127, 7 et seq.). St. John Chrysostom says : " What is worse than hell ? And still nothing is more profitable than fear of it ; for the fear of hell procures for us the crown of the kingdom " (De statuis 15, 1).

The serious accusations made by A. W. Diekhoff and A. Harnack against the doctrine of the later Middle Ages concerning contrition, to the effect that a contrition out of pure fear of punishment—" gallows contrition "—was taken as being sufficient, are not historically true.

3. Imperfect Contrition and the Sacrament of Penance

Imperfect contrition suffices for the forgiveness of sins in the Sacrament of Penance. (*Sent. communis.*)

While the extreme contritionists (Petrus Lombardus, Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, Baius and the Jansenists) demanded perfect contrition for the valid reception of the Sacrament of Penance, the majority of the post-Tridentine theologians firmly insist that imperfect contrition (attritio) suffices. The Council of Trent gave no authoritative doctrinal decision on this point, but it indirectly teaches the adequacy of imperfect contrition by declaring that imperfect contrition without the Sacrament of Penance cannot of itself justify the sinner, but that it disposes to the reception of the grace of justification in the Sacrament of Penance : Et quamvis sine sacramento poenitentiae per se ad justificationem perducere peccatorem nequeat, tamen eum ad Dei gratiam in sacramento poenitentiae impetrandam disponit. D 898. Clearly there is signified here a proximate and immediate disposition which in conjunction with the Sacrament, is sufficient for the attaining of the grace of justification.

If perfect contrition were necessary for valid reception the Sacrament of Penance would cease to be a Sacrament of the dead, as justification would always take place before the actual reception of the Sacrament ; the power to forgive sins would lose its proper purpose, since grievous sins would never be remitted in the Sacrament of Penance (D 913) ; absolution would have a mere declaratory significance, as Petrus Lombardus in fact taught ; the ordinance of the Council of Trent that in danger of death every priest can absolve from every sin and from every censure, so that none would be lost in consequence of refusal of absolution (D 903), would be pointless ; the way to the attaining of justification would not be facilitated by the institution of the Sacrament of Penance ; on the contrary it would be made more difficult.

4. Contritionism and Attritionism

According to the teaching of the Council of Trent on justification, the beginning of the love of God, the so-called amor initialis, must be associated with imperfect contrition (diligere incipiunt ; D 798). During the 17th century a theological controversy developed between moderate contritionists and attritionists as to the nature of amor initialis. While the moderates taught that the initial love must be a formal act of initial charity (initium caritatis), the latter maintained that no formal act of charity, indeed no act of charity whatever, is necessary for the achieving of the grace of justification in the Sacrament of Penance ; all that is required is imperfect contrition, even though that springs from the motive of fear of the punishment of hell alone.

In the year 1667, Pope Alexander VII forbade the disputing parties to censure each other until a final decision would be made by the Holy See, but designated the doctrine of the attritionists as the sententia communior (D 1146). In consonance with this declaration it may be assumed that the express awakening of a special act of the love of friendship or even love from self-interest directed towards God is not necessary, as the necessary initial charity is virtually contained in true attrition, which is an inward aversion from sin together with the hope of pardon.

Since Perfect Charity demands no defiinte intensity of love, the amor initialis

demanded by the contritionists comes to the same thing as the demand for Perfect Charity and thus this theory seems to lead to extreme contritionism.

II. Confession

§ 12. The Divine Institution of Confession and the Necessity of Confession for Salvation

1. Concept and Dogma

Confession is the self-accusation by the penitent of his sins before a fully-empowered priest, in order to obtain forgiveness from him by virtue of the power of the keys (Cat. Rom. II 5, 38).

The Sacramental confession of sins is ordained by God and is necessary for salvation. (*De fide.*)

Following the example of Wycliffe and of Peter of Osma the Divine institution and the necessity for salvation of the particular confession of sins was denied by the Reformers, even though they recognised its psychological and pedagogical value. They appealed to the teaching of medieval codes of Canon Law which based the necessity of confession on the positive ordinance of the Church alone, for example, the Glossa ordinaria to Gratian's Decree, and the Panormitanus (=Nicolas de Tudeschis) invoked by Melanchthon. Cf. Conf. Aug. Art. 11 and 25; Apol. Conf. Art. 11 and 12.

In opposition to the Reformers the Council of Trent declared: Si quis negaverit, confessionem sacramentalem vel institutam vel ad salutem necessariam esse iure divino, A.S. D 916. Cf. D 587, 670, 724. The commandment of confession resting on Divine ordinance is fulfilled not only by public confession, but also by a secret confession before the priest alone (auricular confession). The validity of auricular confession was asserted by the Council of Trent particularly against Calvin, who stigmatised it as a "human invention." D 916.

2. Scriptural Proof

The Divine institution and the necessity for salvation of the particular confession of sins is not explicitly expressed in Holy Writ, but it is a necessary consequence of the judicial power to forgive sins. The power of remitting sins or of retaining them can only be properly exercised, if the possessor of the power of penance knows both the sins and the dispositions of the penitent. But the self-accusation of the penitent is necessary for this. Again, the imposition of an atonement approximate to the guilt presupposes a detailed knowledge of the sins committed. Cf. D 899.

The passages 1 John 1, 9; James 5, 16; Acts 19, 18, which refer to a confession of sins, do not necessarily refer to a sacramental acknowledgment of sins; in fact they probably do not.

3. Proof from Prescription

If confession had been instituted by the Church it would be possible to demonstrate the date of its institution. No such demonstration can be made. All the historical testimonies imply that it is an institution which goes back to Divine ordinance. The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) did not introduce

confession, but merely defined the already existing duty of confession more closely by prescribing yearly confession. D. 437; CIC 906.

The Greek-Orthodox Church teaches the necessity of individual acknowledgment of sins in its official writings on confession (cf. the Confessio Orthodoxa of Petrus Mogilas, Pars I q. 113: Confessio Dosithei, Decr. 15). The Penitential Canons of the Fathers and the Councils, and the Penitential Books of the early Middle Ages presuppose an individual confession of sins.

4. Proof from the Fathers

While the oldest Patristic proofs which speak of a forgiveness of sins (for example, Did. 4, 14; 14, 1), are indefinite, the self-accusation by the sinner of individual sins committed appears clearly as a constituent part of the Church institution of penance in the writings of St. Irenaeus (Adv. haer. I 13, 7), Tertullian (De poenit. 9 and 10), and St. Cyprian (De lapsis and in the Letters). The whole process of penance is called exhomologesis (=confession) after the confession of sins.

The first definite testimony of the existence of secret confession in the pre-Nicene era is offered by Origen. After enumerating six other means of forgiveness of sins, he says of the Sacrament of Penance: "There is still a seventh, although it is a hard and laborious one, namely the forgiveness of sins by penance, when the sinner bedews his bed with tears, and when tears are his food and drink day and night, and when he is not ashamed to confess his sins to the priest of the Lord and to seek a medicine to cure them" (In Lev. hom. 2, 4). In another passage Origen distinguishes between a secret and a public confession: "Look carefully around when thou art to confess thy sins. Test carefully the doctor to whom thou art to explain the cause of the disease . . . if he recognises and foresees that thy disease is of such a nature that it should be confessed in the sight of the whole Church (that is, publicly) and that it should be cured, whereby the others also may be edified and thou thyself may easily be cured, then on mature reflection and following the experienced counsel of that physician, this must be fulfilled" (In Ps. 37, hom. 2, 6).

Pope St. Leo the Great († 461) designated the demand for public confession of sins as "a misuse of the apostolic rule," as a "reprehensible assumption," as a "custom which cannot be approved" and emphasises that "it is enough to reveal the guilt of the conscience to the priest alone in secret confession" (D 145).

§ 13. The Object of Confession

1. Grievous Sins

> **By virtue of Divine ordinance all grievous sins according to kind and number, as well as those circumstances which alter their nature, are subject to the obligation of confession. (*De fide.*)**

The Council of Trent especially stresses that secret sins and inward sins against the last two commandments of the Decalogue (sins of thought and desire) must be confessed. D 899, 917. Physical or moral impossibility excuses from the material completeness of the confession of sins. When the confession

is formally but not materially complete, forgotten grievous sins, or grievous sins, which owing to a state of necessity were not individually confessed, are indirectly remitted. But the duty, founded on the command of Christ, remains of explicitly submitting these sins at the next confession to the confessional tribunal of the Church, when and if the necessity ceases, and of accepting a corresponding penance by way of satisfaction for them. D 1111. (CIC 901.)

In the first centuries of Christianity confession was limited to the most grievous sins, particularly the capital sins. Consequently, the reception of the Sacrament of Penance was a comparatively rare event. In the case of those sins which were not subject to the public penitential tribunal of the Church, acknowledgment before God was considered sufficient.

2. Venial Sins

The confession of venial sins is not necessary but is permitted and is useful. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent teaches that it is not necessary to confess venial sins, as these can be expiated by many other salutary means, such as sorrow, prayer ("Forgive us our trespasses"), works of charity and abstinence, reception of Holy Communion; taceri tamen citra culpam multisque aliis remidiis expiari possunt (D 899). However, it is permissible, good and profitable to confess them (D 899, 917; cf. 748). The permission is based on the universal character of the Church's power to forgive sins.

The confession of venial sins became first a disciplinal exercise, then a sacramental confession in different monasteries, especially in Ireland. Through Irish monks (St. Columbanus) the repeatable private penance, which was also used in cases of venial sins, became established on the Continent. The Council of Trent defended against the reformers the practice of confessing venial sins. Pius VI adopted the teaching of the Council of Trent against the pseudo-Synod of Pistoja (1786), which desired to limit the so-called devotional confession, on the grounds of reverence for the Sacrament. D 1539. Pius XII, in the Encyclicals "Mystici Corporis" (1943) and "Mediator Dei" (1947), recommended the frequent reception of confession, calling it: "the pious practice of frequent confession, introduced by the Church under the guidance of the Holy Ghost," and condemning the belittlement of frequent confession as: "an enterprise which is alien to the Spirit of Christ and most deterimental to the Mystical Body of our Saviour."

3. Sins already Forgiven

Those sins which are already forgiven directly by the Church's Power of the Keys are a sufficient object of confession. (*Sent. certa.*) CIC 902.

According to the declaration of Benedict XI (D 470), the repetition of confession is an act of submission and therefore of atonement. In this case the absolution, according to the teaching of theologians, results not only in the removal of those obstacles which remain as an effect of the sins already forgiven, and which oppose the efficacy of grace (reliquae peccatorum), but also in the remission of the temporal punishments of sin which remain.

III. Satisfaction

§ 14. Concept and Quality of Sacramental Satisfaction

1. Concept

By sacramental satisfaction is understood works of penance which are imposed on the penitent in atonement for the temporal punishment for sins which remain after the guilt of sin and its eternal punishment have been forgiven. The will for satisfaction, which is virtually contained in every true contrition, is an essential element of the Sacrament, but the implementing of this will for satisfaction is only an integrating constituent part.

2. Dogmatic Basis for the Doctrine of Satisfaction

All temporal punishments for sin are not always remitted by God with the guilt of sin and the eternal punishment. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent declared against the Reformers: Si quis dixerit, totam poenam simul cum culpa remitti semper a Deo, satisfactionemque poenitentium non esse aliam quam fidem, qua apprehendunt Christum pro eis satisfecisse, A.S. D 922. Cf. D 807, 840, 904, 925.

The Council of Trent, in establishing the truth of this Dogma (D 904), points to the "clear and vivid examples in Holy Scripture," which show that the sinner must suffer punishment even after the forgiveness of the guilt, for example, Gn. 3, 16 et seq. (First Parents); Numbers 12, 14 et seq. (Miriam); 14, 19 et seq. (Israel); 20, 11 et seq. (Moses and Aaron); 2 Sm. 12, 13 et seq. (David). Christ demands of His disciples that they carry the Cross with Him (Mt. 16, 24; 10, 38), that is, perform penitential works.

The conviction of the Fathers in this matter finds expression in the penitential discipline of the Early Church. If reconciliation was granted for weighty reasons before the expiration of the term of penance, the penance had to be continued after the reconciliation (cf. D 57). St. Augustine says: "The punishment lasts longer than the guilt. Otherwise the guilt could be regarded as being petty, if the punishment also ended with the guilt" (In Ioan. tr. 124, 5).

3. Closer Determination of the Sacramental Satisfaction

The priest has the right and the duty, according to the nature of the sins and the ability of the penitent, to impose salutary and appropriate works of satisfaction. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent declared: Debent sacerdotes Domini . . . pro qualitate criminum et poenitentium facultate salutares et convenientes satisfactiones iniungere. D 905; CIC 887.

The right to impose penance is a corollary of the judicial character of the power of forgiving sins. The duty of the imposition of penance follows from

the fact that the priest, as administrator of the Sacrament, must strive to achieve the completeness of the Sacrament, and as a physician of the soul, must organise the healing of the wounds in the soul. The penance imposed is directed at expiation and amendment. Cf. D 904, 925.

The sacramental satisfaction as a part of the Sacrament of Penance effects ex opere operato the remission of temporal punishments for sins and the curing of the reliquiae peccatorum, that is, the weakening of evil inclinations. The amount of the punishment for sins which is remitted is proportional to the measure of the penance imposed and to the dispositions of the person making satisfaction. The ex opere operato effect of sacramental satisfaction also depends on the degree of grace of the penitent.

The performance of the satisfaction need not precede the absolution. Cf. D 728, 1306–1308, 1535. In Christian antiquity the satisfaction was rendered before the reconciliation as a rule. By way of exception, for example, in danger of death, on the outbreak of a persecution, reconciliation was granted before the performance, or at least before the completion of the penance. When in the early Middle Ages, under the influence of the Celtic penitential practice (St. Columbanus † 615), repeatable private confession was introduced, the submission to penance and the reconciliation were still separated from each other, except in danger of death. In consequence of practical difficulties, the granting of reconciliation immediately after confession and imposition of penance was exceptionally permitted, since the end of the 9th century. At the beginning of the 11th century (Burchard of Worms † 1025), the immediate granting of reconciliation had become a general practice.

4. Appendix: Extra-sacramental Satisfaction

Extra-sacramental penitential works, such as the performance of voluntary penitential practices and the patient bearing of trials sent by God, possess satisfactory value. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent declared that: "Through the merits of Christ satisfaction is rendered to God for the temporal punishment due to forgiven sins by the patient bearing of punishments imposed by God, as well as by voluntarily undertaken penitential works, such as fasting, prayers, almsgiving and other works of piety." (D 923; cf. 906). From the condemnation of a proposition by Baius (D 1077) the definite Church teaching emerges, that the penitential works of the just are satisfactory "de condigno," that is, in the manner of a legal claim.

While the sacramental satisfaction, as a part of the Sacrament of Penance, works ex opere operato, extra-sacramental satisfaction works ex opere operantis. In order that the purpose of the work of satisfaction, the eradication of temporal punishments for sins, may be effected, the same conditions must exist as are demanded for the performance of a meritorious work (freedom, moral goodness and supernatural quality of the action; the wayfaring state and the state of grace); further, the work of satisfaction, as a voluntary substitute for the punishment which should be imposed by God, must be of a penal character, that is, must be associated with labour and pain, which is factually the case with every good work in the state of fallen nature. The possibility of satsifaction is, like that of merit, founded on the redemptive grace of Christ (D 923: per Christi merita).

IV. Absolution

§ 15. The Priest's Absolution as the Form of the Sacrament of Penance

1. Nature of the Sacramental Form

The form of the Sacrament of Penance consists in the words of Absolution. (*De fide.*) D 896. Cf. 699.

In the Latin Church the words are: Ego te absolvo a peccatis tuis in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti. Amen. The words "in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti" are demanded neither by the ordinance of Christ nor by the nature of the judicial sentence for the validity of the form. The prayers preceding and following the Absolution are not essential to the form, and may be omitted for a grave reason. D 896; CIC 885.

2. Significance of the Absolution

Absolution, in association with the acts of the penitent, effects the forgiveness of sins. (*De fide.*)

The absolution is not merely declaratory, as numerous Scholastic theologians assumed by reason of their doctrine of contrition, and as the Reformers assume by reason of their doctrine of justification. It does not merely indicate the forgiveness of sins, but also effects it (cf. Par. 5). The Council of Trent rejected the teaching of the Reformers. D 919.

Starting from the assumption that contrition always effects justification before the actual reception of the Sacrament, Petrus Lombardus and many of his adherents adopted the viewpoint that the absolution is purely declaratory. But they held firmly to its necessity, and ascribed the reconciliation with the Church to it. St. Thomas refused to accept the declaration theory, pointing out that the Sacramental Form must signify the sacramental effect which in penance consists in the removal of a certain matter, viz., sin and which is expressed by the priest saying: I absolve thee, because sins are fetters; and also by drawing a parallel between the forgiveness of sins in the Sacrament of Penance and the forgiveness of sins in the Sacrament of Baptism. S. th. III 84, 3.

3. Verbal Form of the Absolution

In the Ancient Christian Church the form of Absolution was impetratory, that is, it took the form of a prayer. St. Leo I remarks: "God's pardon can only be achieved by the prayers of the priests (supplicationibus sacerdotum)" (D 146). During the Middle Ages indicative additions were made to the impetratory form. In the 13th century the indicative form, which corresponds more to the judicial character, became exclusively used. Up to the present day the Eastern Church, even if not exclusively, uses impetratory formulas. As the impetratory form was current in the whole Church for hundreds of years, and was never rejected, it must be regarded as being sufficient and as valid. The intention of the minister gives the materially impetratory form an indicative significance. A form which is impetratory both as to the wording (materially) and the sense (formally), that is an impetration, pure and simple, for forgiveness, must be regarded as invalid, because it is not consonant with the judicial character of the act of forgiveness of sins.

Absolution may be given orally only and to persons present only. Cf. D 1088

CHAPTER 2

The Effects of the Sacrament of Penance and its Necessity

§ 16. The Effects of the Sacrament of Penance

1. Reconciliation with God

The principal effect of the Sacrament of Penance is the reconciliation of the sinner with God. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent declared : res et effectus huius sacramenti quantum ad eius vim et efficaciam pertinet, reconcilatio est cum Deo. D 896. Reconciliation with God includes not merely the removal of sin, but also the conferring of Sanctifying Grace ; for the forgiveness of sins is achieved by the infusion of Sanctifying Grace. This is either re-bestowed after its loss, or if it was not lost, it is increased. The remission of the eternal punishment for sin is necessarily associated with the eradication of the guilt of sin, but the temporal punishments for sins are not always completely remitted (cf. Par. 14, 2).

The Specific Sacramental grace of the Sacrament of Penance is Sanctifying Grace, in so far as it is adapted to the healing of the soul from sin (D 695 : per poenitentiam spiritualiter sanamur). The claim to the actual graces necessary for one's preservation from sin in the future is also bestowed with the Sanctifying Grace.

2. Peace of Soul

Reconciliation with God has sometimes (interdum), though not always and with all persons, the psychological effect of giving peace and quietness to the conscience and a consequent deep sense of spiritual consolation (conscientiae pax ac serenitas cum vehementi spiritus consolatione : D 896).

3. Revival of Merit

The merits due to good works performed in the state of grace which have been rendered null by grievous sins, that is, have been made inefficacious, revive. (*Sent. communis.*)

There is no formal decision of the Church on this point, but the Council of Trent does not stipulate the uninterrupted duration of the state of grace among the conditions necessary for merit (D 842). Pius XI says, in the Jubilee Bull "Infinita Dei misericordia" (1924), that to those who do penance "the fullness of the merits and the gifts which they lost through sin are restored and given back." D 2193.

The scriptural texts adduced in favour of revival (Ez. 33, 12 ; Hebr. 6, 10 ; Gal. 3, 4 ; Mt. 10, 42 ; Apoc. 14, 13) are not of themselves decisive. However, the Fathers and theologians hold the doctrine almost unanimously. St.

Jerome comments on Gal. 3, 4: "He that has laboured for the faith of Christ and has subsequently fallen into sin, of him it is said that he has suffered the foregoing in vain, so long as he sins; but he will not lose it, if he returns to the former faith and the old zeal." St. Thomas reasons in favour of the doctrine of revival on the ground that the meritorious works have the same standing in the sight of God, even after the sin, as they had when they were performed; but sin prevents the reception of the heavenly reward, hence, as soon as this obstacle is removed, they can exercise once more the efficacy which belongs to them of leading to everlasting life. S. th. III 89, 5.

4. Appendix: No Revival of Sins

Sins the guilt of which has been remitted cannot revive, though individual theologians of early Scholasticism held otherwise. As Christ Himself remitted sins unconditionally and absolutely, He also gave the Church the power of forgiving sins unconditionally and, therefore, finally. The revival of sins would necessarily involve the confession again of all sins previously forgiven and thus might even involve re-Baptism. Individual Fathers, like St. Augustine and St. Gregory the Great, in view of the Parable of the Merciless Servant (Mt. 18, 23, et seq.), speak of the return of sins but with a special meaning, i.e., that through a new grievous sin the former condition of separation from God and the eternal punishment are incurred anew. S. th. III 88, 1.

§ 17. The Necessity of the Sacrament of Penance

The Sacrament of Penance is necessary for salvation to those who, after Baptism, fall into grievous sin. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent draws a parallel between the necessity of the Sacrament of Penance and the necessity of Baptism (D 895). Each must be regarded both as a necessity of precept (necessitas praecepti) and a necessity of means (necessitas medii). The necessity of precept is by Divine institution; the necessity of means derives from the purpose of Penance, i.e., the reconciling of lapsed Christians once more with God. In case of necessity actual reception can be replaced by the desire of the Sacrament (votum sacramenti).

The Fathers' conception of the necessity of the Sacrament of Penance is expressed in the frequent equiparation to Baptism, and in expressions such as "laborious Baptism" (St. John Damascene, De fide orth. IV 9), "Baptism of Penance" (Filastrius, De haer. 89), "Baptism of Tears" (St. Gregory Nazianzus, Or. 39, 17), "Baptism by Penance and Tears" (St. John Damascene), or "second saving board after shipwreck" (secunda post naufragium tabula; St. Jerome, Ep. 130, 9).

The Church has more closely defined the Divine commandment expressed in the institution (praeceptum divinum implicitum) by obliging all the faithful to go to confession at least once a year. This was decreed by the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) and by the Council of Trent as a General Church Law. The obligation begins with the years of discretion, that is, from the beginning of the use of reason, about the seventh year. D 437, 918, 2137; CIC 906. According to the more probable opinion, a person who has committed no grievous sin is not subject to this law since one is not obliged to confess venial sins.

CHAPTER 3

The Minister and the Recipient of the Sacrament of Penance

§ 18. The Minister of the Sacrament of Penance

1. Bishops and Priests the Sole Possessors of the Power of Absolution

The sole possessors of the Church's Power of Absolution are the bishops and priests. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent defined against Luther: Si quis dixerit, . . . non solos sacerdotes esse ministros absolutionis, A.S. D 920; cf. 670, 753. The word "sacerdos" designates both the bishop and the presbyter.

Christ promised the power of absolution to the Apostles only (Mt. 18, 18) and transferred this power to them only (John 20, 23). The power passed from the Apostles to their successors in the priesthood, the bishops and the presbyters. The hierarchical constitution of the Church demands that the judicial power of absolution cannot belong to all the faithful indiscriminately, but only to the members of the hierarchy.

According to the testimony of Tradition, the direction of all matters connected with Penance was, in the Primitive Christian era, in the hands of the bishops and the presbyters. According to St. Cyprian, the forgiveness of sins and the giving of the peace of the Church took place "through the priests" (per sacerdotes: De lapsis 29). St. Basil decrees that the sins must be confessed to those to whom the ministration of the mysteries of God are entrusted (Regulae brevius tractatae, reg. 288). St. Ambrose says: "This right is given to the priests only (solis sacerdotibus)" (De poen. I, 2, 7). St. Leo I remarks that the forgiveness of sins in the Sacrament of Penance can only be achieved by the prayers of the priests (supplicationibus sacerdotum). (Ep. 108, 2; D 146).

2. Confession to Deacons and Laymen

Absolution given by deacons, clerics of lower rank, and laymen is not Sacramental Absolution. (*De fide.*)

St. Cyprian (Ep. 18, 1) and the Synod of Elvira (can. 32) allow deacons to grant the reconciliation in the case of necessity. Whether by this absolution from sin or only absolution from excommunication is to be understood, is uncertain. The penitential books, codices of laws and the theologians of the early Middle Ages (Lanfranc) prescribe confession before a deacon in the case of necessity. Whether this was regularly associated with absolution appears very questionable. Since the end of the twelfth century, Synods raised objections on the ground that the deacons are not possessors of the power of absolution. For an historical understanding of deacon-confession it must be observed that in antiquity the chief weight in the process of the sacramental forgiveness of sins was attached to the satisfaction. In the early Middle Ages the main emphasis was laid on the acknowledgment of sins as a salutary self-accusation, and in consequence the significance of the priestly absolution substantially receded.

For these reasons it was customary in the early Middle Ages to confess sins to lay people if a priest could not be reached. The greatest extension of lay-confession was due to the pseudo-Augustinian treatise De vera et falsa poenitentia (eleventh century). Many Scholastic Theologians, for example, Petrus Lombardus (Sent. IV, 17, 4) and St. Thomas Aquinas (Suppl. 8, 2) declare that it fulfils the obligation. Scotus, who wrongly placed the essence of the Sacrament of Penance exclusively in the priest's absolution, declared against the necessity of lay confession. The post-Tridentine Theologians contested it, because it could easily be used in proof of the Reformers' view of the general lay priesthood. As an expression of a penitential disposition and of a desire for the Sacrament, lay confession could effect justification ex opere operantis.

In the Greek Church all matters connected with confession were preponderantly in the hands of the lay-monks from the end of the images controversy (about 800) down to the 13th century. The forgiveness of sins practised by them was erroneously regarded as Sacramental Absolution. The custom rested on the error which goes back to Origen, that only Spirituals (Pneumatics) could forgive sins and communicate with the Holy Ghost.

3. Necessity of the Power of Jurisdiction

On account of the judicial character of the power of confession, jurisdiction over the penitent is necessary in addition to the power of absolution given in the sacerdotal consecration. D 903, 1537; CIC 872.

For this reason the Pope and the bishops have the right of reserving to their own tribunals absolution for certain sins committed by their subjects so that in these cases the ordinary confessors cannot validly absolve except in case of danger of death or in certain other contingencies provided for by the law of the Church. D 903, 921 : CIC 882, 900. Historically, the episcopal and papal reservations go back to the beginning of the 12th century (Synod of London 1102, can. 20; Synod of Clermont 1130, can. 10). In the later Middle Ages these reservations were unduly extended, to the prejudice of the care of souls.

§ 19. The Recipient of the Sacrament of Penance

The Sacrament of Penance can be received by any baptised person, who, after Baptism, has committed a grievous or a venial sin. (*De fide.*) D 911, 917.

According to the sententia communis the three acts of contrition, confession of sins and satisfaction, which form the matter of the Sacrament, are necessary for the valid reception of the Sacrament of Penance.

For worthy reception the disposition of contrition is necessary in addition to faith. As this is an essential constituent part of the matter, worthy reception coincides with the valid reception.

APPENDIX

§ 20. The Doctrine of Indulgences

1. Concept of Indulgence

By an indulgence (indulgentia) is understood the extra-sacramental remission of the temporal punishments of sin remaining after the forgiveness of the guilt of sin. This remission is valid in the sight of God, and it is granted by the Church out of Her treasury of satisfaction. It is granted to the living by way of absolution and to the dead by way of intercession: remissio coram Deo poenae debitae pro peccatis ad culpam quod attinetiam deletis, quam ecclesiastica auctoritas ex thesauro Ecclesiae concedit pro vivis per modum absolutionis, pro defunctis per modum suffragii. CIC 911.

Remission is not a forgiveness of sin, but it presupposes as a necessary precondition that the sin has been forgiven. The medieval formula used in granting Indulgences: "concedimus plenam (plenissimam) remissionem omnium peccatorum" means that by the remission of the temporal punishments for sin, remaining after the reception of the Sacrament of Penance, the last effects of sin are removed. Contrition and confession were regularly demanded as a condition for the fruitful reception of an indulgence. Cf. D 676.

Again, an Indulgence is not a mere remission of canonical punishments, but a remission of the temporal punishments for sin imposed by God. Cf. D 759, 1540.

2. The Church's Power to Grant Indulgence

The Church possesses the power to grant Indulgences. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent declared against the attacks of Wycliffe and Luther: Sacrosancta synodus . . . eos anathemate damnat, qui (indulgentias) aut inutiles esse asserunt, vel eas concedendi in Ecclesia potestatem esse negant. D 989, 998 Cf. D 622, 676 et seq., 757 et seq.

Pope Leo X in the Indulgence Decretal "Cum postquam" (1518), bases the Church's power to grant Indulgences on the power of the keys. This must not be understood as referring in the narrow sense to the power of forgiving sins, but rather as referring in the wider sense to the jurisdiction of the Church. Thus not every possessor of the power to forgive sins also possesses the power to grant Indulgences. The power to remit the temporal punishments for sins is not automatically included in the power to absolve from the guilt of sins and their eternal punishment. By its very nature an Indulgence is not a pure act of grace, in which the temporal punishment for sin is remitted gratis without anything being done in return: it implies compensation drawn from the treasury of satisfaction amassed by Christ and by the Saints. The Bishops of the Christian communion are entitled to distribute this spiritual treasure among the faithful. The possibility of vicarious satisfaction derives from the unity o the Mystical Body of Christ, the Communion of Saints. Accordingly, the power to give Indulgences rests both on the power of jurisdiction residing in the Church hierarchy and on the union of the faithful in the Communion of Saints. Cf. D 740a· Suppl. 25, 1.

The modern form of Indulgence developed in the 11th century. It emerged from the extra-sacramental absolutions of the early Middle Ages, in which the Pope, the bishops and the priests, frequently invoking the power of binding and loosing transferred to them, besought the mercy of God for individual persons or for the faithful generally with a view to the forgiveness of their sins. When in the 11th century, the forgiveness of sins which people hoped to be granted by God began to be imputed to the penance imposed by the Church absolution began to be regarded as an Indulgence. Even in Christian antiquity the Church exercised, in a different form, the power to grant Indulgences. In response to the intercessory appeals (Letters of Peace) of the Martyrs, the Church especially the Church of North Africa in the 3rd century (St. Cyprian), granted to individual penitents in specific cases, a partial remission of the penitential punishments imposed. People confidently expected that God would remit to them the remainder of the punishments for sins on the intercession and for the sake of the merits of the Martyrs. In the early Middle Ages, under the influence of Germanic legal opinions, the Redemptions (penitential absolutions) appeared, by which severe confession punishments were transformed into easier substitution—works (alms, pilgrimages). Even if fundamentally the equivalence of the commuted penance to the original penance was demanded, in fact the commutation meant an alleviation of the penance. In view of the Communion of Saints, helpers (monks) were permitted to assist in the performance of the penance, or a representative penance was allowed, especially in cases of sickness. This, of course, opened the door to the abolition of the ancient severe penances. The immediate preliminary fore-runners of Indulgences were the absolutions, current since the early Middle Ages, which were at first merely intercessions, but which later acquired more and more the character of an authoritative absolution.

3. Source of Indulgences

The source of Indulgences is the Church's treasury of satisfaction which consists of the superabundant satisfactions of Christ and of the Saints. (*Sent. certa.*)

God could remit the sins of mankind without any satisfaction and without violating justice (S. th. III 46 2 ad 3). But, in fact, in the order of grace established by God through Christ, all forgiveness of sins is granted in virtue of a corresponding satisfaction. In the extra-sacramental remission of temporal punishments for sins in Indulgences, the Church offers to the Divine Justice a substitute satisfaction—that is, the infinite satisfaction of Christ and the superabundant satisfactions of the Saints. These satisfactions, in the case of the Saints, exceeded the measure of their own sins and, together with the superabundant merits of Christ, form the Church's treasury of merit, or treasury of satisfaction (thesaurus Ecclesiae). The Church Authority possesses the right to dispose of this spiritual treasury, though not strictly judicially and by a formal right of disposition, since the moral value of these personal merits is inseparable from the person of Christ and of the Saints. In the granting of an Indulgence, the Church appeals to the mercy of God, beseeching Him to grant to those members of the Mystical Body of Christ who fulfil the prescribed conditions a remission of their due punishments which have not yet been atoned for, in virtue of the superabundant satisfactions of Christ and of the Saints. The prayer of the Church requires the gracious acceptance of God, but in view of the special position of the person granting the Indulgence in the Mystical Body of Christ, a hearing can, with moral certainty, be counted on.

The teaching of the existence of the thesaurus Ecclesiae and of the Church's power over it was developed by the Scholastic Theologians at the beginning of the 13th century (Hugo of St. Cher), and was first officially proposed by Pope Clement VI in the Jubilee Bull "Unigenitus Dei Filius" (1343), and later by Pope Leo X in the Indulgence Decretal "Cum postquam" (1518), but was not defined. D 550 et seq., 740 a. It is based on the doctrine of the vicarious satisfaction of Christ and of the Communion of Saints. The attacks of Luther, Baius and the Synod of Pistoja were rejected by the Church, D 757, 1060, 1541.

4. Bearers of the Power of Indulgence

The practice of the power of Indulgence is not an act of the power of orders, but of the power of jurisdiction. The Pope, as possessor of the supreme power of jurisdiction over the whole Church, has an absolute, that is, an unlimited power of Indulgence. The bishops, by virtue of their ordinary power, can grant Indulgences only to those subject to them, and within the limited compass which is regulated by Canon Law. Cf. CIC 912, 274 n. 2, 349, Par. 2. n. 2. Even Cardinals have only a limited power to grant Indulgences. CIC 239, Par. I n. 24.

5. Division of Indulgences

a) According to the extent of the remission of punishment, Indulgences are divided into Plenary Indulgences (indulgentia plenaria or totalis), and Partial Indulgences (indulgentia partialis), according as the temporal punishments for sins are completely or only partially remitted. The measure of the remission of punishment depends on the approval of the Church: tantum valent, quantum pronuntiantur (or praedicantur; Suppl. 25, 2). The periods of time customarily stipulated in the case of Partial Indulgences signify that as many punishments for sins are remitted as would have been expiated in the given time according to the norms of the old canonical penance.

Departing from the sententia communis, a few theologians, for example, Cajetan, define a plenary Indulgence as a remission of that measure of temporal punishments for sins which corresponds to the expiatory value of the whole canonical penance which would have been imposed by the old penitential order. But since this was not automatically equal to the atonement due before God, the opinion raises doubts as to whether a plenary Indulgence effects the remission of all temporal punishments due to sins. The view arose out of the formula which was current in the granting of Indulgences before the 13th century, which intimated that the whole penance (imposed) was remitted. Urban II declared (1095) on the occasion of the promulgation of the first Crusaders' Indulgence: Iter illud pro omni poenitentia [ei] reputetur (Mansi XX 816).

b) According to the mode of their application, a division is made between Indulgences for the living and Indulgences for the dead. The granting of an Indulgence to the living faithful is accomplished by absolution (per modum absolutionis). The Church has no jurisdiction over the dead in Purgatory; thus, Indulgences cannot be applied directly to them through absolution, but only indirectly by means of intercession (per modum suffragii), for which

reason their operation is uncertain. The possibility of their application is founded on the Communion of Saints.

Theologians are not unanimous in their views as to the significance of the expression " per modum absolutionis." According to its original sense it means the judicial absolution of the penitential punishment imposed by the Church. It was always thought that a remission of the punishment merited by sin accompanied the remission of the penance imposed by the Church. After the cessation of public Church penance, the expression was retained. (Cf. D 740 a [Leo X] CIC 911.) According to L. Billot and P. Galtier, the only meaning it has now is that the punishments for sins are remitted per modum solutionis, that is, by payment out of the treasure possessed by the Church. P. Poschmann wishes to give effect to the original meaning of the expression by taking the granting of Indulgence to mean an act of judicial absolution, but one which refers immediately only to the remission of the canonical punishment which would be imposed in the old order of penance—which is to-day merely hypothetical—while the remission of punishment in the other world results from the prayer offered by the Church in which she asks God to accept by way of substitution for the penance works of satisfaction drawn out of the Church's treasure of satisfaction. This prayer is included in the absolution.

Historically it was only in the second half of the fifteenth century (Callistus III 1457 : Sixtus IV 1476), that Indulgences for the dead appear, although the scholastic Theologians had already affirmed the possibility of indulgences for the dead (Suppl. 71, 10). Luther's teaching that Indulgences are of no profit to the dead, and the refusal by the Synod of Pistoja to accept such Indulgences, was rejected by the Church. D 762, 1542.

6. Conditions for the Granting and Winning of Indulgences

The use of Indulgences is useful and salutary to the Faithful. (*De fide.*) D 989, 998.

a) The conditions for the granting of Indulgences are : α) A legitimate power to grant Indulgences ; β) A just ground. Cf. D 676 : ex causa pia et iusta ; D 740 a : pro rationabilibus causis.

According to St. Thomas (Suppl. 25, 2), any ground which contributes to the honour of God and to the profit of the Church is sufficient. Many other theologians, for example, Cajetan, demand a causa proportionata, that is, a moral performance by the penitent corresponding to the extent of the Indulgence.

b) The conditions for the winning of Indulgences are, in addition to the reception of Baptism and communion with the Church ;

α) The state of Sanctifying Grace at least at the close of the prescribed works ;

β) Subordination to the one granting the Indulgence ;

γ) The habitual intention at least of gaining the Indulgence ;

δ) The exact performance of the prescribed works. Cf. CIC 925, 927 ; Suppl. 25, 2.

It is a controversial question whether the state of grace is necessary for the gaining of an Indulgence for the dead also. Most theologians affirm that it is (against Suarez, Chr. Pesch, P. Galtier), as it is improbable that the prayer of one in the

state of mortal sin would be accepted by God for the application of the Indulgence. Theologians of the 15th century (for example, G. Biel) expound the untenable opinion that the Pope possesses power of jurisdiction over the poor souls in Purgatory also, and could, therefore, grant them the Indulgences in the form of an authoritative absolution. The inference was drawn from this—which had a bad effect in practice—that the mediator of the Indulgence had only to perform the prescribed work (usually alms-giving in the form of money), and that the state of grace was not necessary. For the gaining of a Plenary Indulgence fully a simple state of grace, that is, freedom from grievous sin, is not sufficient; in addition, freedom from all venial sins is required.

V. The Sacrament of Extreme Unction

§ 1. Concept and Sacramental Nature of Extreme Unction

1. Concept of Extreme Unction

Extreme Unction is that Sacrament in virtue of which the sick believer by the anointing with oil and the prayer of the priest receives the grace of God for the supernatural salvation of his soul and often also for the natural healing of his body.

2. Sacramental Nature of Extreme Unction

a) Dogma

Extreme Unction is a true and proper Sacrament instituted by Christ. (*De fide.*)

Many Medieval Sects (Cathari, Waldenses, Wycliffians, Hussites) belittled Extreme Unction and neglected its reception. The Reformers, in addition, denied that it is a true and proper Sacrament. They asserted that it was merely a customary blessing handed down from the Fathers, which was not based on any commandment of God (Apol. Conf. Art. 13 n. 6) and they called it a " sacrament in appearance only " (fictitium sacramentum; Calvin, Institutio christ. rel. IV 19, 18).

The Council of Trent declared against the Reformers: Si quis dixerit extremam unctionem non esse vere et proprie sacramentum a Christo Domino nostro instititum et a beato Jacobo Apostolo promulgatum, sed ritum tantum acceptum a Patribus aut figmentum humanum, A.S. D 926. Pius X rejected the modernistic doctrine, that St. James in his Epistles did not intend to promulgate a Sacrament instituted by Christ, but merely intended to recommend a pious custom. D 2048.

b) Scriptural proof

The Sacrament of Extreme Unction is indicated in Holy Writ and prefigured in the anointing of the sick person in Mk. 6, 13; it is recommended and promulgated (commendatum et promulgatum: D 908) in James 5, 14 et seq.: " Is any man sick among you? Let him bring in the priests of the Church, and let them pray over him, anointing him with oil in the name of the Lord. 15. And the prayer of faith shall save the sick man. And the Lord shall raise him up: and if he be in sins they shall be forgiven him."

In James 5, 14 et seq., all the elements of a true Sacrament are mentioned:

α) An outward sign of grace, consisting of anointing with oil (matter) and of the prayer of the priest over the sick person (form).

β) An inner operation of grace which is definitely expressed in the forgiveness of sins, and which certainly takes place through the communication of grace. According to the context and the language in other passages (cf. James 1, 21; 2, 14; 4, 12; 5, 20), the saving and raising up of the sick person is at least not exclusively to be referred to the cure of the body, but also and above all to the saving of the soul from eternal destruction and to the raising-up of the soul by Divine grace from despondency and despair.

γ) The institution by Christ, if it is not directly expressed in the words "in the name of the Lord" (that is, in the mandate and in the authority of the Lord —cf. 5, 10—or under appeal to the name of the Lord), may be concluded. Only God, or the God-Man Jesus Christ, can by virtue of His Own authority, link up the communication of Divine grace with an outward rite. The Apostles regarded themselves merely as "ministers of Christ, and dispensers of the mysteries of God" (1 Cor. 4, 1).

The theory that Extreme Unction was instituted by the Apostles, as was held by many theologians of the 12th and 13th centuries (for example, Hugo of St. Victor, Petrus Lombardus, Summa Alexandri, St. Bonaventure), is to be understood as signifying a mediate institution by God or by the Holy Ghost through the instrumentality of the Apostles. This is in effect the same thing as a mediate institution by Christ. According to the declaration of the Council of Trent (D 926) this theory is not tenable.

Calvin understood the passage in James 5, 14, et seq in the sense of a charismatic healing of a sick person. This cannot be accepted since, for one thing, the charismata of the Primitive Christian era were not necessarily and regularly associated with the office of the presbyters. Cf. 1 Cor. 12, 9. 30, and again the effect of the anointing and of the prayers is not so much the healing of the body as the healing of the soul. The Council of Trent rejected as heretical the doctrine expounded by Calvin. D 927.

c) Proof from Tradition

Patristic proofs for Extreme Unction are not numerous. Origen, quoting St. James 5, 14 et seq., speaks of the forgiveness of sins, but does not clearly and distinctly distinguish it from the forgiveness of sins by the Sacrament of Penance (In Lev. hom. 2, 4). The Church ritual of St. Hippolytus of Rome contains a short prayer for the consecration of the oil, in which prayers are offered for the "strengthening of all who require it, and health of all who use it." It is obvious from the effects which were expected from the use of the oil, that it was used, even if not exclusively, for the anointing of the sick. The Euchologion of Serapion of Thmuis († about 360) contains a detailed prayer of consecration in which liberation from bodily illness and debility, expulsion of evil spirits, communication of grace and forgiveness of sins are mentioned as effects of the anointing of the sick.

Pope St. Innocent I (401–417), in a letter to Decentius of Eugubium (D 99,) attests that the passage James 5, 14 et seq. is to be taken as referring to the faithful who are sick, that the oil of the sick must be prepared, that is, consecrated by the bishop, and that the anointing of the sick may be undertaken, not only by the priests but also by the bishop, and that the anointing of the sick is a "Sacrament" (genus est sacramenti). The private anointing of the sick mentioned by St.

Innocent, which is permitted to all the faithful, is to be regarded as a non-sacramental anointing of the sick. Caesarius of Arles († 542) exhorts the faithful, in the case of sickness, not to go to soothsayers and magicians, nor to seek cures by the application of magic, but instead of this to come to the Church, to receive the body and the blood of Christ, and to be anointed with the oil consecrated by the priests. In this manner they will achieve the health of the body and the remission of sin, according to James 5, 14 et seq. (Sermo 13, 3; 50, 1; 52, 5; 184, 5). According to Caesarius the sick person as a rule undertakes the anointing himself (but compare Sermo 19, 5, the genuineness of which, however, is doubtful: oleo benedicto a presbyteris inunguatur); parents perform this function on their children (Sermo 184, 5). The Venerable Bede († 735) and authors of the Carlovingian era attest the ministration of the anointing of the sick by the priests, as is demanded by James 5, 14. However, Bede, with St. Innocent I, also permits the private use of the oil consecrated by the bishop (Expos. ep. Iac. 5, 14). From the Carlovingian era onwards bishops and synods exhort that the reception of Extreme Unction should not be neglected. The rarity of the reception of this Sacrament was due to abuses (unduly high offerings) and erroneous views (unpermissibility of marital intercourse, and of the use of foods containing meats, going barefoot after its reception). Cf. Berthold of Regensburg, Sermon on the Seven Sacraments.

The Greek Orthodox Church and the Sects of the East which have been separated from the Catholic Church since the 5th century, with the exception of the Nestorian and Armenians who also had it formerly, know and use the Sacrament of Extreme Unction. Cf. The Testimony of the Armenian Patriarch John Mandakuni († after 480) in his twenty-fifth discourse.

§ 2. The Outward Signs of Extreme Unction

1. Matter

The remote matter of Extreme Unction is oil. (*De fide.*)

By oil (James 5, 14) is understood olive oil from the fruit of the olive tree. The Decretum pro Armenis (1439) teaches: cuius materia est oleum olivae per episcopum benedictum (D 700: cf. 908). According to an old tradition (cf. St. Hippolytus of Rome) the oil must be consecrated by the bishop or by a priest authorised by the Apostolic See (CIC 945). The employment of unconsecrated oil, or of oil consecrated by a priest who is not fully authorised, makes the validity of the Sacrament doubtful. Cf. D 1628 et seq.

The materia proxima is the anointing of the sick person with consecrated oil. For the validity of the Sacrament the anointing on one single sense is sufficient, or more properly on the forehead. CIC 947. Par. I.

2. Form

The form consists in the prayer of the priest for the sick person which accompanies the anointing. (*De fide.*)

The Latin Church employs the words: Per istam sanctam unctionem et suam piisimam misericordiam indulgeat tibi Dominus, quidquid per visum (auditum, odaratum, gustum et locutionem, tactum, gressum) deliquisti. Amen. D 700, 908; cf. 1996.

According to James 5, 14, the form must be a prayer for the sick person, which unambiguously determines the anointing as a religious act. The deprecative form is most suitable for this purpose, but the formerly current indicative and imperative forms also can signify a deprecative meaning through the intention of the priest.

§ 3. The Effects of Extreme Unction

The Decretum pro Armenis ascribes to Extreme Unction the healing of the soul and in certain circumstances also the healing of the body; Effectus vero est mentis sanatio et, in quantum autem expedit, ipsius etiam corporis (D 700). The Council of Trent enumerates the following effects: Bestowal of grace, remission of sins, removal of the remainder of sins (reliquiae peccati), alleviation and strengthening of the sick, in certain circumstances the restoration of the health of the body (D 927, 909). With the Decretum pro Armenis we distinguish two operations:

1. Salvation of the Soul

a) Extreme Unction gives the sick person sanctifying grace in order to arouse and strengthen him. (*De fide.*)

As a Sacrament of the living it effects of itself an increase of Sanctifying Grace. Corresponding to the purpose of the Sacrament the Grace communicated has the power and the purpose of curing the soul of the sick person, of raising it up and of strengthening it, by awakening confidence in God's mercy and by giving strength to bear the hardships of sickness and of the mortal agony, and to resist the temptations of the devil. By means of Extreme Unction the moral weakness, which remains in the sick person as a consequence of sin (reliquiae peccati), is conquered. D 909. Cf. Suppl. 30, 1. With Sanctifying Grace there is also conferred a claim to those actual graces which the sick person requires in the bodily and spiritual necessities arising from his serious illness or death-struggle.

b) Extreme Unction effects the remission of grievous sins still remaining and of venial sins. (*De fide.*)

As Extreme Unction is a Sacrament of the Living, it presupposes in general the remission of grievous sins. But if a person in mortal sin is seriously ill and can no longer receive the Sacrament of Penance, or if he erroneously believes that he is free from grievous sin, Extreme Unction eradicates the grievous sins *per accidens*, but still by reason of Christ's Institution. A necessary pre-condition of the forgiveness of sins is that the sinner has turned away from sin at least by an habitually continuing imperfect contrition. By Extreme Unction also temporal punishments for sins are remitted, corresponding to the intensity of charity and penance in the recipient.

Many Scholastic Theologians, especially Scotists, perceive the main purpose of Extreme Unction in the remission of venial sins. St. Thomas rejects this view, as the assumption of a special Sacrament for the forgiveness of venial sins appears to lack foundation. Suppl. 30, 1.

If the Sacrament is received validly but unworthily it revives after the removal of the obstacles to grace, according to the common opinion of theologians.

2. Healing of the Body

Extreme Unction sometimes effects the restoration of bodily health, if this be of spiritual advantage. (*De fide.*) D 909.

This effect is not produced directly in a miraculous manner, but indirectly by the fact that on account of the intimate connection between soul and body the raising-up and strengthening of the soul brings about the restoration of the body to health. It presupposes the possibility of natural healing. Suppl. 30, 2.

§ 4. The Necessity of Extreme Unction

Extreme Unction is not of itself (per se) necessary for salvation. (*Sent. certa.*) CIC 944.

The reason is that the state of grace can be achieved and preserved without it. In certain circumstances (*per accidens*), however, Extreme Unction can still be necessary, e.g., for the saving of a person in mortal sin, who is not able to receive the Sacrament of Penance.

An express Divine commandment (praeceptum divinum explicitum) to receive the Sacrament of Extreme Unction cannot be proved. However, the institution of a special Sacrament for serious illness and death-agony includes an implicit Divine precept of making use of it (praeceptum divinum implicitum).

Christian self-love and respect for the Sacrament impose the onerous obligation on the sick person of receiving the Sacrament. Charity commands those who are around the sick person to make it possible for him to receive the Sacrament. Disrespect of the Sacrament is condemned by the Council of Trent as "a grievous transgression and an injustice against the Holy Ghost" (D 910).

§ 5. The Minister of Extreme Unction

Only bishops and priests can validly administer Extreme Unction. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent declared against the Reformers who understood by "presbyters" (James 5, 14), the physically oldest members of the community, that by this word priests consecrated by the bishop are to be understood: Si quis dixerit, presbyteros Ecclesiae . . . non esse sacerdotes ab episcopo ordinatos, sed aetate seniores in quavis communitate, ob idque proprium extremae unctionis ministrum non esse solum sacerdotem, A.S. D 929.

The administration by many priests, which was very extended in the Middle Ages, and which is still usual in the Greek Church today, is not demanded by the plural form "presbyteros" (James 5, 14); but it is admissible.

The anointing of the sick performed by lay-people on themselves and on others, which is already mentioned by St. Innocent I (D 99) and which was widely extended in the Middle Ages, was not a Sacrament, but only a sacramental.

§ 6. The Recipient of Extreme Unction

Extreme Unction can be received only by the Faithful who are seriously ill. (*De fide.*) D 910.

Only those who are baptised and in danger of death by sickness (James 5, 14 et seq.), and in addition who have attained the use of reason (sent. certa) may receive Extreme Unction, since according to its purpose and its effect it is a completion of the Sacrament of Penance (consummativum poenitentiae : D 907) and for this reason like it presupposes the possibility of sin and hence the use of reason. CIC 940 Par. 1

Extreme Unction can be repeated. However, it should only be repeated during the one sickness, if after an improvement, the patient relapses into danger of death (relative impossibility of repetition) D 910 ; CIC 940 Par. 2.

The view advanced by individual early Scholastic Theologians (Ivo of Chartres, Godfrey of Vendome, Magister Simon), that Extreme Unction can be received only once in a lifetime, is contradictory of the purpose of the Sacrament, and has no support in Holy Writ or in Tradition. This view was, therefore, almost generally rejected (Petrus Venerabilis, Hugo of St. Victor, Petrus Lombardus). Early Medieval Sacramentaries (Gregorianum and others) even demonstrate that the custom was very extended of administering the anointing of the sick in addition to the communion of the sick, seven days running. One can hardly doubt that this repetition of the Sacrament in the same danger of death, provided for in the Liturgy, was valid.

As a general rule the state of grace is necessary for valid reception. In the case of necessity habitual imperfect contrition suffices.

VI. The Sacrament of Holy Order (Ordo)

§ 1. Concept and Sacramental Nature of Holy Order

1. Concept

Holy Order (ordo, ordinatio) is a true Sacrament, in which a spiritual power is transferred to one of the faithful by the imposition of hands and prayer of the priest, together with grace to exercise this power in a manner pleasing to God.

2. Sacramental Nature of Holy Order

a) Dogma

Holy Order is a true and proper Sacrament which was instituted by Christ. (*De fide.*)

Against the Reformers' doctrine of the general lay-priesthood, the Council of Trent declared that there is in the Catholic Church a visible and external priesthood (D 961), a hierarchy instituted by Divine ordinance (D 966), that is, a special priesthood and a special priestly status (ordo in esse), which is essentially different from the lay state. Acceptance into the priestly state is gained by a special Sacrament, the Sacrament of Holy Order (ordo in fieri or ordinatio). The Council of Trent defined : Si quis dixerit, ordinem sive sacram ordinationem non esse vere et proprie sacramentum a Christo

Domino institutum, A.S. D 963. The definition of the Council asserts the sacramentality of Ordo in general, but not of the individual grades of Order.

b) Scriptural Proof

In the passages of Holy Scripture which refer to acceptance into the Church hierarchy, the individual elements of the concept of a Sacrament distinctly appear.

Acts 6, 6, according to the traditional interpretation, says concerning the institution of deacons : " These (the seven men) they set before the Apostles : and they praying, imposed hands on them." In Acts 14, 22 mention is made of the institution of the presbyters : " And when they had ordained to them priests in every church and had prayed with fasting, they commended them to the Lord." St. Paul writes to his disciple Timothy : " For which cause I admonish thee that thou stir up the grace of God that is in thee by the imposition of my hands " (2 Tim., 1, 6). Cf. 1, Tim. 4, 14 : " Neglect not the grace that is in thee : which was given thee by prophecy, with the imposition of the hands of the priesthood."

Thus, acceptance into the Church hierarchy took place by a precedure perceptible to the senses, consisting in imposition of the hands and prayer. By this external rite a spiritual authorisation of office was conveyed to the ordinand, and an inward grace communicated to him. The institution by Christ may be shown by this that only God or the God-Man Jesus Christ can causally associate the communication of inward grace with an outward rite.

The expression " gratia " (τὸ χάρισμα) in both the passages from Timothy designates not extraordinary gifts of grace (charismata) but the Sanctifying Grace necessary for the administration of the spiritual office which is bestowed.

St. Paul the Apostle's exhortation to Timothy : " Impose not hands lightly on any man . . ." (Tim., 1, 5, 22) proves, according to the more common interpretation, that the overseers of the Church appointed by the Apostles are, in their turn, by imposition of the hands, to inherit the powers received. Some old and new interpreters (P. Galtier, K. Rahmer), however, understand this paragraph as meaning the imposition of hands during a reconciliation, as it is mentioned in connection (v. 20) with the attitude towards sinners.

c) Proofs from Tradition

Tradition corroborates the Divine institution of the Church hierarchy (see Doctrine of the Church, Par. 4), the transference of the sacerdotal powers by the imposition of hands and prayer (see below, Par. 3), and the inward communication of grace associated with this. St. Gregory of Nyssa compares the consecration of priests to the consecration of the Eucharist : " The same power of the word makes the priest also sublime and venerable, marked off from the crowd by the rarity of consecration. Yesterday and the day before yesterday he was one of many, one of the crowd. All at once he becomes a leader, an overseer, a teacher of piety, a perfector of the concealed mysteries. And this without changing body and form. As to the outside he remains the same as he was, but by an invisible power and grace his invisible soul has been changed for the better " (Or. in baptismum Christi). St. Augustine compares the consecration of priests to Baptism : " Both are Sacraments and both are administered to man with a certain consecration ; the former when he is baptised ; the

latter when he is ordained; thus in the Catholic Church neither can be repeated" (Contra ep. Parmeniani II 13, 28).

Seven grades of Order are usually listed: four minor grades, namely, those of Porter, Lector, Exorcist and Acolyte; and three major grades, namely, those of Subdeacon, Deacon and Priest. The last-mentioned includes the Presbyterate and the Episcopate. Cf. D 958, 962.

The first time that all seven grades of Order are mentioned is in a letter of Pope St. Cornelius (251–253) to Bishop Fabius of Antioch (Eusebius, Hist. eccl. VI 43, 11; D 45).
On the relationship of the individual grades of Order to the Holy Eucharist, cf. Suppl. 37, 2.

§ 2. The Individual Grades of Ordination

1. The four Minor Orders and the Order of the Subdiaconate

The four Minor Orders and the Subdiaconate are not Sacraments but merely Sacramentals. (*Sent. Communior.*)

The Decretum pro Armenis (D 701) which follows the teaching of St. Thomas and of most of the Schoolmen, cannot be adduced as a decisive counter-proof, as the Decretum is not an infallible doctrinal decision, but merely a practical institution. The Council of Trent took no attitude in the question. The Apostolic Constitution "Sacramentum Ordinis" of Pius XII (1947) obviously favours the view that only the Orders of diaconate, priesthood and episcopate are the stages of sacramental consecration, as only those three are mentioned.

The Minor Orders and the subdiaconate are not of Divine institution, but were only gradually introduced by the Church to meet special requirements. The lectorate is first attested to by Tertullian (De praescr. 41), the subdiaconate by St. Hippolytus of Rome (Traditio Apost.), all the Minor Orders (which up to the 12th century included the subdiaconate), by Pope St. Cornelius (D 45). The Greek Church knows only two Minor Orders: lectorate and hypodiaconate. The rite of consecration for these does not include the imposition of hands.

2. The Order of Presbyterate

The consecration of priests is a Sacrament. (*De fide.*)

The sacramental nature of the consecration of priests is implicitly expressed in the definition of the Council of Trent that Ordo is a true and proper Sacrament (D 963). Since at the time of the Council of Trent there was no unanimity as to the sacramental nature of the consecration of bishops and of deacons the definition must refer at least to the consecration of priests the sacramental nature of which was never contested. The Apostolic Constitution "Sacramentum Ordinis" of Pius XII teaches that not only the consecration of priests but also the consecration of deacons and bishops has a true sacramental nature, since it determines exactly the matter and form for each of these grades of consecration. D 3001.

The rite of ordination leaves no doubt as to the sacramental nature of the consecration of priests, since it consists in the imposition of hands and prayer, in which the grace of the Holy Ghost is besought from Heaven for the ordinand.

3. The Consecration of a Bishop

The consecration of a bishop is a Sacrament. (*Sent. certa*.)

The Council of Trent declared that the bishops, as successors of the Apostles, belong by excellence (praecipue) to the hierarchical state, and that the bishops at ordination do not pronounce in vain the words : Accipe Spiritum Sanctum. D 960, 964. The Apostolic Constitution " Sacramentum Ordinis " of Pius XII presupposes the sacramental nature of the consecration of bishops, which was denied by most Scholastic Theologians, but overwhelmingly affirmed by the post-Tridentine theologians.

Two scriptural passages : 2 Tim. 1 6 and 1, Tim. 4, 14 refer immediately to the consecration of a bishop. The rite of consecration takes place with imposition of hands and prayer.

The objection of the Scholastic Theologians that the consecration of a bishop confers no new power over the corpus Christi reale, that is, the Eucharist, is not to the point, since the consecration of a bishop confers the power of communicating the power of consecrating the Eucharist to others.

Pre-eminence of the Bishops

Bishops are superior to priests. (*De fide*.)

The superiority of bishops was contested in Christian antiquity by Aerius of Sebaste (4th century) ; in the Middle Ages by Marsilius of Padua (D 498), by the Wycliffians and the Hussites (D 675) ; at the beginning of modern times by the Reformers.

The Council of Trent defined against the Reformers : Si quis dixerit, episcopos non esse presbyteris superiores, A.S. D 967. The pre-eminence of the bishops refers both to the power of jurisdiction and to the power of consecration. Pre-eminence in the power of consecration consists in that the bishops alone have the power, as ordinary ministers, to ordain and to confirm.

The question, whether the pre-eminence of the bishops to the presbyters in regard to the power of jurisdiction and the power of consecration is an institution by Christ directly or by the Church, i.e., by Divine or Church law, has not been decided by the Council of Trent. Tradition proves the pre-eminence of the bishops without doubt, but does not provide a clear answer to the question of the nature of this law. Jerome states that there was no difference between bishops and presbyters originally. To avoid difficulties (disputes) one of the presbyters was elected to be the head of the others and of the community. From that time on the conferring of Orders became a privilege of the bishops. Cf. Ep. 146, 1 ; In ep. ad Tit. 1, 5. Jerome's view was shared by Isidore of Seville Amalar of Metz and many other medieval canons. Of the scholastical theologians it is John Duns Scotus who gives it a certain probability. Most of the other theologians reject it and teach, together with St. Thomas, that the difference between bishops and presbyters existed from the beginning through a direct institution of Christ.

4. The Order of Diaconate

The Order of Diaconate is a Sacrament. (*Sent. certa*.)

The declaration of the Council of Trent that the bishops do not in vain say at the conferring of the Ordo : Accipe Spiritum Sanctum (D 964) finds

an application in the Order of diaconate also. The Apostolic Constitution "Sacramentum Ordinis" of Pius XII presupposes the sacramental nature of the Order of diaconate. This was previously almost generally taught by theologians.

Tradition sees the institution of the diaconate in Acts 6, 6. The rite of ordination consists essentially in the imposition of hands and in the prayer for the grace of the Holy Ghost.

Diaconate, presbyterate and episcopate are sacramental grades of Order. However, they are not three distinct Sacraments, but conjointly form the one Sacrament of Ordo. The priestly power is found in its whole fullness in the episcopate, in a lower grade of perfection in the presbyterate; the lowest grade of the participation in the priestly power is found in the diaconate.

§ 3. The Outward Sign of the Sacrament of Order

1. Matter

a) The matter of the Orders of Diaconate, Priesthood, and Episcopate is the imposition of hands alone. (*Sent. fidei proxima*).

As only the three grades of Orders named are sacramental, the imposition of the hands is the matter of the Sacrament of Order. The imposition of hands implies physical contact with the head of the ordinand. However, a moral contact by the stretching out of the hands suffices for the valid ministration of the Sacrament.

Pope Pius XII, in the Apostolic Constitution "Sacramentum Ordinis" (1947), declared: Sacrorum Ordinum Diaconatus, Presbyteratus et Episcopatus materiam eamque unam esse manuum impositionem. D 3001, cf. D 910, 958, et seq., 1963.

Sacred Scripture (Acts 6, 6; 1 Tim. 4, 14; 5, 22; 2 Tim. 1, 6) and the Old Christian tradition know only the imposition of hands as the material element of the rite of Order of the sacramental grades of Order. Cf. St. Hippolytus of Rome, Traditio Apostolica; St. Cyprian, Ep. 67, 5; St. Cornelius, Ep. ad Fabium (with Eusebius, Hist. eccl. VI 43, 9, 17); the Statuta Ecclesiae antiqua (D 150 et seq.) Only the imposition of hands is customary in the Greek Church; there is no handing over of the instruments. In spite of this the validity of the Greek Order has always been recognised by the Apostolic See.

The Apostolic Constitution of Pius XII decides only the question of what is required in future for the valid administration of the Orders named. The question remains open whether Christ instituted the Sacrament of Holy Orders in genere or in specie, as does the question dependent on this, whether the imposition of the hands was always the sole matter of the Sacrament of Holy Orders in the past also. The more general view of the theologians is that Christ instituted the Sacrament of Holy Orders in specie and that in doing so He laid down the imposition of the hands and the prayer which more closely determines this as the immutable substance of the Sacrament of Holy Orders, so that the imposition of hands was the sole matter in the past also. The determinations of the Apostolic Constitution, in so far as they are of a juridical nature, have no retroactive power.

In the Ordo of priests, in compliance with the declaration of Pius XII referred

to, only the first tacitly performed imposition of hands is to be regarded as the matter of the Sacrament, not the continuation thereof by the stretching out of the right hand. Further, the second imposition of hands at the conclusion of the Order, which is accompanied by the words: Accipe Spiritum Sanctum quorum remiseris peccata, etc., does not appertain to the matter of the Sacrament. The latter is found in the Latin rite of Order only since the 13th century; it is not found in the Greek rite.

b) The handing over (traditio) of the instruments is not necessary for the validity of the consecration of Deacons, Priests, and Bishops. (*Sent. fidei proxima.*)

Starting from the assumption that all grades of Order were sacramental, the majority of the Scholastic Theologians wrongly regarded the traditio as the matter of the Sacrament of Order. In this traditio instrumentorum there is symbolised the service of the individual grades of Order. This opinion was also taken over from St. Thomas in the Decretum pro Armenis and by the Union Council of Florence (1439). D 701; cuius (sc. ordinis) materia est id, per cuius traditionem confertur ordo. However, the Decretum is not an infallible doctrinal decision. The Greeks were not required, on the occasion of the union accomplished at the Council, to change their rite of Order, or to incorporate into it the handing over of the instruments.

Pius XII declared in the Apostolic Constitution "Sacramentum Ordinis," that the handing over of the instruments at least in the future, is not necessary. This declaration leaves open the possibility that in the past the handing-over of the instruments, even if this was done in part of the Church only, was requisite for the validity of the consecrations named, whether as a constituent part of the matter or as the sole matter, which is conceivable on the presupposition that Christ instituted the Sacrament of Holy Orders in genere, or as a condition for valid administration superimposed by the Church.

The handing over of the instruments in the sacramental grades of Order can be demonstrated since the 10th century only. In the case of the non-Sacramental grades of Order it goes back to antiquity (St. Hippolytus, Statuta Ecclesiae antiqua; D 153 et seq.). The imposition of the Book of the Gospels in the Order of bishops which was in existence in antiquity (D 150), did not represent a "handing over of the instruments."

2. Form

The form of the Order of Deacon, Priest, and Bishop consists solely in the words which more closely determine the imposition of the hands. (*Sent. fidei proxima.*)

In the Apostolic Constitution, "Sacramentum Ordinis," Pope Pius XII declared with his supreme apostolic authority: formam vero itemque unam esse verba applicationem huius materiae determinantia, quibus univoce significantur effectus sacramentales—scilicet potestas Ordinis et gratia Spiritus Sancti—quaeque ab Ecclesia qua talia accipiuntur et usurpantur. (D 3001.)

The words which more closely determine the matter by the indication of the effects of the Sacrament, the power of consecration and grace, are the words of the so-called "Order Preface." The following words from the Preface of the Order of Diaconate are essential and, therefore, indispensable for the validity of Order: "Emitte in eum—roboretur." From the Preface

of the priestly consecration the following words are essential: "Da, quaesumus, omnipotens Pater—insinuet." From the Preface of episcopal consecration the following words are essential: "Comple in Sacerdote tuo—sacrifica."

The imperative formula which accompanies the imposition of hands at the episcopal consecration and that of the Diaconate: Accipe Spiritum Sanctum (ad robur, etc., at the ordination of deacons) only became current in the Latin Rite in the Middle Ages (thirteenth and fourteenth centuries). It does not appertain to the form and is not necessary for validity.

Appendix: Invalidity of Anglican Ordination

Pope Leo XIII declared in the Apostolic Script "Apostolicae curae" of 13th September, 1896, that Anglican Orders are invalid. D 1963-66. The declaration of invalidity is based on the fact that in the new formula of ordination of Edward VI, introduced in 1549, the words "Accipe Spiritum Sanctum," which accompany the imposition of hands, and which were regarded as the form, do not unequivocally designate either the grade of Order or the powers of the grade of Order in question (defectus formae)—the subsequent completion of the form: ad officium et opus presbyteri, or episcopi, came too late. It is based also on the fact that the intention of conveying the powers of offering the sacrifice of the Mass and of the forgiveness of sins, which are essential to the priesthood, is not present (defectus intentionis). In addition, it is uncertain whether the consecration of the Anglican Archbishop Matthew Parker (1559), on whom the apostolic succession in the Anglican Church depends, was performed by a validly consecrated consecrator or by a consecrator who was consecrated at all.

§ 4. The Effects of the Sacrament of Holy Order

1. The Grace of Order

The Sacrament of Order confers sanctifying grace on the recipient. (*De fide.*) Cf. D 843a, 959, 964.

As a Sacrament of the Living, the Sacrament of Order effects per se an increase of sanctifying grace. The grace of Order has the purpose of and is specially adapted to enabling the recipient worthily to perform the functions of his Order, and to lead a worthy life. The Decretum pro Armenis teaches with St. Thomas: Effectus (sc. ordinis) augmentum gratiae, ut quis sit idoneus minister. Pius XI teaches in the Encyclical "Ad catholici sacerdotii" (1935): "By the Sacrament of Order the priest receives . . . also a new and special grace and a particular help, by means of which he can cope . . . in a worthy fashion and with unfailing courage with the high obligations of the office he has assumed and fulfil the duties thereof." D 2275. The biblical foundation is to be found in: 1, Tim 4, 14 and 2 Tim. 1, 6. In addition to the special sanctifying grace, the ordinand receives the permanent claim to those actual graces which are necessary for the attaining of the purpose of the Sacrament. Suppl. 35, I.

2. The Character of Order

The Sacrament of Order imprints a character on the recipient. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent defined: Si quis dixerit, per sacram ordinationem . . . non imprimi characterem, A.S. D 946: cf. 852. The Sacrament of Order cannot be repeated nor can one who has received it revert to the lay state. The reason is found in the character. Cf. St. Augustine Contra ep. Parmeniani II 13, 28; De bono coniugali 24, 32.

The character of Order enables the possessor to take an active part in Christian worship, and as this flows from Christ's priesthood, to take an active part in Christ's priesthood. As a signum configurativum it assimilates the possessor to Christ, the eternal High Priest; as a signum distinctivum it distinguishes the consecrated man from the layman and from the possessors of non-hierarchical grades of Order; as a signum dispositivum it enables and entitles him to exercise the hierarchical powers of the Order in question; as a signum obligativum it obliges him to dispense the saving treasures of Christ and to lead a morally pure life.

As the Sacrament of Order falls into three grades, it must be assumed that in each of the three sacramental grades of Order a special character which is distinct from the others is imprinted. As an active participation in Christ's priesthood, the character of Order transcends the baptismal character which it necessarily presupposes, and the character of Confirmation, which it appropriately presupposes.

3. The Power of Order

The Sacrament of Order confers a permanent spiritual power on the recipient. (*De fide.*) Cf. D 960 et seq.

In the sacramental character are rooted those spiritual powers which are transferred to the ordinand in the individual grades of Order. They are directed pre-eminently to the Holy Eucharist. The Deacon receives the power of immediately serving the bishop and the priest at the offering of the Eucharistic sacrifice and of dispensing Holy Communion. The priest principally receives the power of consecration and of absolution (D 961), the bishop the power of ordination.

§ 5. The Dispenser of the Sacrament of Order

1. Ordinary Dispenser

The ordinary dispenser of all grades of Order, both the sacramental and the non-sacramental, is the validly consecrated bishop alone. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent defined: Si quis dixerit, episcopos non habere potestatem confirmandi et ordinandi, vel eam, quam habent, illis esse cum presbyteris communem, A.S. D 967; cf. 701; CIC 951.

According to Holy Writ, the Apostles (Acts 6, 6; 14, 22; 2 Tim. 1, 6) or Disciples of the Apostles who had been consecrated bishops (1 Tim. 5, 22; Tit. 1, 5), appear as dispensers of the Ordination.

The old Christian Tradition knows only the bishops as dispensers of Orders.

The power of Ordination is recognised as a privilege of the bishop and is expressly denied to the presbyter. St. Hippolytus of Rome lays down in his Church Order, that the presbyter does not consecrate any cleric (clerum non ordinat). According to the Apostolic Constitutions, the conferring of Orders is reserved to the bishop. The priest indeed imposes the hands, but not to confer Orders (χειροθετεῖ, οὐ χειροτονεῖ; VIII 28, 3; cf. III 20, 2). St. Epiphanius rejects the error of Aerius of Sabaste, that the priest has the same rank as the bishop, on the ground that the bishop alone possesses the power of conferring Orders (Haer. 75, 4). St. Jerome, although he elevates the status of the priest considerably, at the expense of the bishop, still sees in Ordination a privilege of the bishop: "What does the bishop do if not to dispense ordinations (excepta ordinatione), that a priest does not also do"? (Ep. 146, 1).

Every validly consecrated bishop, including heretical, schismatic, simonistic or excommunicated bishops, can validly dispense the Sacrament of Order, provided that he has the requisite intention, and follows the essential external rite (sent. certa). Cf. D 855, 860; CIC 2372.

In antiquity and in the early Middle Ages, numerous re-ordinations occurred, that is, repetitions of Orders administered by heretical, schismatic or simonistic bishops. The Fathers and the theologians of early Scholasticism were uncertain about this question. Petrus Lombardus does not venture to make any decision in view of the contradictory patristic authorities (Sent. IV 25, 1). St. Thomas affirms the validity of Orders conferred by heretical bishops and by bishops separated from the Church (Suppl. 38, 2).

For the liceity of Orders it is necessary that they be conferred by an episcopus proprius or by another bishop with his approval (Dimissories). CIC 955.

2. Dispenser of the Episcopal Order

For the licit conferring of the Episcopal Order it is necessary that it be performed by three bishops. For valid conferring, however, a single bishop suffices, since the individual bishop possesses the full power of ordination. CIC 954. Both the assisting bishops are, according to the Apostolic Constitution "Episcopalis Consecrationis" (1944) of Pius XII, not merely witnesses, but co-performers of the consecration ("co-consecrators"); et ipsi Consecratores effecti proindeque Conconsecratores deinceps vocandi. It is necessary for this that they form the intention of consecrating and of conferring the Sacrament conjointly with the consecrator, not only by imposing their hands conjointly with him, but also by pronouncing the prayer of consecration (softly) with him, together with the Preface of the Order.

Since the earliest times the consecration of a bishop was always performed by several bishops. According to the prescription of the Nicene Council (can. 4) it must be performed by at least three, according to the Apostolic Constitutions (III 20 1; VIII 27, 2) by three or at least two bishops. But in case of emergency a single bishop has sufficed, as the Apostolic Constitutions (VIII 27, 3) and what purports to be a Letter of St. Gregory the Great (Ep. XI 64, 8) to St. Augustine of Canterbury (shortly before 731), attest.

2. Extraordinary Minister

The extraordinary dispenser of the four Minor Orders and of the Order of Subdiaconate is the presbyter. (*Sent. certa.*)

a) A simple priest can confer the four Minor Orders and the Order of the Subdiaconate by the common law or by a Papal indult empowering him to do

so. The reason is to be found in the ecclesiastical institution of these grades of Order. The current law provides for the conferring of the tonsure and of the Minor Orders only. Cf. CIC 239. Par. 1, n. 22, 957, Par. 2, 964, n. 1. In the Middle Ages and also still in post-Tridentine times, however, the privilege of conferring the Order of Sub-diaconate was repeatedly given to abbots.

b) In regard to the sacramental Order grades of diaconate and presbyterate, most theologians, with St. Thomas, hold the opinion that a simple priest cannot validly administer these, even with plenary power from the Pope.

But there are grave historical difficulties with regard to this opinion: Pope Boniface IX, in agreement with the teaching of numerous medieval canonists (for example, Huguccio † 1210), by the Bull "Sacrae religionis" of the 1st February, 1400, conferred on the Abbot of the Augustine Monastery of St. Osytha at Essex (Diocese of London) and his successors, the privilege of administering to those subject to them both the Minor Orders and those of the sub-diaconate, diaconate, and priesthood. The privilege was withdrawn on 6th February, 1403, on the instance of the Bishop of London. But the Orders conferred on the ground of the privilege were not declared invalid. Pope Martin V, by the Bull "Gerentes ad vos" of 16th November, 1427, conferred the privilege on the Abbot of the Cistercian Monastery of Altzelle (Diocese of Meissen) of promoting all his monks and others subject to him for the term of five years, to the higher Orders also (Sub-diaconate, Diaconate, and Presbyterate). Pope Innocent VIII, by the Bull "Exposcit tuae devotionis" of 9th April, 1489, conferred on the four Proto-Abbots of the Cistercian Order and their successors the privilege of ordaining their subordinates to the Sub-diaconate and the Diaconate. The Cistercian Abbots were still using this privilege in the 17th century without hindrance.

Unless one wishes to assume that the Popes in question were victims of the erroneous theological opinions of their times (this does not touch the Papal infallibility, because an ex cathedra decision was not given), one must take it that a simple priest is an extraordinary dispenser of the Orders of Diaconate and Presbyterate, just as he is an extraordinary dispenser of Confirmation. In this latter view, the requisite power of consecration is contained in the priestly power of consecration as "potestas ligata." For the valid exercise of it a special exercise of the Papal power is, by Divine or Church ordinance, necessary.

§ 6. The Receiver of the Sacrament of Order

The Sacrament of Order can be validly received by a baptised person of the male sex only. (*Sent. certa.*) CIC 968, Par. 1.

That males only are empowered to receive the Sacrament of Order rests on positive Divine law. Christ called men only to the apostolate. According to the testimony of Holy Writ (cf. 1 Cor. 14, 34 et seq.; Tim. 2, 11 et seq.) and according to the standing practice of the Church, the hierarchical powers were handed on to men only. Cf. Tertullian, De praescr. 41; De virg. vel. 9.

In the Early Christian Church the deaconesses formed a special rank, which approached that of the clergy, and, according to the Apostolic Constitutions (VIII 19 et seq.), and the Imperial Legislation (Justinian), they were even ranked with the clergy. They were consecrated by a rite peculiar to them,

according to the Apostolic Constitutions (VIII 19 et seq.), with imposition of hands and prayer. But they were denied priestly functions. Cf. St. Hippolytus, Trad. Apost. Conc. Nic. can. 19; St. Epiphanius, Haer. 79, 3; Const. Apost. VIII 28, 6. Their principal duties were to assist at the Baptism of women and to care for the poor and sick.

The Consecration of a baptised infant as deacon, priest or bishop is valid, but not licit. An adult must have the intention of receiving the Order. On account of the obligations to be assumed, a virtual intention is probably requisite.

For the licit reception of Orders the conditions prescribed by the Church must be exactly followed. A state of grace is necessary for the worthy reception of the Sacrament.

VII. The Sacrament of Matrimony

1. Concept, Origin and Sacramental Nature of Matrimony

1. Concept of the Sacrament of Matrimony

Christian marriage is that Sacrament in which two marriageable people of different sexes associate in an undivided life-communion by mutual agreement for the generation and education of offspring, and in which they receive grace for the fulfilment of the special duties of their state.

In consonance with the theologians (cf. Petrus Lombardus, Sent. IV 27, 2), the Roman Catechism (II 8, 3), gives the following definition modelled on the definition of the concept in Roman Law: Matrimonium est viri et mulieris maritalis coniunctio inter legitimas personas, individuam vitae consuetudinem retinens. However, this definition lacks the element of the communication of grace which is essential for Christian marriage.

2. Divine Origin of Marriage

Marriage was not instituted by man, but by God. (*Sent. certa.*) D 2225.

Marriage, as an arrangement of nature (officium naturae), is of Divine origin. God created mankind as men and women (Gn. 1, 27), and implanted in human nature the urge for reproduction. He blessed the first human pair and, in a special revelation, conveyed to them the Divine mandate of reproduction: "Increase and multiply and fill the earth." Gn. 1, 28.

The Divine origin of marriage was disputed by the Gnostic Manichaean sects of antiquity and of the Middle Ages. Starting from the dualistic doctrine that matter is the seat of evil, they rejected marriage, through which the matter of the body is reproduced, as the source of evil. Under the influence of Platonic spiritualism, St. Gregory of Nyssa (De opif. hom. 17) declared the sexual differentiation of mankind, and the marriage which is founded on it, to be consequences of sin, foreseen by God. St. Thomas rejected the teaching of St. Gregory (S. th. I 98, 2). St. Jerome also erroneously associates the origin of marriage with the Fall (Ep. 22, 19).

3. Sacramental Nature of Marriage

a) Dogma

Marriage is a true and proper Sacrament instituted by God. (*De fide.*)

Christ brought marriage, which was ordained and blessed by God, back again to the original ideal of the indissoluble monogamous marriage (Mt. 19, 3 et seq.), and elevated it to the dignity of a Sacrament. The Council of Trent defined against the Reformers, who denied that marriage was a sacrament and regarded marriage as an "outward secular afiair" (Luther): Si quis dixerit, matrimonium non esse vere et proprie unum ex septum Legis evangelicae sacramentis, a Christo Domino institum, sed ab hominibus in Ecclesia inventum, neque gratiam conferre, A.S. D 971; cf. 367, 424, 465, 702. Pius X rejected the denial of the Divine institution of the Sacrament of Matrimony on the part of the Modernists. D 2051. Cf. the Syllabus of Pius IX (1864) and the Marriage Encyclicals "Arcanum" of Leo XIII (1880) and "Casti connubii" of Pius XI (1930). D 1765 et seq., 1853 et seq., 2225 et seq.

b) Scriptural proof

St. Paul stresses the religious character of marriage by demanding that it be contracted "in the Lord" (1 Cor. 7, 39), and by proclaiming its indissolubility in virtue of the Lord's command (1 Cor. 7. 10). The dignity and the sanctity of Christian marriage is established by St. Paul on this that it is an image of Christ's association with His Church. Eph. 5, 32: "This is a great Sacrament: but I speak in Christ and in the Church." As the unification of Christ with the Church is a rich source of grace for the members of the Church, so marriage if it is to be a perfect image of the grace-conferring attachment of Christ with the Church, must not be an empty symbol, as it had been in the pre-Christian era, but an efficacious sign of grace. The communication of grace could, however, be effected by marriage only in virtue of Christ's ordinance.

The words of the Apostle do not constitute a completely valid proof of the communication of grace essential to the concept of a Sacrament. The word sacramentum (μυστήιο ν) has only the general meaning of "secret." The comparison of Christian marriage with the grace-bestowing union of Christ with His Church is, however, as the Council of Trent stresses, an indication of the grace bestowed by the sacrament of marriage (D 969: Quod Paulus Apostolus innuit).

c) Proof from Tradition

From the beginning the Fathers regarded marriage as a religious affair. St. Ignatius of Antioch († about 107) demands the co-operation of the Church in the contracting of marriage: "It befits the bridegroom and the bride to enter the nuptial relationship with the approval of the bishop so that the marriage may be according to the Lord and not according to concupiscence" (Pol. 5, 2). Tertullian also attests that marriage was contracted before the Church: "How shall I be able to describe the happiness of a marriage which the Church performs, the offering of the sacrifice ratifies, and the blessing seals, to which the angels assent, and which the Heavenly Father recognises?" (Ad uxorem II 9.)

St. Augustine defends the dignity and sanctity of Christian marriage against the Manichaeans who rejected marriage as a source of evil (De moribus ecclesiae

catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum, 389), against Jovinian, who accused the Church of belittling marriage (De bono coniugalia 401), and against the Pelagians, who held the dignity of matrimony as a Sacrament to be incompatible with the doctrine of original sin (De nuptiis et concupiscentia 419, 420). St. Augustine's teaching concerning the three riches of marriage became the common property of later theology: proles (children), fides (matrimonial loyalty), sacramentum (sign of the indissoluble link of Christ with the Church according to Eph. 5, 32, therefore synonymous with indissolubility). However, St. Augustine did not expressly mention the grace conferred by this Sacrament. In Christ's participation in the marriage feast of Cana the Fathers see a recognition and a hallowing of Christian marriage, as they see a hallowing of the water for administration of the Sacrament of Baptism in the Baptism of Jesus in the Jordan. Cf. St. Augustine, De bono coniugali 3, 3: St. John Damascene, De fide orth. IV, 24.

It was only in the times of the Schoolmen that the sacramental nature of marriage achieved formal recognition. The separated Churches of the East likewise regard it as a Sacrament.

§ 2. Purpose and Properties of Marriage

1. Purpose

The primary purpose of Marriage is the generation and bringing-up of offspring. The secondary purpose is mutual help and the morally regulated satisfaction of the sex urge. (*Sent. certa.*) CIC 1013, Par. 1.

In their efforts to evaluate marriage as something more than a personal contract, many modern theologians, as against the traditional teaching of the purpose of marriage, whose principal exponent is St. Thomas, have submitted that the primary purpose of marriage is the mutual completion and personal perfection of the marriage partners, or their mutual love and unity. The Holy Office, in the year 1944, in answer to an enquiry, re-asserted the traditional teaching, according to which the primary purpose of marriage is the generation and bringing-up of children, and according to which the secondary purposes of marriage are essentially subordinate to the primary one. D 2295.

The primary purpose is expressed in Gn. 1, 28: "Increase and multiply and fill the earth!" The secondary purpose is expressed in Gn. 2, 18: "Let us make him a help like unto himself," and in 1 Cor. 7, 2: "For fear of fornication, let every man have his own wife: and let every woman have her own husband."

2. Properties

The essential properties of Marriage are unity (monogamy) and indissolubility. (*Sent. certa.*) CIC 1013, Par. 2.

a) Unity

The Council of Trent declared against Luther, who, invoking the example of the Old Testament, recognised the double marriage of the Landgraf Philip of Hessen: "Christians are forbidden by Divine law to have several wives

at the one time." D 972. The canon was directed against the usual form of simultaneous polygamy, namely polygyny (having several women). Polyandry (having several men) is prohibited by the natural law, as it hinders or at least gravely endangers the primary purpose of marriage. Cf. D 969, 2231 et seq.; S.c.G. III 124.

God instituted marriage in Paradise as a monogamous institution (Gn. 1, 28; 2, 24). But mankind soon lapsed from the original ideal of monogamy (Gn. 4, 19). Polygamy was widely extended in the Old Covenant also (the Patriarachs, Saul, David). It was recognised in the Jewish Law (Dt. 21, 15 et seq.), which implies a Divine dispensation. Christ restored marriage to its original purity. Invoking Gn. 2, 24, He declares: "Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let no man put asunder" (Mt. 19, 6). He declares that the putting away of a wife and the entering into a new marriage is adultery (Mt. 19, 9). According to the teaching of St. Paul, marriage has a strong monogamous character. Cf. Rom. 7, 3; 1 Cor. 7, 2; Eph. 5, 32 et seq.

In their descriptions of the morally pure life of the Christians, the Christian apologists expressly stress the observation of monogamy. Theophilus of Antioch remarks: "Among them wise self-control is found, abstinence is practised, monogamy is observed, and chastity is preserved" (Ad Autol. III 15). Cf. Minucius Felix, Oct. 31, 5.

Speculatively, the rectitude of monogamy is established, by this in that it alone guarantees the fulfilling of all the purposes of marriage, and is a faithful image of Christ's union with the Church. Suppl. 65, 1; S.c.G. IV 78.

b) Indissolubility

α) Inner indissolubility

The Council of Trent declared that the bond of marriage cannot be loosed on account of heresy, or of difficulties in living together, or of absence, with evil intent, of one marriage partner (D 975),; and that the Church does not err when she has taught and teaches that according to evangelic and apostolic doctrine, the bond of matrimony cannot be dissolved on account of the adultery of one of the parties (D 977). Both canons are addressed immediately to the Reformers, but the latter applies to the Greek-Orthodox Church also, which, supported by Mt. 5, 32 and Mt. 19, 9, permits the dissolution of the bond of matrimony in the case of adultery. The doctrinal decisions of the Council of Trent have in mind Christian marriage only. But according to God's ordinance made at the institution of marriage (jure Divino), every marriage, including the marriage of the unbaptised (matrimonium legitimum) is intrinsically indissoluble. Cf D 2234 et seq.

The so-called fornication clause (μὴ ἐπὶ πορνείᾳ), which in a somewhat different form is found in Mt. 5, 32, also (παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας), but which does not appear in the parallel passages Mark 10, 11 and Luke 16, 18, does not, according to the context, imply an exception to the law of indissolubility: for it was Jesus' intention to restore the original order, which did not know divorce, and to set up His new commandment in conscious antithesis to the lax Law of Moses (cf. Mt. 5, 31 et seq.). Unless one wishes to destroy the antithesis and create a contradiction between St. Matthew on the one side and SS. Mark and Luke (such as 1 Cor. 7, 10 et seq.) on the other side, one must either understand the clause in the tradiional excluding sense, according to which it indeed permits,

by way of exception, the putting away of the woman, but not subsequent re-marrying, that is, the so-called separation from bed and board, or in the including sense, according to which an exception from the prohibition of divorce is not laid down, but that the ground for divorce provided for in Dt. 24, 1 ('erwath dabar=something infamous) is drawn into the prohibition of divorce. In the latter interpretation the clause must be conceived and translated as a parenthesis: "He that puts away his wife—and even if she is guilty of unchaste behaviour (he must not dismiss her)—and marries another, commits adultery" (Mt. 5, 32: "excepting for the cause of fornication"). Against the first explanation, which has been traditional since the time of St. Jerome, there is the difficulty that a mere outward separation with a continuation of the bond of marriage was unknown to the Jews. Against the second explanation (K. Staab) philological doubts are adduced. Another possible explanation (J. Bonsirven) understands the word "fornication" in the special meaning of an illegitimate (incestuous) association (cf. 1 Cor. 5, 1); he claimed that this alone justifies and demands divorce.

St. Paul proclaims to married people as a commandment of the Lord that the woman may not leave the man and that the man may not put away the woman. But if one party goes away from the other the deserted party must remain unmarried (1 Cor. 7, 10 et seq.). The woman who associates with another man during the lifetime of her husband is an adulteress (Rom. 7, 3); only on the death of her husband is she free for another attachment (Rom. 7, 2; 1 Cor. 7, 39).

The Fathers of the first centuries almost all expound the view that in the case of adultery the dismissal of the guilty party is permitted, but that a subsequent re-marriage is forbidden. Cf. Pastor Hermae, Mand. IV 1, 6; St. Justin, Apol. 1, 15; St. Clement of Alexandria, Strom. II 23, 145, 3; Origen, in Matth. XIV 24; individual Fathers, St. Basil (Ep. 188 can. 9), St. Epiphanius (Haer. 59, 4) and Ambrosiaster (on 1 Cor. 7, 11) in view of Mt. 5, 32 and 19, 9, and influenced by the state of legislation, allowed the man the right to the dissolution of the marriage and to marry again in the case of adultery of the woman. A defender of the absolute indissolubility of marriage, even in the case of adultery, is St. Augustine. Cajetan, Ambrosius Catharinus and Erasmus of Rotterdam fall back on Ambrosiaster's interpretation, but as against the Reformers, insist that the dissolution of marriage can be accomplished by the Church authority only (outward dissolubility).

The intrinsic reasons for the indissolubility of marriage are the assuring of the physical and moral education of the children, the protection of marital fidelity, the imitation of the indissoluble union of Christ with His Church, and the welfare of the family and society.

β) Outward dissolubility in determined cases

While a consummated Christian marriage (matrimonium ratum et consummatum), which is a perfect replica of the indissoluble union of Christ with the Church, is indissoluble, as to the bond, and cannot be dissolved by any human authority (CIC 1118), it is the centuries-old teaching and practice of the Church that Christian marriage which has not been consummated (matrimonium ratum non consummatum) can be dissolved as to the bond either by a solemn religious profession of one partner or by a dispensation of the Apostolic See granted for weighty reasons. D 976; CIC 1119.

Pope Alexander III (1159–1181), invoking the example of certain saints, permitted that, before the consummation of the marriage, one of the partners, even against the will of the other, enter the religious state and the other re-marry, as they had never become "one flesh" (D 395 et seq.); similarly Innocent III (D 409) and subsequent legislation. Scholastic Theology regards the entering into a monastery as spiritual death, in which one dies to the world. Cf. Suppl. 61, 2.

The beginnings of the Papal dispensation regarding a non-consummated marriage go back to Alexander III. The Papal power of dispensation was generally affirmed by canonists since the 13th century, but as against this, it was mostly denied by theologians. In view of decisions of Popes Martin V and of Eugene IV who make use of the power of dispensation, Antonin of Florence († 1459) and John of Torquemada († 1468) took up a mediatory standpoint. In subsequent times the affirmative view which appealed to the Papal practice of dispensation came more and more to the fore, in spite of the resistance of numerous theologians, until it became the general teaching under Benedict XIV (1740 to 1758).

On the ground of the Pauline Privilege (1 Cor. 7, 12 et seq.), a marriage contracted and even consummated between two unbaptised persons (matrimonium legitimum) can be dissolved as to the bond, if one party to the marriage is baptised, and the other party refuses to continue to live with him peacefully in the married state.

In the Tradition of the Church, the dissolution of the bond of marriage by the "privilege of faith" is first expounded by Ambrosiaster: Contumelia enim Creatoris solvit ius matrimonii circa eum, qui relinquitur, ne accusetur alii copulatus (on 1 Cor. 7, 15). As against this St. Augustine understands the divorce permitted by St. Paul to signify not a dissolution of the bond but merely a separation. The Church teaching (Gratian, Petrus Lombardus) and legislation (Clement III, Innocent III) sided with Ambrosiaster. Cf. D 405 et seq.; CIC 1120–1127.

§ 3. The Outward Sign of the Sacrament of Matrimony

1. Identity of the Sacrament of Matrimony with the Contract of Marriage

Every valid contract of Marriage between Christians is of itself a sacrament. (*Sent. certa.*)

Since Christ elevated natural marriage, which consisted essentially in the contract of marriage, to the dignity of a Sacrament and an efficacious sign of grace, the Sacrament of Matrimony coincides materially with the contract of marriage. Consequently every valid contract of marriage between Christians is, on the ground of positive Divine ordinance, at the same time a Sacrament. According to the Decretum pro Armenis, the mutual declaration of will of the pair to be married (not the priestly blessing!) is the efficient cause of the Sacrament of Matrimony (D 702). According to the teaching of the Council of Trent, those clandestine marriages contracted without the co-operation of the Church by the free declaration of will of the contracting parties are valid

marriages so long as the Church does not declare them invalid (Decree "Tametsi"; D 990). Cf. D 334, 404.

Popes Pius IX, Leo XIII and Pius XI expressly declared that in Christian marriage the Sacrament of Matrimony cannot be separated from the contract of marriage, and that on account of this, every true marriage among Christians is in itself and of itself a Sacrament: omne inter Christianos iustum coniugium in se et per se esse sacramentum (Leo XIII, D 1854). Cf. D 1640, 1766, 1773, 2237; CIC 1012.

2. The Contract of Marriage as a Sacramental Sign

It follows from the material identity of the Sacrament of Matrimony with the contract of marriage that the outward sign of the Sacrament of Matrimony lies exclusively in the contract of marriage, that is, in the mutual declaration of will of the bridal pair by words or sign. To the extent that these declarations designate the handing-over (traditio) of the right to marital congress (ius in corpus), they can be regarded as the matter, to the extent that they designate the acceptance (acceptatio) of this right, they can be regarded as the form of the Sacrament. Cf. CIC 1081. Par. 2.

The priest's blessing does not pertain to the nature of the Sacrament; it is a sacramental, which is added to the sacrament.

3. False Opinions

All attempts to separate the contract of marriage from the Sacrament of marriage are incompatible with the teaching of the Church.

The principal errors:

a) Melchior Cano, O.P. († 1560), thought that the marriage-contract was the "Matter" of the Sacrament and the blessing of the priest the "Form." Estius, Sylvius, Toletus, Tournely and others followed this erroneous view.

b) Gabriel Vasquez, S.J. († 1604), thought that "the matter of this Sacrament was the bodies (non impedita sed legitima) which are mutually handed over in Matrimony, the form is the consent which is legitimately expressed by words or signs." We note that the bodies are "materia circa quam" but not "materia ex qua." In no contract does the external thing about which the contract is made constitute the contract intrinsically.

c) Numerous Gallicanic and Josephinic Theologians (Anthony of Dominis † 1624, Jean Launoy † 1678), in the interest of Civil Marriage, placed the outward sign of the Sacrament of Matrimony exclusively in the priestly blessing, and regarded the contract of marriage simply as a precondition of the Sacrament of Matrimony.

In Greek-Orthodox Theology the view that the contract of marriage is distinct from the Sacrament of Matrimony has become dominant since the 19th century. Most of the Greek-Orthodox Theologians regard the bi-lateral consent of the bridal pair as the matter, and the prayer and blessing of the priest as the form of the Sacrament, and accordingly hold the priest to be the dispenser of the Sacrament. Some modern Russian Theologians would place the whole sacramental sign in the religious rite performed by the priest.

§ 4. The Effects of the Sacrament of Matrimony

1. Bond of Matrimony

From the sacramental contract of marriage emerges the Bond of Marriage, which binds both marriage partners to a lifelong indivisible community of life. (*De fide.*) D 969.

St. Augustine compares the bond of marriage (quiddam coniugale) "which can be removed neither by the separation of the marriage partners nor by the association with another," to the character of Baptism which cannot be lost (De nuptiis et concup. I 10, 11). But Matrimony is not like Baptism, absolutely unrepeatable; it is, however, relatively unrepeatable, that is, during the lifetime of the other marriage partner. After the death of one of the parties the surviving partner may contract a second and further marriages. The Church, in consonance with the teaching of the Apostle St. Paul (Rom. 7, 2 et seq.; 1 Cor. 7, 8 et seq., 39 et seq.; 1 Tim. 5, 14 et seq.), has always firmly held the liceity of re-marriage after the death of one partner against the heretical views of the Montanists and the Novatianists, and against the rigoristic movements in the Greek Church (St. Athenagoras, Suppl. 33; Second Marriage "respectable adultery"; St. Basil, Ep. 188. can. 4). The Council of Florence declared in the Decretum pro Jacobitis, that not only a second, but also a third or fourth or further marriages are permitted (Cavellera 1355). Cf. D 424, 455: CIC 1142.

2. The Grace of Matrimony

The Sacrament of Matrimony bestows Sanctifying Grace on the contracting parties. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent declared: Si quis dixerit, matrimonium . . . neque gratiam conferre, A.S. D 971. Cf. 969. As a Sacrament of the living the Sacrament of Matrimony effects per se an increase of Sanctifying Grace. The grace conveyed by the Sacrament of Matrimony is adapted in a special manner to the purpose of this Sacrament: it sanctifies the marriage partners and gives them supernatural strength for the fulfilment of the duties of their state. Together with the Sanctifying Grace there is bestowed also a claim to those actual graces, which the husband and wife "will receive as often as they require it for the fulfilment of the duties of their station" (Pius XI) D 2237.

In the period of early Scholasticism and at the commencement of the peak period of Scholasticism many theologians (for example, the disciples of Abelard, Hermann, Petrus Lombardus, Petrus Cantor), and many canonists (for example, the Glossa ordinaria to Gratian's Decree, Bernard of Pavia, Henry of Segusia), by reason of their inadequate analysis of the sacramental nature of marriage, expounded the untenable opinion that the Sacrament of marriage, while indeed being a means of salvation against evil, did not bestow Sanctifying Grace. St. Thomas, logically applying to it the qualities of a Sacrament, teaches that

Matrimony, like the other Sacraments of the New Covenant, is not a mere symbol, but also a cause of grace. Cf. S.c.G. IV 78; Suppl. 42, 3.

§ 5. Minister and Recipient of the Sacrament of Matrimony

1. The Contracting Parties as Both Ministers and Recipients of the Sacrament

The contracting parties in Matrimony minister the Sacrament each to the other. (*Sent. certa.*)

Since the essence of the Sacrament of Matrimony lies exclusively in the contract of marriage (see Par. 3), the two contracting parties are both ministers and recipients of the Sacrament. Each administers it to the other, by accepting the other's word of affirmation.

The priest who as a representative of the Church confirms the consent of marriage and blesses the marriage, is only an official witness to the contraction of the marriage and the minister of the accompanying ceremonies. The law of the Church provides, in exceptional cases, for the contraction of a valid marriage without the assistance of a priest. CIC 1098.

2. Validity

For the validity of the ministration and reception of the Sacrament of Matrimony the following are requisite: Both parties must: a) have been baptised; b) have at least the virtual intention of doing what the Church does; c) be free from invalidating impediments to marriage; d) adhere to the form prescribed by the Church (before the Parish Priest and two witnesses: CIC 1094), in so far as the law of the Church does not provide an exception (CIC 1098; 1099, Par. 2: *non-Catholics contracting marriages*).

It is controverted whether the marriage of a baptised person with one not baptised is a sacramental marriage for the baptised person, and whether the existing natural marriage of two unbaptised persons is raised to a sacramental marriage on their Baptism. The first question must be answered affirmatively, as the baptised partner is capable of receiving the Sacrament, and the unbaptised partner is capable of administering it. Against the theory that a natural marriage becomes a sacrament by the baptism of the parties there is the fact that the consummation of the marriage concludes and finalises the Sacrament of Matrimony. On the other hand, it seems to be a great hardship if the married partners who have become Christians must be deprived of the grace of the Sacrament of Matrimony for their whole life long.

For the liceity of the administration and the reception of marriage it is necessary that the parties be free from diriment and/or prohibiting impediments.

The state of grace also is necessary for worthy reception. It is a probable view held by many theologians that if the Sacrament be received unworthily, it is revived if the parties later are received back into the state of grace.

§ 6. The Church's Power over Matrimony

1. Jurisdiction of the Church

The Church possesses the sole and exclusive right to make laws and administer justice in the matrimonial affairs of baptised persons, in so far as these affect the Sacrament. (*Sent. certa.*) Cf. CIC 1016, 1960.

The Council of Trent defined against the Reformers, that the Church possesses the right of extending those impediments to marriage of consanguinity and affinity mentioned in Lev. 18, 6 et seq.; and of laying down other diriment impediments; of dispensing from some (in so far as they are not of the nature of natural law or of positive Divine ordinance, D 973 et seq., 979) and of bringing marital affairs before her Court (D 982). Pope Pius VI rejected as heretical the assertion of the Synod of Pistoja (1786) that the Church could not of her own power (iure proprie) set up diriment impediments, or dispense from them, but only by virtue of the right transferred to her by the power of the State. D 1559. Cf. the Syllabus of Pius IX, Prop. 68–70 (D 1768–70). On Canon 12 of the Council of Trent (D 982), Pius VI gave the authentic declaration that all marital matters of baptised persons are subject to the jurisdiction of the Church exclusively, because Christian marriage is one of the Seven Sacraments of the New Covenant, the administration of which belongs to the Church exclusively. D 1500 a; cf. 1774.

The beginnings of a body of marriage legislation proper to the Church may be seen in the writings of the Apostle St. Paul (1 Cor. 7). Since the fourth century Church Synods set up diriment impediments to marriage, for example, the Synods of Elvira (about 306; can. 15; difference in religion), of Neocaesarea (between 314/25; can. 2; affinity deriving from marriage) and the Synod in Trullo (692; can. 53; spiritual relationship). The Christian Emperors also claimed for themselves the right of making marriage laws, but to a certain extent took cognisance of the Church's position. Thus, in the Civil Law, the right of divorce was limited, nevertheless it was admitted by the law and was very widespread. In the early Middle Ages the exclusive authority of the Church in the making of marriage laws for Christians and her exclusive jurisdiction in regard to the dissolution of the bond gradually gained the upper hand in the unwavering struggle against unchristian conceptions. The development of the complete Christian marriage discipline reached its perfection in Gratian's Decree (about 1140).

2. Competence of the State

The State is entitled to regulate the purely civil legal consequences of the contract of marriage (right of name and state, marital rights to property, right of inheritance), and to settle disputes about these matters. CIC 1016: salva competentia civilis potestatis circa mere civiles eiusdem matrimonii effectus. To the extent that the State's legislation and administration of justice invades the jurisdiction of the Church, the Church cannot recognise their validity. Thus the Church rejects as invalid for Christians obligatory civil marriage. She regards such civil marriages not as real marriages, but merely as legal formalities.

BOOK FIVE

The Doctrine of God the Consummator

The Doctrine of the Last Things or of the Consummation (Eschatology)

CHAPTER I

The Eschatology of the Individual Human Being

§ 1. Death

1. The Origin of Death

In the present order of salvation death is a punishment for sin. (*De fide.*)

The Council of Trent teaches in the Decree on Original Sin, that Adam became subject to sin by the transgression of the Divine commandment, that God had previously threatened him with death, and that he transmitted death to the whole of mankind. D 788 et seq. Cf. D 101, 175.

Although man, on account of his composition from several parts, is by nature mortal, he was, according to the testimony of Revelation, endowed with the preternatural gift of bodily immortality in Paradise. As a punishment for the transgression of the Divine probationary commandment, he was sentenced to the death with which he had previously been threatened. Gn. 2, 17: " For in what day soever thou shalt eat of it, thou shalt die the death (=be subject to death). 3, 19: " In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return to the earth, out of which thou wast taken: for dust thou art, and into dust thou shalt return." St. Paul teaches in the most definite manner that death is a consequence of Adam's sin. Rom. 5, 12: " Wherefore as by one man sin entered into this world and by sin death; and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned."

St. Augustine defends the clear teaching of Revelation against the Pelagians, who denied the gifts of the original state, and, therefore, regarded death as arising exclusively from the natural decomposition of the human being.

In the case of those justified by grace, death loses its penal character and becomes a mere consequence of sin (poenalitas). For Our Lord Jesus Christ and His Mother Mary, on account of their freedom from original sin, death was neither a punishment for sin nor a mere consequence of sin. In view of the constitution of human nature, death for them was, however, natural. Cf. S. th. 2 II 164; III 14, 2.

2. Generality of Death

All human beings subject to original sin are subject to the law of death. (*De fide.*) D 789.

St. Paul bases the universality of death on the universality of original sin (Rom. 5, 12). Cf. Hebr. 9, 27: "It is appointed to men once to die."

Individual human beings can, however, by special privilege, be preserved from death. Holy Writ says of Henoch that he was translated without seeing death . . . (Hebr. 5; cf. Gn. 5, 24; Ecclus. 44, 16), and of Elias, that he drove up to Heaven in a whirlwind (4 Kings 2, 11; 1 Macc 2, 58). Since the time of Tertullian (De anima 50), many Fathers and Theologians assume, in view of Apoc. 11, 3 et seq., that they will come again before the end of the world and give testimony for Christ, and suffer death. However, this interpretation is uncertain. Modern Exegesis understands by the two witnesses Moses and Elias, or men who resemble them.

St. Paul teaches that those of the just who are living when Christ comes again will not "fall asleep" (=die), but will be immediately transformed. Cor. 15, 51: "Behold, I tell you a mystery. We shall not all fall asleep; but we shall all be changed." Cf. Thess. 4, 15 et seq. The explanation expounded by St. Thomas also (S. th. II 81, 3 ad 1) that the Apostle did not wish to deny altogether that they would die but merely implied that their death would be for a very short time, is exegetically hardly tenable.

3. Significance of Death

With death the possibility of merit or demerit or conversion ceases. (*Sent. certa.*)

Against this teaching of the Church we note the "Apocatastasis" doctrine of Origen, according to which the damned angels and men will be converted and finally attain to God, and the ancient (Pythagoras, Plato, Gnostics and Manichaeans) and modern (Theosophists) widely-extended teaching of the migration of souls (metempsychosis, re-incarnation), according to which the soul, after leaving its present body, goes into another body, until it is perfectly purified and then attains to blessedness.

A Synod of Constantinople, in the year 543, rejected the doctrine of Apocatastasis (D 211). The definition of the doctrine of the impossibility of justification after death was projected at the Vatican Council (Coll. Lac. VII 567).

It is a fundamental teaching of Holy Writ that the reward in the next world is proportional to the merits or demerits of life on earth. According to Mt. 25, 34 et seq., the Judge of the World makes His sentence dependent on the performance or neglect of good works on earth. The rich reveller and the poor Lazarus are separated from each other in the other world by an unfathomable abyss (Luke 16, 26). The period of earthly life is the "Day," the time for work, the period after death is the "Night, when no man can work" (John 9, 4). St. Paul teaches: "All must be manifested before the judgment seat of Christ, that every one may receive the proper things of the body according as he hath done (=on earth), whether it be good or evil." (2 Cor. 5, 10.) Thus he enjoins us to do good, "whilst we have time" (Gal. 6, 10). Cf.

Apoc. 2, 10. The Fathers, with the exception of individual adherents of Origen (St. Gregory of Nyssa, Didymus), teach that the time for penance and conversion is limited to life on earth: St. Cyprian declares: "If one is departed from thence, then there is no longer any possibility of penance, and expiation has no effect. It is here below that life is either lost or won" (Ad Demetrianum 25). Cf. Ps.-Clement, 2 Cor. 8, 2 et seq.; Aphraates, Demonstr. 20, 12; St. Jerome, In ep. ad Gal. III 6, 10; St. Fulgentius, De fide ad Petrum 3 36.

The limitation of the possibility of meriting to the period of life on earth rests on a free ordinance of God. However, it is very appropriate that time should decide the eternal fate of human beings, as body and soul are united together, because the eternal reward will also extend to both. This demands that people should make use of life on earth in order to win everlasting life.

§ 2. The Particular Judgment

Immediately after death the particular judgment takes place, in which, by a Divine Sentence of Judgment, the eternal fate of the deceased person is decided. (*Sent. fidei proxima.*)

Opposed to the teaching of the Catholic Church is chiliadism (millenarism) which, invoking Apoc. 20, 1 et seq., and Old Testament prophecies about the coming Empire of the Messias, foretold a long dominion of a thousand years for Christ and the Just on earth before the general Resurrection, and asserted accordingly, that only then will the final beatification take place. This view was expounded by many of the older Fathers (Papias, St. Justin, St. Irenaeus, Tertullian and others). The Church's teaching is also opposed to the view of various ancient and modern sects which hold that souls after their separation from the bodies are, until the final re-unification with the body, in an unconscious or semi-conscious condition, the so-called soul-sleep (hypnopsychites), or that they formally die (death-sleep) and are re-awakened with the body (thnetopsychites). Cf. D 1913 (Rosmini).

The doctrine that there is a particular judgment for each soul immediately after death is not defined but is presupposed by the dogma that departed souls go forthwith (=immediately) after death into Heaven or into hell or into purgatory. The Union Councils of Lyons and of Florence declared that the souls of the just, free from all sin and punishment, are immediately assumed into Heaven, and that the souls of those who die in mortal sin or merely in venial sin descend immediately into hell. D 464, 693. Pope Benedict XII, in the dogmatic constitution "Benedictus Deus" (1336), teaches that the completely pure souls of the Just immediately after death, or after their purification enter heaven, become partakers in the immediate vision of the Divine Essence, and are truly blessed, while the souls of those in mortal sin immediately enter hell and are subject to the torments of hell. D 530 et seq. The decision is directed against the teaching of Pope John XXII, proposed by him as a private opinion, that the completely pure souls are indeed immediately assumed into Heaven, but before the Resurrection do not immediately

enjoy the vision of the Divine Essence, but only the vision of the Transfigured Humanity of Christ. Cf. D 457, 493 a, 570 s. 696.—The Roman Catechism (I 8, 3) expressly teaches the doctrine of the particular judgment.

Holy Writ indirectly implies the existence of the particular judgment by teaching that the departed souls immediately after death receive their reward or punishment. Cf. Ecclus 1, 13; 11, 28 et seq. Lazarus is immediately after death taken into the bosom of Abraham (=limbus Patrum) and the rich reveller is immediately consigned to hell, for punishment (Luke 16, 22 et seq.). The dying Redeemer says to the penitent thief: "This day thou shalt be with me in Paradise" (Luke 23, 43). Judas arrived "at his own place" (Acts 1, 25). Death is for St. Paul the gate to blessedness and to be with Christ. Phil. 1, 23: "I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ." "With the Lord" in his true home (2 Cor. 5, 8). With death the state of faith ceases and the state of vision commences (2 Cor. 5, 7; 1 Cor. 13, 12).

The views of the Early Fathers on the fate of the deceased are obscure. However, their belief in the particular judgment emerges from the general conviction that the good receive their reward and the evil their punishment immediately after death. As to the nature of the condition of reward or punishment in the other world uncertainty reigned. Many of the older Fathers (St. Justin, St. Irenaeus, Tertullian, St. Hilary, St. Ambrose) assume a state of waiting between death and resurrection, in which the just indeed receive reward and the evil punishment, but do not yet achieve the final blessedness of Heaven or the final condemnation of hell. Tertullian makes an exception in the case of martyrs to whom he concedes immediate assumption into "Paradise," that is, the bliss of heaven (De anima 55; De carnis resurr. 43). St. Cyprian insists that all the just enter into the kingdom of Heaven and attain to Christ (De mortalitate 26). St. Augustine doubts whether the souls of the just before the Resurrection enjoy (like the angels) the full blessedness which consists in the vision of God (Retr. I 14, 2).

The belief in a particular judgment is directly attested to by St. John Chrysostom (In Matth. hom. 14, 4), St. Jerome (In Joel 2, 11), St. Augustine (De anima et eius origine II 4, 8), Caesarius of Arles (Sermo 5, 5).

The Greek-Orthodox Church in its teaching on the fate of the departed holds fast to the rather ambiguous standpoint of the older Fathers. It assumes an intermediate condition between death and resurrection, which, however, is unequal for the just and the sinners and which is preceded by a particular Judgment. f. The Confessio orthodoxa of Petrus Mogilas P.I. q. 61.

§ 3. Heaven

1. Essential Bliss of Heaven

The souls of the just which in the moment of death are free from all guilt of sin and punishment for sin, enter into Heaven. (*De fide.*)

Heaven is a place and condition of perfect supernatural bliss, which consists in the immediate vision of God and in the perfect love of God associated with it.

The ancient Orential Creed and the Apostles' Creed in its later version (fifth

century) contain the confession: "I believe in life everlasting." D 6 and 9. Pope Benedict XII declared in the Dogmatic Constitution "Benedictus Deus" (1336), that the entirely pure souls enter Heaven, and behold the Divine Essence immediately and face to face, by the Divine Essence offering Itself to them immediately, uncovered, clear and open, and that by reason of this vision and of this happiness they are truly blessed and have eternal life and eternal rest. D 530. Cf. D 40, 86, 693, 696.

The eschatology of the older Books of the Old Testament is imperfect. According to it the departed souls descend into the underworld (scheol) where they lead a gloomy joyless existence. However, the lot of the pious is better than that of the godless. From this there emerged the thought of retribution by God in the other world, which clearly appears in the later Books. The Psalmist hopes that God will liberate his soul from the underworld and be his lot for ever (Ps. 48, 16; 72, 26). Daniel attests the bodily resurrection to everlasting life, or to ignominy and eternal horror (12, 2). The martyrs of the times of the Maccabees drew comfort and strength from the hope of eternal life (2 Mach. 6, 26; 7, 29; 36). The Book of Wisdom describes the bliss and the peace of the souls of the just, who rest in the hand of God and live with Him forever (3, 1-9; 5, 16 et seq.).

Jesus vividly depicts the bliss of Heaven under the picture of a wedding feast (Mt. 25, 10; cf. Mt. 22, 1 et seq.; Luke 14, 15 et seq.) and calls it life or eternal life. Cf. Mt. 18, 8 et seq.; 19, 29; 25, 46; John 3, 15 et seq.; 4, 14; 5, 24; 6, 35-59; 10, 28; 12, 25; 17, 2. The condition for the achieving of life everlasting is the knowledge of God and of Christ: "Now this is eternal life: That they may know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom Thou has sent" (John 17, 3). He promises the vision of God to the pure of heart: "Blessed are the clean of heart: for they shall see God" (Mt. 5, 8).

St. Paul stresses the mysterious character of the future bliss: "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard; neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love him" (1 Cor. 2, 9; cf. 2 Cor. 12, 4). As a reward, the just receive eternal life (Rom. 2, 7; 6, 22 et seq.) and a glory, which bears no relation to the sufferings of this world (Rom. 8, 18). The immediate vision of God takes the place of the imperfect knowledge of God in this world (1 Cor. 13, 12; 2 Cor. 5, 7).

It is a basic thought of Johannine theology that one attains to eternal life through belief in Jesus, the Messias and Son of God. Cf. John 3, 16. 36; 20, 31; 1 John 5, 13. Eternal life consists in the immediate vision of God. 1 John 3, 2: "We shall be like to him: because we shall see him as he is." The Secret Revelation places the bliss of the blessed in the communion of God and of the Lamb, that is, of the risen Christ. They are relieved from all physical evils. Cf. Apoc. 7, 9-17; 21, 3-7.

St. Augustine occupies himself minutely with the nature of the heavenly bliss. In his later works he erroneously conceived heavenly happiness to consist not alone in the spiritual but in the corporeal immediate vision of God. Cf. De civ. Dei XXII 29 et seq. Scholasticism stresses the absolute supernatural nature of the vision of God, which demands an altogether supernatural elevation of the intellect, the so-called *lumen gloriae* (cf. Ps. 35, 10; Apoc.

22, 5), which makes glorified man capable of the act of the Vision of God. Cf. S. th. I 12, 4 and 5; D 475. Doctrine of God, Par. 6, 3 and 4.

The acts which compose the heavenly blessedness are knowledge (visio), love (amor, caritas) and joy (gaudium, fruitio). The basic act is, according to Thomistic doctrine, knowledge; according to that of the Scotists, love. On the object of the beatific vision of God, see Doctrine of God, Par. 6, 2.

2. Accidental Blessedness of Heaven

In addition to the essential bliss of Heaven which springs from the immediate Vision of God, there is also an accidental blessedness, which proceeds from the natural knowledge and love of created things. (*Sent. communis.*)

An accidental bliss is achieved by the blessed in virtue of the community of life with Christ in His Human Form, with the Mother of God, and with the Angels and Saints; in virtue of their re-unification with families and former friends from their earthly life; in virtue of their knowledge of God's works. Further, the unification of the soul with the transfigured body at the Resurrection means an accidental increase of the glory granted to the Blessed in Heaven.

According to the teaching of the Schoolmen, three classes of the blessed receive, in addition to the essential bliss (aurea, sc. corona), a special reward for the transcendental victory gained by them, called aureola: virgins for their victory over the flesh in accordance with Apoc. 14, 4; martyrs for their victory over the world in accordance with Mt. 5, 11 et seq.; teachers of the faith for their victory over the devil, the father of lies, according to Dn. 12, 3 and Mt. 5, 19. According to St. Thomas the essence of the aureola consists in joy for the works performed by them in the battle against the enemies of salvation (Suppl. 96, I). On the expression aurea cf. Apoc. 4, 4; 14, 4; for the expression aureola Ex. 25, 25.

3. Properties of Heaven

a) Eternity

The bliss of Heaven lasts for all eternity. (*De fide.*)

Pope Benedict XII declared: "The vision and this enjoyment (of the Divine Essence) continues without interruption or diminution of the vision and enjoyment, and will continue until the General Judgment and thenceforth for all eternity." D 530.

Opposed to the teaching of the Church is Origen's doctrine of the moral mutability of the blessed. This includes the possibility of the diminution or the loss of bliss.

Jesus compares the reward for the good works with treasures in Heaven, which cannot be lost (Mt. 6, 20; Luke 12, 33). He who makes friends with the Mammon of iniquity will be taken up in the "eternal dwellings." Luke 16, 9. The just will enter "eternal life" (Mt. 25, 46; cf. Mt. 19, 29; Rom. 2, 7; John 3, 15 et seq.). St. Paul speaks of the eternal bliss under the picture of "an incorruptible crown" (1 Cor. 9, 25). St. Peter calls it "the incorruptible crown of glory" (1 Peter 5, 4).

St. Augustine bases his proof of the eternal duration of heaven on the concept of perfect bliss: "How can one speak of true bliss, when confidence in its eternal duration is lacking?" (De civ. Dei XII 13, 1; cf. X 30; XI 13). The will of the blessed is strengthened by their intimate unification with God in love, in such a fashion that a separation by sin from God is morally impossible (moral impeccability).

b) Inequality of Reward

The degree of perfection of the beatific vision granted to the just is proportioned to each one's merits. (*De fide.*)

The Decretum pro Graecis of the Union Council of Florence (1439) declared: The souls of the perfectly just "clearly behold the Triune and One God as He is, but corresponding to the difference of their merits, the one more perfectly than the other." D 693. The Council of Trent defined that the justified person merits an increase of the heavenly glory by good works. D 842.

Opposed to the teaching of the Church is the teaching of Jovinian, who, influenced by the Stoics, taught that all virtues are of equal grade; opposed to it also is Luther's doctrine of the external imputation of Christ's justice. Both give rise to equality in the beatific vision.

Christ promised: "He (the Son of Man) will render to every one according to his works" (Mt. 16, 27). St. Paul teaches: "And every man shall receive his own reward, according to his own labour" (1 Cor. 3, 8). "He who soweth sparingly shall also reap sparingly: and he that soweth in blessings shall also reap blessings" (2 Cor. 9, 6). Cf. 1 Cor. 15, 41 et seq.

The Fathers are fond of appealing to the words of Jesus concerning the many mansions in the Father's House (John 14, 2). Tertullian remarks: "Why are there many mansions in the Father's house, if not on account of the difference of the merits?" (Scorp. 6). St. Augustine sees in the one penny which all the workers in the vineyard uniformly receive for varying durations of work (Mt. 20, 1–16), an indication of eternal life, which is for all similarly of eternal duration; in the many mansions in the house of the Father (John 14, 2) he sees a symbol of the various grades of remuneration in the one eternal life. To the objection that inequality gives rise to envy, he answers: "There will be no envy on account of the unequal glory, since the unity of love will reign in all" (In Ioan. tr. 67, 2). Cf. St. Jerome, Adv. Iovin. II 18–34. S. th. I 12, 6.

§ 4. Hell

1. The Reality of Hell

The souls of those who die in the condition of personal grievous sin enter Hell. (*De fide.*)

Hell is a place or state of eternal punishment inhabited by those rejected by God.

The reality of hell is contested by those sects which teach the total annihilation of the godless after death or after the General Judgment, and also by all who deny personal immortality (materialism).

The Athanasian Creed declares: "But those who have done evil will go into eternal fire." D 40. Benedict XII declared in the Dogmatic Constitution "Benedictus Deus": "According to God's general ordinance, the souls of those who die in a personal grievous sin descend immediately into hell, where they will be tormented by the pains of hell." D 531. Cf. D 429, 464, 693, 835, 840.

It is only in the Later Books that the Old Testament provides a clear assertion regarding the eternal punishment of the godless. According to Dn. 12, 2, they will rise again "unto reproach, to see it always." According to Judith 16, 20 et seq., the Lord the Almighty will take revenge on the enemies of Israel and will persecute them on the Day of Judgment. "For He will give fire, and worms into their flesh, that they may burn, and may feel forever (that they cry with pain)." Cf. Is. 66, 24. According to Wisdom 4, 19, the godless shall "be a reproach among the dead forever"; "They shall be in sorrow and their memory shall perish." Cf. 3, 10; 6, 5 et seq. Jesus threatens sinners with the punishment of hell. He calls it Gehenna (Mt. 5, 29 et seq.; 10, 28; 23, 15. 33; Mk. 9, 43. 45. 47 originally=valley of Hinnom), Hell of the fire (Mt. 5, 22; 18, 9), Hell where the worm does not die and the fire is not extinguished (Mk. 9, 46 et seq.), everlasting fire (Mt. 25, 41), unquenchable fire (Mt. 3, 12; Mk. 9, 42), furnace of fire (Mt. 13, 42. 50), everlasting pain (Mt. 25, 46). There will be darkness there (Mt. 8, 12; 22, 13; 25, 30), wailing and gnashing of teeth (Mt. 13, 42. 50; 24, 51; Luke 13, 28). St. Paul attests "They (who do not know God and do not obey the Gospel) shall suffer eternal punishment in destruction, from the face of the Lord and from the glory of His power" (2 Thess. 1, 9). Cf. Rom. 2, 6-9; Hebr. 10. 26-31. According to Apoc. 21, 8, the godless "shall have their portion in the pool burning with fire and brimstone"; there "they shall be tormented day and night for ever and ever" (20, 10). Cf. 2 Peter 2, 6; Jud. 7.

The Fathers unanimously attest the reality of hell. According to St. Ignatius of Antioch, the person who "corrupts the faith of God, for which Jesus Christ was crucified, by evil teaching, will go into the unquenchable fire; and so will the person who listens to him" (Eph. 16, 2). St. Justin bases the punishment of hell on the idea of the Divine justice, which does not allow those who transgress the law to escape free (Apol. II 9). Cf. Apol. I 8, 4; 21, 6; 28. Martyrium Polycarpi 2, 3; 11, 2. St. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. IV 28, 2.

2. Nature of the Punishment of Hell

Scholasticism distinguishes a double element in the punishment of hell: the poena damni (pain of loss) and the poena sensus (pain of sense). The former corresponds to the aversion from God inherent in grievous sin, the latter the conversion to the creature.

The poena damni, which is the essence of the punishment of hell, consists in exclusion from the Beatific Vision. Cf. Mt. 25, 41: "Depart from me you cursed!" Mt. 25, 12: "I know you not!" 1 Cor. 6, 9: "Know you not that the unjust shall not possess the kingdom of God?" Luke 13, 27; 14, 24; Apoc. 22, 15. St. Augustine, Enchir. 112.

Poena Sensus consists in the suffering which is caused by outside material things (it is also called the positive punishment of hell). The Holy Scriptures speak often of the fire of hell, to which the damned are consigned; they describe hell as a place where there is wailing and gnashing of teeth—a picture of sorrow and of despair.

The fire of hell was conceived by individual Fathers such as Origen and St. Gregory of Nyssa, and by later Theologians, like Ambrosius Catharinus, J. A. Mohler and H. Klee, in a metaphorical sense as a symbol for purely spiritual pains, especially for the torments of the gnawing of conscience. This opinion has not been formally condemned by the Church. The majority of the Fathers, the Schoolmen and the majority of modern theologians believe it to be a physical fire, but stress the difference between this fire and ordinary fire. St. Thomas, following the precedent of St. Augustine and St. Gregoy the Great, explains the effect of physical fire on a purely spiritual essence as a binding of the spirits to material fire, wich acts as an instrument of the Divine penal justice. Through it the spirits are made subject to matter and hindered in their free movement. Suppl. 70, 3. For an explanation of the reply of the S. Penitentiary of 30-4-1890 regarding the question of hell-fire (Cavellera 1466) cf. H. Lange. Schol 6 (1931) 89 et seq.

3. Properties of Hell

a) Eternity

The punishment of Hell lasts for all eternity. (*De fide.*)

The Caput Firmiter of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) declares: "Those (the rejected) will receive a perpetual punishment with the devil." D 429. Cf. D 40, 835, 840. A Synod at Constantinople (543) rejected the Apocatastasis doctrine of Origen. D 211.

While Origen denied the eternity of hell-punishment altogether, H. Schell (1906) limited it to those who sin "with raised hand," that is, from the disposition of hatred for God, and who persist in this disposition in the other world.

Holy Writ frequently emphasises the eternal duration of hell-punishment by speaking of it as an "eternal reproach" (Dn. 12, 2: cf. Wis. 4, 19); an "eternal fire" (Judith 16, 21; Mt. 18, 8; 25, 41; Judith 7), an "everlasting punishment" (Mt. 25, 46), an "eternal punishment in destruction" (2 Thess. 1, 9). That the word "eternal" is not to be understood in the sense of a duration which is indeed long, but limited is proved by parallel expressions like "unquenchable fire" (Mt. 3, 12; Mk. 9, 43), or Hell, "where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not extinguished" (Mk. 9, 45 et seq.), as well as by the contrast of "everlasting punishment"—"Life everlasting" in Mt. 25, 46. According to Apoc. 14 (19, 3), "the smoke of their torments (of the damned) shall ascend up for ever and ever," that is, without end. Cf. Apoc. 20, 10.

The "restitution of all things" announced in Acts 3, 21, does not refer to the lot of the damned, but to the renewal of the world which is to take place on the coming-again of Christ.

The Fathers before Origen unanimously affirm the eternal duration of the

punishment of hell. Cf. St. Ignatius, Eph. 16, 2 ; St. Justin, Apol. 1 28. 1. Martyrium Polycarpi 2, 3 ; 2 : St. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. IV 28, 2 ; Tertullian, De poenit. 12. Origen's denial proceeded from the Platonic doctrinal opinion that the purpose of all punishment is the improvement of the delinquent. Origen was followed by St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. Didymus of Alexandria and Evagrius Ponticus. St. Augustine defends the endless duration of hell-punishment against the Origenists and against "the merciful ones" (St. Ambrose), who, in view of the Divine mercy, taught the restoration of Christians who died in mortal sin. Cf. De civ. Dei XXI 23 ; Ad Orosium 6, 7 ; Enchir. 112.

On the ground of the teaching of Revelation it is to be inferred, that the will of the damned is immovably hardened in evil and is, therefore, inaccessible to any true repentance. The reason is that God refuses all further grace to the damned. Cf. S. th. 1 II 85, 2 ad 3 ; Suppl. 98, 2. 5. 6.

b) Inequality of Punishment

The punishment of the damned is proportioned to each one's guilt. (*Sent. communis.*)

The Union Councils of Lyons and of Florence declared that the souls of the damned are punished with unequal punishments (poenis tamen disparibus puniendas). D 464, 693. This is probably intended to assert not merely a specific difference in the punishment of original sin (poena damni) and of personal sins (poena damni and poena sensus), but also a difference in the degree of punishment for personal sins.

Jesus threatens the inhabitants of Corazain and Bethsaida, on account of their slowness to repent, with a stricter judgment than the dwellers in Tyre and Sidon (Mt. 11, 22). The Scribes are to be subject to a particularly strict judgment (Luke 20, 47).

St. Augustine teaches : "In their wretchedness the lot of some of the damned will be more tolerable than that of others" (Enchir. 111). Justice demands that the punishment be commensurate with the guilt.

§ 5. Purgatory

1. Reality of Purgatory

a) Dogma

The souls of the just which, in the moment of death, are burdened with venial sins or temporal punishment due to sins, enter Purgatory. (*De fide.*)

The cleansing fire (purgatorium) is a place and state of temporal penal purification.

The reality of purgatory was denied by the Cathari, the Waldenses, the Reformers and by some of the schismatic Greeks. On Luther's teaching, cf. the Schmalcaldic Article, Pars. II. Art. II, Sec. 12-15 ; on Calvin's teaching,

Instit. III 5, 6–10; on the teaching of the Greek Orthodox Church the Confessio Orthodoxa of Petrus Mogilas, P.I, q. 64-66 (revised by Meletios Syrigos), and the Confessio of Dositheos, Decr. 18.

Against the schismatic Greeks whose objection was chiefly directed against a special place of purification, the Union Councils of Lyons and of Florence uphold the purifying fire and the expiatory character of the penal sufferings: "The souls of those who depart this life with true repentance and in the love of God, before they have rendered satisfaction for their trespasses and negligences by the worthy fruits of penance, are purified after death with the punishments of purification." D 464, 693. Cf. D 456, 570 s. Against the Reformers, who asserted that the doctrine of the cleansing fire is contrary to Holy Writ (cf. D 777), and also rejected it from the standpoint of their doctrine of justification, the Council of Trent laid down the reality of the cleansing fire and the value of the suffrages performed for the poor souls: purgatorium esse animasque ibi detentas fidelium suffragiis . . . iuvari. D 983. Cf. D 840, 998.

b) Scriptural proof

Holy Writ teaches the existence of the cleansing fire indirectly, by admitting the possibility of a purification in the other world. According to 2 Mach. 12, 42–46, the Jews prayed for their fallen on whom had been found donaries of the idols, that their sins might be forgiven them. Then they sent twelve thousand drachms of silver to Jerusalem for sacrifice to be offered in expiation. Therefore they were convinced that they could help the dead by prayer and sacrifice to be freed from their sins. The sacred writer approves this course: "Because he (Judas) considered that they who had fallen asleep with godliness had great grace laid up for them. It is therefore a holy and wholesome thought to pray for the dead, that they may be loosed from sins."

The Words of the Lord in Mt. 12, 32: "And whosoever shall speak a word against the Son of man, it shall be forgiven him; but he that shall speak against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world nor in the world to come," leaves open the possibility that sins are forgiven not only in this world but in the world to come. St. Gregory the Great comments: "In this sentence it is given to understand that many sins can be remitted in this world, but also many in the world to come" (Dial. IV 39). Cf. St. Augustine, De civ. Dei XXI 24, 2. D 456.

In I Cor. 3, 12 St. Paul asserts: The work of the Christian teacher of faith who continues to build on the foundation, which is Christ, but in doing so uses wood, hay and straw, that is, performs bad work, will not stand when it is tested in the fire on the last day. V. 15: "If any man's work burn, he shall suffer loss: yet he himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire," that is, in the manner of a man who, in the catastrophe of a conflagration, loses everything and barely saves his life. The Apostle is speaking of a transient punishment of the Day of the General Judgment, probably consisting of severe tribulations after which the final salvation will take place. The Latin Fathers take the passage to mean a transient purification punishment in the other world. They interpret the words "as by fire" all too literally in the sense of a physical fire. Cf. St. Augustine, Enarr, in Ps. 37, 3; Caesarius of Arles, Sermo 179.

The words of Mt. 5, 26 : "Amen, I say to thee, thou shalt not go out from thence (from the prison) till thou repay the last farthing," threaten, in the form of a Parable, the person who does not fulfil the commandment of Christian brotherly love, with just punishment by the Divine Judge. Through further interpretation of the Parable, a time-limited condition of punishment in the other world began to be seen expressed in the time-limited punishment of the prison. Tertullian understands by the prison the underworld, and by "the last farthing" the petty transgressions which must be expiated there by the postponement of the resurrection (to the millennial kingdom). (De anima 58.) Cf. St. Cyprian, Ep. 55, 20.

c) Proof from Tradition

The main proof for the existence of the cleansing fire lies in the testimony of the Fathers. The Latin Fathers especially employ the scriptural passages cited frequently as proofs for a transient purification-punishment and a forgiveness of sins in the other world. St. Cyprian teaches that penitents who die before the reception of the reconciliation must perform the remainder of any atonement demanded in the other world, while martyrdom counts as full atonement: "To be tormented in long pains and to be cleansed and purified from one's sins by continuous fire, is a different thing from expiating one's sins all at once by the suffering (of martyrdom)" (Ep. 55, 20). St. Augustine distinguishes between temporal punishments which must be expiated in this life, and those which must be expiated after death: "Some suffer temporal punishments only in this life, others only after death, still others both in life and after death, but always before this most strict and most final court" (De civ. Dei XXI 13). He frequently refers to an improving and cleansing fire (ignis emendatoriuss ignis purgatorius; cf. Enarr. in Ps. 37, 3: Enchir. 69). According to his teaching, suffrages benefit those who are born again in Christ, and have not lived such good lives that they can dispense with such help after death, but not such bad lives that such help is no longer of any avail to them, that is to say, to an intermediate group between the blessed and the damned (Enchir. 110; De civ. Dei XXI 24, 2). Ancient Christian grave inscriptions beseech peace and quickening for the dead.

Speculatively, the existence of the cleansing fire can be derived from the concept of the sanctity and justice of God. The former demands that only completely pure souls be assumed into Heaven (Apoc. 21, 27); the latter demands that the punishments of sins still present be effected, but, on the other hand, forbids that souls that are united in love with God should be cast into hell. Therefore, an intermediate state is to be assumed, whose purpose is final purification and which for this reason is of limited duration. Cf. St. Thomas, Sent. IV d. 21 q. 1 a. 1 qc. 1; S.c.G IV 91.

2. The Nature of the Punishment of the Cleansing Fire

On the analogy of the punishment of hell a distinction is made between poena damni and the poena sensus.

Poena damni consists in the temporary exclusion from the beatific vision of God. On the ground of the special judgment which has gone before, it is, however, associated with the certainty of the final beatification (D 778). The poor souls are conscious that they are children and friends of God and long for the most intimate unification with Him. Thus the temporary separation is all the more painful to them.

To the poena damni is added, according to the general teaching of the theologians,

a poena sensus. The Latin Fathers, the Schoolmen, and many theologians of modern times, in view of 1 Cor. 3, 15, assume a physical fire. However, the biblical foundation for this is inadequate. Out of consideration for the separated Greeks, who reject the notion of a purifying fire, the official declarations of the Councils speak only of purifying punishments (poena purgatoriae), not of purifying fire. D 464, 693. Cf. S. Thomas, Sent. IV d. 21 2. 1 a. 1 qc. 3.

3. Object of the Purification

The remission of the venial sins which are not yet remitted, occurs, according to the teaching of St. Thomas (De male, 7, 11), as it does in this life, by an act of contrition deriving from charity and performed with the help of grace. This act of contrition, which is presumably awakened immediately after entry into the purifying fire, does not, however, effect the abrogation or the diminution of the punishment for sins, since in the other world there is no longer any possibility of merit.

The temporal punishments for sins are atoned for in the purifying fire by the so-called suffering of atonement (satispassio), that is, by the willing bearing of the expiatory punishments imposed by God.

4. Duration of the Purifying Fire

The purifying fire will not continue after the General Judgment. (*Sent. Communis.*)

According to the judgment of the Judge of the World (Mt. 25, 34. 41), there will be only two states, Heaven and hell. St. Augustine says: "Let purification punishments be counted on only before that last and terrible judgment" (De civ. Dei XXI 16; XXI 13). As to the length of the purification process for the individual souls, nothing can be said in terms of years. Cf. D 1143.

For the individual souls the purifying fire endures until they are free from all guilt and punishment. Immediately on the conclusion of the purification they will be assumed into the bliss of Heaven. D 530, 693

CHAPTER 2

Eschatology of the Whole of Mankind

§ 6. The Second Coming of Christ

1. Reality of the Second Coming

At the end of the world Christ will come again in glory to pronounce judgment. (*De fide.*)

The Apostles' Creed confesses: "From thence He shall come to judge the living and the dead." The other Creeds agree with this. The Nicaeno-Constantinople Creed adds: "in glory." D 86. Cf. D 40, 54, 287, 429.

Jesus repeatedly clearly foretold His second coming (parousia) at the end of the world. Mt. 16, 27 (Mk. 8, 38; Luke 9, 26): "The Son of Man shall

come in the glory of His Father with His angels; and then will render to every man according to his works." Mt. 24, 30 (Mk. 13, 26; Luke 21, 27): "And then shall appear the sign of the Son of Man in Heaven. And then shall all tribes of the earth mourn: and they shall see the Son of Man coming in the clouds of Heaven with much power and majesty." According to the interpretation of the Fathers, the sign of the Son of Man is the Cross. The coming on the clouds of Heaven (cf. Dn. 7, 13) manifests His Divine might and majesty. Cf. Mt. 25, 31; 26, 64; Luke 17, 24. 26 ("the day of the Son of Man"); John 6, 39 et seq. passim ("the last day"); Acts 1, 11.

Most of the Epistles of the Apostles contain occasional indications of the second coming of the Lord, and they associate with it the manifestation of His majesty and His conferring of reward in judgment. St. Paul writes to the community in Thessalonica, which held the parousia to be immediately imminent, and which was exercised about the lot of those previously deceased: "For this we say unto you in the word of the Lord, that we who are alive, who remain unto the coming of the Lord, shall not prevent them who have slept. For the Lord Himself shall come down from Heaven with commandment and with the voice of an archangel and with the trumpet of God: and the dead who are in Christ shall rise first. Then we who are alive, who are left, shall be taken up together with them in the clouds to meet Christ, into the air: and so shall we be always with the Lord" (1 Thess. 4, 15–17). As the Apostle goes on immediately to teach the uncertainty of the time of the Second Coming (5, 1–2), he assumes as an actuality what is clearly purely hypothetical, putting himself as it were at the point of view of his readers. Cf. D 2181. The purpose of the Second Coming is the re-awakening of the dead and the granting of reward to the Just (2 Thess. 1, 8). Thus the just must be found "without crime" in the day of the coming of the Lord (1 Cor. 1, 8; 1 Thess. 3, 13; 5, 23). Cf. 2 Peter 1, 16; 1 John 2, 28; James 5, 7 et seq.; Jud. 14.

The testimony of Tradition is unanimous. Didache 16, 8: "Then the world shall see the Lord come on the clouds of Heaven." Cf. 10, 6.

2. Signs of the Second Coming

a) The preaching of the Gospel to the whole world

Jesus asserts: "This Gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in the whole world, for a testimony to all nations; and then shall the consummation come" (Mt. 24, 14; cf. Mk. 13, 10). The words do not assert that the end will come immediately the Gospel has been preached in the whole world.

b) The conversion of the Jews

In Rom. 11, 25–32, St. Paul reveals "the mystery": When the fullness, that is the number ordained by God, of the Gentiles has entered the kingdom of God "all Israel" will be converted and saved. There is question of a morally universal conversion of the Jews.

The conversion of the Jewish people is frequently brought into a causal connection with the coming-again of Elias, but without sufficient foundation The Prophet Malachy announces: "Behold, I will send you Elias the Prophet

before the coming of the great and dreadful day of the Lord. And he shall turn the heart of the fathers to the children and the heart of the children to their fathers: lest I come, and strike the earth with anathema" (4, 5 et seq.). Jewry understood the passage as referring to a physical coming-again of Elias (cf. Ecclus, 48, 10) but erroneously placed it in the beginning of the Messianic era, and saw in Elias a precursor of the Messiah (John 1, 21; Mt. 16, 14). Jesus confirms the coming of Elias, but refers it to the appearance of John the Baptist, of whom the Angel had foretold that he would go before the Lord, that is, God in the spirit and in the power of Elias (Luke 1, 17): "He (John) is Elias, who (according to the prophecy of the Prophet) is to come" (Mt. 11, 14). "But I say to you that Elias is already come: and they knew him not, but have done unto him whatsoever they had a mind (Mt. 17, 12; Mk. 9, 13). Jesus does not speak explicitly of a future coming of Elias before the General Judgment, probably not even in Mt. 17, 11 ("Elias indeed shall come and restore all things"), in which the prophecy of Malachias is simply reproduced. Jesus sees it already fulfilled in the appearance of John the Baptist (Mt. 17, 12).

c) Falling away from the Faith

Jesus foretells that in the time before the end false prophets will appear who will lead many astray (Mt. 24, 4 et seq.). St. Paul asserts that before the coming-again of the Lord "the schism" must come, that is, the falling-away from the Christian Faith (2 Thess. 2, 3).

d) The appearance of Antichrist

The falling-away from the Faith stands in a causal connection with the appearance of Antichrist. 2 Thess. 2, 3: "unless there be a revolt first, and the man of sin be revealed, the son of perdition. Who opposeth and is lifted up above all that is called God or that is worshipped, so that he sitteth in the temple of God, shewing himself as if he were God." He appears in the power of Satan, works apparent miracles, in order to lead men astray into the falling-away from the truth and into unrighteousness, and to cast them into destruction (V. 9-11). The Lord Jesus will, on His arrival, kill him "with the spirit of His mouth," that is, destroy him with a power proceeding from Him (V. 8). The name Antichrist is first used by St. John (1 John 2, 18. 22; 4, 3; 2 John 2, 7); but he also designates the false teachers, who speak in the spirit of Antichrist, by this name. According to SS. Paul and John, Antichrist is to appear as a definite human personality who is the instrument of Satan. The Didache speaks of a "seducer of the world" (16, 4).

The historical interpretation associated with a particular time (Nero, Caligula, and others) as well as the historico-religious explanation, which seeks the origin of the idea of the Antichrist in Babylonian and Persian myths, are to be rejected. The oldest monograph on Antichrist is that composed by St. Hippolytus of Rome.

e) Severe tribulations

Jesus foretells wars, famines, earthquakes and bitter persecutions for His disciples: "Then shall they deliver you up to be afflicted and shall put you to death: and you shall be hated by all nations for My name's sake" (Mt. 24, 9). Tremendous catastrophes of nature are to accompany the coming-again of the Lord (Mt. 24, 29; cf. Is. 13, 10; 34, 4).

3. The Time of the Second Coming

The time of Jesus' second coming is unknown to men. (*Sent. certa.*)

Jesus left the moment of the parousia indeterminate. At the conclusion of the parousia speech He declared: "But of that day and hour no man knoweth, neither the angels in Heaven, nor the Son, but the Father" (Mk. 13, 32. In the parallel text Mt. 24, 36 the words "nor the Son" are missing in part of the text-proofs). On the Son's not-knowing see Christology Par. 23, 4 a. Shortly before His Ascension into Heaven, Jesus declared to His disciples: "It is not for you to know the times or moments, which the Father hath put in His own power" (Acts 1, 7).

That Jesus did not anticipate that the second coming would be soon is shown by many assertions of the parousia speech (Mt. 24, 14. 21. 31; Luke 21, 24; cf. Luke 17, 22; Mt. 12, 41), the Parables of the return, which suggest a long absence of the Lord (cf. Mt. 24, 48; 25, 5; 25, 19: "But after a long time the Lord of those servants came and reckoned with them"), and the Parables of the gradual growth of the kingdom of God on earth (Mt. 13, 24–33). Many passages which speak of the coming of Jesus must be understood not in a literal sense but rather as referring to the revelation of His power, whether it be for the punishment of His enemies (Mt. 10, 23: destruction of Jerusalem) or for the extension of the Kingdom of God on earth (Mt. 16, 28; Mk. 9, 1; Luke 9, 27) or for the reward of His faithful ones in the blessedness of Heaven (John 14, 3. 18. 28; 21, 22). The words of Mt. 24, 34: "Amen, I say to you that this generation shall not pass till all these things be done," refer, according to the context, to the omens of the parousia, among which already the judgment of punishment on Jerusalem is counted.

The Apostles also teach that the time of the parousia is unknown to us. St. Paul writes to the Thessalonians: "But of the times and moments, brethren, you need not, that we should write to you. For yourselves, know perfectly that the day of the Lord shall so come as a thief in the night" (1 Thess. 5, 1–2). In 2 Thess. 2, 1 et seq., the Apostle gives a warning of exaggerated anticipation of the parousia, by an indication of the omens which must precede it (2 Thess. 2, 1–3). St. Peter ascribes the delay of the parousia to the patience of God who wishes to give sinners time to repent. With God a thousand years are as a day. The day of the Lord will come like a thief (2 Peter 3, 8–10). Cf. Apoc. 3, 3; 16, 15.

In spite of the uncertainty of the time of the parousia, people in primitive Christian days counted very strongly on the probability of its prompt occurrence. Cf. Phil. 4, 5; Hebr. 10, 37; James 5, 8; 1 Peter 4, 7; 1 John 2, 18. A testimony of the ardent longing for the parousia is the Aramaic invocation marana tha = Our Lord, come! (1 Cor. 16, 22; Did. 10, 6). Cf. Apoc. 22, 20: "Come, Lord Jesus!"

§ 7. The Resurrection of the Dead

1. Reality of the Resurrection

All the dead will rise again on the last day with their bodies. (*De fide.*)

In the Apostles' Creed we profess: "I believe . . . in the resurrection of the

body." The Athanasian Creed stresses the generality of the resurrection: "On His coming all men with their bodies must arise." D 40.

Opponents of faith in the resurrection of the body before Christ were the Sadducees (Mt. 22, 23; Acts 23, 8) and certain heathens (Acts 17, 32); after the coming of Christ in the Early Church some Christians of the Apostolic era (1 Cor. 15; 2 Tim 2, 17 et seq.), the Gnostics and the Manichaeans; in the Middle Ages the Cathari; and in modern times Materialists and Rationalists.

In the Old Testament a gradual development of the belief in the resurrection can be noted. The Prophets Osee and Ezechiel use the symbol of the resurrection of the body, in order to express the liberation of Israel from sin or from banishment (Os. 6, 3; 13, 14; Ez. 37, 1–14). Isaias refers to the faith in the individual resurrection held by the pious of Israel (26, 19). Daniel foretells also the resurrection of godless ones, but he has in mind only the people of Israel: "And many of those that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake: some unto life everlasting, and others unto reproach, to see it always" (12, 2). The Second Book of the Machabees teaches the doctrine of the General Resurrection (7, 9. 11. 14. 23. 29; 12, 43 et seq.; 14, 46).

The evidence for belief in the resurrection which is found in Job 19, 25–27 is weakened by the fact that the passage in the Vulgate has been changed. According to the original text, Job expresses the expectation that God will finally appear as an advocate for him as long as he lives on earth, to prove his innocence (N. Peters, P. Heinisch).

Jesus rejects as an error the Sadducees' denial of the resurrection: "You err not knowing the Scriptures nor the power of God. For in the resurrection they shall neither marry nor be married, but shall be as the angels of God in Heaven" (Mt. 22, 29 et seq.). He teaches not only the resurrection of the just (Luke 14, 14) but also the resurrection of the wicked; for these will be cast into hell with their bodies (Mt. 5, 29 et seq.; 10, 28; 18, 8 et seq.). "And they that have done good things shall come forth unto the resurrection of life (from the graves); but they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of judgment" (John 5, 29). To those who believe in Him and who eat His flesh and drink His blood, Jesus promises the resurrection on the last day (John 6, 39 et seq.; 44, 55). He says of Himself: "I am the Resurrection and the Life" (John 11, 25).

The Apostles preach the General Resurrection of the dead in conjunction with the Resurrection of Christ. Cf. Acts 4, 1 et seq.; 17, 18. 32; 24, 15. 21; 26, 23. St. Paul inveighs against adherents of the Community of Corinth, who denied the resurrection, and derives the resurrection of Christians from the Resurrection of Christ. 1 Cor. 15, 20: "But now Christ is risen from the dead, the first fruits of them that sleep. 21. For by man came death: and by a man the resurrection of the dead. 22. And as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all shall be made alive. 23. But every one in his own order: the first fruits, Christ: then they that are of Christ, who have believed in His coming." Death, as the last enemy, will be annihilated by Christ (V. 26; 54 et seq.). In the victory of Christ over death the generality of the resurrection is included. Cf. Rom. 8, 11; 2 Cor. 4, 14; Phil. 3, 21; 1 Thess. 4, 14. 16; Hebr. 6, 1 et seq.; Apoc. 20, 12 et seq.

The Fathers of the first centuries were urged by the manifold contradictions of Jews, pagans, and Gnostics to a very detailed treatment of the dogma of the resurrection. St. Clement of Rome bases it by analogy on nature, the tale of the wonder bird, the Phœnix, and on the writers of the Old Testament (Cor. 24–26). In defence of the Christian faith in the resurrection, St. Justin, Athenagoras of Athens, Tertullian, Origen, Methodius, St. Gregory of Nyssa, wrote their own treatises. Again, most of the early Christian apologists occupied themselves minutely with the teaching concerning the resurrection. Cf. St. Augustine, Enchir. 84–93 ; De civ. Dei XXII 4 et seq.

Reason alone can adduce no compelling proof in favour of the resurrection, since it is supernatural, and therefore can only be effected by a miraculous intervention of God. Reason alone, however, can demonstrate its congruity: a) from the natural unity of body and soul, on the ground of which the soul is adapted to the body; b) from the idea of the just reward, which permits the expectation that the body as the instrument of the soul receives a share in the reward, or in the punishment.

Reason enlightened by Faith further establishes the congruity of the resurrection: a) On the perfection of the Redemption of Christ, b) On the uniformity of the members of the Mystical Body with Christ, the Head, c) On the sanctification of the human body by means of grace, especially by the Holy Eucharist (cf. St. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. IV 18, 5 ; V 2, 3) Suppl. 75, 1–3 S.c.G. IV 79.

2. The Body before and after the Resurrection

The dead will rise again with the same bodies as they had on earth. (*De fide.*)

a) The Caput Firmiter of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) declares: "They will arise with their bodies which they have now." D 429. Cf. D 16, 40, 287, 347, 427, 464, 531.

The material identity of the body after the resurrection with the body which was on earth was disputed by Origen.

Holy Writ attests the identity implicitly in the words "resurrection" or "re-awakening" for such only exists when the same body that dies and decomposes, revives. It is expressly stated in 2 Mach. 7, 11 : "I hope to receive these (tongue and hands) again from Him (God)." 1 Cor. 15, 53 : "For this corruptible must put on incorruption : and this mortal must put on immortality."

The Fathers of the time of Origen teach unanimously that "This flesh will rise again and be judged" and that "we shall receive our reward in this flesh" (Ps.-Clement, 2 Cor. 9, 1–5). St. Justin attests : "We expect to have again our dead and the bodies interred in the earth, by maintaining that with God nothing is impossible" (Apol. 1, 18). The grounds of congruity adduced by the Fathers for the fact of the resurrection presuppose the identity of body before and after the resurrection. This identity is defended against Origen by Methodius, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. Epiphanius (Haer. 64) and St. Jerome (Adv. Ioannem Hierosolymitanum).

b) The identity must not be conceived in such a fashion that all material parts which at any time, or at a definite moment belonged to the earthly body, will be present in the body at the resurrection. As the human body always remains

the same in spite of the constant changing of its constituent matter, it suffices for the preservation of the identity, if a relatively small share of the amount of matter in the earthly body is contained in the body after the resurrection. Thus the fact that the same parts of matter may successively have belonged to several bodies does not raise any difficulty against the Christian belief in the resurrection. Cf. S.c.G. IV 81.

According to Durandus de S. Porciano († 1334) and John of Naples († after 1336), the identity of the soul alone is sufficient for the identity of the resurrection body. Starting from Aristotle's theory of the body, which was adopted by the Schoolmen, according to which the materia prima is pure potency, receiving actuality and individuality through the substantial form and thereby becoming a definite body, they teach that the spiritual soul, as the only essential form of the human body, moulds every and any matter to its body. Apart from the fact that the assumption that the human soul is the only form of the body is unsafe—the Scotistic school assumes a special forma corporeitatis distinct from the soul—this explanation leads to the disquieting possibility that the skeleton of a dead person might still be on earth while he is already in Heaven with the resurrected body. In modern Theology Durandus' view was expounded by L. Billot, but the vast majority of Theologians, with the Fathers, hold firmly to the identity of the matter.

According to the general teaching, the body will rise again in complete integrity, free from distortions, mal-formations and defects. St. Thomas teaches: "Man will rise again in the greatest possible natural perfection," therefore in the state of mature age (Suppl. 81, 1). The integrity of the body after its resurrection also demands the organs of vegetative and sensitive life, including the differences between the sexes (as against the view of Origen; D 207). However, the vegetative functions will no longer take place. Mt. 22, 30: "They shall be as the angels of God in Heaven."

3. Composition of the Body after Its Resurrection

a) The bodies of the just will be re-modelled and transfigured to the pattern of the risen Christ. (*Sent. certa.*)

St. Paul teaches: "Who (Jesus Christ) will reform the body of our lowness, made like to the body of His glory, according to the operation whereby also He is able to subdue all things unto Himself" (Phil. 3, 21). "It is sown in corruption: it shall rise in incorruption. It is sown in dishonour: it shall rise in glory. It is sown in weakness; it shall rise in power. It is sown a natural body; it shall rise a spiritual body" (1 Cor. 15, 42–44). Cf. 1 Cor. 15, 53.

Adopting the teaching of the Apostles, the Schoolmen distinguish four properties or gifts (dotes) of the resurrection bodies of the just:

α) Incapability of suffering (impassibilitas), that is, inaccessibility to physical evils of all kinds, such as sorrow, sickness, death. It may be more closely defined as the impossibility to suffer and to die (non posse pati, mori). Apoc. 21, 4: "And God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes; and death shall be no more. Nor mourning, nor crying, nor sorrow shall be any more: for the former things are passed away." Cf. 7, 16; Luke 20, 36: "Neither can they die any more." The intrinsic reason for impassibility lies in the perfect subjection of the body to the soul. Suppl. 82, 1.

β) Subtility (subtilitas), that is, a spiritualised nature, which, however, is not to be conceived as a transformation of the body into a spiritual essence or as a refinement of the matter into an ethereal body (cf. Luke 24, 39). The archetype of the spiritualised body is the risen body of Christ, which emerged from the sealed tomb and penetrated closed doors (John 20, 19. 26). The intrinsic reason of the spiritualisation of the body lies in the complete dominion of the body by the transfigured soul in so far as it is the essential form of the body. Suppl. 83, 1.

γ) Agility (agilitas), that is, the capability of the body to obey the soul with the greatest ease and speed of movement. It forms a contrast to the heaviness of the earthly body, which is conditioned by the Law of Gravity. This agility was manifested by the risen Body of Christ, which was suddenly present in the midst of His Apostles, and which disappeared just as quickly (John 20, 19. 26; Luke 24, 31). The intrinsic reason of agility lies in the perfect dominion over the body of the transfigured soul, to the extent that it moves the body. Suppl. 84, 1.

δ) Clarity (claritas), that is, being free from everything deformed and being filled with beauty and radiance. Jesus assures us: "The just shall shine as the sun in the kingdom of their Father" (Mt. 13, 43). Cf. Dn. 12, 3. The archetype of the transfiguration is the Transfiguration of Jesus on Tabor (Mt. 17, 2), and after the Resurrection (cf. Acts 9, 3). The intrinsic reason for the transfiguration lies in the overflowing of the beauty of the transfigured soul on to the body. The grade of the transfiguration of the body, according to 1 Cor. 15: 41 et seq., will vary according to the degree of clarity of the soul, which is in proportion to the measure of the merits. Suppl. 85, 1.

b) The bodies of the godless will rise again in incorruption and immortality, but they will not be transfigured. (*Sent. certa.*)

Incorruptibility and immortality form an indispensable pre-condition for the eternal punishment of the body in hell (Mt. 18, 8 et seq.). Immortality (*ἀφθαρσία*, cf. 1 Cor. 15, 52 et seq.), excludes the change of matter and functions associated with change of matter, but not passibility. Suppl. 86, 1–3.

§ 8. The General Judgment

1. Reality of General Judgment

Christ, on His second coming, will judge all men. (*De fide.*)

Almost all the Creeds proclaim, with the Apostles' Creed, that Christ will come again at the end of the world "to judge the living and the dead," that is, those who at His coming are still alive, and those who have died before His coming, who will be re-awakened (according to another interpretation: the just and the sinners).

The dogma is disputed by those who deny personal immortality and the resurrection.

The teaching of the Old Testament concerning the coming judgment shows a gradual development. The general judgment of the just and the unjust at

the end of the world is not to be found in the Old Testament with any precision before the composition of the Book of Wisdom (4, 20–5, 24).

The Prophets frequently warn of the punishment from God in this world, which they call the "day of Jahweh." On this day God will judge the Gentiles, and liberate the people of Israel from the hands of their enemies. Cf. Joel 3, 1 et seq. But not merely the heathens, but also the godless in Israel will be judged and punished. Cf. Am. 5, 18–20. The godless and the just will be separated from each other. Cf. Ps. 1, 5; Prov. 2, 21 et seq.; Is. 66, 15 et seq.

Jesus frequently refers to the "Day of judgment" or to the "Judgment." Cf. Mt. 7, 22 et seq.; 11, 22; 24; 12, 36 et seq.; 41 et seq. He Himself as the "Son of Man" (=Messias) will execute the judgment: "For the Son of Man shall come in the glory of His Father with His angels: and then will He render to every man according to his works" (Mt. 16, 27). "For neither doth the Father judge any man: but hath given all judgment to the Son, that all may honour the Son, as they honour the Father. . . . And He hath given Him power to do judgment, because He is the Son of Man." John 5, 22 et seq., 27.

The Apostles teach the doctrine of Jesus. St. Peter attests that Christ is "appointed by God to be judge of the living and of the dead" (Acts 10, 42; cf. 1 Peter, 4, 5; 2 Tim. 4, 1).

In the speech of the Areopagus (Acts 17, 31), and in his Letters, St. Paul preaches that God through Jesus Christ will judge the world in justice. Cf. Rom. 2, 5–16, 2 Cor. 5, 10. As Christ will exercise the office of judge, he calls the day of judgment "the day of Jesus Christ" (Phil. 1, 6; 1 Cor. 1, 8; 5, 5). From the doctrine of the future judgment the Apostle draws practical inferences for the Christian life, by warning his readers to correct their fellowmen, and by using the judgment as a motive to exhort his readers to amend their lives (Rom. 14, 10–12; 1 Cor. 4, 5), and to persevere patiently through sufferings and persecutions (2 Thess. 1, 5–10). In Apoc. 20, 10–15 St. John describes the process of the judgment after the fashion of a rendering of account. The opening-up of the books, in which the works of each individual person are recorded, is of course merely a symbolical expression of a spiritual process. Cf. St. Augustine, De civ. Dei XX 14.

2. Completion of the General Judgment

Jesus gives a picturesque description of the General Judgment in the great portrait of the Judgment. Mt. 25, 31–46. "All nations" (that is, all mankind) "shall be gathered together before the Son of Man, sitting on the Judgment Seat. The good shall be finally separated from the bad, and immediately after the Judgment retribution shall follow: These '(the wicked)' shall go into everlasting punishment; but the just into life everlasting." (V. 46).

The General Judgment serves the glorification of God and of the God-Man Jesus Christ (2 Thess. 1, 10) by revealing the wisdom of God in the government of the world, His goodness and patience towards sinners and above all His rewarding justice. The glorification of the God-Man achieves its apogee in the exercise of the office of Judge of the World.

The Fathers unanimously attest the clear teaching of Holy Writ. According to St. Polycarp "he that denies the resurrection and the judgment is the first-born

of Satan" (Phil. 7, 1). The Letter to Barnabas (7, 2) and the Second Letter of St. Clement (1, 1) designate Christ as the Judge of the living and of the dead. Cf. St. Justin. Apol. I 8; St. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. I 10, 1. St. Augustine treats in detail of the final judgment, citing various testimonies of the Old and New Testaments, De Civ. Dei XX.

While in the particular judgment the human being is judged as an individual person, in the general judgment he will be judged as a member of the human society, before the whole of humanity. The punishment or reward will be completed by its extension to the re-awakened bodies. Cf. Suppl. 88, 1.

In apparent contradiction of many authors, who expressly attest that Christ the Son of Man will complete the General Judgment, other passages maintain that God will judge the world, for example, Rom. 2, 6. 16; 3, 6; 14, 10. As Christ in His human capacity exercises the office of judge in the order and by the authority and power of God, it is God who judges the world through Christ, as St. Paul attests: "God will judge the hidden things of men through Jesus Christ." Cf. John 5, 30; Acts 17, 31.

The angels co-operate with Him as His servants and ambassadors of Christ (Mt. 13, 41 et seq., 49 et seq.: 24, 31). According to Mt. 19, 28 ("You shall also sit on twelve seats judging the twelve Tribes of Israel"), an immediate co-operation in the judgment is granted to the Apostles, and according to 1 Cor. 6, 2 ("Know you not that the saints shall judge this world?"), to all the just. In consequence of their intimate association with Christ they pronounce with Him the sentence of rejection on the godless by appropriating to themselves Christ's judgment.

"The object of the judgment will be the doings of man" (Mt. 16, 27; 12, 36: "Every idle word"), as well as the hidden things and the intentions of the heart (Rom. 2, 16; 1 Cor. 4, 5). The time and place of the General Judgment are unknown to us (Mk. 13, 32). The Valley of Josaphat, named by Joel (3, 2. 12) as the place of judgment, which has been identified with the Valley of Kidron since the time of Eusebius and St. Jerome, is to be symbolically understood ("Jahweh judges").

§ 9. The End of the World

The present world will be destroyed on the Last Day. (*Sent. certa.*)

Opposed to the teaching of the Church are the ancient Christian Sects (Gnostics, Manichaeans, Origenists), who assert an entire annihilation of the physical world; and the philosophical systems of antiquity (Stoics), who taught that the world will indeed be destroyed in an eternal cycle, but will emerge again in exactly the same form as it was previously.

In consonance with the teaching of the Old Testament (Ps. 101, 27; Is. 34, 4; 51, 6), Jesus foretells the destruction of the present world. In the speech of the Old Testament Apocalypse He foretells (cf. Is. 34, 4) great cosmic revolutions (Mt. 24, 29): "And immediately after the tribulation of those days, the sun shall be darkened and the moon shall not give her light and the stars shall fall from Heaven and the powers of Heaven shall be moved." Mt. 24, 25: "Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass." Mt. 28, 20: "Behold I am with you all days even to the consummation of the world."

St. Paul attests: "The fashion of this world passeth away" (1 Cor. 7, 31: cf. 15, 24). St. Peter foretells the destruction of the world by fire: "The day of the Lord shall come as a thief, in which the heavens shall pass away with great violence and the elements shall be melted with heat, and the earth and the works which are in it shall be (no longer) found" (Vulg.: burned up) (2 Peter, 3, 10). In the vision, St. John sees the destruction of the world: "From the face of the Judge of the World the earth and the heaven fled away; and there was no place found for them." (Apoc. 20, 11.)

In the Ancient Christian Tradition belief in the destruction of the present world is frequently attested. The author of the Barnabas Letter declares that after pronouncing judgment on the godless, the Son of God will "transform the sun, the moon and the stars" (15, 5). Tertullian speaks of a world-conflagration in which "the aged world and all its products will be consumed" (De spect. 30). St. Augustine stresses that the present world will not be entirely destroyed, but merely altered: "The form will pass away, but not the nature" (De civ. Dei XX 14).

As to the manner of the destruction of the world nothing definite can be said either from the standpoint of natural science or from the standpoint of Revelation. The idea of destruction by fire (2 Peter 3; 7, 10, 12), which is often found outside the framework of biblical Revelation, can be taken to be simply a current mode of expression in which the Revelation of the destruction of the world is clothed.

2. Restoration of the World

The present world will be restored on the Last Day. (*Sent. certa.*)

The Prophet Isaias foretells a new heaven and a new earth: "For behold I create new heavens and a new earth" (65, 17; cf. 66, 22). He depicts the blessings of the new earth under the picture of world happiness (65, 17–25). Jesus speaks of the "regeneration," that is, of the new formation of the world: "I say to you who have followed me, in the regeneration when the Son of Man shall sit on the seat of His majesty, you shall also sit on twelve seats judging the twelve tribes of Israel" (Mt. 19, 28).

St. Paul teaches that the whole of Creation came under the curse of sin and awaits redemption, and that it like mankind will be liberated from the bondage of the past and translated into the freedom of the glory of the children of God (Rom. 8, 18–25).

St. Peter tells of "a new Heaven and a new earth" concurrent with the destruction of the world "in which justice dwelleth" (2 Peter 3, 13). Again the words, "the restitution of all things" (Acts 3, 21) refer to the renewal of the world.

St. John gives a picturesque description of the new heaven and the new earth, whose centre is the New Jerusalem, which descends from Heaven, and which is the Tabernacle of God among men. He who sits on the Throne (God) says: "Behold, I make all things new" (Apoc. 21, 1–8).

St. Augustine teaches that the properties of the future world will be just as suited to the immortal existence of the transfigured human body as were the properties of the corruptible existence to the mortal body. (De civ. Dei XX 16.)

St. Thomas infers the renewal of the world from the fact that the object of the world is to serve mankind. As the transfigured man no longer requires the service which the present world renders to him by the preservation of bodily life and by the promotion of the knowledge of God, it is not out of place to imagine that with the transfiguration of the human body the other bodies also will experience a transfiguration, corresponding to the state of the transfigured body. The transfigured eye of the blessed shall see the majesty of God in its operations in the transfigured physical world, in the Body of Christ, in the bodies of the Blessed and also in the other corporeal things. Suppl. 91, 1. Cf. 74, 1. The scope and the manner and mode of the destruction of the world cannot be more closely described in the light of Revelation. Suppl. 91, 3.

The end of the world and its renewal brings to a conclusion the work of Christ. As all enemies of the Kingdom of God are conquered, He surrenders the over-lordship to God the Father (1 Cor. 15, 24), without however divesting Himself of the lordship and royal power founded in the Hypostatic Union. With the end of the world there begins the perfected lordship of God which is the ultimate object of the whole Creation and the final meaning of all human history.

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FOREWORD BY EDITOR OF THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION

In the original German work, of which this is a translation, there is a very extensive and detailed bibliography. Most of the works named in it, naturally, are in German. Since German readers may easily refer to the original for such books it seems unnecessary to list them here. The only works listed, here, then, are in Latin, English, French, Italian, or Spanish. No attempt has been made to reproduce the very detailed bibliography of the original. It has seemed sufficient to draw up a list, culled from the original bibliography, containing those works which are of general import. The effort has been to draw up a reading list rather than a bibliography proper. In most cases works dealing with special questions or particular phases of Church History have not been listed. In a few cases the English editions of works have been listed in preference to the originals referred to in the German work.

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CORRIGENDA

P. 6 : para. 3, last line : " Hebr. II, 6 " should read " Hebr. 11, 6 " ; para. 4, last line : " D3012 " should read " D2312 ".

P. 26 : line 1 : " Acts I, 4, 8 " should read " Apoc. I, 4, 8 ".

P. 29 : para. 1, line 2 : " John 4, 8 " should read " 1 John, 4, 8 ".

P. 30 : para. 2, lines 5 and 7 : " Rom. II, 34 " and " Rom. II, 36 " should read " Rom. 11, 34 " and " Rom. 11, 36 " respectively.

P. 32 : para. 4, next to last line : " Dt. 32, 29 " should read " Dt. 32, 39 ".

P. 33 : para. 4, line 3 : " Jo. 17, 3 " should read " Jn. 17, 3 ".

P. 37 : para. 2, line 6 : " Jo. 8, 58 " should read " Jn. 8, 58 ".

P. 41 : para. 3, line 5 : " Ps. 138, 3 " should read " Ps. 138, 2 ".

P. 42 : para. 2, line 3 : " Mt. 11, 2 : 1 " should read " Mt. 11, 21 ".

P. 48 : para. 2, line 3 : " Ps. 10, 8 " should read " Ps. 10, 7 ".

P. 52 : para. 2, line 1 : " Bernhard " should read " Bernard ".

P. 54 : para. 4, line 4 : " Wis. 7, 22–8, 1 " should read " Wis. 7, 22–8 ".

P. 56 : para. 4, line 6 : " 15th century " should read " 5th century ".

P. 63 : para. 1, line 5 : " Apostles 16, 7 " should read " Acts 16, 7 ".

P. 73 : para. 3, line 2 : " Rom. II, 36 " should read " Rom. 11, 36 ".

P. 88 : line 2 : " Pro. 1, 4 " should read " Eccles. 1, 4 ".

P. 90 : para. 2, last line : " Pet. 5, 7 " should read " I Pet. 5, 7 ".

P. 97 : para. 2, line 5 : " Pro. 12, 7 " should read " Eccles. 12, 7 " ; para. 7, line 3 : " Azechial " should read " Ezechial ".

P. 112 : para. 4, last line : " Pet. 2, 19 " should read " 2 Pet. 2, 19 ".

P. 115 : para. 1, line 3 : " Gen. 22, II " should read " Gen. 22, 11 " ; para. 4, last line : " Jud." should read " Jude ".

P. 116 : para. 4, line 1 : " Jud." should read " Jude ".

P. 118 : para. 3, last line : " Jud." should read " Jude ".

P. 119 : para. 2, line 5 : " Jud." should read " Jude ".

P. 120 : para 2, line 6 : " Mt. 1, 20 " should read " Mt. 1, 18 ".

P. 121 : para. 4, last line : " Jud." should read " Jude " ; para. 5, line 6 : " John 3, 12 " should read " 1 John 3, 12 ".

P. 122 : para. 2, line 7 : " Mt. 17, 18 " should read " Mt. 17, 17 ".

P. 128 : para. 5, last line : " Mk. 9, 7 " should read " Mk. 9, 6 ".

P. 129 : line 2 : " Jo. 1, 34 " should read " Jn. 1, 34 ".

P. 134 : para. 5, line 12 : " Jn. 11, 18 " should read " Jn. 1, 18 ".

P. 169 : para. 3, line 5 : " Jn. 3, 5 " should read " 1 Jn. 3, 5 ".

P. 171 : para. 3, line 6 : " Cor. 12, 12 " should read " 1 Cor. 12, 12 ".

P. 173 : para. 4, line 8 : " rheology " should read " theology ".

P. 174 : thesis, and para. 4, line 1 : " sensual " should read " sensuous ".

P. 191 : para. 3, line 11 : " Jon " should read " Jonas ".

P. 211 : para. 2, line 3 : " Apc. 19, 16 " should read " Apoc. 19, 16 ".

P. 250 : last para., line 5 : " 1 Chr. 21, 8 " should read " 1 Par. 21, 8 ".

P. 253 : para. 2, last line : " Hom. 10, 8 " should read " Rom. 10, 8 ".

P. 254 : line 3 : " Luke 7, 27 " should read " Luke 7, 47 ".

P. 280 : line 4 : " ansferred " should read " transferred " ; para. 1, line 3 : " 1, 42 " should read " John 1, 42 ".

P. 307 : para. 1, line 5 : " 11, 40 " should read " Is. 11, 40 ".

P. 312 : para. 3, line 5 : " 29, 19 " should read " 28, 19 " ; para. 3, last line : " Tit. 3, 10 " should read " Tit. 2, 10 ".

P. 316 : para. 1, line 2 : " Ex. 8, 4 " should read " Ex. 8, 8 ".

P. 338 : para. 4 : " seven-fold " should read " threefold ".

P. 339 : last para. : " 5 Speculative Foundation " should read " Speculative Foundation ".

P. 353 : para. 4, line 1 : " Acts 22, 38 " should read " Acts 2, 38 ".

P. 419 : para. 1, line 3 : " 1 Chr. 21, 8 " should read " 1 Par. 21, 8 ".

P. 441 : line 6 : " poenae debitae " should read " poenae temporalis debitae ".

Corrigenda

P. 451 : para. 5, line 2 : " Tim. 1, 5, 22 " should read " 1 Tim 5, 21 ".

P. 452 : para. 5, line 3 : " D 3001," should read " D 2301 ".

P. 453 : para. 2, line 1 : " 2 Tim. 16 " should read " 2 Tim. 1, 6 ".

P. 454 : para. 6, line 3 : " D3001 " should read " D2301 ".

P. 459 : para. 4, line 3 : " Tim. 2, 11 " should read " 1 Tim. 4, 14 ".

P. 469 : para. 1, line 7 : " Pistoja " should read " Pistoia ".

P. 474 : para. 2, line 3 : " Heb. 5 " should read Heb. 11, 5 " ; para 3, line 2 : " Cor. 15, 21 " should read " 1 Cor. 15, 21 " ; line 4 : " Thess 4, 15 " should read " 1 Thess 4, 15 "

P. 480 : para. 1, last line : " Jud " should read " Jude ".

P. 481 : para. 4, line 3 : " Judith " should read " Jude. "

P. 485 : para. 1, line 2 : " De Male " should read " De Malo "

P. 486 : para. 1, last line : " Jud " should read " Jude "

P. 487 : para. 1, line 13 : " Mk. 9, 13 " should read " Mk. 9, 12 " ; para. 2, line 10 : " 2 John 2, 7 " should read " 2 John 1, 7 ".

P. 488 : para. 2, line 10 : " Mk. 9, 1 " should read " Mk. 9, 11 ".

P. 494 : last para., line 6 : " Mt. 24, 25 " should read " Mt. 24, 35 ".

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Exodus

Leviticus

NEW TESTAMENT

I Corinthians